Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Muhammad Abd Allah Mansur Al Futuri (2005-07-11)

Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Muhammad Abd Allah Mansur Al Futuri (2005-07-11)  (2005) 
Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
11 July 2005
To: Muhammad Abd Allah Mansur Al Futuri
Subject: Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Muhammad Abd Allah Mansur Al Futuri

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary,


The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
a. Commitment
  1. Sources say the detainee was in Afghanistan in approximately 1991.
  2. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
  3. The LIFG is an Islamic terrorist group dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Qadhafi regime. The LIFG have links with Usama Bin Ladin, the Armed Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
  4. During 1991 the detainee joined LIFG and might have been supporting the military committee.
  5. The detainee fled Libya to Egypt in 1999 after he learned that Libyan intelligence officials wanted to question him.
  6. The detainee stated that he left Libya with 7,000 U.S.dollars.
  7. The detainee said he was smuggled into Egypt through border points al-Durrnah/Usfurah with $1,000 U.S. in his pocket.
  8. The detainee traveled from Alexandria, Egypt to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After an 'Umrah (mini hajj) to Mecca, he traveled from Jeddah to Karachi, Pakistan and then Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  9. The detainee based his decision to go to Afghanistan on television and radio news reports as well as a fatwa issued by Sheik Mahmoud at Oukla.
  10. The detainee lived in Jalalabad , Afghanistan, but traveled frequently to Kabul, Afghanistan and Pakistan as a member of the Jama' at at Tablighi. The detainee received support from the Jama' at at Tablighi for two years.
  11. Jama'at al Tablighi has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
  12. A senior al Qaida operative said that the detainee was arrested with him in Tora Bora in December 2001.
  13. When the detainee was arrested he had $1,800.00 U.S. Currency, 1,500 Saudi Ryals, and an unknown amount of Afghani and Pakistani money in his possession.
b. Training
  1. The detainee had military training at the al-Farouq and Salman al Farisi camps. He participated in several Afghan battles , including Lukar and Qardiz, but mostly in the battle of Jalalabad.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee flew from Jeddah to Karachi, Pakistan with a friend, Ibrihim Kahlan.
  2. According to the detainee, al Kahlan joined the Taliban forces and he overheard that the Northern Alliance forces had killed al Khalan. The detainee could not provide any details about his friend's death.
  3. In Peshawar, the detainee met another Libyan named Zuhair al-Libi. The detainee and Zuhair became good friends and moved in together in a house, where they stayed for one year.
  4. When the detainee was asked about the whereabouts of Zuhair al-Libi, he said that Zuhair was killed in northern Afghanistan while fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
  5. Zuhair al-Libi's name appears on a list of names of al Qaida martyrs under the heading "26th of Sha'aban martyrs of the north".
d. Intent
  1. An al Qaida and LIFO facilitator was certain the detainee left the LIFG. He said he believed the detainee had a jihadist philosophy and wanted to die a martyr's death.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee is in the possession of a Casio model F-91 W watch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
  2. The Casio digital watch was commonly given to al Farouq attendees.
  3. The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to Libya due to his association to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:


The detainee advised that he originally lied about his true name and nationality because he was afraid of being sent back to Libya. He knows that religious Muslims have been and continue to be persecuted under the Qaddafi regime.


The detainee stated he did not participate in activity with the Taliban or have any governmental ties.


A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee was handicapped due to a childhood illness, and as such, he was of no benefit to any of the fighting groups in Afghanistan. He lived off the charity of others and had no relationship with al Qaida or the LIFG.


You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding, The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.