The Empire and the century/Canada and the Pacific
CANADA AND THE PACIFIC
By G. R. PARKIN, LL.D., C.M.G.
The geographical position of Canada stamps with great significance her future relations to the British Empire and to the world. The Dominion rests with broad frontage upon both the Atlantic and the Pacific. On the Atlantic her ports command the shortest route to Europe, and furnish an unrivalled naval base for giving security to the greatest food route of the United Kingdom and the greatest trade route of the world. Behind these ports are waterways leading to the very heart of the continent—almost to those prairies which promise soon to yield the largest available surplus of one of the world's prime necessities—wheat.
The frontage on the Pacific is not less significant in view of the general expectation that this ocean is likely soon to be the centre of a vastly increased commerce. Wherever lines of transportation from the prairies may penetrate the Rocky Mountains there can be found, in British Columbia, harbour space for any commerce that may come. Thence is the shortest route to the ports of our ally, Japan, and to what will, we hope, be the open door of China. Thence, too, is easy communication, already partly developed, with the islands of the Pacific, Australasia, India, Central and South America—tropical and subtropical countries which are the natural commercial complement of a northern land.
On both sides of the continent, in immediate contact with the sea, are immense deposits of coal, furnishing extraordinary facilities for transportation by sea and land. It may be doubted if any coal-supplies in the world are so admirably situated for the prosecution or defence of commerce as those of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia on the Atlantic coast, or those of Vancouver Island on the Pacific. At both points excellent steaming coal can be delivered to waiting steamships almost directly from the mouth of the mine.
Across the whole breadth of the continent means of communication are multiplying with a rapidity which seems astonishing to those who watched the beginnings of the movement thirty years ago. The Canadian Pacific Railway already crosses the country from sea to sea; a second one, the Grand Trunk Pacific, by a more northern route, is in course of construction, backed up by all the resources of a prosperous people; a third, the Canadian Northern, is being pushed through by private enterprise between these two national lines from the Great Lakes to the Rockies, and it also undoubtedly looks to ultimate connection with both oceans. Between these main lines a network of branches is being built to supply the needs of the stream of emigrants which flows in to fill up the prairie country.
Eastward, a great canal system, on which thirty million dollars have been spent, supplements and simplifies the natural lines of water communication, and, as compared with railways, cheapens the transport of grain in bulk.
Should Hudson Bay prove available for navigation, as now seems likely, a new economy in transportation, a new safety by reason of greater isolation, will be given to what will soon be the great line of bread-supply for the United Kingdom.
The new situation which has arisen in the Far East as the result of the Russo-Japanese War gives this geographical position of Canada, as part of the Empire, added significance. The ports of Canada on the Pacific coast are only ten days' steaming distance from those of Japan. Thus the Dominion is almost as closely in touch with Asia as with Europe. Across her prairies and through her ports the Far West merges for the Englishman into the Far East, and by a shorter route than that by which the East has hitherto been reached. These ports, taken in conjunction with those of Australasia, Hong Kong, and our Pacific islands, give on the Pacific the same double base for naval support and supply which is the supreme advantage that the Empire enjoys over all other nations on the Atlantic. With the free use of Japanese ports, secured by alliance, the naval advantage becomes overwhelming.
In the momentous decision which British people have made in regard to this alliance, Canada's relation to the problem must have been a weighty factor. A country which links by its railway lines the naval bases of the Empire on the Atlantic with those on the Pacific; which can furnish abundant supplies of coal to both; and which has at the same time the capacity to make the Empire almost self-contained in the most essential elements of food-supply, means much to an ocean Power which must settle the balance of naval influence on the two great oceans. It infinitely increases the value to any other Power of the British alliance.
Facts such as these compel the belief that the Dominion must always remain the keystone of that great arch of outer Empire which has gradually grown up on the foundation of this ancient British monarchy—a foundation which has withstood the shocks of ten centuries of history, and seems to have grown stronger from all that it has withstood.
But other facts supplement those already stated. Under modern conditions of commerce and war, telegraphic routes are scarcely less important than lines of railway and steam communication. In this respect the relation of Canada to the Empire, and especially to the Pacific, as a through route of national communication is quite as important as in the other points hitherto referred to. Most of the Transatlantic cables now in existence reach the American Continent by way of Nova Scotia, and Canada has therefore a multiplied and adequate connection with the Mother-land. With the Pacific the case was long very different. The absence of any cable link across that ocean left a dangerous gap in the telegraphic equipment of the Empire. Five years ago the general demand that the great public interests at stake should not be allowed to depend on the security of cable lines which pass through foreign countries and European waters led to united action between the larger British communities to remedy this defect in our national system. The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined together to establish an all-British line of cable by way of the Pacific. Traversing Canada by established lines from Nova Scotia to Vancouver, it passes on through various Pacific island stations under our flag to New Zealand and Australia, thence connecting with lines to India and South Africa. As the result of that effort for united national action the Empire to-day possesses, through Canada, an alternative line of cable communication to fall back upon if those through Europe and Asia should fail.
