121 STAT. 122
PUBLIC LAW 110–28—MAY 25, 2007
dkrause on GSDDPC44 with PUBLAW
together with components of the other branches of the military, are performing their missions while under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. These deployments, and those that will follow, will have a lasting impact on future recruiting, retention, and readiness of our Nation’s all volunteer force. (4) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating problem of sectarian and intrasectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences among factions of the Sunni and Shia populations. (5) Iraqis must reach political and economic settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, for there is no military solution. The failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq. (6) The responsibility for Iraq’s internal security and halting sectarian violence rests with the sovereign Government of Iraq. (7) In December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq, that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. (8) The President said on January 10, 2007, that ‘‘I’ve made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended’’ so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists. (9) It is essential that the sovereign Government of Iraq set out measurable and achievable benchmarks and President Bush said, on January 10, 2007, that ‘‘America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it works to meet these benchmarks’’. (10) As reported by Secretary of State Rice, Iraq’s Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006 that were: (A) reaffirmed by Iraq’s Presidency Council on October 6, 2006; (B) referenced by the Iraq Study Group; and (C) posted on the President of Iraq’s Web site. (11) On April 21, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that ‘‘our [American] commitment to Iraq is long-term, but it is not a commitment to have our young men and women patrolling Iraq’s streets open-endedly’’ and that ‘‘progress in reconciliation will be an important element of our evaluation’’. (12) The President’s January 10, 2007, address had three components: political, military, and economic. Given that significant time has passed since his statement, and recognizing the overall situation is ever changing, Congress must have timely reports to evaluate and execute its constitutional oversight responsibilities. (b) CONDITIONING OF FUTURE UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN IRAQ ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT’S RECORD OF PERFORMANCE ON ITS BENCHMARKS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—
VerDate Aug 31 2005
13:52 Jan 23, 2009
Jkt 059194
PO 00001
Frm 00120
Fmt 6580
Sfmt 6581
M:\STATUTES\2007\59194PT1.001
APPS10
PsN: 59194PT1
�
