Tooahnippah v. Hickel/Opinion of the Court

by Warren E. Burger

United States Supreme Court

397 U.S. 598

Tooahnippah  v.  Hickel

 Argued: Jan. 14, 1970. --- Decided: April 27, 1970

We granted the writ to review the action of the Court of Appeals holding that the decision of the Regional Solicitor, acting for the Secretary of the Interior, disapproving the will of a Comanche Indian constitutes final and unreviewable agency action. We conclude that such decision is subject to judicial review. ^[1]

George Chahsenah, a Comanche Indian, died on October 11, 1963, unmarried and without a surviving father, mother, brother, or sister. His estate consisted of interests in three Comanche allotments situated in Oklahoma under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior. ^[2] Shortly after Chahsenah's death, the value of those interests was fixed at $34,867. On March 14, 1963, Chahsenah had made a will devising and bequeathing his estate to a niece, Viola Atewooftakewa Tate, and her three children, petitioners herein. Chahsenah had resided with this niece a considerable portion of the later years of his life. His will made no mention of a surviving daughter, but stated that he was leaving nothing to his 'heirs at law * * * for the reason that they have shown no interest in me.'

The beneficiaries under the will sought to have it approved by the Secretary of the Interior, as required by 25 U.S.C. § 373. ^[3] A hearing was had before an Examiner of Interitance, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior. Dorita High Horse, claiming as sole surviving issue, and certain nieces and nephews of the testator contended that the will was not entitled to departmental approval, arguing that due to the effects of chronic alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, and diabetes, George Chahsenah was incompetent to make a will. Pursuant to the provisions of § 5 of the Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U.S.C. § 371, if Chahsenah had died intestate his putative daughter, Dorita High Horse, would have been an heir at law, whether or not her parents were married.

The Examiner found that the will of March 14, 1963, drawn on a form printed by the Department of the Interior for that purpose, was Chahsenah's last will and testament and that it had been prepared by an attorney employed by the Department of the Interior who advised the testator concerning the will. He also found that at the time the will was made the attorney and the witnesses executed an affidavit attesting that the will was properly made and executed, and that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under undue influence, fraud, duress, or coercion at the time of its execution. The Examiner found that Dorita High Horse was George Chahsenah's illegitimate daughter and his sole heir at law. He concluded, however, that the evidence presented by the contestants was not sufficient to outweigh the presumption of correctness attaching to a properly executed will, in addition to which were the unimpeached statements of the draftsman and witnesses that Chahsenah possessed testamentary capacity. The Examiner concluded that the testator's failure to provide for Dorita High Horse was not unnatural since there was no evidence of any close relationship between the two during any part of their lives. The will was approved and distribution in accordance with its provisions was ordered.

A petition for rehearing, contending that the evidence did not support the Examiner's conclusion regarding the decedent's competency, was denied. An appeal was taken to the Regional Solicitor, Department of the Interior, an officer having authority to make a final decision in the matter on behalf of the Secretary. He concluded that although the evidence supported the Examiner's finding that decedent's will met the technical requirements for a valid testamentary instrument, 25 U.S.C. § 373 vested in the Secretary broad authority to approve or disapprove the will. In exercising that discretion, the Regional Solicitor viewed his authority as requiring him to examine all the circumstances to determine whether 'approval will most nearly achieve just and equitable treatment of the beneficiaries thereunder and the decedent's heirs-at-law.' Under this standard he concluded that the decedent, an unemployed person addicted to alcohol ^[4] and living on the income he received from his inherited land allotments, had not fulfilled his obligations to his illegitimate daughter and had ceased cohabiting with her mother shortly before Dorita's birth, thus failing to provide her with a 'normal home life during her childhood.' The Reginal Solicitor concluded that although the daughter was a married adult and could not legally claim support monies from her father or his estate, 'it is inappropriate that the Secretary perpetuate this utter disregard for the daughter's welfare * * *.' Accordingly, he found that under the circumstances the Examiner's approval of the will was not a reasonable exercise of the discretioanry responsibility vested in the Secretary. He thereupon set side the Examiner's action, disapproved the will, ^[5] and ordered the entire estate distributed by intestate succession to Dorita High Horse as sole heir at law.

