Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 113 Part 1.djvu/836

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113 STAT. 812 PUBLIC LAW 106-65—OCT. 5, 1999 required by this section, including progress with respect to each of the matters required to be included in the report under subsection (b). (d) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. —For purposes of this section, the term "specified congressional committees" means the following: (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (2) The Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. SEC. 1604. REPORT ON AIR FORCE SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES. (a) STUDY OF SPACE LAUNCH RANGES AND REQUIREMENTS.— The Secretary of Defense shall, using the Defense Science Board of the Department of Defense, conduct a study— (1) to assess anticipated military, civil, and commercial space launch requirements; (2) to examine the technical shortcomings at the space launch ranges; (3) to evaluate current and future oversight and range safety arrangements at the space launch ranges; and (4) to estimate future funding requirements for space launch ranges capable of meeting both national security space launch needs and civil and commercial space launch needs. Deadline. (b) REPORT. —Not later than February 15, 2000, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing the results of the study. Subtitle B—Commercial Space Launch Services SEC. 1611. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-RUS- SIAN COOPERATION IN COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH SERVICES. It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States should demand full and complete cooperation from the Government of the Russian Federation on preventing the illegal transfer from Russia to Iran or any other country of any prohibited fissile material or ballistic missile equipment or any technology necessary for the acquisition or development by the recipient country of any nuclear weapon or ballistic missile; (2) the United States should take every appropriate measure necessary to encourage the Government of the Russian Federation to seek out and prevent the illegal transfer from Russia to Iran or any other country of any prohibited fissile material or ballistic missile equipment or any technology necessary for the acquisition or development by the recipient country of any nuclear weapon or ballistic missile; (3) the United States Government decision to increase the quantitative limitations applicable to commercial space launch services provided by Russian space launch providers, based upon a serious commitment by the Government of the Russian Federation to seek out and prevent the illegal transfer from