The new conditions arising in the East make it practically certain that another Pacific cable must soon connect Canada with Japan, Hong Kong, and our other centres of Eastern interest. The United States found such a Transpacific cable necessary as soon as they took charge of the Philippines, and our need cannot be less. When the three great railway systems of Canada have fixed their termini on the coast of British Columbia, telegraphic communication with Asia by way of San Francisco will not long content them.
But the completion of the Pacific cable as a State-owned and a State-managed line has led to the earnest consideration in Canada of a much larger question. For many years Sir Sandford Fleming, to whom must be assigned much of the credit for educating public opinion on the importance of the Pacific route, has strenuously advocated the establishment of a complete system of Empire cables, owned and operated jointly by the various Governments in the interests of the whole Empire. During the past two years the Board of Trade of Ottawa, the capital city of the Dominion, has shown great energy in the study of the question, and has brought it under the consideration of public bodies in all parts of the Empire. A pamphlet, lately issued by the Board as the result of its inquiries, proves conclusively that business men in every part of the Empire look upon the scheme as one likely to profoundly affect our future as a nation. For a people scattered as is our British race in all quarters of the globe, and yet aspiring to closer commercial intercourse, to complete political unity and effective mutual support, rapidity, ease, and cheapness of communication are of the very essence of our needs.
Hence the long and persistent effort which has at length been crowned with the almost universal adoption of penny postage throughout the Empire. Hence the establishing and subsidizing of swift steamship lines along the main routes of intercommunication. Hence the constant endeavour to induce the companies which control the lines of cable connection to lower the rates at which messages are conveyed.
If penny postage round the Empire—if the sixpenny telegram rate throughout the United Kingdom—have come to be regarded as boons of the first magnitude, then surely the cheapest possible rate for cable communication with every part of the Empire is a still greater boon to which we should look forward! It is one to which we have a right to look forward. The lowering of postage rates has always been followed by an immense increase in the volume of business done, and hence in the profits derived from the Post-Office. The lowering of cable rates would have a corresponding result. Partly through an increased volume of business, partly under the pressure of competition, the companies controlling the cable communication with the East and Australasia have lowered their rates to one-half of what they formerly were, or even less. But no one supposes that the limit of reasonable reduction has yet been reached. The growth of commercial interests, the interchange of news, the exchange of views between statesmen and governments, the growth of national sentiment founded on intimate mutual understanding, are all hindered by the necessity of paying large dividends on watered stock to companies enjoying in parts of the Empire a practical monopoly of the work to be done. Making all due allowance for the business energy which established cable communication in its earlier stages, and granting that the reward of this energy should be large, still the question now arises whether the debt of gratitude has not been sufficiently paid, and whether the national necessity does not outweigh the continued claims of the individual or the company. If patent laws fix a limit to the rights of an inventor; if copyright laws define a time when a writer's exclusive profits cease; if Governments exercise the right of eminent domain in expropriating at a fair price, in the interests of the public, land lines of telegraph, or ground required for the public service, surely a stronger argument can be made for a nation assuming the control—at least on its main lines—of what has become its own nervous system. This is what is aimed at in the establishment of a system of Empire cables, kept under national control, maintained at national expense, and worked for national ends. Sir Sandford Fleming has described such a system as consisting of four divisions, as follows:
1. From the United Kingdom to the Pacific, embracing a cable across the Atlantic, and land lines through Canada.
2. A cable across the Pacific from Canada to New Zealand and Australia, with land lines through Australia to the Indian Ocean.
3. A cable from Australia across the Indian Ocean to South Africa, with a branch from Cocos Island to India.
4. A cable from Cape Town to the United Kingdom viâ Ascension, the West Indies, and Bermuda, with a branch to Canada.
Such a system, traversing the deepest seas, touching only British soil, protected at every point of landing by British vigilance and courage, would be as reliable for the direction of our navies, and for combined military action in times of war, as it would be useful in time of peace for the development of commerce and the interchange of thought and information on national affairs. The first colonial conference, held in London in 1887, and the second, held in Ottawa in 1894, discussed the project as a possible expansion of the Pacific cable scheme. The congress of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, held at Montreal in 1904, endorsed it in the strongest terms. That endorsement has now been echoed by the most important commercial bodies throughout the Empire. The subject has probably entered into the deliberations of the Pacific Cable Conference, held this year in London, and it will form a natural supplement to the work of any colonial conference summoned to consider the fiscal relations of the Empire.
Canada, as the 'half-way house of the Empire,' to use an expression of the late Principal Grant, has an especial interest in the working out of the scheme. On the Atlantic it strengthens her intimate touch with the Mother-land, and adds close connection with the West Indies and South Africa, where she has growing commercial interests. On the Pacific it touches issues vital to her present position and future development.
What are Canada's interests in the Pacific?
One would put first the trade with China, Japan, the East Indian Archipelago, and India. From time immemorial the trade with the East, the exchange of the useful products of the Western world for the luxuries of the Orient, has proved the foundation of wealth. Rome, Carthage, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Genoa, Venice—all in turn felt the influence of this stimulus as Britain feels it now. Canada will do the same. A Northern population, with increasing wealth, will be sure to demand what the East can give—its silken fabrics, porcelain, jewels, and other native manufactures; its tea, spices, raw material, and so on.