The beneficiaries under the will brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma contending that the action of the Regional Solicitor was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and that it exceeded the authority conferred upon the Secretary by 25 U.S.C. § 373. The plaintiffs sought to have the District Court review the Regional Solicitor's action in accord with the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), arguing that the District Court had jurisdiction over the matter by virtue of either that Act ^[6] or 28 U.S.C. § 1361. ^[7] Dorita High Horse was allowed to intervene as a party defendant. Both the Secretary and Dorita High Horse moved for summary judgment, contending that the action of the Regional Solicitor was within the authority conferred upon the Secretary, and, as such, is made final and unreviewable by 25 U.S.C. § 373. They also contended that the Regional Solicitor's decision was in accordance with the evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not involve an abuse of discretion. Although the Secretary conceded that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the action of the Regional Solicitor, Dorita High Horse contended that neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor 28 U.S.C. § 1361 allowed judicial review.

The District Court held that while there was some question as to whether jurisdiction existed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 did provide a basis for jurisdiction, 'in order to effectuate the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act by providing the review function which the act contemplates.' ^[8] Atewooftakewa v. Udall, 277 F.Supp. 464, 465 n. 1. The court then reasoned that, unlike § 1 of the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, 25 U.S.C. § 372, ^[9] § 2, 36 Stat. 856, as amended by the Act of February 14, 1913, 37 Stat. 678, 25 U.S.C. § 373, contains no language conferring unreviewable finality upon a decision of the Secretary approving or disapproving an Indian's will. The District Judge concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), does not preclude judicial review of the Regional Solicitor's action. On the merits he held that Congress had conferred upon adult Indians the right to make a will, limited only by the requirement that it be approved by the Secretary.

The District Court held that the review powers of the Secretary are not so broad as to defeat a plainly expressed and rationally based distribution by one who possessed testamentary capacity. The court concluded that the Regional Solicitor incorrectly viewed the Secretary's powers as authorizing disapproval of any will thought unwise or unequitable, and stated: 'Congress has conferred the right to make a will upon the Indian and not upon the Secretary. The Secretary can no more use his approval powers to substitute his will for that of the Indian than he can dictate its terms.' 277 F.Supp., at 468. The case was remanded to the Secretary with directions to approve the will and distribute the estate in accordance with its provisions.

On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the Secretary's action under 25 U.S.C. § 373 was unreviewable. ^[10]

Two basic questions are presented here: First, whether the Secretary's action is subject to judicial review; and second, if judicial review is available, whether on this record the Secretary's decision on the validity of the will was within the scope of authority vested in him under 25 U.S.C. § 373.

* The Administrative Procedure Act contemplates judicial review of agency action 'except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. * * *' 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Earlier in this Term in City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 164, 90 S.Ct. 309, 311, 24 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969), relying on Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), we noted that 'we start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions unless there is 'persuasive reason to believe' that Congress had no such purpose.' ^[11] Section 2 of the Act of 1910 contains no language displaying a congressional intention to make unreviewable the Secretary's approval or disapproval of an Indian's will.

The respondents argue that we should follow the course taken by the Court of Appeals, reading into § 2 the language of the first section of the 1910 Act, which declares that the Secretary's decisions ascertaining the legal heirs of deceased Indians are 'final and conclusive.' Cf. First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243, 244, 46 S.Ct. 246, 70 L.Ed. 565 (1926). The respondents contend that §§ 1 and 2 of the 1910 Act must be read in pari materia because both deal with the Secretary's power over the devolution of lands held in trust by the United States and both vest in the Secretary broad managerial and supervisory power over allotted lands.

