Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.
While I join the opinion of The Chief Justice, I wish to add a word. The philosophy of the opinion that sustains this statute is foreign to our constitutional system. It gives supremacy to the Legislature in a way that is incompatible with the scheme of our written Constitution. A decision such as this could be expected in England where there is no written constitution, and where the House of Commons has the final say. But with all deference, this philosophy has no place here. By proclaiming it we forsake much of our constitutional heritage and move closer to the British scheme. That may be better than ours or it may be worse. Certainly it is not ours.
We deal here with the right of citizenship created by the Constitution. Section 1, cl. 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment states 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' As stated by the Court in the historic decision United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702, 18 S.Ct. 456, 477, 42 L.Ed. 890, 'Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the constitution.'
What the Constitution grants the Constitution can take away. But there is not a word in that document that covers expatriation. The numerous legislative powers granted by Art. I, § 8, do not mention it. I do not know of any legislative power large enough and powerful enough to modify or wipe out rights granted or created by § 1, cl. 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our decisions have never held that expatriation can be imposed. To the contrary, they have assumed that expatriation was a voluntary relinquishment of loyalty to one country and attachment to another. Justice Paterson spoke of expatriation in Talbot v. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133, 153, 1 L.Ed. 540, as 'a departure with intention to leave this country, and settle in another.' The loss of citizenship in this country without its acquisition in another country was to him the creation of 'a citizen of the world'-a concept that is 'a creature of the imagination, and far too refined for any republic of ancient or modern times.' Ibid.
So far as I can find, we have, prior to this day, never sustained the loss of a native-born American citizenship unless another citizenship was voluntarily acquired. That was true both in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 36 S.Ct. 106, 60 L.Ed. 297, and Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 70 S.Ct. 292, 94 L.Ed. 287. We should look to their facts, not to loose statements unnecessary for the decisions. In the Mackenzie case it was the marriage of a native-born woman to an alien that caused the loss of one nationality and the acquisition of another. In the Savorgnan case the native-born American citizen became naturalized in Italy. In this case Perez did vote in a foreign election of some kind. But as The Chief Justice has clearly shown, § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 'is not limited to those situations that may rationally be said to constitute an abandonment of citizenship.' 78 S.Ct. 585.
Our landmark decision on expatriation is Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884, 83 L.Ed. 1320, where Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court. The emphasis of that opinion is that 'Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance.' Id., 307 U.S. at page 334, 59 S.Ct. at page 889.
Today's decision breaks with that tradition. It allows Congress to brand an ambiguous act as a 'voluntary renunciation' of citizenship when there is no requirement and no finding that the citizen transferred his loyalty from this country to another. This power is found in the power of Congress to regulate foreign affairs. But if voting abroad is so pregnant with danger that Congress can penalize it by withdrawing the voter's American citizenship, all citizens should be filled with alarm. Some of the most heated political discussions in our history have concerned foreign policy. I had always assumed that the First Amendment, written in terms absolute, protected those utterances, no matter how extreme, no matter how unpopular they might be. Yet if the power to regulate foreign affairs can be used to deprive a person of his citizenship because he voted abroad, why may not it be used to deprive him of his citizenship because his views on foreign policy are unorthodox or because he disputed the position of the Secretary of State or denounced a Resolution of the Congress or the action of the Chief Executive in the field of foreign affairs? It should be remembered that many of our most heated controversies involved assertion of First Amendment rights respecting foreign policy. The hated Alien and Sedition Laws grew out of that field. [1] More recently the rise of fascism and communism has had profound repercussions here. Could one who advocated recognition of Soviet Russia in the 1920's be deprived of his citizenship? Could that fate befall one who was a Bundist [2] in the late 1930's or early 1940's and extolled Hitler? Could it happen in the 1950's to one who pleaded for recognition of Red China or who proclaimed against the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East? No doubt George F. Kennan 'embarrassed' our foreign relations when he recently spoke over the British radio. [3] Does the Constitution permit Congress to cancel his citizenship? Could an American who violated his passport restrictions and visited Red China be deprived of his citizenship? Or suppose he trades with those under a ban. To many people any of those acts would seem much more heinous than the fairly innocent act of voting abroad. If casting a ballot abroad is sufficient to deprive an American of his citizenship, why could not like penalties be imposed on the citizen who expresses disagreement with his Nation's foreign policy in any of the ways enumerated?
