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Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Omar Said Salem Adayn (2007-07-25)


Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
25 July 2007
Omar Said Salem Adayn
Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Omar Said Salem Adayn

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.


The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (l) release you to your home state ; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
a. Commitment
  1. In August 2001, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
  2. In Quetta, Pakistan an individual arranged for the detainee's airline tickets and gave him 500 United States Dollars to cover travel expenses.
  3. When the detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan he was taken to a safe house run by a Saudi Arabian. The detainee was at this safe house for one day before becoming ill with malaria.
  4. The detainee claimed that due to illness he had trouble standing and walking during his stay at the safe house. The detainee claims not to have received any training at the safe house, nor did he see any weapons.
  5. After half a month at the Kandahar, Afghanistan safe house, the Arabs present were told to go to Jalalabad, Afghanistan due to the increase in bombing in Kandahar. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad by car and arrived at a safe house run by a Saudi.
  6. After half a month, the detainee was told to head to Tora Bora, Afghanistan with the rest of the Arabs present at the Jalalabad, Afghanistan safe house.
  7. When the detainee arrived in Tora Bora, Afghanistan he was shown to his position. A Saudi Arabian, who led the position, issued the detainee a Kalashnikov and showed him where to go. There were between 10 and 12 Arabs in the detainee's position.
  8. A source stated that the Saudi Arabian individual in the previous statement was an al Farouq Camp Commander and a leader at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
  9. All members of the detainee's group were armed with Kalashnikov's except for one individual who was armed with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The group spent most of its time hiding in one of the three eaves located close to its position. The detainee was in this position for a month before being wounded in the leg by a missile.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. A Saudi Arabian al Qaida member managed the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Arabs awaiting training at the al Farouq Camp stayed at this house.
  2. The detainee' s nane was found on a list of Arabic names, aliases , and nationalities recovered from a safe house connected with suspected al Qaida members in Pakistan.
  3. The detainee' s name was listed as a captured Mujahedin on a document associated with a senior al Qaida operative.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
The detainee denied having any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks prior to their execution. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.