Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962/CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 1
ENQUIRY IN SARAWAK
Section A,——Background
10. Sarawak occupies the north—western part of Borneo and is bordered on the east and south by Indonesian Kalimantan, and on the north by Brunei and North Borneo. The country is 47,500 square miles in area (compare North Borneo 29,388 square miles, and Malaya 50,700 square miles), three—quarters of it covered by tropical evergreen rain forest. Behind a coastal fringe of mangrove and nipah palm, there is a belt of swamp forest, in some places extending far inland. Beyond this lies rugged hill country and the complex mountain ranges and forested ravines along the Indonesian border. Large muddy rivers and a maze of tributary streams and channels flow north-westwards into the South China Sea and form the principal means of communication. Large areas of Sarawak are practically uninhabited (overall density: 15 per square mile) and nearly a quarter of the population is concentrated on about 3 per cent. of the total land area in the Kuching and Serian District. Only 6 per cent of the country is under settled cultivation, and a further 18 per cent. under shifting cultivation. The climate is hot, wet and humid. The economy depends on agriculture. forestry and fisheries; the principal exports by value being rubber, timber, pepper and sago.
11. Evidence of human activity in Sarawak dates from prehistoric times, but its growth as an integral State began with the landing of James Brooke in 1839 and his installation as Rajah in 1841. Under the Brooke family the frontiers of Sarawak were extended many times until the country is now over 20 times its original size.
12. Sarawak became a Crown Colony in 1946 when it was ceded to Britain by the third Rajah. In 1941, just before the Japanese occupation, the Rajah introduced a new Constitution of which the "Nine Cardinal Principles of the rule of the English Rajah"[1] formed part. The present Constitution, which replaced that of 1941, incorporates the Nine Cardinal Principles and provides for the appointment of a Governor and Commander-in-Chief, a Supreme Council (the executive council), and a Council Negri (the legislature). The Council Negri consists of 24 elected members, 14 ex officio members, 4 nominated members and 1 standing member who was appointed for life before cession. The Supreme Council consists of 5 elected members elected by Council Negri, 3 ex officio members, and 2 nominated members. There is a well—established system of Electoral Colleges and Sub-Electoral Colleges under which members are elected to Council Negri by Divisional, Municipal and Urban District Councils.
Section B.―Arrangements for Commission's Visit
13. Arrangements had been made, before our arrival, for the members of the Commission to visit all five Divisions of Sarawak. The Commission held sittings in all but one of the Districts and saw representatives from the other. Details of the itinerary are contained in Appendix A and it is sufficient to record here that hearings were held at 20 different places over a total period of four weeks. This involved us in an extensive programme of travelling by air, river and road. Although it was not possible for us to reach the remoter areas, the flight to Long Akah on the Baram River and the journey by the M.V. Zahora up the Rejang River provided an opportunity for us to see something of conditions in the interior and to visit some longhouses.
14. Apart from one mishap caused by the weather, which did not seriously interfere with our programme, the arrangements went smoothly throughout. We recognise, however, that the Sarawak Government had provided us with the best and most rapid means of transport, including chartered aircraft and the use of the Governor's and other launches and river craft, and that it would not otherwise have been possible to carry out such a comprehensive tour in such a relatively short space of time. This question of difficulty of communications in Sarawak is an important one and one which in our opinion has a definite bearing on the problem which we were asked to examine.
15. The Sarawak Govenrment's Paper on Malaysia had been published early in January some six weeks before we arrived in Kuching. It had been translated into the major local languages, and instructions had been issued to Residents and to District officers that it should be distributed as widely as possible and every effort made to ensure that the implications of the proposals were understood. We were much impressed with the energy with which these instructions must have been carried out. The task was no easy one. Away from the towns, we have already drawn attention to the slow means transport and to the distances to be covered, but there was the further difficulty that a high proportion of the people in the interior are illiterate and that it takes time and perseverance to explain a complex subject to them. Inevitably there were some areas where knowledge of the Paper was slight; but with only a few weeks available between the issue of the Paper and the arrival of the Commission, it was remarkable, judging from the evidence given to us, how much had been achieved.
16. In the towns, the problem was a different one. The atmosphere since the idea of a Federation of Malaysia had first been mooted in May 1961 had been conducive to the intensification of political discussion and greater awakening of political consciousness The task of the Government's administrative staff was not so much to foster discussion of the proposals for a Federation of Malaysia as to endeavour to see that the public was not misled.