We find this unpersuasive. First, while § 1 of the 1910 Act applies only to Indians possessed of allotments, § 2, as amended in 1913, also applies to all Indians having individual Indian monies or other properties held in trust of the United States. Thus, the coverage of these sections is not identical. Second, the 1910 Act is composed of some 33 sections, virtually all of which deal with the Secretary's managerial and supervisory powers over Indian lands. Many of these provisions vest in the Secretary discretionary authority. For example, § 3 of the Act permits transfers of beneficial ownership of allotments by providing that allottees can relinquish allotments to their unallotted children if the Secretary 'in his discretion' approves. 25 U.S.C. § 408. Yet neither this section nor any of the others in the enactment contains language cloaking the Secretary's actions with immunity from judicial review. If the respondents' position were accepted and we implied the finality language of § 1 into § 2, it would be difficult to justify on a reading of the statute a later refusal to extend the 'final and conclusive' clause to other sections, such as § 3. Congress quite plainly stated that the Secretary's action under § 1 was not to be subject to judicial scrutiny. Similar language in § 2 would have made clear that Congress desired to work a like result under that section. Cf. City of Chicago v. United States, supra.

The Regional Solicitor accepted the findings and conclusions of the Examiner of Inheritance that the testator had testamentary capacity when he executed the instrument, that he was not unduly influenced in its execution, and that it was executed in compliance with the prescribed formalities. This removes from the case before us all questions except the scope of the Secretary's power to grant or withhold approval of the instrument under 25 U.S.C. § 373.

The Regional Solicitor's view of the scope of the Secretary's power is reflected in his statement:

'When a purported will is submitted for approval and it has been determined that it meets the technical requirements for a valid will, further consideration must be given before approving or disapproving it to determine whether approval will most nearly achieve just and equitable treatment of the beneficiaries thereunder and the decedent's heirs-at-law.' App. 84-85. (Emphasis added.)

The basis of the Regional Solicitor's action emerges most clearly from his reliance on the legal relationship of the testator to his daughter and his failure to support her. From this he concluded that failure to provide for the daughter in the will did not meet the just and equitable 'standard' that he considered the Secretary was authorized to apply in passing on an Indian will. The Regional Solicitor related the failure to support the daughter in her childhood to the absence of provision for her in the will and declared that the decedent 'had an obligation to his daughter which was not discharged either during his lifetime or under the terms of his purported will. For this reason it is inappropriate that the Secretary perpetuate this utter disregard for the daughter's welfare * * *' (Emphasis added.) While thus stressing the natural ties with Dorita High Horse, the Regional Solicitor neither challenged nor gave weight to the predicate of the Examiner's determination which was that the decedent has a close and sustained familial relationship with his niece and had resided in her home, while in contrast, he had virtually no contact with his natural daughter.

To sustain the administrative action performed on behalf of the Secretary would, on this record, be tantamount to holding that a public officer can substitute his preference for that of an Indian testator. We need not here undertake to spell out the scope of the Secretary's power, but we cannot assume that Congress, in giving testamentary power to Indians respecting their allotted property with the one hand, was taking that power away with the other by vesting in the Secretary the same degree of authority to disapprove such a disposition. ^[12]

In reaching our conclusions it is not necessary to accept the contention of the petitioners that the Secretary's authority is narrowly limited to passing on the formal sufficiency of a document claimed to be a will. The power to make testamentary dispositions arises by statute; here we deal with a special kind of property right under allotments from the Government. The right is not absolute; the allottee is the beneficial owner while the Government is trustee. 25 U.S.C. § 348. The Indian's right to make inter vivos dispositions is limited and requires approval of the Secretary. The legislative history reflects the concern of the Government to protect Indians from improvident acts or exploitation by others and comprehensive regulations govern the process of such inter vivos dispositions. No comparable regulations govern the right to make testamentary dispositions, and from this one might argue that the power of an Indian relating to testamentary disposition of allotted property is uninhibited. The legislative history on this score is perhaps no more or less reliable an indicator of what Congress intended than is usual when the scope of administrative discretion is in question.

