PUBLIC LAW 98-94—SEPT. 24, 1983 97 STAT. 697 his review and shall make available to the Comptroller General (consistent with those provisions of title 31, United States Code, replacing the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, and provisions of law contained in the amendments made by Public Law 96-226) such additional data and information as the Comptroller Ceneral requires for the purposes of his review. Such data and information Nondisclosure of as the Comptroller General receives under this section shall not be information. disclosed to anyone other than those persons specially designated by the Comptroller Gteneral to have access to that data and informa- tion. Any report by the Comptroller General concerning data and information provided pursuant to this section may, consistent with the classification of such report, be provided to the Congress and shall be prepared with due regard to the sensitivity of the informa- tion received in such a manner as to avoid disclosure of data which could adversely affect ongoing contract negotiations or the national security. PART D—MISCELLANEOUS ENDORSEMENT OF REPORT ON IMPROVED STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS SEC. 1251. (a) The Congress finds that the report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense entitled "Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability", dated April 11, 1983, and submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 1123 of the Depart- ment of Defense Authorization Act, 1983 (Public Law 97-252; 96 Stat. 756), contains several significant proposals that if implemented would, taken tc^ether, make significant progress toward eliminating the danger of accident or misinterpretation leading to nuclear war. Among the proposals in that report that Congress specifically finds constructive are proposals— (1) to enhance the speed and quality of communications be- tween the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) to establish a communications link between the senior military commands of the United States and the Soviet Union; and (3) to develop a system of prior notification between the United States and the Soviet Union of missile launches and military exercises by either nation that could be misinterpreted by the other and therefore be destabilizing. (b) The Congress— (1) endorses the findings in the report described in subsection (a) and urges the President and the Secretary of Defense to implement as rapidly as possible the proposals made in that report; (2) suggests that, when practicable and not harmful to the national security of the United States, the United States should unilaterally implement confidence-building measures (such as prior notification of missile launches and military exercises) on a temporary, voluntary basis and should invite the Soviet Union to join in implementing those measures; and (3) endorses proposals that the United States, through its arms control negotiators, should seek a separate, limited agree- ment with the Soviet Union on confidence-building measures, such as those recommended in the report described in subsec- tion (a), designed to reduce the danger of accident or misinter- pretation leading to nuclear war.
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