Section C.―Poiitical Developments and Racial Relations
17. Before proceeding with more detailed consideration of our findings, It may be useful to draw attention to a few of the more salient features of the situation as we have found it in Sarawak. 18. A most fundamental question in the multi-racial society of Sarawak is that of race relations. In recent years relations between the different communities have been excellent and Sarawak has clearly had the good fortune of being a very happy country. It is true that under a colonial administration, where power manifestly rests not with any one racial group but with the colonial Power which is held in regard for its efficiency and impartiality, the harmony of racial relations on the surface may tend to conceal latent friction. So long as the reins of power are firmly in the colonial administration's hands there is little conflict of interests between the indigenous people on the one hand, and the immigrant races, in this case the Chinese, on the other, who are on the whole satisfied to go their separate ways.
19. However, this state of affairs could only last as long as political power remains with the colonial authority. We saw in Sarawak the conflict arising when a transfer of power is contemplated in some form and the indigenous people become aware of the prospect of having to share political power with the immigrant races at a time when they feel themselves still economically backward.
20. Uneasiness was felt at the time after the first elections when the first political party, the Sarawak United Peoples Party (S.U.P.P.) was formed with predominantly Chinese leadership. Taken as a signal for the beginning of the bid for power by the non-natives at a time when the natives felt themselves not yet in a position to compete, this set in motion the strain in race relations springing from the imbalance in economic power. The emotional identification by races became intensified as a result of fear of, and the desire for protection against, the domination of the other race groups. For this reason the Party Negara (Panas) and later the Sarawak National Party (S.N.P.) with native leadership came into being followed by the formation of Barisan Anak Jati Sarawak (Barjasa) and its proposal to enter into an alliance with S.N.P. The present proposals for a Malaysian Federation and the prospect of independence within the Federation have served to accentuate these developments. We, therefore. fully understood the reasons for the alignment of political forces along racial lines. Nevertheless, it is a matter of the gravest concern.
21. The position in Sarawak is further exacerbated by the fact that the present Government in Malaya, which would clearly be an important force in a new Federation of Malaysia, is anti-Communist. In the absence of some project like Malaysia, the Chinese, with their rapidly increasing population and their long start over other races in education, could expect, when independence came, to be in an unassailable position in Sarawak. This, in turn, could put the Communists, with their highly developed organisation to work on the fears and frustrations of the great body of non—Communist Chinese, in an equally unassailable position. The Malaysia proposals would interfere with this development. Communist elements have therefore worked ceaselessly to exaggerate the fears which the Chinese community as a whole and members of other communities have of Malay domination and to make capital out of every possible issue, e.g., special position for the natives, citizenship, national language and religion. They have also worked on the emotions of a large body of younger Chinese, who have been educated in Chinese schools, who are strongly nationalistic and who have feelings of frustration and anxiety about their prospects. The activities and the methods adopted by the extreme Left-wing groups, the hard core of which consists of the younger Chinese, have antagonised the other communities and indeed many Chinese and have drawn the attention of the country as a whole to the possibility of communal friction, which is being deliberately fanned by Communist elements.
22. The attitude of the indigenous population on the one hand and of the immigration race, on the other, to the concept of the Head of State is an interesting reflection of the communal conflict to which we have drawn attention above. The constitutional niceties of the concept may not be fully understood by many sections, except the more politically sophisticated, of a population which has been accustomed in the last l20 years to a Head of State, a Rajah or a Governor, who wielded executive powers. There is therefore a confusion in the popular mind between the functions of a constitutional Head of State and those of the officer who actually wields executive authority. There is no confusion of mind, however, about the transfer of authority in the new Federation from the British Government to the peoples of the territories, and the Head of State has become a symbol of this transfer of power. The native races therefore have insisted that the Head of State should be a native, reflecting their concept of the return of the power of government from the British Government to themselves, and the immigrant races have likewise insisted that anyone born in Sarawak should be eligible for the office, reflecting their concept of the transfer of power from the British Government to the people of Sarawak. The native population's insistence on a native being the Head of State stems in the main from the anxiety to utilise what they believe are the political powers of the office to correct the imbalance of economic power between themselves and the immigrant races. It is clear also that in the minds of both the natives and the non-natives of Sarawak the office of the Head of State or Governor or whatever other title it may be given, carries with it a prestige which is an important consideration in the context of race relations. At the same time both the natives and the non-natives are fully aware that the administrative machinery must continue to depend upon British officials for the proper and efficient discharge of its responsibilities.
23. In the above paragraphs we have considered the question of relations between the Chinese and the natives. While on the subject of race relations, mention must also be made of the relations between the Malays and the other indigenous people. Although there are no ideological overtones here, we have found that the prospect of Malaysia is viewed by non-Malay natives in certain parts of the country within the framework of their unhappy recollection of Brunei domination in the past, which is regarded as Malay domination, and of their fear of its return with the new Federation. The suggested name of Malaysia for the new Federation, and of Malay as the national language and Islam as the national religion have tended to emphasise these misgivings.
