THE PARMENIDES. 7
the present time is no more, so with respect: to all corporeal natures (from their subsistence in time), before we can lay that they exist, they lose all identity of being. And hence no one of them is truly that which it is said to be. On the contrary, truth is eternal and immutable : for, if any one should assert that truth is not, he asserts this either truly or falsely ; but if falsely, there is such a thing as truth ; and if truly, then it is true that there is no such thing as truth. But if it is truly asserted, it can only be true through truth ; and, consequentlv, there is such a thing as truth, which mud; also be eternal and immutable. Hence, truth cannot subsist in any thing mutable ; for that which is situated in a mutable nature is also changed in conjunction with it. But all corporeal natures are continually changed, and hence they are neither true, nor have a true existence. If, therefore, the forms of bodies are imperfect, they are not the first forms; for whatever ranks as first is perfect and entire, since the whole reason of every nature is established in that which is first. There are, therefore, certain forms above these, perfect, primary, and entire, and which are not indigent of a subject.
But if the forms of bodies are not true, where do the true forms subsist: ? Shall we say nowhere ? But in this cafe falsehood would be more powerful than truth, if the former possessed, and the latter had no, subsistence. this is impossible. For that which is more powerful derives its power from truth ; since, unless it was truly more powerful, it would not be that which it is said to be. But, indeed, without the pretence of truth, the forms which are said to be false could not subsist: for they would no longer be what they are, unless it was true that they are false. True species, therefore, have a subsistence somewhere. But does not our soul possess truer species than those which are the objects of sensible inspection, by which it judges, condemns, and corrects them, and understands how far they depart from, and in what respect they agree with, such forms as are true ? But he who does not behold true forms, can by no means make a companion between them and others, and rectify the inaccuracy of the one by the accurate truth of the other. For the soul, indeed, corrects the visible circle, when it does not touch a plane in one point only ; approves or condemns every artificial structure and musical modulation ; and judges concerning the goodness or depravity, utility or detriment, beauty or deformity, of every object in na- ture.