Whatever may be the scope of the Secretary's power to grant or withhold approval of a will under 25 U.S.C. s 373, we perceive nothing in the statute or its history or purpose that vests in a governmental official the power to revoke or rewrite a will that reflects a rational testamentary scheme with a provision for a relative who befriended the testator and omission of one who did not, simply because of a subjective feeling that the disposition of the estate was not 'just and equitable.' The Regional Solicitor's action was based on nothing more that we can discern than his concept of equity and in our view this was not the kind or degree of discretion Congress vested in him. Cf. Attocknie v. Udall, 261 F.Supp. 876 (D.C.W.D.Okl.1966), reversed on other grounds, 390 F.2d 636 (C.A.10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833, 89 S.Ct. 104, 21 L.Ed.2d 104 (1968).

The Secretary's task is not always an easy one and perhaps is rendered more difficult by the absence of regulations giving guidelines. It is not difficult to conceive of dispositions so lacking in rational basis that the Secretary's approval could reasonably be withheld under § 373 even though the same scheme of disposition by a non-Indian of unrestricted property might pass muster in a conventional probate proceeding; on this record, however, we see no basis for the decision of the Regional Solicitor and must hold it arbitrary and capricious. There being no suggestion that the record need or could be supplemented by added factual material, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice BLACK, for the reasons set forth by the Court of Appeals in this case, High Horse v. Tate, 407 F.2d 394, and in Heffelman v. Udall, 378 F.2d 109 (C.A.10th Cir. 1967), would affirm the judgments below.

Notes

1. The Court of Appeals decision, which held that the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma had erred in reviewing the Regional Solicitor's action, is reported as High Horse v. Tate, 407 F.2d 394.
2. The General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended by Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 794, as amended by Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq., provides, inter alia, for the allotment to individual Indians of parcels of land. The title to these lands is held by the United States in trust for the allottee, or his heirs, during the trust period, or any extension thereof. Chahsenah had interited the interests he held at his death.
3. Section 2 of the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 856, as amended by Act of February 14, 1913, 37 Stat. 678, 25 U.S.C. § 373, provides in pertinent part:
4. Reference to Chahsenah's supposed alcohol addiction carries an intimation that the Regional Solicitor saw some want of testamentary capacity, a notion contrary to his approval of the Examiner's finding of testamentary capacity and absence of undue influence.
5. The Regional Solicitor gratuitously volunteered that if any of the five previous wills made by the testator between 1956 and 1963 were presented he would disapprove them because they made no provision for Dorita High Horse. The record discloses no inquiry by him into the circumstances of the execution of those wills, the testator's state of health at the time of their execution or his reasons for omitting provision for Dorita High Horse.
6. The plaintiffs supporting the will appear to have relied upon 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), which provides:
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides:
8. We express no opinion as to the correctness of this determination. The complaint alleged that the amount in dispute was in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and that the dispute arose under the laws of the United States. Independently of the District Court's ruling, it had jurisdiction over the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Cf. International Association of Machinists AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 685 n. 2, 83 S.Ct. 956, 958, 10 L.Ed.2d 67 (1963); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 589-591, 66 S.Ct. 761, 764-765, 90 L.Ed. 873 (1946).
9. That section provides in pertinent part:
10. There is a conflict in the circuits on this point. Compare Hayes v. Seaton, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 128, 270 F.2d 319, 321 (1959); Homovich v. Chapman, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 153, 191 F.2d 761, 764 (1951), with Heffelman v. Udall, 378 F.2d 109 (C.A.10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 926, 88 S.Ct. 287, 19 L.Ed.2d 278 (1967); Attocknie v. Udall, 390 F.2d 636 (C.A.10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833, 89 S.Ct. 104, 21 L.Ed.2d 104 (1968).
11. See also Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192.
12. This is borne out by the Secretary's interpretation of § 373 in an arguably 'improvident' testamentary disposition. As to a will naming a Caucasian as a beneficiary, a memorandum, dated May 10, 1941, from the Solicitor's Office to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, stated, inter alia,

'Whatever discretion the Secretary may have in the matter of approving or disapproving the will, it is clear that this discretion should not be exercised to the extent of substituting his will for that of the testator * * *.'