The fact that First Amendment rights may be involved in some cases and not in others seems irrelevant. For the grant of citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment is clear and explicit and should withstand any invasion of the legislative power.
What the Court does is to make it possible for any one of the many legislative powers to be used to wipe out or modify specific rights granted by the Constitution, provided the action taken is moderate and does not do violence to the sensibilities of a majority of this Court. The examples where this concept of Due Process has been used to sustain state action [4] as well as federal action, [5] which modifies or dilutes specific constitutional guarantees, are numerous. It is used today drastically to revise the express command of the first Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A right granted by the Constitution-whether it be the right to counsel or the right to citizenship-may be waived by the citizen. [6] But the waiver must be first a voluntary act and second an act consistent with a surrender of the right granted. When Perez voted he acted voluntarily. But, as shown, § 401(e) does not require that his act have a sufficient relationship to the relinquishment of citizenship-nor a sufficient quality of adhering to a foreign power. Nor did his voting abroad have that quality.
The decision we render today exalts the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment above all others. Of course any power exercised by the Congress must be asserted in conformity with the requirements of Due Process. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989; Lambert v. People of State of California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228. But the requirement of Due Process is a limitation on powers granted, not the means whereby rights granted by the Constitution may be wiped out or watered down. The Fourteenth Amendment grants citizenship to the native-born, as explained in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra. That right may be waived or surrendered by the citizen. But I see no constitutional method by which it can be taken from him. Citizenship, like freedom of speech, press, and religion, occupies a preferred position in our written Constitution, because it is a grant absolute in terms. The power of Congress to withhold it, modify it, or cancel it does not exist. One who is native-born may be a good citizen or a poor one. Whether his actions be criminal or charitable, he remains a citizen for better of for worse, except and unless he voluntarily relinquishes that status. While Congress can prescribe conditions for voluntary expatriation, Congress cannot turn white to black and make any act an act of expatriation. For then the right granted by the Fourteenth Amendment becomes subject to regulation by the legislative branch. But that right has no such infirmity. It is deeply rooted in history, as United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, shows. And the Fourteenth Amendment put it above and beyond legislative control.
That may have been an unwise choice. But we made it when we adopted the Fourteenth Amendment and provided that the native-born is an American citizen. Once he acquires that right there is no power in any branch of our Government to take it from him.
Notes edit
1 Miller, Crisis in Freedom (1951), 167-168, states the Federalist case for those laws:
'As in the case of the Alien Act, the Federal lists justified the Sedition Law by citing the power of Congress to provide for the common defense and general welfare, and the inherent right of every government to act in self-preservation. It was passed at a time of national emergency when, as a member of Congress said, 'some gentlemen say we are at war, and when all believe we must have war.' 'Threatened by faction, and actually at hostility with a foreign and perfidious foe abroad,' the Sedition Act was held to be 'necessary for the safety, perhaps the existence of the Government.' Congress could not permit subversive newspapers to 'paralyze the public arm, and weaken the efforts of Government for the defense of the country.' The wiles of France and its adherents were as dangerous as its armies: 'Do not the Jacobin fiends of France use falsehood and all the arms of hell,' asked William Cobbett, 'and do they not run like half famished wolves to accomplish the destruction of this country?' If Congress had failed to take every precautionary measure against such danger, the blood of the Republic would have been upon its hands.'
2 Cf. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 65 S.Ct. 1203, 89 L.Ed. 1745.
3 See Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the West (1957).
4 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 89 L.Ed. 1795; Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903; Bute v. People of State of Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986; Feiner v. People of State of New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 267; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517; Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919; In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 77 S.Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448.
5 United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754; American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137.
6 E.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.Ct. 236, 240, 87 L.Ed. 268.
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