CODIFICATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS and completed in another it shall be deemed to have been committed in either, and may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in either district, in the same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein.' This provision takes an emphasis of signification from the fact that it was originally a part of the same section of the statute which defined conspiracy- that is section 30 of the act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 484, c. 169. Nor has the provision lost the strength of meaning derived from such association by its sub- sequent separation, for it is provided in section 5600 of the Revised Statutes that 'The arrangement and classification of the several sections of the revision have been made for the more convenient and orderly arrangement of the same, and therefore no inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the title, under which any particular section is placed.' " To the same effect was Buck Stove and Range Co., 226 U. S . 205; U. S. v. Marsh, 106 Fed. 474; U. S . v. Thomas, 145 Fed. 74 . Also, King v. McLean Asylum (64 Fed. 331), in which it was said: "This section (5600) is expressly limited to arrangement and classification, and does not extend to changes in phraseology." Page v. Burnstine, 102 U. S. 664 This was an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a bill by the personal representatives of Robert C. Page to recover for the estate the value of a life insurance policy issued November 22, 1866, over and above amounts due Burnstine for loans made by him to Page on the policy. Loans were made from time to time and assignments taken to the extent of lender's interest. On January 7, 1873, assignment of the policy was made purporting to transfer Page's entire interest. Plaintiffs admitted Burn- stine s interest but prayed an accounting. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that at the death of Page he was the absolute owner of the policy and entitled to all the proceeds. The life insurance company paid the amount due on the policy into court abiding the result of the suit. Some depositions were taken, among them being one of Burnstine with reference to the loans and the several assignments. As to this, plaintiffs contended Burnstine could not testify as to any transaction with or statement by the deceased unless called on by them or required by the court, relying on section 858 of the Revised Statutes. Defend- ant contended that his right to testify was determined by Sections 876 and 877 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia. Plaintiff's bill was dismissed and appeal taken to the United States Supreme Court, where the decree was reversed and the cause remanded directing an account of the amount due Burnstine for loans or other payments made to keep the policy in force, and holding that Burnstine could not testify in the suit on his own motion. In view of the conflict between sections 876 and 877 of the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia and section 858 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the basic statutes to determine the intent of Congress. The act of July 2, 1864, relating to the law of evidence in the District was carried into the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia as sections 876 and 877, without change; the third section of the act of July 2, 1864, with respect to appropriations, and the amending act of March 3, 1865, were carried into the Revised Statutes of the United States as section 858, without change; and the act of February 21, 1871, was carried into the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia as section 93. The court said that by the third section of the act of July 2, 1864, and the amending act of March 3, 1865, witnesses could not testify in such a case; that the act of February 21, 1871, made the rule applicable to the courts of the District of Columbia unless locally inapplicable, which it was not; and that this was the law as it existed at the time the two revisions went into effect. It said these provisions having been carried into the two revisions, respectively, without change, Congress did not intend to change the law with respect to the rule of evidence in the District of Columbia, having so provided by section 1296 of the Revision for the District and by section 5600 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. In this con- nection the court said: "We should not, therefore, permit the mere collocation of rearrangement of the previous statutes in the new revisions, adopted on the same day, to operate to change the law, and thereby defeat the will of Congress * * *. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that Burnstine could not, on his own motion, testify as to any transaction with, or statement by, the decedent, Page. His deposition as to such transactions, and statements, must be excluded from consideration" (in the further proceedings in the lower court). McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. A decree was rendered April 17, 1878, and appeal was taken September 6, 1883. Defendant was sued in New York City upon the decree, judgment rendered against him, and he was thrown into jail, 1879. Appeal having been taken 6 CC
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