But the captain would not listen to him. To the joy of Cortés, however, a storm arose, which obliged this captain to slip his anchor and put to sea; obliged him to take refuge in San Juan de Ulua harbor, where he found his vessel so unsafe as to require her to be stranded, whereupon the forces and armaments were landed.[1] Cortés at once sent a sympathizing message, offering the captain every assistance, but never for a moment intending to give him any. He even tendered other vessels for his voyage — so he tells the emperor.[2] But there is no doubt that the tender was illusive, and that he did all in his power, with bribery, promises, and even force, to secure the men and armament, and at the sane time to weaken his rivals by their loss. According to some accounts he caused their vessels to be sunk to prevent departure,[3] an act which Oviedo declares a fair war measure, particularly on the part of Cortés, who greatly needed reinforcements. Men destined for so comparatively unattractive a region as Pánuco must have been pleased by the prospect of ready spoils and Mexican treasures soon to fall into their hands under so able and successful a leader as Cortés. They were therefore readily induced to join him, the captains alone, as in the last instance, interposing objections for a while. These several accessions amounted, according to the testimony of Cortés, to about two hundred men and some twenty horses,[4] together with a large quantity
- ↑ Bernal Diaz refers to the last accession from Garay's expeditions as 40 soldiers and 10 horses, under an old man mamed Ramirez. Protected by heavy cotton armor they were nicknamed the 'albardillas.' Hist. Verdad., 115.
- ↑ 'Si todos ó algunos dellos se quisiesen volver en los navíos que allí estaban, que les diese licencia.' Cortés, Cartas, 163.
- ↑ Oviedo, iii. 335; and so Herrera also intimates in reference to Camargo's only remaining vessel, 'la qual se anegò tābien dētro de 10. dias en el puerto.' dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xviii.
- ↑ The last two vessels bring 150 men and 16 horses, probably over 20, to which must be added Camargo's force, amounting no doubt to 50 effective men, for Bernal Diaz admits 60 soldiers, not counting sailors; and Herrera intimates that over 100 men must have reached Villa Rica of the total force on board Camargo's three vessels. Bernal Diaz' estimates for the five vessels which he enumerates exceed 170 soldiers and 20 horses; on fol. 115 he contradicts several points, including the total, to which the sailors may be added, while a small reduction is to be made for deaths among Camargo's men. Vetancurt follows
