U. S. Senate Speeches and Remarks of Carl Schurz/Sales of Arms to French Agents 7

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U. S. Senate Speeches and Remarks of Carl Schurz
by Carl Schurz

Sales of Arms to French Agents (7 of 7)

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“The Senate having taken up the motion of Mr. Sumner to postpone indefinitely the sundry civil expenses appropriation bill” (The Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix, pp. 531-540).

476929U. S. Senate Speeches and Remarks of Carl Schurz — Sales of Arms to French Agents (7 of 7)Carl Schurz

Sales of Arms to French Agents

SPEECH OF HON. CARL SCHURZ,

OF MISSOURI,

In the United States Senate,

May 31, 1872.

Mr. SCHURZ said:

Mr. President: It was announced by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner] a few days ago that he, as well as myself, desired an opportunity to address the Senate on the subject of the report of the committee charged with the investigation of the sales of arms to France. The Senator from Massachusetts has devoted but a few remarks to that subject; I intend to discuss it more elaborately. Nobody will question the propriety of our speaking on this report. The personal animadversions contained in it are, I think, unprecedented in the history of this body. They ought not to pass without comment.

But the importance of that report goes far beyond this personal attack; it goes even far beyond the matter of the sale of arms. The report has already been styled by the Senator from Massachusetts as being of a character so extraordinary that we may look in vain for a parallel in our parliamentary history.

When in some European countries the court and the aristocracy become so profligate and so defiantly reckless of appearances as want only to provoke public opinion, thoughtful observers conclude that a revolution is imminent. In this Republic, happily, violent revulsions are of very rare occurrence. Here great changes are effected by the simple movements of public opinion; but here also we may sometimes find in the reckless defiance thrown out to public opinion by Administrations or ruling parties, symptonms indicating that a change must come, and such a symptom those will find in this report who attentively study it.

I will not call this report a white-washing document as the Senator from Massachusetts has done; first, because I have some doubt as to that expression being in strict accordance with parliamentary courtesy ; and secondly, because I think the word “white-washing” is scarcely applicable to the case; for all the colors of the rainbow are heaped so thick and heavy in this document upon truth and reason that the whole subject in question disappears under the monstrous accumulation of paint.

In sober earnest, facts and evidence and law, and the principles of free institutions and constitutional government, and the interests of the country, have in this case been so heroically dealt with that I do not hesitate to affirm the political atmosphere which renders such a production possible is so unhealthy that a free government cannot long live in it. That atmosphere must be purified or the miasma will become fatal. It will render us unable to see the truth, and to appreciate what so far has been dearest to us as citizens of this Republic. In this respect the report may well serve as a warning example, and it becomes of interest to the whole country.

Let us examine its principal features in order to understand the bearing of what I say. Why was this investigation held? Its object was to ascertain whether, as was asserted, in the sales of arms conducted by this Government in the years 1870 and 1871 illicit practices had taken place. But behold, here is the report of the majority of the committee, and one half of that report is devoted to a sharp criticism of certain members of this body, while the larger part of the other half is devoted to a theory advanced to prove that what was admitted to be wrong even by the friends of the Administration on this floor, was right after all. The Administration is there defended against itself.

We are obliged to go into the details. The first great question to be answered by this investigation was, were the sales of arms conducted according to the laws of the country? The majority report of the committee by its verdict places the officers of the Government who conducted the sales above censure. There are two statutes by which the sales of ordnance stores are governed. One is a statute enacted in 1825, and the other a statute enacted in 1868. The statute of 1825 reads thus:

“That the president of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause to be sold any ordnance, arms, ammunition, or other stores, or subsistence or medical supplies, which upon proper inspection or survey shall appear to be damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the public service, whenever, in his opinion, the sale of such unserviceable stores will be advantageous to the public service.

“Sec. 2. That the inspection or survey of the unserviceable stores shall be made by an inspector general, or such other officer or officers as the Secretary of War may appoint for that purpose; and the sales shall be made under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.”

The statute of 1868 reads thus:

“That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to have sold, after offer at public sale on thirty days' notice, in such manner and at such times and places, at public or private sale, as he may deem most advantageous to the public interest, the old cannon, arms, and other ordnance stores now in possession of the War Department, which are damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the United States military service or for the militia of the United States, and to cause the net proceeds of such sales, after paying all proper expenses of sale and transportation to the place of sale, to be deposited in the Treasury of the United States.”

[At this point the Senate took a recess for two hours; at which time Mr. Schurz resumed as follows:]

Mr. President, when I was interrupted this evening by the vote to take a recess I was discussing the question how far the report of the majority of the committee of investigation corresponded with the facts with regard to the observance of the law in conducting these sales by the War Department. I had quoted two statutes, one enacted in 1825 and one in 1868.

I go into these details because it is necessary in order to exhibit this majority report as a valuable contribution to the history of the political morals of our times. The provisions of these statutes then were as follows: the one provided that an inspection of ordnance stores to be sold should be held by officers designated for that purpose; the other provided that there shall be an offer at public sale after thirty days' notice before private sale should he permitted, and that only ordnance stores damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the use of the Army or militia now, that is to say, at the time of the passage of the act “in the possession of the War Department,” should be sold.

Now, sir, have those provisions been observed? The committee says yes. I affirm that not only were they not observed, but that every one of them was most flagrantly violated. Let us see how things were done in the War Department, and then let us examine the judgment passed upon the official way of doing things by a Senate committee.

In the first place, there is not even in this testimony the least pretense of an inspection in connection with the sales under investigation. The matter of inspection is not even mentioned by the officers of the War Department testifying before the committee. Secondly, there is not even a pretense of the offering at public sale at thirty days' notice of the lots of arms and ordnance stores that were sold. The modus operandi followed by the War Department is very curious. It was this: the War Department advertises a very small quantity of arms or ordnance stores, say a few hundred rifles and a few thousand cartridges. Thereupon at any future time the War Department claim the right to sell at pleasure any quantity of arms or ordnance stores ever so large and ever so varied at private sale. The consequences to which such a modus operandi is calculated to lead are set forth as follows:

“Question. In illustration of this ruling let me put a question to you. It appears from the advertisement before us that two thousand breech-loaders were advertised for sale and bids were invited thereon publicly. A party desiring to buy arms might not desire to buy two thousand, and might desire to buy twenty thousand, having a market for twenty thousand and not for a small lot; the two thousand, therefore, would not be sold possibly at public sale; and then the two thousand not having been sold, the Ordnance Bureau would have considered itself authorized to sell all the rest upon the strength of that advertisement for two thousand at private sale. Was that the construction?”

And the answer is given by one of the most prominent officers of the Ordnance Bureau:

“That was the construction. One thing should be considered, however, in that connection, and it is this: that the dealers, and those parties who would be apt to make offers for the purchase of such arms, were thoroughly informed as to what was going on in the Department and what things they could buy. They were constantly, you might say, in communication with the agency in New York gathering information.”

So that in fact, the injunction of public dealing was set aside and the whole matter virtually given over to private transaction. I repeat, therefore, there is not even a pretense that the vision of the statute, in this respect has been faithfully executed.

Thirdly, there is no pretense even that only such ordnance stores were sold as were then, at the time of the passage of this statute, in possession of the War Department, for the evidence shows that cartridges were newly manufactured for the purpose of being sold and certainly that ammunition was not in the possession of the War Department as ammunition when the statute was passed.

Fourthly, were only such arms sold as were “damaged or otherwise unsuitable arms or ordnance stores” for the use of the Army or the militia of the United States? There were carbines sold to Remington on October 13, 1871, of the description “Spencer” and “Remington.” Were they damaged? General Dyer, in an official document over his signature, testified here that they were fit to be issued to our own troops. Were they unsuitable for the Army or the militia? The very same kind of arms are in the hands of our regular soldiers down to this very day. Was the ammunition to accompany the breech-loaders sold “damaged or otherwise unsuitable?” Why, sir, that ammunition was newly manufactured for the purpose of being sold, and the same kind and caliber of ammunition is used in our Army to-day. Were the breech-loaders sold in such large quantities to Mr. Richardson, a straw man of Remington's, “unsuitable?” Why, sir, here is a report of our officers, who have officially examined those breech-loaders, and testify that they are a most powerful and effective infantry arm. Another officer of the ordnance department testifies that those arms are to-day far better than any arm now in the hands of any regular army abroad, and certainly those arms are infinitely better than a large majority of the arms now in the hands of the militia of the United States, for most of the arms in the hands of the militia are still the old muzzle-loaders. Who will then pretend that the breech-loaders were not infinitely more suitable? To be sure it is said that in the meantime improvements were made in the breech-loading musket; but what will it lead to if the doctrine be accepted that any improvement which may be thus made will render all other arms “unsuitable” and fit to be sold? Then you might change only a screw in a gun, and changing that screw the ordnance department may decide that according to the statute all muskets in which that screw is not changed may be sold at the pleasure of the Ordnance Bureau. Would not that be preposterous?

It is evident that if such a doctrine be adopted there will be unlimited latitude to private dealing and jobbery. The restrictive provisions of the statute were therefore in these sales, as they were conducted, absolutely set at naught. It appears that the arbitrary pleasure of the War Department was regarded as the law. They construed the law in such a way that they might just as well have made a law to suit themselves. Is not such a doctrine, therefore, utterly inadmissible? Thus my assertion is sustained that the law was flagrantly violated in every particular. But what does the majority of the committee say?

“But, as we find those sales to have been made according to the settled construction of the statute in the Department, with results exceedingly favorable to the Government, your committee find nothing in the conduct of the Secretary of War or his subordinates deserving censure in this respect.”

Now, mark the wonderful process of reason by which such a breach of law is justified. First, not even the pretense of an inspection having been had, it was found convenient that no inspection should be necessary. Hear the committee about that:

“Your committee are clearly of opinion that the inspection and survey required by the first act, and which was equivalent to a condemnation, was not a condition-precedent to the sale under the last act.”

In other words, that the last act virtually repealed the first as to the matter of inspection. This is a somewhat desperate expedient. But it so happens that this construction put upon the two statutes by the committee of investigation is contravened by the War Department itself; for the law officer of the War Department, the Judge Advocate General, in an opinion given at the request of the Department, speaks upon the same subject as follows:

“War Department,

Bureau of Military Justice.

Washington, October 12, 1869.

“Respectfully returned.

“Under the act of March 8, 1825, which is regarded as still in force, the sales referred to may be ordered by the President of the United States. That act is in the following words:

“'That the President of the United States be, and is hereby, authorized to cause to be sold any ordnance, arms, ammunition, or other military stores, or subsistence or medical supplies, which, upon proper inspection or survey, shall appear to be damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the public service, whenever, in his opinion, the sale of such unserviceable stores will be advantageous to the public service.

