2540734The Mastering of Mexico — Chapter 191916Kate Stephens

CHAPTER XIX

How Cortes ordered the towns to furnish us arrows and arrow-heads, and, before beginning the siege of Mexico, held a muster and published articles of war; and how having divided our troops, he ordered the three divisions to invest the city and break the aqueduct of Chapultepec; how the sloops aided in our daily battles and difficulties they met.

Now that the canal by which they were to pass into the lake had been broadened, and the sloops had been built and rigged with sails and oars, and each sloop fitted with spare oars for case of need, Cortes sent to all the allied towns that lay near Texcoco, asking that the people furnish in eight days eight thousand arrow heads of copper, made after Spanish points which were given them as models, and eight thousand arrows, also of a certain sort of wood, and in form like the Spanish arrows sent as patterns. At the end of the time they brought their work to our camp—more than fifty thousand arrowheads and as many thousand arrows—and the arrow-heads were even better than those we brought from Spain.

Cortes at once commanded Pedro Barba, leader of the crossbowmen, to divide arrows and copper points among the crossbowmen, and to see that they fixed the points neatly, and put the feathers on with a paste (which sticks better than that from Spain) made from some roots. Every crossbowmen also was to have two well-twisted cords for his bow, and also two nuts, and the whole company were to shoot at heaps of earth to see what distance the crossbows would carry. The horsemen were also to have their horses fresh shod, and to get their lances ready and to exercise their horses in such ways as galloping and turning quickly.

Cortes then sent word to the caciques of Tlaxcala that we should soon leave Texcoco and begin the siege of Mexico, and that he wanted them to send twenty thousand warriors from Tlaxcala, Cholula and other peoples. But the message was unnecessary. All knew of the meeting and the plan, and all were now our brothers in arms. From every side most friendly assurances of assistance reached us.

A muster of our troops the second week after Easter in the large square of Texcoco made our number eighty-four horsemen, six hundred and fifty foot soldiers, some with swords and shields and others with lances, and one hundred and ninety-four crossbowmen and musketeers. From these, twelve crossbowmen and musketeers were chosen to man each of the thirteen sloops. Twelve other men and a captain were to serve as rowers, six on each side of each sloop. Therefore each sloop carried twenty-five men with cannon and powder.

In choosing men to row, Cortes could not find enough sailors. He therefore asked who went out a-fishing every day, and if these fishers came from any port in Spain celebrated for its sailors, he commanded them to service of the sloops. Many who were men of noble birth protested to Cortes that he would not think of insulting them by setting them to such work. But under threat of heavy penalties he made them go and row, and in this way mustered one hundred and fifty capital oars.

Next Cortes published the articles of war:—First of all no one should dare blaspheme our Lord Jesus Christ or his blessed mother. Our Lady, or the holy apostles, or any other saint. Second:—No man was to ill-use our allies, or take anything from them, even booty; for we were to bear in mind that they joined us at our request. Third:—No soldier, day or night, should leave our camp for any purpose whatever, even to fetch food from a town. Fourth:—Every soldier must wear good armor, well quilted, a neck guard, head piece, leggings and shield, for defence from javelins, stones and darts of our enemy. Fifth:—No man should gamble for horses or arms. Lastly:—No soldier should lie down to rest unless he were fully armed and wearing sandals (unless, indeed, he were suffering from wounds or illness); that we might be prepared to receive the enemy at a moment's notice.

Then, in addition, were the usual articles of war:—Death to the sentinel who deserted his post or fell asleep on duty; and death to a soldier who went from one camp to another without leave from his officer, or who deserted his captain in battle.

Our captain now divided the whole of our troops into three divisions. The first division, Alvarado commander, was of one hundred and fifty foot, armed with swords and shields, thirty horsemen and eighteen musketeers and crossbowmen, and eight thousand Tlaxcalans; and Cortes chose me to go with Alvarado, and we were to take up our position in the town of Tacuba. To Olid our captain gave the second division of thirty horse, one hundred and seventy-five foot and twenty musketeers and crossbowmen, and likewise eight thousand Tlaxcalans, and he ordered him to pitch his camp in the town of Coyoacan, about eight miles from Tacuba. To Sandoval fell the third division of twenty-four horse, fourteen crossbowmen and musketeers, one hundred and fifty foot armed with shields and swords, and another body of eight thousand Tlaxcalans. This division was to seize a site near Iztapalapa, and attack the town and do it as much damage as possible. Cortes himself commanded the sloops. On a Wednesday of May, 1521, we set out from Texcoco, turning to the right or north. By vespers of the fourth day we had come to Tacuba, like other towns we had passed, deserted. Here, at Tacuba, we quartered ourselves and here our Tlaxcalan friends that very afternoon went through every house in the town and brought in plenty to eat. So close is Tacuba to Mexico that we could plainly hear the Mexican warriors crowding the causeways, and the lake in their canoes, and yelling at us, derisively challenging us to come out and fight. They wished to provoke us to sally at night, when they would have the advantage.

