Page:Vol 5 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/526

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506
FALL OF THE CAPITAL.

One effect of the defeat was a marked increase in desertion, and a declining confidence among the corps, due greatly to the glaring lack of unity and energy among the leaders.[1] This in itself compelled Santa Anna to confine himself more than ever to defensive operations along the inner lines of the capital, with their walls, embankments, and ditches, and their eight garitas, or gates, each forming an intrenched fort, which in times of peace served for customhouses.[2] Owing to the marshy nature of the surrounding land, during this the rainy season, the approach was practically restricted to the corresponding roads, five of them main causeways, whereof the two on the west, and the others more or less, were obstructed by cuts and barricades. The western roads were commanded to some extent by Chapultepec, the only outwork now entering into consideration. The increased demonstrations by the enemy along the south front, marked by the location of a battery at La Piedad, only one mile distant, and the advance of several corps toward it, led naturally to the belief that this was their objective line. Aware of its weakness, as formerly explained, Santa Anna at once directed a large force to throw up a line of intrenchments, extending from Niño Perdido diagonally to the exterior barricade of San Antonio Abad, and provided with

    Sept. 1847; Correo Nac., Sept., also Nov. 27, 1847, Jan. 3, Aug. 23, Oct. 10 -17, 1848; Razonador, Nov. 17, 1847; Arco Iris, Dec. 3, 1847, etc.; Rayon, A sedio, 125-57; Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., vii. 221-6; Diario Exact., MS., 60 et seq.; Taylor and his Staff, 13-20; Scott's Mem., 506-7; Peterson's Milit. Heroes, ii. 114-20; Harrison's Battle-fields, 391-402; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 531-75; Perez, Dicc., ii. 467-73; Jenkins' Mex. War, 331-97.

  1. Bravo declares that he had to watch his men to prevent further loss. Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., viii. 27 et seq. Governor Olaguíbel of Mexico brought in a body of several hundred recruits, Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 313, and cannon were sent from Acapulco; but these gains were small. Gamboa still assumes a defence force of 17,000, Impug., 52, from which Roa Bárcena deducts desertion and losses at Molino del Rey.
  2. At San Antonio, 10 pieces of artillery; at Niño Perdido, 2 pieces; San Cosme, 2 pieces; Belen, 3 pieces, commanded by General Terrés. The other gates had no artillery, but could obtain men and armament in case of need, if the front should change from the south and west, where intermediate works existed with from 1 to 4 pieces. Details in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 309; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 456.