Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 4.djvu/154

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EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS.⁠Sess. II. Ch. 64.⁠1825.

demand, or any part thereof, or any copy of any record of any judgment, or decree, in any court of law, or chancery, or any execution which may have issued thereon; or any copy of any other record, or any other article of value, or any writing representing the same; or if any such person, employed as aforesaid, shall steal, or take, any of the same out of any letter, packet, bag, or mail of letters, that shall come to his or her possession, such person shall, on conviction for any such offence, be imprisoned not less than ten years, nor exceeding twenty-one years; and if any person who shall have taken charge of the mails of the United States, shall quit or desert the same before such person delivers it into the post-office kept at the termination of the route, or some known mail-carrier, or agent of the general post-office, authorized to receive the same, every such person, so offending, shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, for every such offence; and if any person concerned in carrying the mail of the United States, shall collect, receive, or carry any letter, or packet, or shall cause or procure the same to be done, contrary to this act, every such offender shall forfeit and pay for every such offence a sum not exceeding fifty dollars.^[1]

Persons robbing the mail, &c., to suffer death.Sec. 22. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall rob any carrier of the mail of the United States, or other person intrusted therewith, of such mail, or of part thereof, such offender or offenders shall, on conviction, be imprisoned not less than five years, nor exceeding ten years; and, if convicted a second time of a like offence, he or they shall suffer death; or if, in effecting such robbery of the mail the first time, the offender shall wound the person having custody thereof, or put his life in jeopardy, by the use of dangerous weapons, such offender or offenders shall suffer death.^[2] And if any person shall attempt to rob the mail of the United States, by assaulting the person having custody thereof, shooting at him, or his horse or mule, or threatening him with

↑ The 25th section of the post-office law of 1825, which prescribes a penalty for the detention of a letter, refers to a letter or packet detained before it reaches its destination. The United States v. Pearce, 2 M’Lean’s C. C. R. 14.
↑ The defendant was indicted upon the 24th section of the act of Congress of March 3, 1825, entitled “An act to reduce into one, the several acts establishing and regulating the post-office department,” for advising, procuring and assisting one Joseph Straughan, a mail carrier, to rob the mail; and was found guilty. Upon this finding, the judges of the circuit court of North Carolina, were divided in opinion on the question, whether an indictment founded on the statute for advising, &c., a mail carrier to rob the mail, ought to be set forth or aver that the said carrier did, in fact, commit the offence of robbing the mail? By the Supreme Court—The answer to this, as an abstract proposition, must be in the affirmative. But if the question intended to be put, is, whether there must be a distinct substantive averment of that fact, it is not necessary. The indictment in this case sufficiently sets out that the offence had been committed by the mail carrier. United States v. Mills, 7 Peters, 138.
The offence charged in this indictment is a misdemeanor, where all are principals; and the doctrine applicable to the principal and accessory in cases of felony does not apply. The offence, however charged against the defendant, is secondary in its character; and there can be no doubt that it must sufficiently appear upon the indictment, that the offence alleged against the chief actor had been committed. Ibid.
Upon an indictment for robbing the mail, and putting the life of the person having the custody of it in jeopardy, under the 19th section of the act of April 30th, 1810 ch. 262, a sword, &c. in the hand of the robber, by terror of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon within the act, putting the life in jeopardy; though it be not drawn or pointed at the carrier. So a pistol in his hands, by means of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon; and it is not necessary to prove that it was charged; it is presumed to be so until the contrary is proved. The United States v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 440.
It is not necessary to a conviction, under the 22d section, that the carrier of the mail should have taken the oath prescribed by the 2d section of the act of 1825, or that the whole mail be taken. The United States v. Wilson et al. 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 102.
All persons present at the commission of a crime, consenting thereto, aiding, or assisting and abetting therein, or in doing any act which is a constituent of the offence, are principals. Ibid.
The word “rob,” in the act of Congress of 1825, sec. 22, is used in the common law sense. Ibid. 93.
“Jeopardy,” as used in the section, means a well-grounded apprehension of danger to life, in case of refusal to yield to threats, or resistance. Ibid.
A mail carrier is within the 18th section of the “Act regulating the post-office establishment,” subjecting to a penalty in certain cases, “persons employed in any of the departments of the general post-office.” United States v. Belew, 2 Brock, 280.

[1] The 25th section of the post-office law of 1825, which prescribes a penalty for the detention of a letter, refers to a letter or packet detained before it reaches its destination. The United States v. Pearce, 2 M’Lean’s C. C. R. 14.

[2] The defendant was indicted upon the 24th section of the act of Congress of March 3, 1825, entitled “An act to reduce into one, the several acts establishing and regulating the post-office department,” for advising, procuring and assisting one Joseph Straughan, a mail carrier, to rob the mail; and was found guilty. Upon this finding, the judges of the circuit court of North Carolina, were divided in opinion on the question, whether an indictment founded on the statute for advising, &c., a mail carrier to rob the mail, ought to be set forth or aver that the said carrier did, in fact, commit the offence of robbing the mail? By the Supreme Court—The answer to this, as an abstract proposition, must be in the affirmative. But if the question intended to be put, is, whether there must be a distinct substantive averment of that fact, it is not necessary. The indictment in this case sufficiently sets out that the offence had been committed by the mail carrier. United States v. Mills, 7 Peters, 138.
The offence charged in this indictment is a misdemeanor, where all are principals; and the doctrine applicable to the principal and accessory in cases of felony does not apply. The offence, however charged against the defendant, is secondary in its character; and there can be no doubt that it must sufficiently appear upon the indictment, that the offence alleged against the chief actor had been committed. Ibid.
Upon an indictment for robbing the mail, and putting the life of the person having the custody of it in jeopardy, under the 19th section of the act of April 30th, 1810 ch. 262, a sword, &c. in the hand of the robber, by terror of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon within the act, putting the life in jeopardy; though it be not drawn or pointed at the carrier. So a pistol in his hands, by means of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon; and it is not necessary to prove that it was charged; it is presumed to be so until the contrary is proved. The United States v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 440.
It is not necessary to a conviction, under the 22d section, that the carrier of the mail should have taken the oath prescribed by the 2d section of the act of 1825, or that the whole mail be taken. The United States v. Wilson et al. 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 102.
All persons present at the commission of a crime, consenting thereto, aiding, or assisting and abetting therein, or in doing any act which is a constituent of the offence, are principals. Ibid.
The word “rob,” in the act of Congress of 1825, sec. 22, is used in the common law sense. Ibid. 93.
“Jeopardy,” as used in the section, means a well-grounded apprehension of danger to life, in case of refusal to yield to threats, or resistance. Ibid.
A mail carrier is within the 18th section of the “Act regulating the post-office establishment,” subjecting to a penalty in certain cases, “persons employed in any of the departments of the general post-office.” United States v. Belew, 2 Brock, 280.

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