“'Sec. 2. That the inspection or survey of the unserviceable stores shall be made by an inspector general or such other officer or officers as the Secretary of War may appoint for that purpose; and the sales shall be made under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.'”

The Judge Advocate General further says:

“It will be observed that the ordnance, arms, ammunition, or other military stores, or subsistence or medical supplies, authorized to be sold by this act, must first have been inspected as provided for, and declared to be either 'damaged' or 'otherwise unfit for the public service,' which having been done, the power of the President to dispose of them is complete provided in his opinion such sale will be advantageous to the public service.”

This opinion was given by the Judge Advocate General on the 12th of October, 1869, more than a year after the passage of the statute of 1868. The occasion was the sale of a number of muskets to the republic of Liberia, sold in the same manner as afterward muskets were sold to Mr. Remington or Mr. Richardson. The cases were entirely parallel, and yet the Judge Advocate General insisted that the inspection prescribed by the statute of 1825 could not, without a violation of law, be dispensed with.

Thus we find here the curious spectacle of an investigating committee defending the War Department against its own law officer; the law officer of the War Department affirming that the action of the Department is wrong, and then the committee of the Senate stepping in and saying “In the opinion of your own law officer you may be wrong, but in our opinion you did just right.” The War Department virtually through its law officer confesses a violation of the law, and the committee tells them in spite of themselves they did not violate the law. I call this a somewhat desperate expedient.

The committee has shown us that “some things can be done as well as others.” But in other respects, the offer at public sale on thirty days' notice, &c., the 'proceedings of the War Department were so flagrantly arbitrary that even this committee is forced to admit what it euphoniously calls “error or irregularity in the details of execution;” a new and ingenious phrase for violation of law. But the committee is up to the work; it finds a justification for everything. How did that arbitrary construction of the law pass into the practice of the War Department? It was first made by General Schofield, when he was Secretary of War, and was then accepted by General Belknap. It was communicated verbally in an off-hand way by General Schofield to the chief of ordnance, and then passed in a verbal communication from the chief of ordnance who himself was to conduct the sales to the new Secretary of War, who without hesitation and further inquiry adopted it. The Secretary of War, as he himself testifies in answer to my question, consulted nobody for his own satisfaction; what the chief of ordnance told him was to the department just as good as law. No law officer of the Department was consulted then.

The circumstances are somewhat peculiar. We hear much about the looseness of construction and execution of the laws under Andrew Johnson. In fact, whenever this Administration is attacked we meet the standing argument in excuse, “But how much worse was it under Andrew Johnson!” And now the very loosest construction of a law that ever was made and acted upon under Andrew Johnson is adduced as a justification for a far more extensive violation of the law made by the officers of this Administration. With you, gentlemen, I condemn the misdeeds that were perpetrated under Andrew Johnson, but, if you please, cease claiming to be saints on your part; if the sins committed under this Administration are to be justified by the smaller and less considerable sins committed under Mr. Andrew Johnson, cease to exclaim, “We thank thee, Lord, that we are not like those sinners who went before us.”

Now, I ask you in all soberness, is this the way in which the high officers of the Government are to construe the laws of the land? Is it the part of good officers to accept the most glaring errors of their predecessors as their own rule of conduct without even taking the trouble to satisfy themselves as to the justice of what they are doing? Is that intelligent, is that conscientious government? It seems to be more than intelligent and conscientious enough for the committee, but I doubt whether intelligent and conscientious enough for the welfare of the people.

But worse than that, the committee have found another still more striking justification for a violation of the law. Listen; it is that the violation of law as perpetrated by the War Department was more beneficial to the Government in its results than the observance of the law would have been! Let us look at the committee's own language:

“Nevertheless it must be admitted that the soldier's construction” —

Meaning the construction of the law as made by General Schofield and accepted by General Belknap —

“was far more beneficial to the Government and more in harmony with the object of the act than a lawyer's construction would have been.”

Now, sir, I call a doctrine like this the most abominable, the most dangerous and destructive doctrine ever advanced in a country enjoying free institutions — a doctrine utterly subversive of a government of laws. Let the principle be once established that the officers of the Government may be justified in violating the law when the violation of the law in their opinion is more beneficial to the Government than its observance, and there is the end of all responsible power. Let the practice be established that the representatives of the people will consider a violation of law justified on such a plea, and there is the end of parliamentary Government; there is the end of republican institutions. If you are willing to let executive officers construe and execute the laws, that is, virtually make the law for themselves as they deem best for the public interests, then you, legislators of the country, may go home, for you have created an authority that will tell you what is best for the country, instead of listening to your voices. Does it not seem as if we were approaching that point at this present moment? Look around you.

The Secretary of the Treasury negotiates a loan, and in his expenditures he goes far beyond the allowance provided for in the statute; and he is justified on the ground that his transgression facilitates negotiation of the loan! The Secretary of the Navy pays a claim of $93,000 in direct violation of the clear meaning of the statute, and yet that lawless act is justified on the plea that in the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy that claimant had an equitable claim against the United States! And now an equally clear violation of the law is committed by the War Department, and it is vindicated on the ground that in the opinion of the War Department that was the best way to make money.

I tell you, you go on in that direction, you permit such precedents to be established, and your officers will soon shrink from nothing in construing, in obeying, or in violating the laws, according to their, and not to your notion of public, and by and by also of their private interests.

Show me the vilest despotism in the world, show me in that despotism the vilest sycophants, rolling in the dust at the foot of the throne, and those sycophants will justify the vilest acts of that despotism upon the identical doctrine that those in power know best whether it is more beneficial to the public interest to obey or to violate the law.

I am very far from comparing any Senator on this floor with any of those sycophants; but let me tell them it is alarming, it is humiliating to find something like this doctrine, which is the very foundation of all irresponsible power, of all arbitrary government, advocated in the American Senate; and as a Senator, as a friend of republican institutions, and as an American, I declare I would rather have this right hand cut off than that it should sign my name to such a doctrine like this.

After all this it is perhaps not surprising that we should in the same paragraph of the report be treated to something equally startling and significant. Listen to this. Speaking of the construction of the statute acted upon by the War Department, the report says:

“This was rather a soldier's than a lawyer's construction of the act. In the opinion of your committee the letter of this act requires that nothing should be sold at private sale which had not previously been offered, on thirty days' notice, at public sale. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the soldier's construction was far more beneficial to the Government and more in harmony with the object of the act, than a lawyer's construction would have been.”

Look there; a soldier's construction of a statute of the United States! A new sort of legal authority, a soldier's construction, which is so much more beneficial to the interests of the Government, and so much more in harmony with the object of the law, than a lawyer's construction would have been! Is there any doubt about the meaning of a statute? Let only a soldier be asked to construe it, for he instinctively knows the object of the law so much better than the lawyer would have known it; his construction is so much more beneficial to the Government than the lawyer's would have been. Do you hear that? Do you understand what this means, especially in times like these? Is there a violation of the law; never mind, your committee tells you, you have instead of the sanctity of law the soldier's construction, which is so much more beneficial to the interests of this Government! Who of you will be squeamish enough now to complain of a violation of the law when we enjoy the blessings of a soldier's legal construction? Is it not time to abolish the Cabinet and these legislative bodies, and to put in their places the higher and more beneficial understanding of a council of war? Should we not make haste to do away with the Supreme Court and the other legal tribunals of the country, and have the laws interpreted and administered by the far superior and more beneficial wisdom. of a court-martial? Bow your heads, Senators, before that higher legal authority, a soldier's construction of the law, and presume no longer to stand in the way of a blessing which you are so much less able to confer.

Speaking in sober earnest, sir, a committee of the Senate of the United States fallen in love with a soldier's construction of the law in preference to a lawyer's — is not that a very strange sign of the times? Justifying a violation of the law on the ground that it is a soldier's construction — is it not time that we should at last come to our senses? Should we not stop and consider what such enormous and unprecedented doctrines will lead to, doctrines fitted only for the military despotisms of the Old World, and hardly accepted even there? I doubt whether the sanctity of the law has ever been trifled with in language of as wanton levity in any constitutional Government as it has been in this report.

Take care lest so insidious an example become contagious, for if the spirit which dictated this report obtain the sanction of the representatives of the people in these legislative Halls; if it become the accepted and ruling sentiment of the American people; nay, if it be not repelled with indignation and alarm throughout this land, then indeed the friends of popular liberty and republican institutions may well say that evil days are coming. As for me, sir, I shall never cease to fight that spirit which appears here in so repulsive a shape as long as I have a voice to speak, and I do not hesitate to affirm that, bad as the willful violations of the law by the War Department and its officers may be, the justification they have received at the hands of this committee, and the principles upon which such justification is based, are infinitely worse. They are among the most alarming symptoms of the decay of this Government as a Government of laws, and of that political demoralization which is attacking our body-politic to its very core. It is indeed time that the military construction and administration of the laws should be made to cease in this country when we see Senators of the United States with such delight bow to “the soldier's construction of the law.”

I now proceed to the second question involved in this report, whether the sales of arms were made in accordance to the rule laid down by our own Government as to its duties as a neutral. The majority of the committee says most emphatically that they were. Let us see.

Under what circumstances was that rule established by our Government? There was a great war raging between France and Germany. Our Government declared its neutrality. Sales of arms and ordnance stores by private persons were legitimately made at the risk of their being confiscated by either belligerent party as contraband of war. But it appeared that a belligerent party itself applied to this Government for arms and ordnance stores through its agent, Mr. Remington, and in his name, Mr. Squire. On October 13, 1870, Mr. Squire exhibited at the War Department a dispatch, which in the opinion of the Secretary of War revealed Mr. Remington as an agent of the French Government. Then the Secretary of War ordered that no arms or ordnance stores should be sold to Mr. Remington or persons acting for him, on the ground that Mr. Remington was the agent of one of the belligerent parties.

This order and rule was correct. It placed the Government, as to the observance of its neutral obligations in the right position. Had this rule been observed, then certainly no complaint would have been made on that head. Was that rule observed by the officers of the Government? Let us examine the testimony.

In the first place, on the very same day, the 13th of October, 1870, when, after the exhibition of that dispatch and the discovery of Mr. Remington as an agent of the French Government, the Secretary of War prohibited sales of arms to that agent, carbines to the number of thirty-seven thousand and cartridges to the number of seventeen million were sold to the same individual. To be sure it is asserted that the agreement upon which those arms and that ammunition should be sold to him was made previous to his discovery as a French agent; but it must also be observed, and it appears very clearly from the testimony, that previous to the discovery only a verbal understanding took place between an officer of the ordnance department and the agent of the French Government, and that by no act on either side was that bargain confirmed.

