Political fragments of Archytas and other ancient Pythagoreans/From Diotogenes in his treatise concerning a kingdom
FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.
A king should be one who is most just; and he will be most just who pays the greatest attention to the laws. For without justice no one will be a king; and without law there can be no justice. For that which is just is just through law, which is the effective cause of justice. But a king is either animated law, or a legal ruler. And hence it follows that he will be most just and most observant of the laws. There are, however, three peculiar employments of a king; viz. to lead an army, to administer justice, and to worship the gods. He will, therefore, be able to lead an army properly, if he knows how to carry on war in a becoming manner. But he will be skilled in administering justice, and in governing all his subjects, if he has well learned the nature of justice and law. And he will worship the gods in a pious and holy manner, if he has diligently considered the nature and virtue of God; so that a good king must necessarily be a good general, judge, and priest. For these are things consequent and suitable to the transcendency and virtue of a king. For it is the province of the pilot to preserve the ship, of the charioteer to preserve the chariot, and of the physician to save the sick; but it belongs to a king and to a general to save those who are in danger in battle. For of that of which any one is the leader, he is also the provident inspector and artificer. But to be conversant with judicial affairs is, indeed, a universal thing; but is particularly the proper work of a king: who, like a god, is a leader and protector in the world. And universally, indeed, it is fit that the whole polity should be coadapted to one ruler and empire; but, especially, that things which have the relation of parts should accord with the same harmony and supreme domination. Farther still, it is the province of a king to oblige and benefit his subjects, but this not without justice and law. And the third thing which is adapted to the dignity of a king is the worship of the gods. For it is necessary that what is most excellent. should be honoured by the most excellent; and that which is the leader and ruler, by that which leads and rules. Of things, therefore, which are by nature most honourable, God is the best; but of things on the earth, and pertaining to men, a king is the most excellent. As God also is to the world, so is a king to the city [which he governs]; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God. For a city, indeed, being coadapted from things which are many and different, imitates the coarrangement and harmony of the world; but a king who possesses an innoxious dominion, and who is himself animated law, exhibits the form of God among men.
AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.
Hence it is necessary that a king should not be vanquished by pleasure, but that he should vanquish it; that he should not be similar to, but far excel the multitude; and that he should not conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure, but rather in the acquisition of probity. At the same time also it is fit that he who has occasion to rule over others should first be able to govern his own passions.
But with respect to the desire of obtaining great property, it must be observed, that a king ought to be wealthy in order that he may benefit his friends, relieve those that are in want, and justly punish his enemies. For the enjoyment of prosperity in conjunction with virtue is most delightful. The same thing must be said concerning the transcendency of a king. For since he always surpasses others in virtue, it is fit to form a judgment of his empire with reference to virtue, and not with reference to riches, or power, or his military strength. For he possesses one of these [viz. riches] in common with any casual persons; another [viz. power] in common with irrational animals; and the last in common with tyrants. But virtue is alone the peculiarity of good men. Hence, whatever king is temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money, and prudent and most skilful in governing, he will be in reality a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For the desire of accumulating more than is fit subsists about the irrational part of the soul: for desire is not rational[1]. But ambition and ferocity subsist about the irascible part: for this is the fervid and strenuous part of the soul. And the love of pleasure subsists about the epithymetic part: for this is the effeminate and yielding part of the soul. But injustice, which is the most perfect vice, and is of a composite nature, subsists about the whole soul. Hence it is necessary that the king should coharmonize like a lyre the city that is furnished with good laws, first establishing in himself the most just boundary and order of law, as knowing that the proper arrangement of the people, over whom divinity has given him dominion, ought to be coadapted to this boundary. It is also necessary that a good king should establish becoming positions and habits in the delivery of public orations, conducting himself politically, seriously, and earnestly, in order that he may neither appear to be rough to the multitude, nor may be contemptible; but may be agreeable and easy in his manners. He will however obtain these things, if in the first place he is venerable in his aspect and his discourse, and appears to deserve the sovereign authority which he possesses. But, in the second place, if he proves himself to be benign from his behaviour to those whom he may happen to meet, from his countenance and his beneficence. And in the third place, if he is formidable from his hatred of depravity, from the punishment which he inflicts on it, from his celerity in inflicting it, and, in short, from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable gravity, being a thing which imitates divinity, is capable of causing him to be admired and honoured by the multitude. Benignity will render him pleasing and beloved. And his being formidable will cause him to be terrible to and unconquered by his enemies, and magnanimous and confident to his friends.
It is necessary, however, that his gravity should have nothing in it of an abject or vulgar nature, but that it should be admirable, and such as becomes the dignity of empire and a sceptre. Nor should he ever contend with his inferiors, or his equals, but with those that are greater than himself; and he should conceive, conformably to the magnitude of his empire, that those pleasures are the greatest which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which arise from sensual gratifications; separating himself indeed from human passions, and approximating to the Gods, not through arrogance, but through magnanimity and an invincible transcendency of virtue. Hence he should invest himself with such a gracefulness and majesty in his aspect and his reasonings, in the conceptions of his mind, in the manners of his soul, and in his actions and the motions and gesture of his body, that those who survey him may perceive that he is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a decorous disposition. For a good king should convert to himself the souls of those that behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and harmony attract the attention of those that hear them. And thus much concerning the venerable gravity of a king.
But I shall now endeavour to speak of his benignity. Universally, therefore, every king will be benign, if he is just, equitable, and beneficent. For justice is a connective and collective communion, and is alone that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to those that are near to us. For as rhythm is to motion, and harmony to the voice, so is justice to communion; since it is the common good of those that govern, and those that are governed, because it coharmonizes political society. But equity and benignity are certain assessors of justice; the former indeed softening the severity of punishment; but the latter extending pardon to less guilty offenders. It is necessary, however, that a good king should give assistance to those that are in want of it, and be beneficent. But his assistance should be given not in one way only, but in every possible way. And it is requisite to be beneficent, not looking to the magnitude of honour, but to the manner and deliberate choice of him by whom honour is conferred. It is likewise necessary that a worthy king should so conduct himself towards all men as to avoid being troublesome to them, but especially towards men of an inferior rank and of a slender fortune: for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions similar to those of the Gods, and which especially resemble those of Jupiter, the ruler of all things. For he is venerable and honourable, through transcendency and magnitude of virtue. He is benign, because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; and hence he is said by the Ionic poet [Homer] to be the father of men and Gods. He is also terrible and transcendent, because he punishes the unjust, and reigns and rules over all things. But he carries thunder in his hand, as a symbol of his formidable excellence. From all these particulars, therefore, it is requisite to remember that a kingdom is a God-resembling thing.
- ↑ In the original, α μεν γαρ πλεονεκτια γινεται περι το αγουμενον μερος τας ψυχας· λογικα γαρ α επιθυμια. But for αγουμενον, I read αλογον; and for λογικα, it is necessary to read ου λογικα. For the vices, according to the Pythagoreans, subsist about the irrational part of the soul, which consists, according to them, as well as according to Plato, of anger and desire. Hence Metopus, the Pythagorean, says: "Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, the latter is divided into the irascible and the appetitive. And the rational part, indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire." See my translation of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments, at the end of my translation of lamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras.