Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ali Bin Attash, Hassan Mohammed (2007-10-31)

UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
	31 October 2007

To:	Ali Bin Attash, Hassan Mohammed
Subject:	Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ali Bin Attash, Hassan Mohammed

1.

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary,

2.

The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's family had been close to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida since the early 1980s. It was not uncommon for Usama bin Laden to be at the detainee's father's house, and the detainee had often been to the Usama bin Laden family home in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The detainee's entire family, with the exception of his mother, two sisters, and his youngest brother, has participated in jihad.
2. The detainee was always eager to join the jihad. The detainee was very involved in al Qaida and first traveled to Afghanistan in 1997.
3. The detainee stated he first went to Afghanistan for jihad one to two months prior to Ramadan, 1997. The detainee stated he traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Peshawar. Pakistan via Yernen and Karachi, Pakistan.
4. The detainee stated in order to reach Afghanistan, he and one of his brothers traveled to Yemen where they contacted a Mujahedin facilitator. The Mujahedin facilitator contacted an individual and recommended that the detainee and the second brother be accepted for participation in the Afghan jihad.
5. The detainee stated that he and another brother stayed for only one day at the guest house before traveling to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where a third brother of the detainee took them to the Najm al Jihad complex.
6. Nejiin al Jihad was an al Qaida housing compound owned by Usama bin Laden that is occupied by al Qaida. members and their families.
7. The detainee stated that prior to 11 September 2001, the detainee was privy to information about the plot to attack United States ships in Dubai, United Arab Emirates using explosives and a boat. The detainee stated he remembered meeting about ten Yemeni men who were to be involved in the operation. The detainee stated he would have liked to have been a part of the operation.
8. The detainee stated he traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta with three to five Sega cartridges made into remote detonators. The detainee stated he delivered the cartridges to two Afghan males.
9. A source identified one of the individuals in the previous statement as the leader of a 10 person Taliban terrorist cell created in March 2002.
10. The detainee stated he joined al Qaida and was treated well within the organization due to his family's close relationship with Usama bin Laden. The detainee also stated he became a trusted al Qaida member and was especially close to a senior al Qaida member.
11. The detainee stated he resided in a safe house with a senior al Qaida facilitator and a senior al Qaida operational coordinator in the Golshin Qabaal area of Karachi, Pakistan.
12. The detainee stated he traveled back and forth to fight in Kabul after he trained at the Jihad Wal Camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that in 1997 he took bomb making classes at the Khalden and Jihad Wahl camps in Khowst, Afghanistan where he was able to observe how bombs were built. The detainee stated that bombs created at the camp in 1997 were created mostly to be used against the Northern Alliance Forces. The detainee stated that after 11 September 2001 the bombs were likely used against United States Forces in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee stated he received basic military-type training in the Khalden camp followed by additional training during which time he resided in Usama bin Laden guest hDuses and camps.
3. The detainee stated he stayed at the Khalden camp for five to six months where he received training on weapons such as the Kalashnikov, Beeka and Deshooka, as well as training in explosive devices such as mines, grenades and mortars. The detainee also stated he did not attend all the training, estimating that he attended less than half of the classes. The detainee speculated that he was given great leniency due to his young age.
4. The detainee stated he attended the Jihad Wal camp between three and five months. The detainee stated the instruction consisted primarily of explosives training.
5. Jihad Wahl camp is located near Khowst, Afghanistan with a training program lasting approximately two months and is concentrated on shooting and self-defense tactics and skills.
6. The detainee stated that in 1999 he attended an Algerian camp called Derunta where he studied how to make explosives, The detainee stated he stayed at the camp for only about a week before he quit to return to Jalalabad. The detainee stated most of the camp's training was conducted in French, which he did not understand.
7. The Derunta training camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan was one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan. The camp provided training in the use of explosives and toxic chemical usage. Derunta also contained several secondary bases belonging to Usama bin Laden.
8. The detainee stated an individual had shown him how they made a remote out of a game cartridge. The detainee also stated the remotes were given to him with directions on how to use them. The detainee further stated the directions were printed in both Pashtu and English.
9. A source stated the individual in the previous statement was an al Qaida explosives expert who was a trainer at the al Farouq camp and carried out attacks in Nairobi, Kenya and Yemen against the USS Cole.

c Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's older brother is a senior al Qaida operational planner.
2. The detainee stated that in March 2001, an individual assigned the detainee to establish a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan for al Qaida members to use when they traveled from Afghanistan to Karachi to plan operations.
3. The individual in the previous statement is a senior al Qaida operational coordinator who has been linked to as many as a dozen plots to attack the United States and western interests since late 2001. The individual masterminded the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole.
4. The detainee stated that in 2001, the detainee followed the individual's orders and traveled back and forth to Kandahar, Afghanistan every two months bringing $10,000 United Slates. dollars per trip back to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated the money was to be used to pay for a 300 to 400 ton ship to assist in the attacks against United States naval vessels and United States oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.
5. The detainee stated that a second individual directed the detainee's activities after the first individual's departure from Karachi, Pakistan in April 2002. The detainee stated that the second individual worked under a senior al Qaida Lieutenant providing timers, remote control devices and explosives to be used in operations against United States personnel.
6. The detainee was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan on 11 September 2002 with another individual.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he was raised with Takfiri jihad radical beliefs.
2. Takfir is a moverrtent of ultra hardcore Islamist groups within the worldwide terrorist network. Takfir cells have used aassassinations, kidnappings and bombings against state governments, moderate Muslims, Muslim extremists who have a different ideology, and Western interests.
3. The detainee stated that around the end of 2000, his older brother instructed him to leave Afghanistan to go to Karachi, Pakistan because of rumors the detainee was affiliated with Takfiris and their ideology.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee established a number of e-mail accounts to communicate and coordinate with other al Qaida members. The detainee also admitted he sent letters to an individual confirming plans to carry out major operations in Yemen including targeting oil tankers in Yemeni ports, which would have completed the plan to attack ships in the Straits of Hormuz.
2. The individual in the previous statement was identified as the lead recruiter of six Yemeni-Americans from a small city five miles from Buffalo, New York who went to al Qaida military training camps in the summer of 2001.

4.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer,

a.	The detainee stated he did not take an active part in any of the planning or execution of the boat attacks against American vessels.
b.	The detainee stated he never personally saw how the Sega remote detonators were made and never participated in their manufacture . The detainee stated he did not initially know what the remote detonators would be used for.

5.

You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding, The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.