The Writings of Carl Schurz/To Thomas F. Bayard, June 28th, 1884

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

110 West 34th St., June 28, 1884.

We are together against Blaine and for honest government. I should be glad to see you in the Presidential chair on the 4th of March, 1885. If my vote could put you there, I should not hesitate a moment. If you are nominated, I shall work for your election to the best of my ability. I feel, therefore, that I can speak to you as a friend.

I have no right to meddle with the business of the Democratic party, but I know you will not consider it an intrusion if I give you my view of the situation. The revolt in the Republican party is at this moment very strong. But it would be a mistake to consider Blaine a weak candidate. He is weak in his own party, but he will have the support of the Irish dynamite faction, and the speculators and rascals will flock to him without distinction of previous condition. He will have a large campaign fund at his disposal. The Democratic candidate in order to beat him will, therefore, need the support of the Independent Republican vote to make up for desertions and to furnish the necessary majority. The Independent Republicans will undoubtedly cast a more than sufficient number of votes, if the character of the Democratic candidate be such as to overcome this disinclination to “vote for a Democrat.” That disinclination still exists with many. If the Independent Republicans feel themselves compelled to nominate a “conscience ticket,” and thereby to declare their distrust of the Democratic nominees, the whole movement will be so seriously crippled as to leave the result doubtful. Only in case they vote directly for the Democratic candidates, their votes thus counting double as against Blaine, will the result be certain.

There are only two possible Democratic candidates for whom that vote can be counted upon—you and Cleveland. The nomination of either of you would make success reasonably sure. Cleveland's enemies say that he cannot carry New York on account of the hostility of Tammany. This is nonsense. What Tammany's proclaimed hostility and friendship respectively effect has been seen in the cases of Tilden and of Hancock. The hostility of Tammany would very largely increase the Independent vote for Cleveland. I am sure he would carry the State by an immense majority. Your enemies say that you cannot be elected on account of your Dover speech. This is nonsense also. The Independent Republicans who have revolted against Blaine understand that speech and do not care anything about it. What begins to tell more against you is the apparent friendship of Tammany. It would not be a good thing for you to appear as the club with which Tammany Hall killed Cleveland because he was too much of a reformer. At any rate, the nomination of either of you would reasonably insure success. The nomination of any other man would be apt seriously to discourage and weaken that Independent element whose vote is necessary to defeat Blaine.

I am sure it is as clear to you as it is to me, what a terrible calamity for the country Blaine's election would be. It is equally clear that if the Democratic party, under circumstances so unusually favorable, fails again, it will be eternally damned for incorrigible stupidity as well as want of patriotism. The coming election is therefore for it a matter of life or death.

As between you and Cleveland the “question of merit” is easily decided. Of course, your long and great career gives you the strongest title to the first place. If there is any other question it is that of availability. In that respect the difference between you would probably be slight, but between either of you and any other possible candidate it would be very great.

Naturally, you desire to be nominated, and you have my hearty wishes. But if it should turn out that you cannot be nominated, I take it for granted that you would desire the nomination of the man who, next to you, can command the support necessary to success; and that man is Cleveland. I take it that Cleveland wants to be nominated, but that in case that is impossible, he would desire the nomination of the other strongest man, and that would be you. These would be the natural sentiments of two patriotic men. Would it not be equally natural there should be an understanding between the friends of these two patriotic men in the Convention, to the effect, that, as soon as it becomes reasonably clear that the one cannot be nominated, his forces go over to the other to secure his nomination, so that in any event the success of the common cause be safe? The expressed wish of the candidates would no doubt go very far to bring about such an understanding. It would probably be decisive.

I hope you will not charge me with unwarrantable meddlesomeness for making a suggestion like this. My excuse must be my profound anxiety that this Republic be spared the terrible disgrace of Blaine's election and the dangers of a Blaine Administration. There seems to be cause for serious alarm in the confusion of counsel of which the newspapers inform me.