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United States Supreme Court

56 U.S. 189

Rockhill  v.  Hanna

THIS case was brought up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, upon a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof.

The facts in the case are succinctly stated in the opinion of the court, and also the questions certified.

It was submitted, on the part of the plaintiffs, by Mr. Thompson, upon a printed brief by Mr. Morrison and Mr. Mayor, and submitted on the part of the defendants, upon a printed brief, by Mr. O. H. Smith.

Mr. Thompson, for plaintiffs.

We shall in the outset assume, that the following principles must be carried into an examination of this case, and that without a recognition of which, the questions submitted cannot be intelligently and correctly determined. It is, perhaps, superfluous to say, that these principles are only a reiteration of the long-established and uniform decisions of this court, viz.

1st. If the State of Indiana has a statute declaring and defining judgment liens on real estate, this court will give full effect to such statute.

2d. If the supreme judicial tribunal of the State has given construction to the statute, this court will follow that construction.

The transcript shows that in the court below there were three several judgments rendered on the same day, against the same defendant, but in favor of different plaintiffs, one of which was in favor of our clients, Rockhill, Smith & Rockhill; that the marshal sold real estate of the execution defendant, under executions issued upon all three judgments, offering to each set of plaintiffs a portion of the avails, according to the amount of their respective judgments; that Rockhill, Smith & Rockhill, the plaintiffs, rejected such apportionment, claiming the whole avails of the sale as their legal right, and that for refusing to pay over the whole, the plaintiffs instituted this suit against the marshal and his sureties on their bond.

We state the case thus briefly to call the special attention of the court to the two propositions above stated; and we insist that the questions submitted naturally and necessarily suggest the inquiry, as a first principle to be ascertained, has the State of Indiana a law on the subject of judgment liens?

'Judgments in the Circuit and Supreme Courts of this State shall have the operation of, and shall be liens upon the real estate of the person or persons against whom such judgments may be rendered, from the day of the rendition thereof.' Revised Statutes of Indiana, 1838, page 306, § 22. The revised Statutes of 1843, page 454, are to the same effect.

We do not insist that the literal reading of the statute above cited, determines the questions submitted, in our favor; neither does it determine any thing against us. As to judgments of the same date, it is altogether silent. It neither in terms asserts the principle for which we contend, that priority should be accorded to the most vigilant creditor, nor the principle assumed and acted upon by the marshal, when he undertook to apportion the avails of the sale among the several creditors. They both rest upon the same foundation-a construction of the statute.

We proceed to show that the Supreme Court of Indiana has given the statute a construction that, if followed by this court, must determine the questions submitted, in favor of the plaintiffs. The case of Michaels v. Boyd, and others, Indiana Rep. 100, while it recognizes the doctrine that judgments rendered at the same time, have, under the statute, no priority of lien over each other, it yet decides that the creditor whose execution is first issued and levied, gains priority, as the most vigilant creditor.

If any thing were required to add weight to the opinion, we might suggest that it was pronounced by Judge Blackford, whose reputation as a jurist, we suppose, is not entirely unknown to this court. It will be also noticed that the decision is sustained by the cases of Adrams v. Dyer, 8 Johns. 347; Waterman v. Haskin, 11 Johns. 228, and 1 Howard's Miss. Rep. 39.

It was argued below, that the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana could not be considered a judicial construction of the local law of Indiana, on the subject of judgment liens. We suppose the argument will be pressed in this court. We cannot, however, believe it will find any favor here. The very second paragraph in Judge Blackford's opinion, cites the statute, by book and page, and his whole reasoning is in direct reference to the statute. The statute is the basis, the substratum of the decision.

We trust we shall not be considered guilty of the slightest disrespect, or as transgressing any rule of propriety, by alluding to the circumstance that at one important conjuncture of this case, his Honor Judge McLean allowed his judgment to be controlled by the same authorities cited by Judge Blackford in his opinion, which, by the by, was previous to the decision in Indiana. Judge McLean then ruled, that by our superior vigilance in taking out execution, levying, and selling, we had gained such a priority as entitled us to the whole of the proceeds of the sale. Afterwards, however, and after the second sale, (the first having been set aside by the court on the application of the attorneys for the other execution plaintiffs,) the learned judge, on the authority of the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in Rankin & Schatzell v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177, had his former opinion shaken.

NotesEdit

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).