The Czechoslovak Review/Volume 4/The Coal Problem

by Jiří Stříbrný

The Coal Problem

By JIŘÍ STŘÍBRNÝ.

The deficiency of coal is so serious that it has become our most urgent problem. Without coal we cannot improve our finances and communications, to say nothing of real distress of millions who freeze on streets and at home.

We hear constantly appeals to work harder. All of us, whether socialists or bourgeois, are saying over and over again that the world war subverted the economic foundation of all Europe, that productive capital is being consumed, that our republic has but one treasure, namely creative, productive human labor.

And while we are calling on the nation to work more intensively, one factory after another is being closed because of lack of coal.

Railroad transportation is in the same condition. We lack in comparison with peace times some 60,000 cars, but without coal we cannot make more cars, and when the firemen are compelled to stoke the locomotive boilers with coal dust and shale, the engines have to be sent to repair shops and transportation slows down even more.

I will refrain from speaking of the condition of those poor people who cannot get fuel to cook dinner or keep warm at home; one would need strong language to characterize such a state of affairs.

Looking at the situation without prejudices we come to the conclusion that there are several reasons for this misery, and it is up to us to do away with them. Merely to criticize or blame this or that ministry will get us nowhere. I do not propose to discuss the question from a party viewpoint, but solely as a good republican.

The main cause of the lack of coal is to be sought in my opinion in a decrease of the efficiency of the miners. This is best seen by comparing coal production for 1914 with 1918 and the first half of 1919. I use round numbers covering the production of the entire republic, Slovakia included, and taking in both black and brown coal.

---

Translated from the České Slovo of Nov. 21. The author is former minister of railways and one of the leaders of the Czechoslovak socialist party.

Year	Production in mill. tons	0Number 0of miners	Tons per miner	Decrease in efficiancy
1914	33½	093,600	353
1918	28	096,100	289	19%
1919	13	105,700	242	32%

The decrease in efficiency is not the same everywhere; it is greater in Kladno than in northern Bohemia or in the Ostrava basin. But it would not be just to say that the miner is wholly to blame for producing one third less. In 1914 the coal mines were in pretty good condition and getting up coal was much easier than it is today after the reckless robbery to which the mines were subjest during the war and with the run down equipment available now. Undoubtedly also the second half of the current year will, as is usual, show somewhat larger production. And then we must not forget the introduction of the eight hour law.

To explain the decreased production per man one must take into account poor nourishment of the workers, distaste for hearty work which is so striking all over Europe, and especially the run down equipment and war methods of exploitation for four years.

One may affirm that our miners work harder and more efficiently than they are getting credit for, but not as well as in the days before the war. To increase their efficiency is a matter of deep interest to us all. But let us remember that what we are after is more coal, and that does not depend on the miners alone.

Here we come to the second difficulty. All our mines need modern equipment, rational economy, costly improvements. Can we expect all that from private owners and speculators who are being told constantly that coal mines will be taken over by the state? It would be as sensible to expect that a criminal awaiting execution would send for a dentist and pay him to have his teeth overhauled.

An end must be put to this hesitation. Either socialization of the coal mines, and then let it be taken in hand at once; or a definite statement that for so many years the mines will be left undisturbed by the state. But to threaten socialization and do nothing more is very poor policy. Our German coal barons, Messrs. Petschek, Weimann, Guttmann, have no more idealism than the average man. It is in their interest to get as much out of the mines as it is possible at the last minute; why should they pay attention to rational exploitation or the need of putting more capital into the mines?

We must decide quickly. The most dangerous course would be not to go through with socialization, but to keep on talking about it, just to scare the owners and keep the workers in good humor.

Another problem is the distribution of coal. In spite of our dire needs tremendous quantities are being exported. Factories are shut down, trains cannot run, hospitals are closed, and yet we send coal out of the country. I do not want to lay the blame for that on the government. When our state was born, we lacked the freedom to do with our coal as we would like.

Out of the 26 million metric tons which is our present annual production we export about 7 million to Austria, Germany, Jugoslavia and Poland; certain compesation agreements increase that by half a million more. We send out over a fourth of what we produce and have hardly 18 million left for ourselves.

Deliveries abroad are of two kinds: voluntary on the basis of agreements made by our government of its own initiative, and compulsory deliveries which we had to agree to by orders of the Entente. To Germany and Jugoslavia we send coal voluntarity, to Austria and Poland we are compelled to.

Germany gets from the Czechoslovak Republic 262,000 tons of brown coal and 75,000 tons of black coal (including 6500 tons of coke) each month. For that we get German coal from Upper Silesia. Against this trade itself nothing can be said, but the conditions are onerous. For each carload of Silesian coal we must give Germany three and a half carloads of brown coal. That is a startling disparity, and even a layman will know that we give more heating value. That such a disadvantageous agreement was concluded was due to the fact that we needed German cars for this exchange of coal. On top of that, when, there was strike, in the Katovitz mines, the Germans remained behind in their deliveries and now owe us 46,000 tons. This agreement expires on November 30, and it is up to us to make a better deal for the future.

To Jugoslavia we deliver monthly 4000 tons of coal and 12,500 tons of coke. That is not a larga quantity and what we receive in return is badly needed. We cannot save any coal here.

A sad chapter in the brief history of our republic is the compusory coal agreement with Austria and Poland. Under pressure of the Entente we had to agree to furnish Austria monthly 42,750 tons of brown coal, 27,500 tons of black coal, 2250 tons of coke, 250 tons of blacksmith coal; further 74,100 tons of brown and 15,220 black coal for the Austrian state railways and 5000 tons for the Southern railway. Thus we give Austria over two million tons a year. Poland which is so rich in coal gets nearly a million and a half from us.

This is a touchy subject, but our very existence is involved in this, and it would be foolish to avoid it. For five years we had to suffer through the economic catastrophe of the Central Powers; Vienna robbed us of all our accumulated capital, and now we are ordered to restore the neighboring states with our natural riches.

As long as our domestic needs are not fully covered, we must be allowed to dispose of our own coal for our own use. Only the surplus can be sent out of the country. It is most peculiar, how all these international commissions insist on our coal for Austria; it sometimes seems, as if they were Austries allies, instead of ours. Are we to give in all the time?

The last great trouble, responsible for coal shortage, is bad communication. That is not caused wholly by lessened efficiency of the railroad employees or by the crying need of more rolling stock. Much can be done to remedy this evil. First of all, the railroads themselves must get enough coal; it will not do to have in division points just enough coal on hand to last 24 hours. And the coal used in locomotives must be of good quality; at present Czechoslovak state railroads get the kind that even Austria refuses.

The monthly output of our carshops is about eight or nine hundred cars. That is not enough; to get back to our quota before the war we would need at that rate six years. For the present our attention must center on rapid turn-over of the existing rolling stock. Give the engines good coal; instead of making up trains with a car apiece for each city, run straight coal trains for the larger towns at regular intervals and thus avoid unnecessary switching. All state officials must have a regard in the performance of their duties to the needs of railroad traffic.

If we sum up all these causes of the coal crisis, we reach the conclusion that we need first of all to increase the efficiency of the miners, next break the passive resistance of the operators either by instant nationalization, or by strict supervision and orders to invest the needed capital with a state guarantee; to reduce our export of coal, to give the railroads plenty of good coal and make better use of what cars we have.