24. We have been conscious of these political forces which are at present active in Sarawak and are most anxious to emphasise that the new constitutional arrangements should be designed not only in full awareness of these factors but also with the deliberate intention of removing the fundamental causes of these disharmonies in so far as they can be removed by constitutional arrangements. The indigenous peoples and the Chinese are both an integral part of the population of Sarawak; both have played their part in the past and both have their part to play in the future; it is essential that they should live and work in harmony. If these things can be achieved, the intensification of political consciousness arising out of the Malaysia proposals will in the long run prove beneficial. Although some kind of association between the Federation of Malaya and the Borneo territories has long been discussed, the degree of interest taken in Sarawak, both by supporters and by opponents of the present proposals, has been a most encouraging indication of their concern regarding their political future. In this connexion, the deliberations of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee,[2] representing the opinion of informed and responsible sections of the population of Sarawak, have made a most useful contribution.
Section D.—General Observations on Evidence.
25. We have noted earlier the high esteem in which the colonial administration is held in Sarawak. Generous tributes were paid by all communities to the impartiality of colonial administrators and to the progress which has been made since the war. In a multi-racial society the quality of impartiality, and belief in such impartiality, is exceedingly important. The present officials, moreover, have an intimate knowledge of the people and of the requirements and possibilities of the country. For these reasons, the wish was expressed to us from almost every quarter that any new arrangements should not cause an exodus of the present ofiicials, but should rather encourage them to remain in service in Sarawak until their places can be taken by the local people with the necessary qualifications.
26. We were made aware of the high respect and affection in which Her Majesty The Queen is held, more especially among native populations in the interior. There was genuine gratification that the Commonwealth links would be maintained with Malaysia.
27. On a number of occasions during our tour, we were reminded of the “Nine Cardinal Principles of the rule of the English Rajah”. These Principles which had long been observed were enacted by the then Rajah of Sarawak in 1941, and since the cession of the territory to the Crown, have been enshrined in the First Schedule to the Sarawak (Constitution) Order-in-Council, I956. They are reproduced in Appendix C. The eighth of these Principles, to which our attention was most frequently drawn, reads as follows:
- “That the goal or self-government shall always be kept in mind, that the people or Sarawak shall be entrusted in due course with the governance of themselves, and that continuous efforts shall be made to hasten the reaching of this goal by educating them in the obligations, the responsibilities and the privileges of citizenship."
The argument was used by those who opposed the Malaysia proposals that it would be inconsistent with the British Government's obligation to agree to a scheme which did not first grant independence to Sarawak. The Malaysia proposals are regarded in some quarters as an indication that the British Government are no longer prepared to shoulder their responsibilities or honour their commitments. We should record, however, that some of the native population, who at the time of cession had found assurance in these Principles, were at pains to explain to us that they would not wish them to stand in the way of the achievement of Malaysia.
28. We have found that a very large number of the supporters of Malaysia were influenced by their admiration for the Malayan Prime Minister and his colleagues for their firm leadership and their imaginative policies in rural development. In particular those who had visited the Federation of Malaya were much impressed by the economic and social progress which they had found there and they were anxious that Sarawak should enjoy similar progress within Malaysia. We might, in parenthesis, draw attention to the unfortunate repercussions which may follow if these hopes are not realised.
29. The firm opposition or the present Malayan Government to Communist designs has also won the admiration of many people of all races. They are increasingly aware of the threat of Communist subversion and infiltration to which we have drawn attention. As transfer of political power in due course is inevitable. they see advantage in independence within a larger community.
30. At the same time the ideological position of the present leadership in the Federation is also an important factor in the opposition to Malaysia. We have drawn attention earlier to the threat which Malaysia poses for those Chinese who are emotionally or ideologically inclined to China, and to the sedulous efforts of Communist elements to foster opposition among this group and among the Chinese population generally.
31 Another important factor, giving rise in some cases to opposition and in other cases to doubt, is a dislike of change and a fear of the unknown. The present administration is well liked, considerable economic and social progress has been made, and law and order is maintained. Many people among the native populations see no need for the Malaysian proposals and would prefer things to go on as they are. The same is true of a large section of the Chinese business community.
32 Last but not least, a major strand in the opposition to Malaysia lies in the demand for independence, after the achievement of which there was general readiness to consider the possibility of Malaysia. This expression of opinion merits serious consideration. It springs from a genuine fear of discrimination after Malaysia, a feeling among the Chinese that their status would be reduced to that of " second-class citizens" and among the natives that their customary laws and practices would be affected. Similarly, there is concern that Malaysia would entail migration from the other territories of the new Federation, and also that such safeguards as may be given could be removed at a later stage by the Central Government. Assurances were therefore sought on these points. If their misgivings and reservations are met, many of those (both Chinese and native) who are now hostile or doubtful might well come round to support. Malaysia.