Next morning, having commended ourselves to God, with the two divisions headed by Alvarado and Olid united, we marched about two miles and broke the pipes of the aqueduct of Chapultepec—the reader recalls that these carried water to Mexico. On this errand we fell in with many warriors, for the Mexicans understood that we were now beginning our operations against the city. We put our opponents to flight, however, and carried out our purpose of breaking the pipes. From that time on to the end of the siege no more water flowed into Mexico from Chapultepec.

As soon as we had destroyed the conduits our officers agreed to advance from Tacuba along the causeway in endeavor to gain one of the bridges. We had scarcely reached the causeway when many canoes filled with warriors crowded forward, and such hosts on foot, also, that we were astounded at the very sight. Our crossbowmen and musketeers kept up a riddling fire on the canoes, but with little effect, for the foe sheltered themselves by boards raised alongside each boat. And those of our troops on horseback made no gain, for the Mexicans would wound their horses, and then, when the horsemen charged, they would jump into the lake. Under such conditions we fought upwards of an hour. Finally when we saw another fleet of canoes advancing to fall upon our rear, and also that our friends, the Tlaxcalans, were obstructing our passage, we determined to retreat in good order.

The very instant the Mexicans saw us turn back what distracting yells and howls and whistles they gave! And how they came on! I declare it is out of my power to describe it. In an instant the whole causeway was covered with lances, arrows and stones hurled at us—to say nothing of quantities that fell into the water. But we again reached the land, and then gave fervent thanks to God for having saved us. Eight of our men had fallen and fifty suffered wounds. .Hoots and jeers still reached our ears, and that night we dressed our wounds very quietly in camp. The next morning Olid withdrew his division about six miles off, for he said it was Alvarado's fault that we had advanced so prematurely. His pride was hurt that we had not done well in this attempt upon the causeway.

As for Sandoval—he had settled at Iztapalapa after burning many houses. He and his men were engaged with Mexican troops when they saw thick smoke rising from a hill near Iztapalapa, and answering smoke signals from other towns standing in the lake. This was the Indians' signal that Cortes had run out from Texcoco with our thirteen sloops and all the Mexican canoes should assemble against our fleet. When Cortes saw the canoes crowding towards his sloops he was greatly alarmed—and with reason, for they were more than a thousand—and he chose a position where he might watch the enemy and yet steer off the sloops in any direction he chose. He also ordered that no attack should be made till the wind freshened. The Mexicans, thinking we were fear-bound, sped their canoes against our boats. But just at that moment a stiff breeze sprang up, our rowers pulled with all their might, and our whole fleet ran in among the enemy. Numbers of the canoes were upset, many Indians killed and captured, and the rest made off at a rapid rate seeking refuge in places our boats could not reach. So it was that in our first combat on the lake Cortes gained the victory. Thanks be to God! Our officers and soldiers now, after several unsuccessful encounters, determined that it was impossible to fight along the causeways into the city, unless the sloops covered us on each side. With the sloops keeping off canoes from which the Mexicans attacked us from the water, we would, and did have better success. We captured several bridges and entrenchments. But the Mexicans had two advantages: First, they could relieve their troops from time to time and pour in fresh men; second, they could shower stones, lances, arrows upon the sloops—I can find no word to tell the fact more clearly, their missiles fell from housetops thicker than hail. But if at times, and after much labor, we succeeded in capturing a barricade, or a bridge, the enemy would return in the night, make another opening, throw up stronger defences and dig deeper pits. These pits, at once filling with water, they would cover lightly so that in the midst of the battle next day we would get caught in them, and with canoes ready at hand they could carry us off prisoners. In another artful way they kept our sloops from coming to our aid, for they drove down stakes, hidden, for their tops came below the surface of the water, and often our boats stuck fast on the stakes and so became open to attacks from the canoes.

I have already told that our horsemen were of little use to us on the causeway. If they charged, or gave chase, some of the Mexicans would throw themselves into the water, and others, standing behind breastworks, would receive them with lances made very long by swords they had taken In the night of our great defeat. With these lances, and arrows from canoes, they would wound the horses so that the owners became unwilling to risk their valuable flesh in fruitless conflict—for a horse at that time cost from eight hundred to a thousand dollars.

