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by them for the political organisations, as they existed there, were in a position to assume, unaided, full responsibilities of the administration, we made a provision in some of the Covenants that till the new Constitution came into operation in these Unions, the Rajpramukh and the Council of Ministers shall, in the exercise of their functions, be under the general control of the Government of India and comply with the instructions issued by that Government from time to time. The stress of the transitional phase is likely to continue for some years. We are ourselves most anxious that the people of these States should shoulder their full responsibilities; however, we cannot ignore the fact that while the administrative organisation and political institutions are to be found in most of the States in a relatively less developed state, the problems relating to the integration of the States and the change-over from an autocratic to a democratic order are such as to test the mettle of long established administrations and experienced leaders of people. We have therefore found it necessary that in the interest of the growth of democratic institutions in these States, no less than the requirements of administrative efficiency, the Government of India should exercise general supervision over the Governments of the States till such time as it may be necessary.

It is natural that a provision of this nature which treats States in Part B differently from Part A States should cause some misgivings. I wish to assure the Hon'ble Members representing these States, and through them the people of these States, that the provision involves no censure of any Government. It merely provides for contingencies which, in view of the present conditions, are more likely to arise in Part B States than in the States of other categories. We do not wish to interfere with the day-to-day administration of any of the States. We are ourselves most anxious that the people of the States should learn by experience. This Article is essentially in the nature of a safety valve to obviate recourse to drastic remedies such as the provisions for the breakdown of the constitutional machinery. It is quite obvious that in this matter the States, e.g. Mysore and Travancore-Cochin, where democratic institutions have been functioning for a long time and where Government responsible to Legislation