33. We have found near-unanimous agreement on some points among those who favour Malaysia; on other points, among all the native populations whether or not strong supporters of Malaysia, and on other points again, among all races except in those groups who were not prepared to discuss Malaysia at all.
34. Those who favour Malaysia expressed a general desire—
35. Groups from all native populations expressed a general desire—
36. Groups from all races, other than outright opponents of Malaysia, expressed a general desire, in addition to the point already mentioned about the retention of British officers—
37. Regarding the Head of Sarawak State, to which reference has been made earlier, there was some conflict between the indigenous people on the one hand, and the Chinese on the other: each group was, nevertheless, near-unanimous in its views. The natives have insisted that only natives should be eligible to be Head of State, while the non-natives have expressed with equal emphasis their desire that the office should be open to anyone born in Sarawak.
38. On a number of other points there were differences of opinion—
39. These points of agreement and disagreement are further discussed later.
Section E.—Summary of Evidence from Various Racial Groups and Political Parties
40. In this section we record the evidence submitted to us by the various racial groups and political parties. We have found this a convenient method of setting out the evidence and it is noteworthy that the great majority of groups which appeared before us were composed of people of the same race. But an over—emphasis, as much as a denial, of the communal element in the affairs of Sarawak would be unfortunate and misleading. There should not be too rigid of final identification of particular communal groups with particular attitudes towards Malaysia. The analysis by races should therefore be read fully with the general observations set out above. It should also be noted that in this section we lay considerable emphasis (as did witnesses themselves) on the various qualifications and conditions which were put up for our consideration by supporters and opponents of Malaysia alike, as well as by those who had not entirely made up their minds. It was to the particular matter which they wished to see covered that witnesses called our attention, rather than to the reasons for which they favoured the scheme. The fact that, in the following pages, much space is devoted to conditions and reservations reflects the anxiety or witnesses and of ourselves that every point raised should have full consideration. It should not obscure the fact that, among very many groups of supporters who appeared before us, there was great enthusiasm for early realisation of Malaysia.
41. The Ibans form the largest single group of the population and by far the largest native group. They are primarily, country people and few take to town life. Although they are to be found throughout the country, nearly 75 per cent, of their total number live in the Second and Third Divisions.
42. Probably the most important single centre of the Ibans is at Kapit in the Third Division. A conference(or "aum") of 51 elected Chiefs (Pengarahs and Penghulus) had been held there on the 15th February, 1962, to discuss the proposals for a Federation of Malaysia set out in the Sarawak Government's Paper. The conference reached general agreement that the scheme should be supported, subject to certain conditions: and their resolutions (which had been published in the Press) were formally presented to us when the Commission visited Kapit on the l9th March. The resolutions were the following:
43. This was an expression of opinion to which we attached very great weight. The 51 Chiefs at the conference together were said to represent some 112,000 lbans out of a total population of nearly 238,000 and many delegations of lbans who came before us at different centres in the Third Division confirmed that they supported the Kapit Resolutions. In a small number of cases a demand was made that they should either be accepted without alteration or that any changes should be made only after there had been opportunity for further discussion with the Iban people.
44. While the great majority of the Ibans in the Third Division who were in favour of the Malaysia plan took their stand on the Kapit Resolutions, there were sortie groups who gave their full support to the scheme on the basis of the recommendations in the report of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Commmittee.
45. In many places, more especially in the more remote areas and in areas where the Ibans form a proportionately smaller section of the population, a feeling of general uncertainty was apparent. It was represented to us by Ibans and others who had given the matter careful thought, that the Kapit Resolutions had to be considered against a background of implicit trust in the British Government. Hitherto, the lbans had been looking forward to the self-government which had been promised to them, and the principal reason why they were ready, on conditions, to accept the Malaysia proposals, despite their uncertainties, was because they were confident that the British Government would not recommend the scheme if it was not going to be beneficial to them.
46. Some of the younger men in predominantly Iban areas were less ready than their chiefs to accept the proposals, even on conditions, and a number were definitely opposed to it. We were reminded that the second of Brunei rule in Borneo in past centuries was far from encouraging and fears were expressed that the relative backwardness and inexperience of the Ibans might be used to their disadvantage by the more advanced and sophisticated Malays. They wanted to be treated by the Malays as brothers, but not as younger brothers. They were opposed to the idea that Sarawak should be treated as only one of 15 States in a Federation of Malaysia; they maintained that this would give her too small a voice in the new Federation's affairs. There was fear too that a large proportion of Sarawak's revenue would be handed over to the Federal Government without a corresponding return in the shape of services to the people of Sarawak.