It was the usage of this Government that when arms and ordnance stores were sold to any private party a deposit was made, a so-called margin was put up by the purchaser to bind the bargain. It appears from the testimony before us that such deposit was not made and accepted before the discovery was made that Mr. Remington was a French agent; that the deposit was offered and was accepted two days after the War Department had issued the order that no arms and ammunition should be sold to that agent of the French Government; and it appears further from the evidence that six weeks after that time the arms and cartridges were delivered by the Government to the same agent of the French Government.

Now, is there a Senator on this floor who will deny that this was a flagrant violation of the rule established by the War Department — the rule, I mean, that in consideration of the neutral duties of this Government no arms or ordnance stores should be sold to any agent of either of the belligerent parties? If,in the opinion of the Government, our neutral duties were violated by the sale of arms to a belligerent, is it not clear that they were still more pointedly violated by the delivery of arms to a belligerent party? Is not the delivery the main thing? And certainly no previous contract could justify such a delivery. As the minority report drawn up by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Stevenson] very conclusively shows, if a druggist had sold poison to an individual and actually taken the money therefor, and afterward discovered that individual to be a criminal, would that druggist be bound to deliver the poison to him? Would it not, on the contrary, be his duty to withhold the article so sold, although the buyer may have put the purchase-money into his hands?

In order to understand this matter still more clearly, look at the case of the rebel cruisers which at this time gives the Government of the United States and that of Great Britain so much trouble. I assert that the British Government might have permitted the building of ever so many war-ships had it only not permitted them to go out. Not that the rebel cruisers were permitted to be built in Great Britain, but that they were permitted to escape from British ports, was the circumstance which constituted the violation of neutral duties on the part of the British Government, and which furnished our Government a ground upon which to put forth its claims. I repeat, the failure to prevent their escape was the sin for which Great Britain is held to account, and not the mere construction of the vessels on the Mersey. In one word, the delivery constituted the real crime. And thus the delivery of these arms constituted the breach of that rule which our Government laid drawn to guard against the violation of our neutral duties, and not the mere contract of sale. I suppose every school-boy can and should understand that; and if the War Department was not intelligent enough to understand it, then it is indeed time that we should have a War Department with common sense enough to justly construe rules established by itself to guard our neutral obligations. But if they had sense enough in the War Department to understand it, and yet did not act accordingly, then it is high time we should have a War Department with honesty enough to enforce its own rules in good faith. If the President of the United States had appreciated and cared to execute his duty in the premises, then I assert he should not have hesitated to remove the officer responsible for the delivery of arms and ammunition to the same person who had been excluded from the sales made by the Government on the ground of his being a French agent.

Now, let us look at the testimony in the celebrated case of the breech-loaders, bought in the name of Mr. Richardson, the lawyer of Ilion of whom we have heard before. The order was that no arms and ordnance stores should be sold to Remington, nor, as the Secretary of War testified in response to a question put by myself, to any person known to buy for Remington. Mr. Remington spent several months in France in the year 1870. About the 3d of December, 1870, he returned to this country for the express object of purchasing breech-loaders. At once a mysterious exchange of dispatches takes piece between the ordnance agency in New York and the Ordnance Bureau here at Washington. The ordnance agent at New York requested General Dyer to come to New York “for the purpose of meeting parties.” General Dyer telegraphed back that he had not time to go to New York, but requested that the parties meet him here. Finally, however, he did go to New York to look after the business there.

Let the minority report drawn up by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Stevenson] tell the story:

“The sale of the breech-loading muskets, which to a great extent were still in the hands of troops, was then taken in hand, and soon thereafter the manufacturing of a large quantity of cartridges to accompany them was ordered.

“The arms merchants known in the trade were not invited by letter to send in bids, as they had been in October. General Dyer addressed the following letter to the Ordnance Bureau at Washington, (page 108:)

Sale of Springfield breech-loaders, model of 1866, and ammunition.

Office of United States Ordnance Agency,

Corner Houston and Greene Streets,

(Entrance on Greene) P. 0. Box 1811,

New York City, December 10, 1871.

Sir: You will please ascertain and inform Major Crispin by telegraph on Monday next as follows, namely:

Within what time five thousand Springfield breech-loading, model of 1866, with two hundred rounds of ammunition, can be delivered in New York?

Within what time ten thousand breech-loading, model 1866, with two hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, can be delivered?

Within what time twenty thousand, with ammunition, can be delivered?

What number, with ammunition, can be delivered?

Reply in cipher, using this key:

Five thousand muskets and ammunition, A

One thousand muskets and ammunition, B.

Twenty thousand muskets and ammunition, C.

To express the total number of muskets, with ammunition, that can be delivered, and the time in days within which the deliveries can be made, use the following cipher, namely.”

I will not read the cipher signed “A. B. Dyer, chief of ordnance, Washington, D. C.”

In reply Colonel Benét, in charge of the Ordnance Bureau at Washington during General Dyer's absence, sent a statement of the number of arms and the quantity of ammunition that might be had for sale. General Dyer then addressed the following letter to Colonel Benét, (page 109:)

Office of United States Ordnance Agency,

Corner Houston and Greene Streets,

(Entrance on Greene) P. 0. Box 1811,

New York City, December 12, 1870.

Sir: Your answer of yesterday by mail to my cipher dispatch of the 10th instant, in relation to Springfield breech-loading muskets, model 1866, is received. I find that all the muskets of this model, or any portion of them, can be sold at our price, (cost,) provided four hundred cartridges per gun can be furnished with them.

As these guns are of obsolete pattern, and the troops are anxious to obtain the model 1868, it would seem that we should sell as many of these muskets as we can, and as it is vital that in order to do it that ammunition should be furnished, we might very property fabricate it to go with them, (to be sold at its full value,) but this cannot be done without the full knowledge and approval of the Secretary of War.

You will please learn from him, and inform me, whether he will authorize ammunition to be made at Frankford and sold with the arms, and should he authorize it, direct the commanding officer of Frankford arsenal at once to increase the manufacture of cartridges to the extent of the capacity of the arsenal.

You can explain to the Secretary why it is desirable that all of the 1866 model muskets should be sold, and that only so many as we can furnish ammunition for can be sold.

I may leave for Springfield armory to-morrow night. Advise me to-morrow forenoon by telegraph of the result of your interview with the Secretary, and should he approve the sale, have all of the unserviceable muskets of 1866 model ordered to Springfield armory to be repaired, and take measures to call in the muskets of this model which are now in the hands of the troops, and replace them by muskets of the 1868 model.

Those called in should be sent to New York agency. If an exchange of fifteen to twenty thousand or more of these muskets, now in the hands of troops, for an equal number of Remington arms could be made by the Department, it is worthy of consideration whether it is not desirable that it should be done, especially in view of the recommendations of the board of which Major General Schofield was president, and of the admitted excellence of the Remington system, and of the fact that the same cartridge can be used in the Remington and Springfield standard muskets.

The question of exchange is more especially to be considered, as it is not deemed best to materially deplete our present limited supply of breech-loaders, even of inferior models, to extent below the present quantity. If a sale is made and not an exchange, the moneys will of course go into the public Treasury, and not be available for the fabrication or purchase of arms.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. B. DYER.

Chief of Ordnance, United States Army.

Lieutenant Colonel S. B. Benét,

Ordnance Office, Washington, D. C.

Approved:

WM. W. BELKNAP,

Secretary of War.

December 13, 1870.

The minority report proceeds:

“In reply, Colonel Benét announced that the approval of the Secretary of War, except as to the proposed exchange, had been secured, and that the ammunition had been ordered to be made. The arms were at once ordered to be sent to New York from all parts of the country by speediest means of conveyance, (see telegrams,) and the troops were ordered to deliver them up.

“On December 16 General Dyer, still at New York authorized the sale of arms by Colonel Crispin, at twenty-one dollars cash, and also ammunition, at thirty-five dollars per thousand.

“On December 29 a letter was received from Mr. Thomas Richardson, offering to buy the arms at established prices. General Dyer and Colonel Crispin both testify that they never saw Mr. Richardson until a long time afterward. In his testimony, General Dyer made the following statement:

“Question. Did you sell a lot of breech-loading muskets to one Thomas Richardson?

“Answer. A lot of breech-loading muskets was sold, and, I believe, to one Thomas Richardson. I saw from the report that he was the purchaser. Who he was I did not knew.

“Question. Did you see him?

“Answer. I never saw him.

“Question. Was any public notice given thirty days before the sale of those breech-loading arms took place, that that kind of arms were to be sold?

“Answer. Of some of the breech-loading arms there was.

“Question. Is the public notice on the records of the Department?

“Answer. I presume so.

“Question. The breech-loading muskets sold to Richardson were of Allen's patent of 1866, were they not?

“Answer. Yes, sir.

“Question. Have you the original of the bid which was sent in by Thomas Richardson?

“Answer. It may be in the office. As I said before, the sale of those arms was made by the officer in New York, Major Crispin, and I did not know to whom they were sold. He had my authority to sell those 1866 model arms at a particular price. After I gave that order I made no further inquiry, and I did not know until after the sale had been made who was the purchaser.

“Question. The bids for the arms would regularly come to the Ordnance Bureau, would they not?

“Answer. No; they were with him.

“Question. Did the Ordnance Bureau inquire who were the bidders for those arms, so as to ascertain whether there were agents of any of the belligerent Powers among them?

“Answer. It did not. That was left entirely to the officer making the sale.

“Question. In the case where Richardson bought breech-loading arms, were there any sealed bids invited?

“Answer. Not that I am aware of. As I told you, I knew nothing whatever about the sale of those arms. The last thing that I did in regard to it was to authorize the sale at the established prices. I had fixed the prices.

“Question. Who urged that the cartridges should be manufactured?

“Answer. I do not remember who. I think, in conversation with Major Crispin, we concluded that if ammunition could be furnished with those guns we could find a sale for them. I knew we had no such ammunition on hand. I considered it desirable to get rid of the guns on the best terms we could, and thought it would be good policy to furnish the ammunition, just as we would put guns in order.

“This would convey the impression that General Dyer, when he resolved upon the sale of the breech-loading muskets and had them ordered in from all parts of the country, and even from the hands of the troops, and when cartridges were ordered to be manufactured to accompany the arms, had no particular purchase at all in view. But in his letter of December 12, 1870, we find the following statement: 'I find that all the muskets of this model, or any portion of them, can be sold at our price, provided four hundred cartridges per gun can be furnished with them. You can explain to the Secretary why it is desirable that all of the '66 model muskets should be sold, and that only so many as we can furnish for can be sold.'

