Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Abu Bakr, Omar Khalifa Mohammed (2005)

Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Abu Bakr, Omar Khalifa Mohammed  (2005) 
To: Abu Bakr, Omar Khalifa Mohammed
Subject: Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Abu Bakr, Omar Khalifa Mohammed


An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.


The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.


The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was recruited to work for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
  2. In Libya the detainee preached anti-Qadhafi sentiment in local mosques, at weddings and on street corners. The detainee used sheep herding as a cover to conduct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group operations in Jebbel-Acteher area of Libya.
  3. The detainee assisted people illegally entering Egypt and Sudan from Libya.
  4. The detainee used a fake passport to travel from Libya to Sudan.
  5. The detainee worked in Khartoum, Sudan overseeing Sudanese drivers for one of Usama bin Laden's transportation companies.
  6. The detainee traveled from Sudan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan via Karachi and Peshawar, Pakistan.
  7. In Jalalabad, Afghanistan the detainee lived in a house belonging to a group fighting against Qadhafi. The detainee joined this fighting group.
  8. The detainee left Sudan and traveled to Kabul and Khowst, Afghanistan with the intention of attending the Khaldan training camp in Khowst.
  9. The detainee was in charge of a guard post behind the Jihad Wahl camp. The guard post had a 23mm cannon and SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launcher. The detainee commanded five men during daylight hours and 20 to 30 men at night.
  10. The detainee built props for ambush technique instruction at the Jihad Wahl camp. He also filmed Jihad Wahl training sessions.
  11. The detainee conducted explosives training at the al Farouq camp.
  12. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida member as an al Farouq instructor during 1998. The detainee provided instruction on topography and explosives.
  13. The detainee went to the Taliban in 1998 to offer his services to fight the Northern Alliance.
  14. The detainee joined a group clearing mines so the Taliban could advance against the Northern Alliance. The detainee stepped on a mine that detonated, resulting in the loss of his right leg.
  15. The detainee had initially lied about his leg amputation injury.
  16. An individual stated he immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 to train under the detainee, whom he knew as Umar al Libi, at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
  17. The detainee was identified by another fighter as being on the front lines near Taloqan, Afghanistan fighting the Northern Alliance in 2001. The detainee was a military leader in charge of many Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other Gulf States while on the front lines. The detainee would meet with the other Taliban leaders to plan military operations.
  18. The detainee is said to have trained another fighter on the use of anti-aircraft weapons.
  19. The detainee and an al Qaida member established a large training camp for Mujahidin in Afghanistan, where the detainee served as an instructor for many different groups.
  20. In mid-August 2001 the detainee was seen at a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  21. Approximately two weeks after 11 September 2001, the detainee left the front lines and traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan with other fighters. The detainee stayed at a Libyan guest house in Kabul.
  22. The detainee was identified as having stayed at the Ashara guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  23. In approximately October 2001 the detainee left Kabul for Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  24. From Jalalabad the detainee traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan where he stayed in three different homes over the course of about three months. The detainee then moved to another house that belonged to the Al Solafiya University.
  25. The detainee stayed at this school in Faisalabad, Pakistan until he was arrested in February 2002.
  26. The detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W wristwatch in his possession.
  27. The Casio model F-91W wristwatch has been used in bombing that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
b. Training
  1. While in Sudan, the detainee took weapons and explosives training.
  2. The detainee recieved training on Kalashnikovs, PK's , Doshka anti-aircraft weapons and grenades at a camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee attended the Jihad Wahl training camp.
  4. At the Jihad Wahl camp, the detainee learned about planning attacks, setting up missions, organizaing a resistance cell, leadership, politics, and reasons for the success or failure of past jihad operations.
  5. The detainee learned about explosive devices from an Egyptian explosive expert at the Jihad Wahl camp.
  6. The detainee took a course on heavy artillery at the Jihad Wahl camp.
c. Connections/Associations
The detainee met Abu Musab al Zarqawi on two occasions, first in 2000 and again in March 2001.
d. Detainee Actions and Statements
The detainee said he went to Afghanistan to obtain military experience and weapons training and said he was not an instructor or a military leader.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee was identified as an instructor at a camp in Afghanistan and a front line leader.
  2. The detainee is said to have provided training on 32mm anti-aircract weapons, mines, rocket propelled grenades and tactics to Libyan and Tanzanian fighters as well as other instructors.
  3. The detainee is said to have had a lot of knowledge on how to operate, assemble and disassemble explosive devices (such as mines), missile and remote controlled explosive devices.
  4. The detainee is said to have had a document explaining how to destroy a target with a rocket propelled grenade using some type of distance calculation chart.
  5. A former al Qaida member also identified the detainee as having a great deal of experience in arms dealing and was known to assist Usama bin Laden in purchasing weapons.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has no problems with the United States and does not plan to use what he learned at the training camp to attack the United States.
b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.
c. The detainee denied knowlege of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.
d. The detainee denied being at Taloqan or any place north of Kabul or Jalalabad.
e. The detainee claimed he never fought the Northern Alliance or the Americans and that he had never been at the al Farouq training camp.
f. The detainee denied being associated with, or a member of, the Taliban or al Qaida.

You will be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present information to this Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.