Of any master, &c., of any ship or vessel belonging in whole or in part to a citizen of citizens of the United States, while abroad, who shall force any officer, &c., on shore to leave him behind in any foreign port or place.Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That, if any master or commander of any ship or vessel, belonging, in whole, or in part, to any citizen or citizens of the United States, shall, during his being abroad, maliciously, and without justifiable cause, force any officer, or mariner of such ship or vessel, on shore, or leave him behind, in any foreign port or place, or refuse to bring home again, all such of the officers and mariners of such ship or vessel, whom he carried out with him, as are in a condition to return, and willing to return, when he shall be ready to proceed in his homeward voyage, every master or commander, so offending, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding six months, according to the aggravation of the offence.[1]
Of any person wilfully, &c. setting on fire any ship or vessel of the United States afloat on the high seas, or any arm of the sea, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.Proviso.Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That, if any person or persons, shall, wilfully and maliciously, set on fire, or burn, or otherwise destroy or cause to be set on fire, or burnt, or otherwise destroyed, or aid, procure, abet, or assist in setting on fire, or burning or otherwise destroying, any ship or vessel of war of the United States, afloat on the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin or bay within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of
- ↑ The crimes act of 1825, ch. 66, sec. 10, enumerates three distinct offences: (1) maliciously and wilfully, and without justifiable cause, forcing an officer or mariner on shore, in a foreign port, or (2) maliciously, or without justifiable cause, leaving any officer or mariner behind in a foreign port, or (3) maliciously, or without justifiable cause, refusing to bring home again all the officers or mariners of the ship, in a condition to return and willing to return. It is not necessary to complete the first or second of the enumerated offences, that the officer or mariner should be in a condition to return or willing to return. Those latter words apply only to the trial of the enumerated offences. The United States v. Netcher, 1 Story’s C. C. R. 307.Where a mariner applied for a discharge, which was refused by the master, and he thereupon used abusive language to the master, for which he was imprisoned by the master, so that he was unable to return, and the ship sailed without him, it was held, that the leaving him behind was an offence under the crimes act of 1825, ch. 66, sec. 10. Ibid.Indictment for maliciously, and without justifiable cause, forcing a seaman on shore, in a foreign port, against the crimes act of 1825, ch. 66, sec. 10. “Maliciously,” in the statute, means wilfully, against a knowledge of duty; “justifiable cause” does not mean such a cause as the known policy of the American laws on the subject contemplates as a cause of moral necessity, for the safety of the ship and crew, or the due performance of the voyage. The United States v. Thaddeus Coffin, 1 Sumner’s C. C. R. 394.Under the 10th section of the act of 1825, ch. 66, the forcing a mariner on shore must be done, not only without justifiable cause, but also maliciously, to justify a conviction. If done under a mistaken sense of duty, it is not a case for conviction. The United States v. Spencer Ruggles, 5 Mason’s C. C. R. 192.“Maliciously,” in the statute, means a wilful disregard of right and duty, or doing the act, against a man’s own conviction of duty. Ibid.A master of a ship has authority to confine his seamen in a common jail in a foreign port, for offences and misconduct in extreme cases; and when the proper correction and punishment cannot be effected on ship-board. Ibid.
feloniously stealing a quantity of merchandise, belonging to the ship Bristol, the ship being in distress and cast away on a shoal of the sea on the coast of New York. The indictment was founded on the 9th section of the act, entitled “An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes,” approved March 3, 1825. The goods were taken above high-water mark, upon the beach, in the county of Queens, in the state of New York. Held, that the offence committed was within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 72.
In cases purely dependent on the locality of the act done, the admiralty jurisdiction is limited to the sea, and to the tide water, as far as the tide flows. Mixed cases may arise, and often do arise, where the act and services done are of a mixed nature, as when salvage services are performed, partly on tidewater and partly on shore, for the preservation of the property; in which case the admiralty jurisdiction has been constantly exercised, to the extent of decreeing salvage. Ibid.The offence of larceny is not punishable under the act of 1790, ch. 9, unless committed in a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; and to bring the case within the statute, there must be an averment of such sole and exclusive jurisdiction in the indictment. The United States v. Edmond Davis, 5 Mason’s C. C. R. 356.“Personal goods” in that statute does not include choses in action, the latter not being the subject of larceny at common law. Ibid.Where larceny is committed in a place not under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, it may be yet punishable under the third section of the act of 1825, ch. 66. Ibid.Offences are punishable under that section according to the state laws, where they are committed under circumstances, or in places, in which, before that act, no court of the United States had authority to punish them. Ibid.It seems, that a reservation in a cession of “concurrent jurisdiction” to serve state process, civil and criminal in the ceded place, does not exclude the exclusive legislation, or exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, over the ceded place. Ibid.See United States v. Kessler, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 15.