“From this it appears that the purchaser had already been found, and that this purchaser insisted upon a certain quantity of ammunition to accompany the guns. Who was this purchaser? There is a letter in evidence addressed by Mr. Remington to Mr. Le Cesne, president of the commission of armament in France. The authenticity of this letter has not been questioned. It is dated at New York, December 13, 1870. Mr. Remington was at the time in that city. In that letter Mr. Remington says: 'Regarding the purchase of Springfields, transformed, Allen system, I am sorry to say the greatest number we may hope to get will not, I fear, exceed forty thousand. The Government have never made but about seventy-five thousand, all told, and forty thousand is the greatest number they think it prudent to spare. I may be able to procure, depending upon an exchange of our arms at some future time, for the number of breech-loading Springfields over and above the forty thousand they are willing to let go now. This question of an exchange, with the very friendly feeling I find existing to aid France, I hope to be able to procure. More cartridges for these forty thousand will, in a great measure, require to be made, as the Government have not above three million on hand. But the Government has consented to allow the requisite number, four hundred for each gun, to be made, and the cartridge-works have had orders (given yesterday) to increase production to full capacity of works. This question of making cartridges at Government works was a difficult one to get over, but it is done. The price the Government will charge for the gun and cartridges will be cost, or as near that as possible. The forty thousand guns cannot all be shipped immediately, as they are distributed in the various arsenals throughout the country. The chief of ordinance thinks it may take twenty or thirty days before all would be brought in.'”

We find between this letter and that addressed by General Dyer to Colonel Benét on the previous day, a singular correspondence: an offer to purchase all the Springfield breech-loaders that can be had; the cartridges which must accompany the guns in each letter stated exactly at four hundred rounds per gun; the cartridges to be manufactured in the Government workshops, and that the production must be increased to the full capacity of the works; the exchange with Remington arms to be effected at some future time; the price of arms to be cost.

Colonel Benét informs General Dyer by telegraph of the approval of the proposition by the Secretary of War, (page 110,) that the ammunition had been ordered to be made, and that General Dyer's wishes were fully carried out. And on the same day, December 13, Mr. Remington writes the same information to Mr. Le Cesne. What a wonderful coincidence between Dyer's dispatches and Remington's letter!

Was General Dyer at New York in direct communication with Mr. Remington? He testifies as follows:

“Question. When you were in New York about December 19,1870, when the order was given that these breech-loading arms were to be sold, did you see either Remington or Squire there?

“Answer. I have no recollection of it.”

But other witnesses did have a recollection of it. Colonel Crispin testifies as follows, (page 194:)

“Question. Was not General Dyer there, according to correspondence, on the 9th of December, 1870?

“Answer. He was there when his correspondence was written. His letter of instruction to me was dated in my office.

“Question. Did he have any intercourse with Colonel Squire ?

“Answer. I do not think he did at that time. That is my impression, but I will not speak positively.

“Question. You never saw them together?

“Answer. I cannot say that at that time I saw them together.

“Question. At what time did you see them together?

“Answer. I have seen them together here in Washington, I do not recollect at present where. I saw them together in New York.

“Question. Did you see Mr. Remington there about that time?

“Answer. I saw Mr. Remington there.

“Question. Did you see General Dyer in intercourse with him

“Answer. I have seen them together.

“Question. That was about the 9th or 10th of December, 1870?

“Answer. I cannot say positively what was the time they were together. I do not recollect. I simply know by the date of the correspondence. Whether General Dyer was there on the 9th or 10th, I have forgotten.

“Question. General Dyer was in your office at that time frequently?

“Answer. He was in New York only twice. I said in my testimony before the House committee once or twice: I think it was twice.

“Question. I mean about the time that correspondence took place with regard to the breech-loading rifles, in December, 1870?

“Answer. He was in New York at that time.

“Question. Did you hear anything said about the manufacturing of cartridges?

“Answer. I did not listen attentively to the conversation which was occurring between them.

“Question. Between whom?

“Answer. Between Mr. Remington and General Dyer, whom I said I saw together. I may have overheard some conversation as to that subject; I cannot be positive.

“Question. As to manufacturing cartridges?

“Answer. Yes, sir.

“Question. You say you may have heard some conversation about the manufacturing of cartridges?

“Answer. Yes, sir.

“Question. You are not sure?

“Answer. I cannot be positive at this date what the conversation exactly was. At that time I was very busy in my office, and so was my chief clerk.

“Question. Was there not some conversation between them as to the propriety of selling the breech-loaders of the model of 1866, or whether they could be sold, and how many could be sold?

“Answer. I should not be surprised if such a conversation did take place; but it was one of those evanescent things that made no impression on my mind, so that I cannot state the facts distinctly.

“Question. Is it your impression that such a conversation occurred?

“Answer. It is my impression that conversations on these general subjects took place between Mr. Remington and General Dyer.”

Who was Mr. Remington? He was the agent of the French Government to whom, according to the order of the War Department, no arms or ordnance stores should be sold on account of the neutral obligations of the United States. And who was General Dyer? He was the chief of ordnance in our War Department. Now, considering that Colonel Crispin, to say nothing of his high character, is a subordinate of General Dyer, and cannot be inclined to create impressions prejudicial to his chief, seems to be conclusive as to General Dyer's and Mr. Remington's personal conferences on the subject of these guns and cartridges, and there can be no reasonable doubt as to the purchaser alluded to in General Dyer's letter, who would take all the breech-loaders, with four hundred rounds of ammunition per gun; and that purchaser was Mr. Remington himself.

The minority report of the Senator from Kentucky continues:

“Between the 13th and 19th of December, 1870, the breech-loading Springfields, model of 1866, were ordered to be sent forward to New York from all parts of the country, (see telegrams, Pages 807-809,) and orders were issued to military officers to deliver those still in the hands of troops.

“The manufacture of cartridges had also been ordered at Frankford arsenal, all in accordance with General Dyer's letter, corresponding with that of Remington to Le Cesne. On the 19th, formal authority to sell was given to Colonel Crispin at New York, and at last on December 29, appears the offer to purchase all the breech-loading Springfields, .50 caliber, the Government would sell, at established prices, by Thomas Richardson, dated at Ilion, (page 195.)

“Thomas Richardson confesses, in his testimony, that he merely gave, his name for the purchase of breech-loaders and ammunition, which passed at once into the hands of Remington. He remembers nothing of the particulars of the bargain. He testifies that Mr. Smoot, a late lieutenant in the ordnance corps, who at the period of the sales in question was in the employ and pay of Remington & Sons, transacted business for him without any written authority and without any power to conclude purchases. He verbally authorizes Smoot to speak for him but a few days before he put in his offer for the breech-loaders, (December 19,) and Smoot, who was also known as being in the employ of the Remingtons, was received by Colonel Crispin as Richardson's representative without any questions being asked.

“Colonel Crispin testifies that the only question he asked about Richardson, when the name of the latter appeared as a large purchaser of arms, was addressed to Colonel Squire, Mr. Remington's agent, whether Mr. Richardson was a member of the Remington firm. Colonel Squire's reply being in the negative, Colonel Crispin was satisfied, in spite of all the surrounding circumstances, and the transactions went on. The breech-loaders and ammunition purchased in the name of Richardson passed, as soon as delivered, into Remington's hands, and were shipped to France.

“The testimony bearing upon this transaction forces the conclusion upon our mind that Richardson's bid was put in as a blind to avoid the appearance of a direct sale from the Ordnance Bureau to Mr Remington; that after all that had occurred between General Dyer and Mr. Remington, in New York, touching the breech-loading Springfield muskets and ammunition, General Dyer could easily have ascertained that Thomas Richardson was but a cover to avoid the appearance of a direct sale from the Ordnance Bureau to Mr. Remington.”

Now, I ask, is there any member of the committee or can there be any Senator who has listened to this recital or who has studied the testimony contained in this report and will then gainsay the truthfulness of the assertion that General Dyer and Mr. Remington did transact this business in person? I therefore affirm, on the strength of this testimony, that the purchase of breech-loaders and cartridges was negotiated directly between General Dyer and Mr. Remington, between the chief of ordnance and the French agent, in person, in flagrant violation of the order of the War Department, and no sane man can read the evidence in this case without arriving at the same conclusion.

Another case of similar import is that of the Gatling guns, which I will lay before the Senate in the language of the minority report:

“The circumstances surrounding the exchange of Gatling guns with General Franklin, vice president of the Colt's Arms Manufacturing Company, at Hartford, Connecticut, are equally singular.

“Sometime in December, 1870, Mr. Remington, or his agent, whom he met in New York, told General Franklin that the Government had certain Gatling guns which he (Remington) hoped to be able to get, (General Franklin's testimony, page 494,) and that this could be effected in the way of an exchange, if the Colt's Arms Manufacturing Company would consent to take nine Gatling guns then in the possession of the Government, and to deliver in their place, to the Government, nine Gatling guns of a superior model. The Remingtons informed him that 'such a thing could probably be done,' (testimony, page 495.)

“General Franklin went to Washington, saw General Dyer about it, and found General Dyer understood the matter as the Remingtons had represented it to him, (Franklin testimony, page 751.) A contract was made accordingly, in the following language, (page 622:)

Washington, D.C. December 30, 1870.

General: The Colt's Arms Manufacturing Company will agree to receive from the United States nine .50-caliber six-barrel Gatling guns, with carriages, and return the same number of guns and carriages in six months from the date of the receipt from the United States of the guns, &c., the guns to be returned to be fitted with improved extractors and traversing motion, if required. It is understood that the carriages are to be made by the ordnance department, at the expense of Colt's Arms Company.

Very respectfully, yours,

W. B. FRANKLIN,

Vice President and General Agent

Colt's Arms Company.

Major General A. B. Dyer,

Chief Ordnance, Washington, D. C.

“Thereupon General Dyer issued the following instructions to the ordnance agency at New York, (page 623:)

Ordnance Office, War Department,

Washington, D. C., January 5, 1871.

Sir: Upon the application of the Colt's Arms Company you will make requisition upon Colonel Hagner for the delivery to them of nine .50-caliber Gatling guns and carriages on hand at the Watervliet arsenal. This will be done upon the Colt's Arms Company depositing with you the sum of $14,400, and giving you a written agreement to deliver at the Watervliet arsenal, free of cost to the United States, within six months from this date, the same number of guns and carriages, the guns to be fitted with improved extractors of the latest pattern, and the carriages to have a traversing motion, it being understood that the carriages are to be made by the ordnance department at the Watervliet arsenal, and at the expense of the Colt's Arms Manufacturing Company, who, upon the fulfillment of their agreement, are to receive from the United States the difference between the amount deposited, ($14,400,) and the cost of making the nine gun-carriages. The guns are to be inspected by an officer of the ordnance department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. B. DYER.