The Canadian Pacific Railway, in the early days of its history, secured a large portion of the tea trade of China with America as the result of superior steamboat and railway organization. New lines across Canada will enter into free competition for the same expanding trade and other branches of commerce. The open door in China is of the deepest interest to Canadians. Friendly rivalry with Japan may prove the best of stimulants to Canadian energy.
Should the Chinese and Japanese people ever become a wheat-consuming instead of a rice-consuming people—and nothing is more likely with increasing prosperity—the prairies of Canada would have an Eastern market as important as that which Europe now offers.
But Canadian trade already touches many other points upon the Pacific. The timber and coal of British Columbia find their way along the whole coast of North, Central, and South America. A line of steamships is employed in the business that has grown up with Australia. Canada's exchange of agricultural implements and other manufactures for the sugar of Queensland and Fiji is sure to develop on many lines. An improved passenger service on this route, equal to that between Vancouver and Japan, would compete successfully with the Suez Canal lines for a large share of Australasian travel to or from Europe. Few objects are more to be desired from a national point of view than that the citizens of one great Colony should become familiar in the ordinary course of travel with those of another. There are very strong climatic objections to the voyage by the Red Sea at certain seasons of the year, and an adequate Pacific service from Dominion ports would secure for either the inward or outward voyage a large proportion of Australasian visitors to Europe.
These are only illustrations of the growing interests of the Dominion in the Pacific. The safety of commerce will soon become for Canada as important on that ocean as on the Atlantic.
How will it best be secured?
It was openly avowed by the Russian autocracy that 'the command of the Pacific ' was its objective in undertaking the late war. We cannot accept the Russian view, also explicitly stated, that the achievement of this end would have been in the interests of peace, commerce, and civilization. Rather would it have been a disturbing factor and a constant menace to the interests of other nations, notably to those of Britain and her Colonies. Now that the stout resistance of Japan has thwarted this attempt to control the Pacific, the question of who are to be its masters necessarily arises. A glance around the Pacific basin shows the natural answer to this question. Commencing at the south, we have on the Pacific the great and growing British communities of New Zealand and Australia, splendidly equipped with docks and fortified harbours, and rich in coal. Farther north are Singapore and Hong Kong, also under the British Flag, in positions which give extraordinary command of the neighbouring seas. After that the Philippines, now a dependency of the United States. China might be important, but she lacks the naval power which gives effective influence on the sea. Next is Japan, the ally of Britain. Little new territory has been added to the Japanese possessions as the result of the war, but directly or indirectly she will practically dominate the coast northward to the Arctic. Passing to the American continent, we have the United States territory of Alaska. Next comes Canada, with her splendid sea-front, her ports and bases of coal-supply, and behind, her vast inland prairies, seeking through several passes of the Rockies an outlet to the Pacific for their products. After Canada comes the United States, with a sea-front on the Pacific extending from Puget Sound to Mexico, with a rapidly increasing naval power, and with the prospective control of the Panama Canal. These, then, are the dominant factors. Germany, it is true, is in New Guinea and Kiaou Chou, France in Siam and New Caledonia, the Dutch in Java; but their interests are not sufficiently large to enter seriously into the estimate of dominant control. The South American States have no naval significance.
It seems clear that if an understanding can be reached between Britain, the United States, and Japan, the predominance of interest which they represent and the predominance of power with which it can be supported will make conclusive any decisions at which they arrive in order to give security to the Pacific basin.
What is the relation of the Dominion to this great problem?
It is a striking coincidence in our national development that the very time when the whole balance of power in the East has changed and the destiny of the Pacific is in debate is also the time when Canada has reached a period of intense activity; when her territory and political system have been consolidated; when her population is increasing by leaps and bounds; when her prairies are being filled up; her manufactures growing; and when her public men are compelled by the expansive forces at work to take large views of the present and the future.
It must be remembered that for 3,500 miles of its southern boundary Canada marches upon the territory of the United States, the other American factor in the problem of the Pacific. The actual land area of the continent north of Mexico is divided nearly equally between the two countries. While the rapid growth of the United States, during the last half-century particularly, has made Canada's relative position appear comparatively unimportant, it seems likely that the next half-century may make the disparity less striking. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's picturesque saying that 'the nineteenth century was for the United States; the twentieth is for Canada,' is not exaggerated if we refer it to the rapid filling up of virgin territory and the speedy development of untouched resources. Canada must make her plans for a large future, and that as a Pacific Power.
In her partnership in the Empire lie her best hopes for the realization of such plans. On the other hand, as a half-way house and through route of Empire the significance of her relation to the nation as a whole cannot be overestimated. The fact that the naval stations at Halifax and Esquimalt have been handed over for maintenance to the Dominion Government proves the trust the Mother-land puts in Canadian loyalty to the national partnership. That Canada is willing to accept this crucial responsibility proves as conclusively that she begins to realize that partnership in a great Empire involves duties as well as advantages. The sense of duty will grow as Canadians face the problems of the Pacific. They cannot study them too carefully.