47. The question of the right to withdraw from the new Federation was raised with us at Kapit and elsewhere. It was suggested to us that in certain circumstances there should be such a right at least for a period of five years, and that this should be specifically stated in the Federal Constitution. Some felt that this was a desirable provision in a new venture about which they felt some doubts. Others suggested that it should apply only in certain circumstances such as:
48. One group from the Baram River hotly opposed the creation of a Federation of Malaysia but recognised that the decision might go against them. They insisted that, if this was so, certain conditions should be met. These were much the same as those set out in the Kapit Resolutions, but went further in some respects and the group was not prepared to discuss any modification of them.
49. The Second Division Ibans were nof represented at the Kapit "Aum " but most of the many groups whom we saw supported the idea of Malaysia, though they asked for safeguards. These differed little from those which had been suggested by Ibans in the Third Division but in some respects were rather more specific. The following points were raised, many of them repeatedly:
50. As in the case of the Third Division, the Iban groups in the Second Division who supported the Malaysia plan included some who did so on the basis set out in the report of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee. They were, in most cases, members of Party Negara.
51. A considerable number of groups were uncertain what attitude to adopt towards Malaysia. There were perhaps more of these in the Second Division than in the Third. There were some too who presented the standard S.U.P.P. demands with which we deal in paragraphs 79-85. One letter suggested that the Brooke regime should be restored before Malaysia is considered.
52. Finally, the view was expressed to us by Hbans in many centres that it was of great importance that a decision on Malaysia should be reached as soon as possible. Political activity had been stimulated to an alarming degree during recent months by the Malaysia proposals and many Ibans were afraid that there might be violence not only between different races but between Ibans who supported the Malaysia plan and those who opposed it.
53. The Malays form the next largest native group after the Ibans. Rather over half of the total number live in the First Division, chiefly in the neighborhood of Kuching, and in the rest of the country they live mainly in downriver areas or near the towns. They all adhere to the Muslim religion.
54. Almost without exception the Malays who appeared before the Commission, or who sent their views to us in writing, were wholly in favour of the creation of a Federation of Malaysia. A large proportion of them supported the recommendations made by the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee. The points to which Malay opinion attached most importance were the following:
55. Some of the more thoughtful groups of Malays said that they were convinced that in present circumstances the creation of a Federation of Malaysia would give Sarawak the best possible guarantee of effectively combating the dangers of Communism and possible predatory designs of other countries in the area. They asked that opportunities should be provided for Sarawak natives to be recruited in the armed forces.
56. Emphasis was placed too on the importance of speed, on the grounds that political parties with Communist affiliations or leanings would be making every effort, against the true interests of Sarawak, to induce the people—more especially the illiterate—to oppose the plan. A few persons mentioned, as a possible target date, the 31st August, 1962, being the fifth anniversary of Merdeka in the Federation of Malaya, but they gave no evidence of having given serious thought to the legal and constitutional difficulties of moving so fast.
57. In the Fifth Division, the attitude of the Malays was affected by the desire of some of them to be reunited with Brunei. More than one group of Malays, including some younger men, opposed the creation of a Federation of Malaysia for this reason. Some said that they wished first to have a Federation of the three Borneo territories, and claimed that the whole of Sarawak and North Borneo had formerly been part of the Sultan of Brunei's dominions and should be returned to His Highness. Only then should the possibility of a merger with Malaya be considered.
58. Although not the next largest group in point of numbers, it will be convenient to deal next with the Melanaus, as their attitude towards the Malaysia proposals is almost identical with that of the Malays. The Melanaus live in kampongs mainly in the coastal areas of the Third and Fourth Divisions and just over 70 per cent of them are Muslims.
59. The views of many of the groups whom we saw were clearly influenced by the hope that the coming of Malaysia would bring them benefits and privileges, for example free primary education, a larger number of scholarships and places in the Public Service and opportunities in trade, which are not available to them now. Some of them recognised that special privileges for natives should continue only until the natives have had time, through education and training, to be able to compete on equal terms with the other races. They suggested a term of 20 years after which the privileges should be abolished.
60. The Melanaus' support of the proposal to create a Federation of Malaysia was subject to the same conditions as are set out in paragraph 54 dealing with the Malays. Indeed in many cases Malays and Melanaus came together to see us in a single delegation. In one respect only was there any divergence of view: most non-Muslim Melanaus were opposed to a State religion for Sarawak.
61. The Land Dayaks live almost entirely in the First Division of the country. In relation to their numbers (57,619) not many came forward to give us their views, but we saw some groups of Land Dayaks in each of the four districts which we visited in the First Division and we were able to obtain more information about their attitude towards Malaysia from other reliable sources.