Chief of Ordnance, United States Army.

P. S.-The agreement must be sent to this office.

S. V. B.

Commanding Officer, United States Agency.

“General Franklin had a conversation with General Dyer about the deposit of $14,400 to be made, but he did not make that deposit himself, nor did he pay any attention to it. The deposit was made by 'somebody,' without General Franklin's or the company's action. He acted upon being advised of it. He thinks the deposit was made by the Remingtons, 'because there were no other people who had the slightest interest in depositing $14,400 except the Remingtons,' for the reason that the nine Gatling guns were to be delivered to them, (page 753.) And yet General Franklin never exchanged a word with the Remingtons about it, and the deposit was made, (testimony, page 754.) That the Remingtons really made the deposit appears from their settlement with Franklin, (page 723,) the Remingtons accounting for the amount of the deposit, minus the cost of the gun-carriages manufactured at Watervliet arsenal. Neither General Franklin nor the Gatling Gun Company, with whom the Colt's Arms Manufacturing Company had business relations, (page 754.) advised the Remingtons of the necessity of making the deposit, the Remingtons must have been advised by another party as to this matter, and there was no other party interested but the Ordnance Bureau.

“The nine Gatling guns were, according to contract, delivered from Watervliet arsenal to General Franklin, who repaired them for the Remingtons. But the carriages of these guns not needing repairs, General Franklin requested that instead of being sent to Hartford, they be kept at Watervliet arsenal, which was done. When General Franklin had repaired the guns for the Remingtons he forwarded them to their address in New York.

“To the carriages of those guns which had been retained at Watervliet arsenal General Franklin gave no further attention. He did not request that they be forwarded, but they were sent to Colonel Crispin, commanding officer of the ordnance agency at New York, and then found their way into the hands of the Remingtons. The correspondence before the committee throws no light upon this matter. General Franklin testifies that he understood the carriages were sent to the address of the Remingtons it New York, but has no positive knowledge. Mr. McGowan testifies that he thinks the carriages were delivered to Austin Baldwin & Co., in pursuance of some verbal instructions from somebody. But General Franklin positively denies that he gave any instructions to that effect, or any instructions with regard to the delivery of the carriages at all, and he is sure there was no other member of the Colt's Arms Company through whom that business went, (pages 755-756.) Certain it is, however, that, without any instructions being given about that matter by General Franklin, or any other member of the Colt's Arms Company, the gun-carriages sent from Watervliet arsenal to Colonel Crispin went into the hands of the Remingtons, as accounted for by them to General Franklin, (page 723.) General Franklin further testifies, in answer to the question whether he had any personal conversation with Dyer or Crispin about it, that he thought it was 'generally understood by everybody that he (Franklin) had any business connection with in regard to this matter that the Remingtons were the people to whom the guns were to be delivered,' (pages 495.) And further: 'these nine guns that were got from Watervliet came to us without any instructions from anybody, but I knew perfectly well all the time that they were to go to the Remingtons, although there may have been no mention made in the correspondence of it. I knew very well that everybody I dealt with knew that too. As soon as these nine guns came to our factory we received instructions from the Remingtons with regard to them, and from nobody else, and the guns were disposed of according to their instructions.'

“In reply to the question: 'Was there not a design, upon your part that the Ordnance Bureau should not know?' General Franklin declared: 'Not the slightest in the world. The Ordnance Bureau knew just as much as I did.' He subsequently qualified this declaration as follows: 'It was my impression that the Ordnance Bureau knew just as much as I did.'

“General Dyer denies having any knowledge of it. We seek not to impugn him, and least of all to do him the slightest injustice. But it is evident from the testimony that the Remingtons were advised of the probability that the bargain could be made before General Franklin made his proposition to the Ordnance Bureau; that the Remingtons made the deposit of $14,400 at the ordnance agency at New York, through a New York bank, without having been advised about it by General Franklin, and that the gun-carriages found their way from the ordnance agency at New York into Remington's hands without any knowledge of or instructions from General Franklin, or any member of the Colt's Arms Company. The conclusion is inevitable that there was an understanding between Remington and somebody connected with the Ordnance Bureau; for without this neither the matter of the deposit nor the delivery of the gun-carriages could have been effected in the absence of instructions and advice of any kind from General Franklin. In no other way can the testimony be harmonized.”

Now, sir, I ask you, is it not as clear as sunlight that the ordnance department was in direct personal contact and collusion with Remington, the French agent? We see Remington's hand again in the sale of a lot of ten thousand Navy rifles, which, when they were sold, had not yet been finished in the Springfield armory, but were sold on the part of the Navy Department ostensibly for the reason that some slight defect had been detected which in the opinion of the Department rendered it advisable that they be disposed of; and, remarkable enough, according to the correspondence which appears in this report, that defect had been discovered and had been brought to the notice of the Navy Department — by whom do you think? By Mr. Remington, the French agent himself, and the Navy Department confesses it! And then the Navy rifles are sold to a third party, and forthwith pass into Remington's hands to be shipped to France.

And now I ask, are not these things true? Are they not fully developed and conclusively, proven by the evidence? Is there any sane man who can gainsay it? But what has the majority report to say about such startling revelations? To bring the facts proven in conformity with the rule laid down by the War Department was indeed a desperate task, and it was desperately performed. If I admire anything in the report of that majority of the committee, it is its exuberant spirit of enterprise. In the first place, the testimony is entirely lost sight of in the report. There is not the slightest allusion to the evidence given by the witnesses. It is just as if this investigation had never been undertaken. But the committee resorts to argument, and what argument! In the first place it asserts that Remington, although the War Department believed him to be a French agent, was no French agent after all. A wonderful discovery! The Secretary of War read a dispatch which, to his unsophisticated mind, conveyed the idea that Remington was the agent of the French Government for the purchase of arms; and well he might, for here is the dispatch:

Ilion, New York, October 13.

W. C. Squire, Arlington House, Washington:

Remington telegraphs if you have not yet bought for the Government you will be able to do so on better terms. By decree of the Government, issued yesterday, all arms entering France are liable to be taken as national property and paid for according to appraisement. Speculators in arms intended for France will find their profits small. Competition with you has been forced and fictitious.

What does this mean, “if you have not yet bought for the Government?” The testimony shows that “the Government” meant the French Government." What does it mean that “by decree of the Government,” meaning the French Government, “issued yesterday, all arms entering France are liable to be taken as national property and paid for according to appraisement?” It means simply that no man shall import arms into France with any advantage to himself except that which the French Government is willing to grant him, that thus competition is to be killed, so that Mr. Remington, the agent of the French Government, may control the market. Of course, the unsophisticated mind of the Secretary jumped at once to the conclusion that Remington must necessarily be an agent of France, and I think that conclusion was very well justified. There was a “soldier's construction” again, gentlemen of the committee, but this time it seems the soldier's construction did not exactly suit you, and the astute lawyer steps in for the purpose of protecting the unsophisticated soldier against himself. Remington not an agent of France when the Government sold and delivered arms to him in October and November, and yet Remington, according to the majority report, recognized as an agent of France when it is asserted that the War Department did not deliver arms and ordnance stores to him! What was the difference between his position in October and November, and that in December and January? In October and November he received a commission from the French Government for the arms he bought, and in December and January he did the same, only that in October and November his commission was five per cent., and,in December and January it was two and a half per cent. But aside from that the relations between Remington and the French Government were absolutely the same; there was no difference at all. What constitutes an agent? We have in this very document a professional opinion on that point; it is given by Mr. Garrison, an old merchant, one of the witnesses in this case:

“Question. What would you consider the conditions that would make a merchant an agent of the French Government in the purchase of arms?

“Answer. A man who bought articles for the French Government on a commission.”

And that was exactly Mr. Remington's relation to the French Government.

Sir, the Secretary of War drew his conclusions justly from that dispatch. How astonished the unsophisticated mind of that soldier must have been when the lawyer's wits suggested to him that he had been superfluously virtuous! Oh, the simple-minded Secretary; he himself suspected some wrong in the case, and he did not know by half how innocent be was until the committee of investigation told him, just as the Irishman who stood before a police court, and who, when he was acquitted, exclaimed, “I almost suspected myself of having broken Jimmy's head, and I did not know, until I heard my lawyer, that I was as innocent as a new-born babe.” [Laughter.] The Secretary was not quite as quick as the Irishman, for when you read this testimony, you will find that it required with him some hard thinking to convince himself of his innocence. But I suppose the committee have thoroughly convinced him by this time.

But even the lawyer's ingenuity and skill were not sufficient to the task of reasoning away the evidence proving the direct complicity of the ordnance officers in the subsequent sales to Remington, the French agent, under the name of Richardson, and in the Gatling gun case. There discretion was the better part of valor. When they found it impossible to deny that arms and ordnance stores had been sold by our officers directly to French agents, then the committee resorted to a heroic effort.

The Secretary of War virtually admits himself that the sale of arms by the Government to a belligerent party is a violation of our neutral obligations. When it is proved that officers of the Government have done this very thing, then the committee concludes that this is not so much the worse for the officers of the Government, but it is so much the worse for international law. Not only our statutes, but also the law of nations must go by the board.

And now mark the monstrous doctrine advanced in this report by the majority of the committee, that a neutral Government may not only permit its subjects to trade in material of war with the belligerent party, which is not denied, but that a neutral Government may, without compromising its neutrality, open its own arsenals and furnish a belligerent party directly with arms and ordnance from its own stores. Sir, I think such a doctrine has never been heard of since civilized nations have considered themselves bound by rules of international conduct. Let me quote one of the most recent authorities on that subject, Bluntschli's code of international law. Bluntschli says:

“It is also a violation of neutral duties when a neutral State furnishes or aids in furnishing a belligerent party with arms or other material of war. But when private persons merely in the ordinary way of trade sell arms or other material of war to the belligerent State, then they indeed run the risk to have their goods confiscated by the opposite party as contraband of war; but by permitting such commerce of private parties with a belligerent, the neutral position of the State whose subjects carry on such commerce is not compromised; but the neutral State is in duty bound to prevent as much as possible the exportation from its territory to a belligerent of large quantities of arms and material of war which may afford great aid to one of the belligerent parties in the contest.”

So that Bluntschli not only holds that a neutral Government is not permitted to open its own arsenals and sell and transfer from its own stores arms and material of war to a belligerent party or its agents, but that a neutral Government is even bound to see to it that the quantities of arms exported by private citizens in aid of one of the belligerents are not so large as to exercise a very material effect upon the issue of the war.

