after the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and other provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and that the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at the hands of victorious Mexico. Thus, while many were frightened into severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state of affairs.
To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable, and many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be far more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage such hostile movements by a passive demeanor. "It was now more necessary than ever," he writes, "to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as to hide our weakness both from friends and foes." Andrés de Tápia was accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together with a considerable force of allies.[1] In order to calm the many remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return within ten days. Tápia found the enemy awaiting him in large force near a hamlet not far from Malinalco, and at once prepared to attack, assisted by the Quauhnahuacs. The ground being level, the horses proved of great service, and the hostile army was presently in flight toward Malinalco. This place was strongly situated on a height, well supplied with water, so that Tápia considered it useless to attempt an assault, much less a siege when so short a term had been allowed him, and he accordingly returned.
- ↑ Forty thousand, says Ixtlilxochitl, obtained chiefly from Quauhnahuac and other towns subject to Tezcuco. Hor. Crueldades, 40. Herrera and others mention no auxiliaries from the camp. Bernal Diaz is confused.