62. Some of the Land Dayaks whom we saw were members of Party Negara and. gave their support to the proposals set out in the report of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee; others appeared as members of S.U.P.P. delegations and opposed the Malaysia plan.
63. But our impression generally of Land Dayaks' opinion was that they had less understanding of the Malaysia proposals than the other major native communities in Sarawak. They wish to be given more time to consider a scheme which they recognise is of great importance to them and to the future of Sarawak as a whole. They know that they are educationally backward and that they cannot at present hold their own, but they can also see that the rising generation is getting an education which was not available to them when they were young, so that the position of their community should improve within a foreseeable space of time.
64. All this, combined with an innate dislike of change and a distrust of new ideas, leads the majority of the Land Dayaks to wish to remain under British guardianship for at least a number of years longer. They pointed out that Sarawak was their only home and that they wanted to run no risks that it might be destroyed by others, as they feared it would be if people came in from outside. They did not think they were ready for independence but, if it had to come, they wanted Sarawak to become independent on its own and to remain in the Commonwealth.
65. Another important factor in Land Dayak thinking on the Malaysia scheme is the recollection—handed down from earlier generations of rule by Brunei and Kuching Malays. This arouses antipathy to any proposals which might involve the return of Malay hegemony in any form and leads them to view Malaysia (particularly under that name) at best with considerable reserve.
66. While this was the general attitude, there were some exceptions among the more thoughtful of the Land Dayaks who appeared before us. These had studied the Government Paper and agreed that the idea of Malaysia was a good one, but asked that matters should not be hurried. Particular points in which interest was shown were the position of the Head of State who, it was asked should be eligible for election to the position of Head of the Federation; the safeguarding of customary land rights; and the strict control of immigration.
67. The Kenyah and Kayan peoples total just under 16,000 persons and they live in the Third and Fourth Divisions. The majority live in the middle and upper reaches of the Baram River.
68. The views expressed to us by these peoples were that they did not want independence and that they relied on the British to continue to provide the help and guidance which they felt they still badly needed. They did not understand the Malaysia Plan and could not avoid the impression that the British, who had ruled them so well, were preparing to desert them. They wanted the British to stay until they were able to look after themselves. We were referred to the petition which had been addressed to Her Majesty The Queen in 1959, to which a reply had been sent giving an assurance that it was implicit the Eighth of the Cardinal Principles that Her Majesty's Government would not surrender final responsibility for the development of Sarawak until they were satisfied that the people as a whole were able to play their full part in the government of the country, and that in pursuing this goal sight would not be lost of the best interests and desires of the indigenous communities.
69 There were 7,200 Kedayans in Sarawak at the time of the 1960 census and they live in the Fourth and Fifth Divisions. The majority are Muslims and their attitude towards Malaysia differed little from that of the Malays. They were concerned that local customs should be safeguarded.
70 There were only 5,200 Muruts in Sarawak at the 1960 census. They live in the Fifih Division (there are much larger numbers over the border in Indonesia and in North Borneo). Their attitude to Malaysia was that they were very happy and peaceful as they were and, although they could see the advantage of belonging to a larger and stronger unit, they felt that they needed more time to think the matter over in view of its very great importance for their future. They very much feared the effects of the British leaving Sarawak. A large proportion of the Muruts in Sarawak are fervent Evangelical Christians and emphasis was laid on the importance not only of freedom of workship but of freedom to propagate their faith.
71. There are approximately 2,800 Bisayahs living in the Firth Division. Few representatives were seen by the Commission. Some were members of S.U.P.P., some of a Malay youth organisation, and no clear racial attitude towards the Malaysia proposals was apparent.
72. There are rather over 2,000 Kelabits living in the uplands in the extreme interior of the Fourth and Fifth Divisions. Until an air strip was put in last year, the journey up river to reach them took two to three weeks. Their representatives paid tribute to the great progress which had been made since the cession of Sarawak to Britain in 1946. They had discussed the Malaysia proposals fully and had reached the conclusion that they were not yet ready for them. Their attitude was identical with that of the Kenyahs and Kayans.
73. No groups representing the Punans, a nomadic race in the far interior, appeared before the Commission, although one or two Punans appeared as individual members of other groups.
74. The Chinese are the next largest community in Sarawak after the Ibans and it is probable that within a few years they will become the largest. At the time of the 1960 census, the quite remarkable figure of over 50 per cent of the Chinese population was under the age of fifteen and this is bound to create an acute employment problem in a few years' time, particularly among those whose education has been solely in Chinese-medium schools. The Chinese live largely in the towns where they are shopkeepers, artisans, clerks and labourers, and in the environs of towns where they are market gardeners and small holders. A number are growers of rubber and pepper. About 80 per cent of the total number of Chinese in the country were born in Sarawak and, of the remaining 20 per cent a high proportion have been settled in Sarawak for many years.