Mr. CARPENTER. I should like to have the Senator read section eight hundred and eight, on page 406, of the same work, which I have here in French.

Mr. SCHURZ. I have here the work in German. I translate from the German the section to which the Senator refers:

“Trade in material of war or the manufacturing of the same is not prohibited by international law to neutral persons on neutral territory, not even when such articles of trade are ordered or bought by a belligerent party.

“But it is the duty of a neutral State to see to it that no aid considerable enough to affect the result of the war be rendered to a belligerent party by persons on neutral territory, and it is the right of a belligerent to capture contraband of war and to prevent the reinforcement of the opposite party.”

Well, sir, what of this? Is not this the same principle laid down in the paragraph which I read before? And it tells directly against the Senator's position. That private persons may trade in material of war nobody denies, although, as Bluntschli states, such trade ought not to be carried on to too great an extent. But the case is widely different when a neutral Government opens its arsenals and transfers from its own stock, arms, ammunition, and material of war to a belligerent party. There is a wide difference recognized by every authority on international law.

Mr. SUMNER. That is impossible. It cannot be done.

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly not. Such a doctrine was never heard of. I think it appeared here in this report for the very first time in the history of international law. What is the statement of the committee?

“Congress having, by the act of 1868, directed the Secretary of War to dispose of these arms and stores, and the Government being engaged in such sales prior to the war between France and Germany, had a right to continue the same during the war, and might, in the city of Washington, have sold and delivered any amount of such stores to Frederick William or Louis Napoleon in person without violating the obligations of neutrality, provided such sales were made in good faith, not for the purpose of influencing the strife, but in execution of the lawful purpose of the Government to sell its surplus arms and stores.

“The United States, therefore, having a perfect right to sell these arms, as above stated, it remains to be considered what in fact was done by the Government in the premises.”

The principle laid down here is indeed most wonderful, that Congress having directed the Secretary of War to dispose of arms prior to a war abroad, the Government may go on selling arms to a belligerent party during the pendency of such a war. A Government thus relieved of its international obligations by its own statutes! Was there ever anything like it? Carry that one step further. Suppose Congress had directed the Secretary of the Navy in time of universal peace to sell our iron-clads, fully armed and equipped, to any purchaser that may offer himself, then, according to the doctrine laid down here, the government might go on after the breaking out of a war abroad selling to a belligerent party our iron-clad vessels, with guns and equipment on board, in the lawful pursuit of trade, without in the least compromising its neutrality.

Mr. CARPENTER. Undoubtedly.

Mr. SCHURZ. The Senator says “undoubtedly.” Can he be in earnest? Is that a principle that the American Congress can possibly indorse? Then, in the name of common sense, let us go home with our Alabama claims, for Great Britain did nothing that in any degree could be compared with this. It was not the British Government that sold rebel cruisers to the confederate agents. The rebel cruisers were built and sold by private parties; those private parties had carried on their lawful trade before the war of the rebellion ever was heard of in this country; and according to the doctrine laid down by this committee, not only private individuals in England, but the British Government, had it ever sold war ships before, would have been perfectly in the right had they sold iron clads fully armed and equipped to confederate agents. No violation of neutral duties in it, I suppose.

Mr. CARPENTER. If an interruption will not annoy the Senator, then we may get exactly at the point of difference. The difference between the two cases is this: if England had had men-of-war for sale and had sold them, that would have been one thing. Our complaint against England has been, not that she sold what she had a right to sell in peace or war, but that she allowed ships to be built in her territory for the purpose of being equipped, and manned, and sailed from her ports to prey upon our commerce. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided in the case of the Santissima Trinidad, that where a ship is sold, that is where it is sent from a neutral country to be sold as an article of commerce, that is contraband of course, and i runs that risk, but it is no violation of neutrality; but that if we had permitted that ship to be manned and sailed from our harbors for the purpose of making an expedition against the commerce of a belligerent, that would have been making war upon her.

Mr. SCHURZ. The case of the Santissima Trinidad is not at all in point here. Now, does the Senator not know that the British Government as a Government did not sell any cruisers to the confederacy? Does he not know that those rebel cruisers were built, not by the British Government, but by private parties, the Lairds, whose business it had been for many years to do the very same thing.

Mr. CARPENTER. I assume that the Senator does not want to misrepresent me or misunderstand me.

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly not.

Mr. CARPENTER. I will not interrupt the Senator if it annoys him.

Mr. SCHURZ. Not at all.

Mr. CARPENTER. We all understand that the British Government did not sell those cruisers. The Lairds did sell them. They had a right to sell them in time of peace. Our complaint against England, however, was that they were furnished forth there and turned into an expedition inside British territory; not that it was a sale of a ship as an article of commerce, but that expeditions were fitted out there, these vessels were built there for the purpose of being used, they were manned, they were armed and equipped with British guns and with British seamen, and sailed from their ports for an expedition. That is the ground, as I understand.

Mr. SCHURZ. In answer to this point I will go with the Senator once more over his whole argument. He tells us, there having been a statute before the French-German war broke out which authorized and directed the War Department to sell arms and ammunition, by virtue of that statute the War Department had authority, and for aught I know in his opinion it was its duty, to sell those arms and ammunition during the pendency of the French-German war, and even directly to the belligerent parties if they had been represented here by the very chief of the belligerent States. Is not that the argument?

Mr. CARPENTER. Well, it is partly so and partly not. [Laughter.]

Mr. SCHURZ. I will read it from the printed report again; and inasmuch as this report is reputed to be the production of the Senator himself, I think he will not deny that I state him correctly when I read his own language.

Mr. CARPENTER. The report is all right.

Mr. SCHURZ. The report says:

“Congress having, by the act of 1868, directed the Secretary of War to dispose of these arms and stores, and the Government being engaged in such sales prior to the war between France and Germany, had a right to continue the same during the war, and might, in the city of Washington, have sold and delivered any amount of such stores to Frederick William or Louis Napoleon in person without violating the obligations of neutrality, provided such sales were made in good faith, not for the purpose of influencing the strife, but in execution of the lawful purpose of the Government to sell its surplus arms and stores.”

That is the Senator's own statement. What does it mean? The statute having been enacted previous to the war, that same statute authorized the Government to sell arms and munitions of war during the pendency of that war directly to the belligerent parties represented in the persons of the very chiefs of the belligerent States. Is that a correct statement or not? The Senator nods assent. Very well. I went on to say that if this applies to the War Department, it might just as well apply to the Navy Department; that in 1868 a statute might have been passed authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Navy to sell off our iron-clads, fully armed and equipped with guns and ammunition on board, to be manned here by whomsoever pleased to man them, the flag of the purchasing Government to be hoisted in our own ports on delivery; and that by virtue of that statute our Government might have sold those iron-clads fully armed and equipped, in the same manner in which they might have sold them in times of peace, during the pendency of the French-German war, either to Louis Napoleon or the Emperor William. Is the conclusion correct? Very well; then I say if that is the law, we may at once withdraw our Alabama claims, for then Great Britain did far less than the Senator from Wisconsin at the present moment asserts the Government of the United States would have been authorized to do. Who will gainsay that? I assert that if the committee had been retained as the attorneys of Great Britain, which I am sure they were not, certainly they could not have in this case used bolder arguments than this; but I am sure arguments so reckless will appear rather amusing than serious to impartial men in every civilized country. At any rate, whatever the short-comings of the committee may have been, it did not lack the courage of self-sacrifice.

Now, sir, survey the whole field once more. Neither the evidence in the case, nor manifest truth, nor common sense, nor our own laws, nor the law of nations, nor the interests of the country before a great international tribunal where they are or ought to be taken care of now, could escape promiscuous slaughter to justify the astounding conclusion that even if the officers of the Government in this case were wrong according to their own showing, their own showing must have been wrong and the officers must have been right in spite of themselves. I leave the majority of the committee to the glory of their achievements.

Of course after all this the verdict of that majority is that there is no officer of the Government in the least to blame in this matter; that they did just right, nothing more and nothing less. But, sir, there are some persons to blame; some persons who in the opinion of the committee did wrong; and marvelous as it may seem, they are not the officers of the Government who broke the laws and violated the orders of the War Department, but the men who really did wrong were those upon this floor who moved and advocated that those violations of law should be inquired into. The committee has indeed not ventured to assert in plain and positive language that those Senators, meaning the Senator from Massachusetts and myself, have been, as was once insinuated, in communication or collusion with an agent of a foreign Government for illicit purposes.

It is indeed stated that those Senators could have obtained all the facts elicited by this inquiry by simply applying to the Secretary of the Treasury and the War Department for information, which they might have done in five minutes; and it is intimated that in moving the inquiry, they were to some extent prompted and set on by a gentleman connected with a foreign legation.

Now, sir, as to the first point, I ask, is there a man in this country credulous enough to believe that the War Department would have voluntarily disclosed the facts elicited by this inquiry? Were not those facts elicited by long and difficult examination of witnesses, most of whom were so unwilling that the truth could be drawn only from a mass of evasive and prevaricating testimony? And now it is boldly asserted that all this could have been discovered by putting a question or two to the very parties who are so highly interested in concealing what was done. It is preposterous. You might as well have tried to discover all the abuses of the New York customhouse by simply addressing your questions to Tom Murphy or to the firm of Leet & Stocking.

But, as to the second point, I repel with indignation the imputation which is thrown upon us that the Senator from Massachusetts or myself in advocating this inquiry were moved by any instigation on the part of anybody connected with any foreign Government in the world. Who are the gentlemen of this committee that they should undertake to cast so foul an imputation upon their associates in this body? There is not one of them, let me boldly tell them, to whom I yield in patriotic impulse or in devotion to the best interests of the American people. And when to impartial men the question is once put, who it is that in this business rendered the best service to his country, I am sure the answer can be but one; and that is, not those who by artful quibbles or by monstrous doctrines, or by graceless aspersions upon their associates, strive to justify the most indefensible acts of public servants, thus encouraging violations of law for the future, nourishing that demoralization of the public service which is so much complained of, and instigating the repetition of acts calculated to undermine constitutional government and to dishonor and imperil the Republic. Not that they rendered a service to this country, but those did who fearlessly drew to light the wrongs committed, that the breakers of the law, even if they do escape the punishment they so richly deserve, shall at least not escape public reprobation, and that in future those who are tempted to trifle with the laws and the great interests of the Republic shall stand in wholesome fear of a watchful eye and of a fearless and independent sense of right. For, sir, whatever may be the result of this inquiry now, and however indisposed those in power may be to vindicate the laws, one thing is certain: as long as this generation lives, no other Administration will dare again to compromise the international standing of this country by such scandals as the sales of arms here in question. I challenge comparison between the character of our conduct and the character of this report, and I am sure we shall not suffer by placing them side by side.

