must inevitably be the case, if not prevented) — when the stronger shall concentrate in itself both the majorities which form the elements of the government of the United States — (and this, it must shortly do) — every barrier, which the constitution, and the organism of the government oppose to one overruling combination of interests, will have been broken down, and the government become as absolute, as would be that of the mere numerical majority; unless, indeed, the system itself, shall be found to furnish some means sufficiently powerful to resist this strong tendency, inherent in governments like ours, to absorb and consolidate all power in its own hands.
What has been stated is sufficient to show, that no such means are to be found in the constitution of the United States, or in the organism of the government. Nor can they be found in the right of suffrage; for it is through its instrumentality that the party combinations are formed. Neither can they be found in the fact, that the constitution of the United States is a written instrument; for this, of itself, cannot possibly enforce the limitations and restrictions which it imposes, as has been fully shown in the preliminary discourse. Nor can they be enforced, and the government held strictly to the sphere assigned, by resorting to a strict construction of the constitution — for the plain reason, that the stronger party will be in favor of a liberal construction; and the strict construction of the minority can be of no avail against the liberal construction of the majority — as has also been shown in the