75. The bulk of the evidence submitted to us from Chinese sources did not favour Malaysia. Numerically a very high proportion of the Chinese who actually appeared before us came in groups putting S.U.P.P. views which we record later.
76. In comparison with North Borneo, fewer Chinese associations or individuals in Sarawak submitted evidence which did not closely follow party lines. We attribute this partly to a feeling that they might be wasting their time and that decisions had already been taken, but even more to fears that the submission of evidence to us might expose them to retaliation and intimidation by extreme Left-wing elements. We therefore felt it necessary in arriving at the general considerations set out earlier in this Chapter to rely to some extent on indirect enquiry and individual contacts.
77. The main points put to us from Chinese sources other than those appearing in S.U.P.P. groups or expressing similar views were the following. In some cases they were put to us as reasons for opposition to Malaysia: in others as matters which, if Malaysia came into being, it was hoped would receive earnest consideration.
- (a) Citizenship
- (b) Special Privileges for Natives
- (c) Position of Sarawak in Relation to the Federal Government
by the delegation from the party's headquarters, was such as to deserve careful and sympathetic examination. Many members of the party delegations throughout the country were responsible persons, presenting serious views to which we have given due weight. But at a very early stage we had evidence that a large section of the party's supporters had other motives for its opposition to Malaysia. It is clear to us that, although the origin and leadership of the party are in no way Communist, there has recently been a high degree of Communist infiltration and influence in the party. It was equally clear that the Communist elements have worked on two other elements which form the main components of the party—those Chinese who are fearful that Malaysia would reduce their status in Sarawak in comparison with other races, and the younger Chinese who are educated, nationalistic, and suffer from a sense of frustration.
83. Some of the party's delegations were aggressive; in other delegations the spokesman was sometimes unable to answer the Commission's questions and sometimes unwilling or afraid to do so. On such occasions it was usually possible to pick out another member of the delegation who was watching carefully what the spokesman said. In a number of instances, delegations consisting almost entirely of Chinese were headed by a spokesman of another race and we could only assume that this was done to convey the impression that the delegation was multi-racial. One argument which some of the more aggressive delegations advanced was that conditions in Malaya were thoroughly bad; that there was much unemployment and that daily wages were far below those current in Sarawak. They said that they had read this information in Chinese newspapers.
84. We should refer here to the signature campaign which was a prominent feature of the party's programme. We were presented by the headquarters' delegation and by the party's branch delegations, at nearly every place we visited, with one or more volumes of signatures and thumbprints of persons who, it was claimed, were opposed to the Malaysia plan and supported the party's stand. The thumbprints vastly outnumbered the signatures and the total number of both from the whole of Sarawak amounted to over 112,000. Without extensive official enquiries, which did not seem to us desirable or likely to be conclusive, we were not able to verify these signature or thumbprints, nor to check that the same thumbprints were not impressed on the document more than once or that they were all of them of adults. It is perhaps sufficient to draw attention to the ease with which illiterate persons may be induced to place their thumbprints on a piece of paper without being aware of its contents. The very number of thumbprints and signatures alone, when considered in relation to the population of Sarawak, led us to be very doubtful of their value in view of the weight of opinion in favour of the Malaysia proposals which has been described elsewhere in this Chapter. Moreover from enquiries which we made in many responsible quarters, we derived the impression that the methods by which this signature campaign had been conducted included misrepresentation of the question being asked and a degree of intimidation. For these various reasons we have unanimously concluded that we should not be wise to attach undue importance to these columes of signatures and thumbprints as a true expression of public opinion on the issues before us.
85. Before concluding this section, and to avoid any possible misapprehension, we should make it clear that we do not in any way question the sincerity of very many thinking people, both Chinese and others, who opposed the Malaysia plan when appearing before us as members of S.U.P.P. delegations. It would be quite wrong to describe all these people as Communist or as being knowingly under Communist influence, and we had much sympathy with those who took exception to being so described.
- Party Negara (PANAS)
86. This party was formed in April 1960. Its total membership towards the end of February 1962 was stated to be 52,795 of which Malays and Ibans provided approximately 20,000 each and Land Dayaks another 10,000. The party claimed to have established 65 branches and sub-branches throughout the State, and party delegations did in fact appear before us at a number of places.