Another matter which the committee have made the subject of elaborate censure is this: in testifying I refused to lay before the committee letters giving me confidential information on the subject under inquiry, and also the name of the Senator who had communicated to me the letter from Remington to Le Cesne. I stated under oath that, aside from the information I had from the Marquis de Chambrun, which I testified to, the letters in question all came from American citizens, so that they did not bear upon that part of the inquiry which related to collusion with agents of a foreign Government. The Senator from Massachusetts, I think, made the same declaration. The majority of the committee call such a refusal an assumption of “an artful and arbitrary immunity belonging to feudal days and resting upon monarchical principles, a crime, a contempt of the Senate, and so on.

Now, sir, I will not follow the committee in the details of their learned argument, but I do assert that the Senator from Massachusetts and myself stood in this business not only as witnesses, but also as Senators of the United States who had advocated an inquiry, and one of whom was by permission engaged in conducting it; and standing there as such, we not only could claim it as a right, but we could regard it as a duty to refuse a disclosure of confidential communications and conversations with other Senators on the subject under inquiry. How is information received in such cases? In many, perhaps in most instances, from voluntary communications of persons who do not want their own names to appear, but suggest names of witnesses to be put on the stand. Everybody who has conducted an inquiry knows that this is so. You force the disclosure of the names of such persons and there is an end of such communications; and there is an end, to that extent, of the inquiry itself. The Senate has ordered an investigation. It is duty of each Senator to promote it, and it cannot be the right of the committee charged with its conduct to hamper and to defeat it. Let it be understood that the private correspondence of a Senator about such a matter can be forced to light, and that therefore no confidential communication with a Senator on such a subject can be had, and one of the most important sources of information is stopped, and investigation in many cases becomes a mere mockery. There is a certain official confidence which a Senator must have a right, and which he may claim it as his duty, to guard for the public interest.

But now as to disclosing a conversation with a Senator about public business, which we were asked to do; if we can be forced to that by order of the majority, I ask you where are we going? Have you considered that? If we, gentlemen, among ourselves, cannot exchange a word about a matter of public concern without fear that some day a committee of investigation may lay its hands upon our shoulders and force us to answer the questions, “What did you say to your associate,” and “What did he reply” — if that can be done, where will be the end of the encroachments of the majority upon your independence and discretion as legislators of this Republic?

As for myself, I may say I had absolutely nothing to conceal concerning myself in this case; and I did not conceal anything. The information I received by confidential letters appeared in the shape of evidence, every item of it. I might have exhibited those letters but for the fact that they were confidential, and that their exhibition would have stopped at once further information.

I might have testified also that it was the Senator from New Hampshire, not now in his seat, [Mr. Patterson,] who communicated to me the letter from Remington to Le Cesne. I might have obtained his permission to say it; but I did not want to say it until he said it himself. Every man in this land shall understand that he can communicate with me about public business in confidence, and that this confidence shall not be violated; and every Senator on this floor shall understand that he can speak to me in confidence on public business, and that confidence shall be sacred, whatever the consequences may be to myself.

I call these the natural privileges of a position like ours, and as far as in me lies I shall endeavor to maintain them, and if maintaining them should cost me the high honor of a seat in this body, I shall not be the man to set a precedent to the contrary.

The committee must indeed have been in great need of argument when they had to devote one third of their report to degrading their own position as Senators in order to find culprits upon this floor, instead of finding them among the officers of the Government. And now I again affirm if such expedients are resorted to in order to cover up the misdeeds of our executive officers, there is an end of responsible power.

Let me now for a moment turn to another aspect of this business. How does our Administration appear in it? We behold an instructive spectacle as unrolled by the evidence. Look at these sales of arms in the light of surrounding circumstances. There was a great war raging abroad. Our Government had declared its neutrality; and as a neutral our Government was in a most delicate position. It had especial reasons for carefully guarding its duties in the premises. The Alabama case was pending. We accused another Government of a violation of neutral obligations. Our own acts, therefore, we had to expect to become the subject of the most minute scrutiny by that other Government. More than that, the war abroad was a matter of very peculiar interest to a large, valuable, and patriotic portion of our population; I mean the Germans. They made remonstrance after remonstrance against the sales of arms to the French, complaining with much feeling, and nobody will deny that there was some justification for that feeling, that the same muskets which they had borne in the war in the defense of this Republic were now sold to the French Government for the purpose of being used in slaughtering their friends and kindred. Whatever view may by some have been taken of their complaints in other respects, nobody will deny that their feeling was natural and appealing to generous sentiments. That feeling was at least entitled to some respect by their own Government.

Such circumstances would have suggested to a wise Government the propriety of selling at such a time no arms from their arsenals at all, for the pecuniary advantage to be gained by taking advantage of a good chance stood in no proportion whatever to the risk incurred. But if the Government was not wise enough for that, it should have been at least careful enough so to conduct the sales of arms as not to lay itself open to any imputation of unfair and illicit dealing. The official position taken by the War Department as expressed in the order not to sell to any agent of a belligerent was correct. It was of the highest importance that it should be kept correct by the most scrupulous enforcement and observance. The strictest surveillance of the subordinate officers of the Government was therefore necessary.

Now, sir, what was done? The Secretary of War, according to the testimony, simply gave verbal directions to the chief of ordnance that no arms should be sold to Remington, and there he stopped; that was all. There were no written or other instructions at all issued by the War Department to subordinate officers to stimulate their watchfulness — absolutely nothing of the kind. As General Dyer himself testifies, he entirely left that practical conduct of the details of the business to the subordinate officers themselves. Neither the President nor the head of the Department troubled themselves any further about the matter. Subordinate officers did absolutely what they pleased. The newspapers reported that cargo after cargo of arms was being shipped to France. The War Department knew nothing about it. It was a matter of general notoriety that arms were bought for France by French agents. Everybody knew it except the President and the War Department. They felt no concern. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were delivered to Remington after the War Department itself had discovered him to be a French agent; but the War Department did not stop to inquire whether this would do or not. Breech-loading arms were taken out of the very hands of our troops and delivered to French agents. The War Department thought it all right without further inquiry. A great commotion arose among a certain class of our citizens. The War Department went on without any regard to it. Direct dealings with French agents were carried on so openly in the glaring light of day, under the very eyes of the Government, that its officials with the least degree of watchfulness could not have failed to discover the character of the proceedings; but the War Department was blind as well as deaf.

The honor and the international standing of the country, the relations of this Government with a large body of our citizens, the laws of the land were absolutely left at the mercy of General Dyer and Colonel Crispin — a mere plaything in the hands of subordinate officers, and the Administration did not wink. There was, in one word, the completest anarchy in our public service with regard to one of the most delicate, dangerous, and responsible affairs ever conducted by this government, and those at the head of the Government did not in the least trouble themselves about it. What were the consequences? Here at home, under our very eyes, flagrant violations of law and of orders, proceedings so unjustifiable that no Government could have tolerated them that respected itself. And what were the consequences abroad? I think we heard something said in this debate to-day as to our present standing in foreign countries. What were the consequences of these proceedings abroad ?

The Senator from Massachusetts and myself were tauntingly told that if we insisted on this inquiry the German Government would raise claims against us, and we were inciting it to do so. The gentlemen belonging to the majority of the committee must in the mean time have come to the conclusion that when we predicted that the German Government would do nothing of the kind we understood the policy of that Government much better than they did; that we were right in what we predicted. Bismarck's policy not to disturb the relations between Germany and the United States on account of this matter, and to consider himself satisfied with the official position of this Government as declared by the order of the War Department was undoubtedly wise and well considered, and there is no reason to doubt that he will adhere to it. But, sir, we must not forget that such a policy was favored, nay, was rendered possible only by very fortunate circumstances. The war in France was carried on with uninterrupted success in spite of the arms imported from the United States into that country; and Bismarck's pleasantry that he could pick up these arms on the banks of the Loire cheaper than he could buy them was rather cheap under the circumstances. We also, I think, would scarcely have had so long and so acrimonious a quarrel with Great Britain, had that Power during the war been otherwise friendly to us, and had we captured the rebel cruisers immediately after their leaving British ports, before having burned a single American craft. We might have considered it good policy to overlook things in order to keep up a friendly understanding with a foreign Power, had we not been materially damaged by its delinquencies.

But, sir, what would have happened in this case if, in consequence of the importation of arms from the United States into France, untoward accidents had befallen the German armies; if defeats had occurred, if the war had been materially prolonged? Then I submit the matter would not have been dismissed with a mere joke.

Was it not the part of a wise Government to look forward and consider such possibilities? Was it not wanton levity in our rulers to trust the honor and the interests of our country to mere fortunate chance? But as it was, although we have been lucky enough to escape an interruption of our friendly relations with a friendly Government, there is another thing we have not escaped. We must not forget that in the long run the strength of our diplomacy consists in a favorable public opinion abroad; that what we say will be respected by Governments in the same measure as their people think well of us.

Now, sir, what is public opinion abroad with reference to this subject? How has it been affected by this business? Let us flatter ourselves with no delusions. In Germany the people think and say that we have treated them to very fair words of sympathy, and in the mean time our Government has furnished their enemies with arms. In France the people say that we have indeed furnished them ordnance stores, but have taken advantage of their misfortunes and necessities to drive a hard bargain. What they think and say in England at this moment I need not further detail, nor will I go through the rest of the list. The result of it, then, is that we have forfeited to a very great degree the confidence, the esteem, and the friendship of foreign nations.

And now what is the justification of all this? It is, as the officers of the Government testifying before the committee, and indeed the committee itself, proclaim with great exultation, that we have made much money; that if we had not taken advantage of a foreign war to sell these arms we could not in time of peace have received half the price for them. We have made money, gentlemen; let us rejoice. We could not have sold the arms so profitably had we not permitted them to go to the battle-fields of tile French-German war, and we have indeed made money. Have we violated the laws? Never mind; we have made money. Have we offended a respectable and patriotic class of American citizens? No matter; we have made money. Have we imperiled our friendly relations with a foreign Government? Never mind that; we have made money. Have we forfeited the affection and the esteem of foreign nations? No matter; we have made money.