Under such conditions we went on fighting from morning till night. Then, when darkness came on, we would return to camp and treat our hurts with bandages steeped in oil. If our wounded had remained in camp, none of the companies would have gone out with more than twenty men at a time. Our officers and standard bearers were most exposed and oftenest wounded, and to hold aloft our tattered colors we had need every day of a fresh bearer. The divisions under Cortes, who was with Olid, and Sandoval, fared no better than ours, and the Mexicans kept attacking us every blessed day. Well, says the reader, with all these hardships they at least had enough to eat. Yes, plenty of maize cakes, but not food refreshing for the Invalided. The confounded vegetables and herbs that the Indians eat kept body and soul together, with the help of cherries, while they lasted, and prickly pears.

When we began to see that in our daily advance along the causeway, we suffered loss of men, and whatever points we forced by day the Mexicans returned to by night and captured, we agreed to take up a position in a small plaza where several idol towers rose together, and where we should have some room for our quarters. Here we were miserably off, and had nothing to protect us from the rain. Still we could carry out our object of demolishing the buildings, from the tops of which we received most injury, and of filling in the canals with the stones and woodwork from the houses. Whenever we now took entrenchment or bridge we guarded it night and day, each company watching by turns;—the first watch, which numbered more than forty soldiers from even-time until midnight, the second from midnight till a couple of hours before daylight, and the third from that time till full daylight. On nights when we expected some sudden attack we all kept watch together.

And we had every reason to be on our guard, for Guatemoc had formed the idea of falling some day or night upon our encampment on the causeway, saying that when he had defeated us on our causeway, he could promptly master Sandoval and Cortes on the other two. It was not long before Guatemoc carried out his plan and sent great hosts to storm us at midnight, and a couple of hours after still another host, and with daylight a third, and at one time they came in silence, and at another with hideous yells. Terrible it was to see the numberless stones, javelins and arrows they let fly. But we maintained our ground and sent them back with great loss.

In this way, in spite of rain and wind and cold, up to the ankles in mud, aching from wounds, there we watched; and after heavy fighting stayed our hunger with a mess of wretched maize cakes, herbs and prickly pears—which the officers cheered us by saying was a matter of course. And notwithstanding every effort of ours, the bridges we took from our enemy they often re-took from us.

But you, the reader, ask what benefit did we get in destroying the aqueduct of Chapultepec, and then the three causeways? Very little, I confess, for the Mexicans by light canoes during the night, brought in much food and water from the towns near Mexico. To cut off these supplies we determined that two sloops should cruise by night about the lake and waylay convoys of provisions. By such means we soon found we had diminished the enemy's supplies and increased our own. But even with all our effort many canoes well laden with food and water did get into Mexico. And the Mexicans tried many stratagems to rid themselves of our troublesome sloops. One time they fitted out thirty large canoes, manned with best rowers and most valiant warriors, and concealed them among the reeds of the lake to decoy our sloops in pursuit, and then run them foul of stakes they had driven in the water.

But always, and in best possible order, in our daily conflict, we were by degrees taking temples, houses, bridges, razing everything before us, and filling in the openings in the causeways with materials of the buildings we had pulled down. At last the city stood open to our view. When the towns lying in that part of the lake which was of sweet water saw how the victories we gained were counting, and that the peoples of Chalco, Texcoco and Tlaxcala had united with us more closely—these towns apparently leagued for defence, for they all sent an embassy to Cortes to sue for peace, telling how they had opposed us because Guatemoc had ordered them and they had to obey. Their coming of their own will rejoiced Cortes uncommonly. With the flattering words he knew how to use he pardoned them, although he added that they deserved severest punishment for having aided the Mexicans.

Seeing at length the futility of our present means, and the impossibility of our filling in all the gaps in the causeway that we took day by day, and the Mexicans endeavored to reopen night by night, and that this fighting and filling in and keeping watch was ail of it very hard work, Cortes determined to get the opinion of officers and soldiers in the camp where he was, that is in Olid's. And also he wrote to us in the camp of Alvarado, and to those with Sandoval. The question was whether or no it seemed good to us to fall on the city with a sudden rush and force our way to the great market place, there to pitch our three camps and from our vantage point attack our enemy in their streets—thus escaping the heavy advance and retreat every day, and not having to toil everlastingly in filling in openings and canals.

Opinions differed—as always happens in such cases. Some thought we should not enclose ourselves so completely in the heart of a hostile city, that we should fight as we were then doing—pulling down the houses as we advanced and filling in the openings. If we fortified ourselves in the market place, we thought the Mexicans would reopen the hollows we had filled up and would repossess the causeways. In the great square they would assail us day and night, and our sloops could not come to our aid because of the stakes they would drive, or had driven, in the lake. In short, if we made such a station, the enemy would then be masters of the town, the country and the waters. This opinion we took care to draw up in writing. Cortes heard our objections. Nevertheless it followed that on the next day we were ordered to push on from all three camps till we reached the great market place, and the Tlaxcalans, the Texcocans and our new allies of the towns of the lake were to aid us with their canoes.