Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 5.djvu/144

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of the public lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting such public lands, and, also, such as relate to private claims of land, and the issuing of patents for all grants of land under the authority of the Government of the United States, shall be subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the direction of the President of the United States.


    The second section of the act of Congress of March 3, 1803, was intended to confer a bounty on a numerous class of individuals, and in construing the ambiguous words of the section, it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction which will best effect the liberal intentions of the Legislature. Ibid. 667.

    The time when the territory over which this law operated was evacuated by the Spanish troops, was very important, as the law was intended to provide for those who were actually at that time inhabitants of, and cultivated the soil within it; but whether it was in 1797 or 1798, was comparatively unimportant. The decision of the commissioners upon the period when the evacuation took place, is sufficient: and the court are disposed to adopt the construction of the act given by the commissioners west of Pearl river; that the evacuation took place on the 30th March 1798, by which persons coming within the objects of the section were entitled to donation certificates. Ibid. 667.
    Congress have treated as erroneous the construction given to the law by the commissioners to settle claims to lands east of Pearl river, who have decided that only those who were settled on the lands within the territory in the year 1797 were entitled to donation certificates, and who had granted to others pre-emption certificates. Ibid. 668.
    The commissioners appointed under the act of Congress relative to claims to lands of the United States south of the State of Tennessee, were authorized to hear evidence as to the time of the actual evacuation of the territory by the Spanish troops, and to decide upon the fact. The law gave them power to hear and decide all matters respecting such claims, and to determine thereon, according to justice and equity; and declared their deliberations shall be final. The court are bound to presume that every fact necessary to warrant the certificate, in the terms of it, was proved before the commissioners; and that, consequently, it was shown to them that the final evacuation of the territory by the Spanish troops took place on the 30th of March 1798. Ibid.
    By the treaty of St. Ildefonso, made on the 1st of October 1800, Spain ceded Louisiana to France; and France, by the treaty of Paris, signed the 30th of April 1803, ceded it to the United States. Under this treaty, the United States claimed the countries between the Iberville and the Perdido. Spain contended that her cession to France comprehended only that territory which at the time of the cession was denominated Louisiana, consisting of the island of New Orleans, and the country which had been originally ceded to her by France, west of the Mississippi. The land claimed by the plaintiffs in error, under a grant from the crown of Spain, made after the treaty of St. Ildefonso, lies within the disputed territory; and this case presents the question, to whom did the country between the Iberville and Perdido belong after the treaty of St. Ildefonso? Had France and Spain agreed upon the boundaries of the retroceded territory before Louisiana was acquired by the United States, that agreement would undoubtedly have ascertained its limits. But the declarations of France, made after parting with the province, cannot be admitted as conclusive. In questions of this character, political considerations have too much influence over the conduct of nations, to permit their declarations to decide the course of an independent government, in a matter vitally interesting to itself. Foster et al. v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 306.
    If a Spanish grantee had obtained possession of the land in dispute so as to be the defendant, would a court of the United States maintain his title under a Spanish grant, made subsequent to the acquisition of Louisiana, singly on the principle that the Spanish construction of the treaty of St. Ildefonso was right, and the American construction wrong? Such a decision would subvert those principles which govern the relations between the legislative and judicial departments, and mark the limits of each. Ibid.
    The sound construction of the eighth article of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of the 22d of February 1829, will not enable the court to apply its provisions to the case of the plaintiff. Ibid. 314.
    The article does not declare that all the grants made by his catholic majesty before the 24th of January, 1818, shall be valid to the same extent as if the ceded territories had remained under his dominion. It does not say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have acted directly on the subject, and it would have repealed those acts of Congress which were repugnant to it; but its language is, that those grants shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession, &c. By whom shall they be ratified and confirmed? This seems to be the language of contract; and, if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the Legislature. Until such act shall be passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject. Ibid.
    A title to lands, under grants made by Indian tribes or nations, north-west of the river Ohio, to private individuals, in the years 1773 and 1775, cannot be sustained in the courts of the United States. Lessee of Johnson et al. v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543; 5 Cond. Rep. 515.
    The title to lands depends entirely upon the law of the nation in which they lie. Ibid.
    Discovery constituted the original foundation of title to lands on the American continent, as between the different European nations; the title thus derived, was the exclusive right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it; the title was to be consummated by possession. Ibid.
    The rights of the original inhabitants were, to a considerable extent, impaired, but in no instance entirely disregarded. The Europeans respected the right of the natives as occupants, but asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in the possession of the natives. Ibid.
    By the treaty between Great Britain and the United States, which concluded our revolution, the powers of government and the right to soil which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to these States. Ibid.
    The United States, or the several States, have a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy; and the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it. Ibid.
    It is a principle of universal law, that, if an uninhabited country be discovered by a number of indivi-