87. The party's attitude towards Malaysia is based on the recommendation in the report of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee that Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei should each become States in the present Federation which would include in addition the 11 States in the present Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore. It recognises that Sarawak is not yet ready for independence on her own but welcomes the opportunity to gain independence as part of a strong Federation, particularly in view of the cultural, economic and historical ties that exist between Sarawak and Malaya. The party agrees generally with the reservations contained in the M.S.C.C. report. Points which were particularly emphasised to us were the following:
- Sarawak National Party
88. This party was formed in 1961 by Ibans in the Second Division, and its influence up to the time of the Commission's visit had not penetrated to any appreciable extent to the other Divisions. The membership claimed was then 46,000, predominantly Iban. It is, of course, difficult to judge but our impression, based on the evidence we heard and on information from reliable sources, leads us to think that the active membership probably falls substantially short of this figure.
89. Despite initial misgivings, the party has come down firmly in favour of Malaysia which it now considers to be a " vital necessity ", for the reasons that it recognises that Sarawak cannot stand alone, and that Malaysia will bring greater prosperity and will provide protection against the threat of Communism.
90. The main points which the party has asked shall be considered in drawing up a plan for a Federation of Malaysia are the following:
To be called Rajah; to be from one of the indigenous races; and to be elected by the people of Sarawak.
Each Head of State in the new Federation to be eligible for nomination in rotation as Head of the Federation.
No alteration of boundaries of any State, especially between Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo.
Preservation of both to remain a State responsibility.
Malay to be accepted as the national language in Malaysia but Iban to be one of the secondary languages. English to remain the official language not only in Sarawak but also in the new Federation for at least 15 years. English also to remain the medium of instruction in schools, provided that the study of other languages is not prevented.
To remain until suitable people from Sarawak can replace them.
Adequate constitutional safeguards to ensure that State powers are not changed without the agreement of the State.
To be under State control.
The indigenous peoples to enjoy the same privileges as the Malays in Malaya, including a fair share of Government employment and of overseas training and scholarships. Preferential treatment for indigenous peoples should not, however, be made " hard and fast ".
The Constitution of the new Federation to guarantee freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate any religion freely.
Each State to be permitted to make a fair contribution of manpower to the armed services of Malaysia.
91. On all other matters, the party supports the recommendations made in the report of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee.
92. Finally, the party regards it as most important that a clause should be included at the beginning of the Constitution that any State that finds it not acceptable shall have the right to withdraw from the Federation.
- Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak (BARJASA)
93. This party was formed only a short while before the arrival of the Commission in Sarawak. It is composed of Malays, Ibans, Land Dayaks and Chinese, but it was difficult to assess the extent to which it was attracting substantial support. Its headquarters, and its principal source of strength at the time of our visit, was in Kuching.
94. The party is in full support of the proposal to create a Federation of Malaysia and with most of the recommendations in the report of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee. Particular points made by the party are the following:
The party considers that he should be a person who is indigenous to Sarawak and that he should be styled the Yang di-Pertuan Negara. The party does not consider it appropriate that a Sultan or Rajah should be appointed for the purpose of making the Head of State in Sarawak eligible for appointment as Head of the Federation.
While agreeing with the recommendation of the M.S.C.C. that the Chief Minister must be someone who has the support of the State Legislature, the party considers that, if Malaysia comes into being before the next General Election in Sarawak, the votes of the official as well as the unofficial members of the Council should be taken into account in deciding this question.
The party considers that the existing system of indirect elections should continue at least until the next General Election.
The party wishes Sarawak to be given at least 17 seats in the House of Representatives. For the Senate, they agree with the present arrangements in Malaya under which each State elects two members.
Malay is accepted as the National Language. but the party considers that English should be used for ofiicial purposes in Sarawak for at least l5 years from the day on which Malaysia comes into existence. The party considers too that the present policy of the Sarawak Government on the use of English as a medium of instruction in secondary schools should not be changed without the concurrence of the State Legislature.
The party consider it essential that control of migration into Sarawak should be vested in the State.
The party agrees with the views of the M.S.C.C. on this subject, but does not wish a test of permanent residence to be applied to a person who is indigenous to Sarawak.
These should be granted to the indigenous peoples In Sarawak as they are to the Malays in Malaya but, as the latter are more advanced than the natives in Sarawak, the party considers that the ratio of scholarship awards for Sarawak should be seven for natives to every one for non—natives; and that the same ratio should apply to the public services. The indigenous peoples should also be given special treatment in the economic field, and assistance, including financial assistance, to encourage them to enter into business. These special privileges should, however, continue for a limited period and the party suggests 20 years. The party makes clear its opposition to any suggestion that non-native should be deprived of their vested rights.
The party wished these to be confined to natives as at safeguard against infiltration by Communists and their agents.
- ↑ See Appendix C.
- ↑ See Appendix F.