PUBLIC LAW 110–140—DEC. 19, 2007
121 STAT. 1741
(B) to achieve the goals and objectives described in paragraph (1); (4) the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to protect the national energy security of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national authority of the United States to support the implementation of the national energy security strategy; and (5) such other information as the President determines to be necessary to inform Congress on matters relating to the national energy security of the United States. (c) CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED FORM.—Each national energy security strategy report shall be submitted to Congress in— (1) a classified form; and (2) an unclassified form. SEC. 934. CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE CONTINGENT COST ALLOCATION.
42 USC 17373.
dkrause on GSDDPC44 with PUBLAW
(a) FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.— (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— (A) section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210) (commonly known as the ‘‘Price-Anderson Act’’)— (i) provides a predictable legal framework necessary for nuclear projects; and (ii) ensures prompt and equitable compensation in the event of a nuclear incident in the United States; (B) the Price-Anderson Act, in effect, provides operators of nuclear powerplants with insurance for damage arising out of a nuclear incident and funds the insurance primarily through the assessment of a retrospective premium from each operator after the occurrence of a nuclear incident; (C) the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997, will establish a global system— (i) to provide a predictable legal framework necessary for nuclear energy projects; and (ii) to ensure prompt and equitable compensation in the event of a nuclear incident; (D) the Convention benefits United States nuclear suppliers that face potentially unlimited liability for nuclear incidents that are not covered by the Price-Anderson Act by replacing a potentially open-ended liability with a predictable liability regime that, in effect, provides nuclear suppliers with insurance for damage arising out of such an incident; (E) the Convention also benefits United States nuclear facility operators that may be publicly liable for a PriceAnderson incident by providing an additional early source of funds to compensate damage arising out of the PriceAnderson incident; (F) the combined operation of the Convention, the Price-Anderson Act, and this section will augment the quantity of assured funds available for victims in a wider variety of nuclear incidents while reducing the potential liability of United States suppliers without increasing potential costs to United States operators;
VerDate Aug 31 2005
07:12 Jan 26, 2009