PUBLIC LAW 106-79 —OCT. 25, 1999 113 STAT. 1265 (7) Command, control, communications and operational security of NATO forces as a whole and United States forces separately during Operation Allied Force, including the ability of United States aircraft to operate with aircraft of other nations without degradation of capabilities or protection of United States forces. (8) The deplojment of United States forces and supplies to the theater of operations, including an assessment of airlift and sealift (to include a specific assessment of the deployment of Task Force Hawk during Operation Allied Force, to include detailed expleinations for the delay in initial deployment, the suitability of equipment deployed compared to other equipment in the United States inventory that was not deployed, and a critique of the training provided to operationEd personnel prior to and during the deplo5rment). (9) The use of electronic wetrfare assets, in particular an assessment of the adequacy of EA-6B aircraft in terms of inventory, capabilities, deficiencies, and ability to provide logistics support. (10) The effectiveness of reserve component forces including their use and performance in the theater of operations. (11) The contributions of United States (and with respect to Operation AlUed Force, NATO) intelligence and counterintelligence systems and personnel, including an assessment of the targeting selection and bomb damage assessment process. (c) The report should also contain: (1) An analysis of the transfer of operational assets from other United States Unified Commands to these operations' theater of operations and the impact on the readiness, warfighting capabihty and deterrence value of those commands. (2) An analysis of the implications of these operations as regards the ability of United States Armed Forces and intelligence capabilities to carry out the current national security strategy, including— (A) whether the Department of Defense and its components, and the intelligence community and its components, have sufficient force structure and manning as well as equipment (to include items such as munitions stocks) to deploy, prosecute and sustain operations in a second major theater of war as called for under the ciurent national security strategy; ' > (B) which, if any aspects, of currently programmed manpower, operations, training and other readiness programs, and weapons and other systems are found to be inadequate in temis of supporting the national military strategy; and (C) what adjustments need to be made to current defense planning and budgets, and specific programs to redress any deficiencies identified by this analysis. SEC. 8126. None of the funds provided in this Act may be used to transfer to any nongovernmental entity ammimition held by the Department of Defense that has a center-fire cartridge and a United States military nomenclature designation of "armor penetrator", "armor piercing (AP)", "armor piercing incendiary (API)", or "armor-piercing incendiary-tracer (API-T)", except to an entity performing demilitarization services for the Department of Defense under a contract that requires the entity to demonstrate
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