CHAP. XX.
Whether Fortresses, and other Means which appear useful to Princes, are really so.
There are princes, who, to maintain themselves in their states, disarm their subjects. Others encourage divisions in the provinces subjugated to their rule. Some go so far as designedly to make enemies. Others again strenuously strive to gain over those whom they had at the commencement of their reign suspected: the one builds fortresses, and the other razes to the ground those erected to his hands. It is not easy to determine which mode is the best, without entering into an investigation of the different states to which the rules to be established might properly be applied. I shall therefore rest satisfied by treating the.subject in that general way it requires.
A new prince never disarms his subjects; on the contrary, if he find them defenceless, he hastens to put arms into their hands, and nothing is easier understood; for from that moment these arms are entirely his own. Those whom he suspected become thenceforth attached to his cause, those who were faithful continue to be so, and the whole of his people become his partisans.
It is unquestionably impossible to arm every one; but the prince who knows how to attach to him those whom he arms, has nothing to fear from the others. The first become attached to him on account of the preference, and the others readily excuse him, because they naturally imagine that the greatest merit is due to those who run the greatest dangers. But a prince who disarms his subjects offends them by the distrust they think he entertains of them, and nothing is more likely to excite their hatred. Added to which, such a measure renders it necessary that he should have recourse to mercenaries, the dangers of which I have at sufficient length elucidated. Besides, were not this resource liable to inconvenience, it would always be inefficient against a powerful enemy and subjects liable to be suspected.
Thus it has eyer been a maxim with those who have raised themselves to supreme magistracy to arm their new subjects. If it be, however, necessary to unite a new state with ane that is ancient or hereditary, the prince should then disarm his new subjects, those always excepted who had declared in his favour antecedent to his conquest; and it would still behove him by degrees to soften and enervate them, so as to concentrate in the old stațe his whole milițary force. Our ancestors, and those most particularly who were deemed wise, were of opinion that Pistoia should be restrained by domestic factions, and Pisa by fortresses. It was therefore but seldom they neglected to foment divisions in the cities and towns where the people were suspected. This policy was very well understood, considering the state of uncertainty in which the affairs of Italy at that epoch fluctuated. But it would at this moment be scouted, because a town divided against itself can never hold out against an enemy, who would not fail to allure one of the two factions to its cause, and so become master of the place.
The Venetians, adopting this very policy, favoured alternately the Guelphs and the Gibilines in the cities subjeçted to their sway; and although they never suffered them to come into each other's power, they incessantly fomented divisions, which prevented them from thinking of revolt; but this republic did not derive from this conduct the benefit which they expected; for their armies having been defeated at Vaila, one of these factions had the audacity to aspire at dominion, and was successful in the attempt. This policy is ever the resort of weakness, and a powerful prince will never permit such divisions, which in times of peace are unquestionably attended with less inconvenience, because they divert the attention of the people from every idea of rebellion, but which in time of war lay open the impotence of a power that is so devoid of reason as to recur to it.
It is by conquering difficulties that princes aggrandise themselves, and fortune has not a more successful mean of elevating a new prince than that of creating him enemies who may surround him with difficulties, which may stimulate his genius, exercise his courage, and serve him as so many ladders whereby to clmb to a high degree of power. Thus many persons are of opinion that it is advantageous for a prince to create himself enemies, which, by preventing him from the indulgence of a dangerous repose, will attract the esteem and admiration of both his faithful and rebellious subjects.
Princes, and above all new ones, have often experienced more zeal and fidelity in those of their subjects whom they had, at the commencement.of their reign, cause to suspect, than those in whom they supposed at the same period they could place the utmost reliance. Pandolpho Petrucci, Prince of Sienna, was less inclined to employ those than the others: It is, however, difficult to establish general rules by an object that varies according to circumstances. I shall only observe, that if those whom the prince had for enemies at the beginning of bis reign stand in need of his support and protestion, he may easily gain them; and having done so, they will be so much the more faithful to him, as they will wish to efface by their services the unfavourable prejudices to which their past conduct had given rise. Those, on the other hand, who have never opposed the prince's interest, serve him with that lukewarm seal that ensures security.
However, since my subject naturally leads me to it, I will observe that those who have attained supreme authority by popular favour should minutely ascertain the cause and motives of this good will: if it arises more from a hatred of the old government than any interest inspired by the prince, he will not easily maintain himself in the people's affecțion, from the great difficulty to content them.
If we look into history, ancient or modetn, we shall be convinced that it is easier to gain the friendship of those who seemingly supported the old government, notwithstanding they were įts enemies, than those who have not aided the prince to become master of the state, in consequence of their difficult and factious character, that will not suffer them to tolerate the abuses of the past administration.
Princes havė erected fortresses the more easily so maintain themselves in their states, often. threatened: by enemies from within, and to be able to repel the first efforts of a revolt. This mode is very old, and seems to me to be a good one; we have however seen in our own times Nicholas Vitelli demolish the two fortresses of the city af Castello to effect the safety of that state. Guy d'Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, having recovered his duchy from which Cæsar Borgia had driven him, razed all the fortresses, the more easily to maintain himself therein. The Bentivoglii did the same at Bologna, when that state returned under their government.
Fortresses are therefore useful or otherwise according to circumstances; and if in some cases they are serviceable, they are in others injurious, Thus a prince who is more in dread of his subjects than of foreign foes ought to fortify his cities; but if the reverse, he should do without them. The castle that Francis Sforza built at Milan, has injured, and will yet more injure that family, than all the disorders with which that duchy has been lacerated.
There is no better fortress than the affection of the people, because a prince who is hated by his subjects must expect, when he sees them fly to arms, to see the enemy from without fly to their assistance. We have not seen that fortresses have much assisted the princes of the present day, with the exception perhaps of the Countess of Forli, who, after the death of her husband Count Jerome, found herself by this mode enabled to wait for the succours sent to her by the state of Milan, and thereby to preserve her own; yet even then she was greatly indebted to circumstances, which did not permit her subjects to be assisted by foreign aid. But having since been attackėd by Cæsar Borgia, she must, from her subjects having joined that prince, have been convinced, though too late, that the best fortress is the people's affection. I repeat it therefore, fortresses may be serviceable as well as the contrary; but that which can never be of service, but must always be injurious, is to become odious.