CHAP. XXIV.
The Reason why the Princes of Italy have lost their States.
A prince, although a new one, will maintain himself as easily in his states as he who reigns by hereditary right, if he follows the maxims I have laid down ; and his situation is perhaps preferable in certain respects to that of the hereditary prince, because as we pay more attention to the conduct of a new prince, if he governs with wisdom, his merit will conciliate the esteem and affection of the penple more than any legitimate right of dominion[primus 1]. It is besides well known that men think much more of the present than the past, and do not seek to change when they find themselves comfortable. A prince who performs well his duties need never fear the want of defenders : his recent elevation, so far from being a motive for esteeming him less, will, on the contrary, double his glory, on account of the obstacles he has had to conquer, and which his merit alone has enabled him to surmount. So much as his reign acquires eclat by the good laws which he has established, by the institution of a national militia, the valuable friends he has made, and by brilliant exploits, so much he who loses hereditary states, and through his own fault; is inconsiderate and disgraceful.
If we examine the conduct of the King of Naples, the Duke of Miļan, and others, who have lost their dominions in aur tine, we shall find they have all committed a grand fault in neglecting to institute a national militia. Nay, more, they appeared to give themselves no trouble to gain the affections of the people and the friendship of the nobles, for errors of this kind alone can lose a state capable of bringing an army into the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but him who was defeated by Titus Quintius, was possessed of only a petty state, if compared with the territories of either Rome or Greece, whose combined effects he had to withstand; yet he resisted those great powers, and during the several years that the war lasted he lost only a few towns; but this prince was a warrior, and besides he knew how to make himself beloved by the peo- ple and esteemed by the great. It is not therefore to fortune that the princes of Italy ought to attribute the loss of their states, but to their cowardice and want of foresight. For they were so far from believing such a revolution in their fortunes, which is commonly the case with governments whose tranquillity has not been disturbed for some time, that when they saw the enemy approach they fled instead of defending themselves, vainly fancying that the people would feel impatient under the insolence of a conqueror, and not delay to recal them. This system, in default of every other resource, is undoubtedly good; but it is most shameful in a prince thus to neglect the honourable means of endeavouring to preserve his states, and ignobly fly, in the hope that you will recal him, though he has deserted you: a hope ridiculous and vain, but even, were it well founded, he who counts on foreign aid will find a master in his defender. It is in himself and in his own courage that a prince ought to seek ręsources against the reverses of fortune.
- ↑ A very mistaken notion is generally entertained in England,
viz. that Buonaparte is hated by the French people, and calculating
on such erroneous data, the fabric of their reasoning is replete
with sophisms which the daily series of events destroy. The
writer of this note was in France previous to and during his Consulate,
and also since he assumed the imperial dignity; and he
does not hesitate to record his dissentient voice against the clamour
of popular opinion (fomented assuredly for no wise purpose,
for the fabric of error is illusory), and to state unequivocally, of
his own knowledge, that France appears happier now than at any
former period.
In arts and arms Buonaparte has rendered France truly great. The north and the south are humbled at her feet: and what bosom feels not proud in triumphing over a host of rivals; of rivals, who, but a few years before, swore the destruction of France? He is adored as a conqueror, for victory has uniformly followed his footsteps; he is beloved as a sovereign, for he is the friend of the sciences, the protector of the arts, and the encourager of commerce and agriculture. His wisdom is evinced as the uniform patron of merit, which alone is the passport to honour.
The conduct of the King of Naples, &c. has been that of the King of Spain and his son. They possessed no regular military force of any importance; they treated the people as slaves, and neglected to unite in their interests the grand link between the people and the throne,-the nobles. Hence it was that Buonaparte was considered as a deliverer rather than a tyrant; and hence it was that the flame of patriotism languished to its close[secundus 1]; for out of 9,000,000, notwithstanding every effort of the patriot chiefs, there were never more than 150,000 in arms to resist the enemy; and of those, how nany were traitors to the cause they professed to espouse, we are not now to be told. Those who had every thing to lose, solicited our aid; and we, taking spirited proclamations for the spirit of the people, or rather overjoyed with the opportunity of increasing obstacles to the enemy's success, inconsiderately sent for the aid of the patriots, as they were called, immense sums of money and a formidable army, which bad to perform an inglorious and harassing march of upwards of a thousand miles in the worst country of Europe for travelling, without the co-operation of a single Spanish battalion. How many thousand widows and orphans of murdered British heroeş must curse the madness of the British Ministry, and the guilty apathy of the Spanish nation! If we apply the reasoning of Machiavelli, in the conclusion of this chapter, to the Prince Regent of Portugal, we shall find him unworthy of recal. How can a prince expect a people to do every thing for him, when he will do nothing for them; and who, on the first approach of danger, ignobly flies and leaves to its fate his bleeding country?
- ↑ It is virtually extinct. The immortal defenders of Saragossa and Gerona do not affect the conclusion I have drawn, though forming splendid exceptions to the general rule. They must curse the remainder of their nation more than we ought, for they poured forth the blood of heroes in vain. Be it on the head of overy traitor to his country!