Well, gentlemen, how much money, then, have we made? I have figured it up somewhat minutely, and I find that had we refrained from selling these arms in times of war, we might in peaceable times have received perhaps two and a half or three million dollars less for them. I will put it at a higher figure and say we have actually made four millions which otherwise we would not have made. Well, then, this is a nation of forty millions, and the four millions make a gain per capita of just ten cents. So we have made ten cents apiece, gentlemen. [Laughter.] For ten cents a head we have violated and trampled under foot the laws of this country; for ten cents a head offended a very large and patriotic class of our citizens; for ten cents a head imperiled our relations with a foreign Government; for ten cents a head forfeited the esteem and friendship of foreign nations. Let us rejoice, Americans; we have made ten cents a head. [Laughter.] Is this worthy of this proud Republic; worthy of the great American people?

When mere money becomes the motive of action of a great Government at the expense of duty and honor, then that nation certainly is on its downward course. Napoleon insultingly said of the British that they were a nation of shop-keepers. Let the cry of money be generally accepted as a justification for everything, and the American people will soon be degraded to the level of a nation of horse-traders; Is that what you will have? Shame upon those who, in justification of wrong, use so degrading an argument — although I may say it is well in keeping with the spirit of an Administration whose head permitted one of his friends to claim a second term of office for him on the ground that he had accepted the Presidency of the United States only with the understanding that he should enjoy its emoluments for eight years — perhaps the first time that the highest honor of the Republic was looked at in a pecuniary light.

Consider now, sir, what must have been the cause of such blunders, blunders so dangerous and so disgraceful as are here disclosed? How can it happen that the highest interests and the honor of a great people can be put so recklessly at the mercy of mere subordinate officers, and that all higher considerations are sacrificed for mere gain? It is that there is no intelligent head at the helm of this Government; no head understanding and appreciating the greatness of its duties and responsibilities. That is the cause. It is as if a parcel of boys were playing with the great powers of the State. Only thus can it happen that the Government becomes the foot-ball of official anarchy and of capricious accident. And it is the justification of just such things that this committee has undertaken.

Now, sir, I repeat, if there is anything worse than the action of the Administration and of its officers in this case, it is the attitude of its defenders. Look at the full significance of this report. What lesson does it teach the officers of the Government? It tells them that they may violate the laws as they please, and here they will always find a ready defense. It tells them, as the evidence in this case shows, that they may put forth the flimsiest pretenses, the shallowest subterfuges, the most bare-faced jugglery, such as that with which the transactions between Remington and the Department were attempted to be covered up, and here they will always find men violently closing their eyes against the most glaring facts; and that they can always rely upon the friends of the Administration in Congress ready to exhaust their whole ingenuity to protect those in power.

Have you considered what that means and what it will lead to? Let the officers of the Government understand that they can violate the laws of the land and the orders of their superiors with entire security, and what will become of their respect for the law and of their obedience to superior authority? Where will their lawless assumptions stop if we with thoughtless levity defend and justify them? Where will the safety of our public concerns be if we teach our public servants they can do what they please and we shall not hold them to account? What kind of spirit are we encouraging in the executive branch of this Government if we make it feel that its transgressions, however scandalous, and its usurpations, however glaring, will always, even under the extremest circumstances, find defense and protection in the legislative halls of the Republic? Let this go on, and you will prepare for absolute power on one side and for absolute and degrading subserviency on the other; and indeed we have already gone very far. We have already seen strange things, very strange things right here upon this floor. Sometimes it has already appeared as if there were but one ruling will in this Republic, and as if the rest of us had only to bow our heads in submissive obedience. Let me give you an example which may still be fresh in the memories of some of us.

Do you remember the day when the Senator from Massachusetts was removed from the head of the Committee on Foreign Relations, a position he had filled so long with so much honor to himself and so much advantage to this country? I remember that day well; it was a sad day for the Senate. Do you remember how in the debate of that day the question was passed around, what reason could be assigned for the degradation of that distinguished gentleman? and when the only tangible answer was that the Senator from Massachusetts had at a dinner-table refused to notice a question addressed to him by the Secretary of State; and to this very day it has not been decided yet whether that question was on duck or partridge. [Laughter.] Do you remember how in that debate every Senator who spoke on the Administration side seemed anxious to shake off from his shoulders the responsibility for that act, as if ready to exclaim, “Thou canst not say I did it.” Ah, sir, if nobody on this floor did it, who did it then? No impartial observer could have listened to that debate without jumping to the conclusion that it was the President's will that did it; that the President's will stalked into this Senate Chamber demanding the head of the Senator from Massachusetts; that to the President's will that head was given; and that before the President's will on that day the Senate lay in painful prostration.

I remember another spectacle of equal significance, to which the Senator from Massachusetts has already alluded to-day. It was when the Executive was arraigned for his open and flagrant usurpation of the war power in the San Domingo case. That act of usurpation, striking at the very foundations of constitutional government, was so clearly proven by documentary evidence, by the showing of the Administration itself, by arguments so irrefutable, and by conclusions so imperative, that the whole ingenuity of the President's defenders exhausted itself in utterly useless efforts. And yet the Senate, seeing the Administration in danger, did not rise up to the supreme duty of vindicating the fundamental law of the land, of protecting against wanton encroachments those safeguards with which the Constitution surrounds the rights of the people, the prerogatives of the national Legislature, and the peace and safety and honor of the country. That flagrant act of usurpation on the part of the President was tamely acquiesced in, and remains tamely acquiesced in to this very day; the Constitution remains violated with impunity and without remonstrance; and a precedent was then established which, if suffered to become a rule of constitutional construction, places the war power, that is, the peace, the honor, and the welfare of the American Republic, at the mercy of one single man's ambition and recklessness. The Senate submitted then, and is submitting yet.

But, however alarming those occurrences may have been, they are even surpassed in dangerous tendency by what we now see before us. This report seems to cap the climax in a certain respect, for I believe never in the history of this country has every respect for evidence and fact as proven by evidence, have the privileges of the national legislator, have the principles upon which every civilized Government regulates its international conduct, have the laws of the land, have the safety of our free institutions and the rights and liberties of the citizen which find their security, ill the sanctity of the laws, been more recklessly thrown at the feet of executive officers than it is done by that daring justification of wrong and the destructive doctrines advanced in this document.

And why is this done? Sir, I would not be the first man in this case to discuss the motives of other Senators, but the committee have set an example for following which they must not find fault with me. The committee say:

“But in that case” —

Meaning if we had obtained our information from the Departments directly —

“Chambrun would have failed in his effort to use the Senate as an instrumentality for obtaining testimony to vindicate his friend, M. Place, and the opportunity would have been lost to cast suspicion upon, and raise a scandal against, the executive administration of our Government.”

Thus the Senator from Massachusetts and myself are charged with having moved and advocated this inquiry for the purpose of raising scandal against, and of injuring the Administration. If, for the sake of argument, I admit that, what of it? Does not the Administration deserve to be injured if the disclosure of the truth will injure it? Have we not served the interests of the American people by drawing the truth to light? Have not the American people a right to know the truth, even if the Administration may not like it? Was it not our solemn duty as representatives of the people to attack the Administration if the truth tells against it? Are the interests of the Administration of greater moment than the interests of the people at large as involved in the laws of this Republic? Should we violate our duty to vindicate those laws for fear of displeasing or injuring those in power? Not we, sir, whatever others may do.

But now let me measure the members of the majority of the committee by the same standard which they have applied to us and see how they will appear. If we have advocated this inquiry to hurt the Administration, let us see what the committee have done to defend the Administration. They have justified the most flagrant and barefaced violations of the law. They have placed that justification upon the doctrine that a violation of law may be excused when it becomes an established habit; may be excused when its effects are advantageous in the opinion of the law breakers themselves. They have taught the officers of the Government that, upon such grounds, they may violate the laws with impunity. They have made the officers of the Government understand that by the flimsiest pretext and by the most transparent jugglery, they can furnish members of this Senate with satisfactory material to justify a wrong ever so glaring. They have thus contributed to nourish that demoralization and anarchy which are so dangerously infesting our public service. They have to this end laid down a doctrine, which, if carried out, would lead to the ruin of all responsibility in our Government. They have attacked the natural privileges of the national legislator, without which the investigation of abuses would in most cases become a mockery. They have, even at the expense of our position in that great international trial now pending, laid down a doctrine of neutral duties which is a disgrace to this civilized age, and by the observance of which we should forfeit the esteem and friendship of every civilized nation, dishonor the American people in the eyes of the whole civilized world, and involve this Republic in endless quarrels with our neighbors; and all this, if we apply the same criterion of motives which they applied to us, to defend the Administration! They have sacrificed what should be dearest to every American citizen to that end. Ah, gentlemen, if you lay down a standard of motives in this case, you must not object if you have the full benefit of it.

And now, while you call our action the offspring of a factious spirit, you call yours patriotism. Patriotism, sir! If this becomes the standard of patriotism in this country, then good night free institutions and republican liberty; then it may be truly said that the decay of constitutional government in the American Republic is in full operation. That is the patriotism preached in the document before us.

I called this report at the commencement of my remarks a symptom of a morbid tendency of our political life, and as such its importance goes far beyond the question involving the mere sales of arms. I said, and I repeat, the moral and intellectual atmosphere which renders such productions possible is so unhealthy that republican government cannot long live in it. That atmosphere must be purified or the miasma will become fatal. It is not merely the offenses here disclosed that must be punished now and prevented in the future, but that spirit must be checked which so recklessly protects offenders, or this will become no longer a Government of laws, but a Government of factions, without conscience, without self-respect, and without restraint, or a Government whose powers are wielded without responsibility, and whose arrogance is submitted to without shame.

If there be already in this land an authority above our heads which, not by superior intelligence, but by the mere brutal force of its being, renders such performances as this report acceptable to the Senate and to the ruling party, and threatens to stifle among the guardians of the public welfare that independence of spirit without which the sanctity of the laws cannot be maintained and free government cannot be kept alive — if there be such an authority above our heads, then it is time that this authority be overthrown. If there be a party spirit abroad which so subjugates the hearts of men that they welcome error and deception when the truth stands in the way of party interest, that they are willing to see the laws sacrificed, wrong called right, and our republican institutions undermined for the protection of those in power against the consequences of their misdeeds, then, sir, it is time, it is high time, that the despotism of party be broken.

As for me, I have fulfilled what I consider a solemn duty in warning the Senate and the American people of their danger. I rejoice to see a spirit sweeping over the land which makes the patriotic citizen rise above the partisan, breaking the fetters which have so long cramped every free movement, and promising to restore to all the full liberty of political conscience. May that spirit be victorious, for surely the Republic stands in great need of its speedy triumph, and I fervently hope that in the struggle which is now upon us the surest means will be found to unite, upon the most honorable and most fruitful ground, for a common, irresistible effort, all the forces that can and ought to work together for that great end.