himself by offering to refer his proposals to Washington, to which end the armistice would naturally have to be prolonged for about six weeks. His judgment in making such an offer may be questioned in face of the growing sick-list among the United States troops, scattered in unhealthy villages, remote from reënforcements, while their opponents were daily gaining strength.[1] To the Mexicans the proposal seemed so extraordinary that they began to suspect a lurking design to gain time for reënforcements; and being now ready to resume the contest, they resolved to break off negotiations by presenting a counter-project, known to be inadmissible, at least by Trist with his limited powers, and even by Mexico, for that matter, under the changed aspect of affairs, for it offered to surrender all territory beyond the Nueces and latitude 37°.[2]
Scott had been duly warned that Santa Anna was not only infringing the terms of the armistice by defence operations, but displaying an attitude in common with the leaders of public opinion that could not be misunderstood; he was urged to resume hostilities ere the enemy grew too strong. But his suspicions were lulled by the aforesaid neutrals, duly instructed by the chief at Mexico. Perhaps he was ashamed to acknowledge openly that he had been duped. The final turn of the negotiation, however, woke him from his dream.
He now gave vent to his anger in a sharp
- ↑ He pleads the wish to commit the Mexican government to yielding a part of the national domain, and the prospect of better weather in October for fighting. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 52, p. 192. But these were doubtful gains.
- ↑ The line to follow the eastern border of New Mexico to 37°, and along this parallel to the Pacific, the territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande to remain neutral ground. The money offers of the U. S. were accepted. See U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 40; Mex. Treaties, vii. pt 5, as above, and Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 280-6, with a note from the commissioners, condemning the war as unjust, and giving the reasons for not ceding more territory. See also Herrera, Contest. al Comis., 1-36; Contest. entre Sup. Gob., 1-36; Mex. Pamphlets, iii. pt 3, iv. 141-384; Rayon, Asedio, 112-25, 305-40; Diario Exact. Mex., 1-68; Arco Iris, Sept. 1, 26, 1847, etc.; Sonorense, Diario Gob., and other journals, and notably the later chapter on final peace treaty.
