United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/IV. A. 2. Notes

by the Pentagon

1.	Department of State Circular to certain American diplomatic and consular officers, January 23, 1946. The association of the Netherlands East Indies with French Indochina could not have been lost on the French.
2.	Department of State, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Memo for Mr. Acheson from J.C.V., January 8, 1947.
3.	Department of State outgoing telegram to AMEMB Paris 431, February 3, 1947 (SECRET).
4.	Department of State outgoing telegram to AMEMB Paris 145, January 17, 1949 (SECRET).
5.	Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2 vols), II, pp. 706–707.
6.	Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 197–198.
7.	Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, February 2, 1950.
8.	Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1950.
9.	NS 48/1, Report by the Executive Secretary, December 23, 1949, p. 3 (TOP SECRET).
10.	Cf. McCarran bill, introduced February 25, 1949, to provide $1.5 billion loan to Nationalist China, subsequent Bridges call for investigation of U.S.–China policy.
11.	NSC 48/1, p. 13.
12.	NSC 64, Report by the Department of State, February 7, 1950, p. 3 (TOP SECRET).
13.	The French Assembly ratified the bill which in effect established the Associated States on January 29, 1950. The reasons for recognition advanced by the Secretary of State to the President are encouragement to national aspirations under non-communist leadership; establishment of stable non-communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China; support to France; demonstration of displeasure with communist tactics. Department of State, Memorandum for the President from the Secretary, subject "U.S. Recognition of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia," February 2, 1950.
14.	The import of Secretary Acheson's statement of February 1 is made clear by the first paragraph of the Department of State press release of that date: "The recognition by the Kremlin of Ho Chi Minh's communist movement in Indochina comes as a surprise. The Soviet acknowledgment of this movement should remove any illusions as to the 'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal enemy of independence in Indochina..."
15.	As President Truman was later to write concerning his view of Chinese operations in November 1950, "The situation in Korea...was not the only instance of a new aggressiveness on the part of Communist China. There was evidence that the communist rebel forces in Indochina were receiving increasing aid from Peiping. Also, in the last days of October, Communist China had moved against the ancient theocracy of Tibet. We were seeing a pattern in Indochina and Tibet timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a challenge to the Western world." Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Volume 2, p. 380.
16.	On May 3, 1949, General Chennault told two Congressional Committees that unless the U.S. took immediate steps to save the Nationalists, all Asia would fall to the communists.
17.	Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia, April 10, 1950 (TS).
18.	NSC 48, 64 series, 124 series, 177, 5405.
19.	NSC 64, p.2.
20.	NIE 5, Indochina: Current Situation and Probable Developments, December 29, 1950, p.2 (TS).
21.	NIE 5, p. 2. Lucien Bodard in his The Quicksand War (pp. 228–229) contends that the French High Command "systematically put out false intelligence that was meant to end up in Washington" on this and related issues. Only subsequent events showed the French that there was a real Chinese threat.
22.	Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, April 5, 1950 (TS).
23.	NIE 5, pp. 1, 2.
24.	Ibid., p. 1.
25.	See Department of State Outgoing Telegram to AM Consul Saigon 25, Personal for Jessup from Butterworth, January 20, 1950, "...marked opposition has been encountered which demonstrates at least that Bao Dai's popular support has not yet widened."
26.	NIE 5, p. 1.
27.	Department of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837, February 22, 1950.
28.	NSC 64, The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, February 27, 1950, p. 3 (TS).
29.	Department of State letter from Deputy Under Secretary Rusk to Major General James H. Burns, March 7, 1950 (TS).
30.	Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense, approved by SecDef, March 6, 1950 (TS).
31.	By March 6, State and Defense had agreed on a military assistance program for Indochina and Thailand in the amounts of $15 and 10 million respectively. Draft memorandum to the President, "Allocation of Funds to Provide Military Assistance to Thailand and Indochina Under Section 303 of Mutual Defense Assistance Act, March 6, 1950 (TS).
32.	Ninth Report to Congress of ECA, 1951, p. 99.
33.	Quoted in Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Secretary of the Navy, "Aid to Indochina," March 28, 1950, p. 2. (TS)
34.	Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia, 11 April 5, 1950 (TS).
35.	Department of State Outgoing Telegram to AmEmbassy London 20149, May 3, 1950 (TS).
36.	Statement of the President, June 27, 1950.
37.	Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Secretary of Defense, June 6, 1950. Cited in U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam Since 1945 OCMH Draft TS-62-5-3 (TS).
38.	Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Annex 2, October 16, 1950 (S); see also The U.S. Army Role in the Conflict in Vietnam, OCMH Draft TS-64-7-1 (TS), pp. 22–23; the generally pessimistic conclusions of the mission are also presented in Annex 2 to Southeast Asia Policy Committee "Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy in Indochina for NSC Consideration," October 11, 1950 (TS).
39.	OCMH Draft TS-64-7-1, p. 23.
40.	In their comment on this paper, the Joint Secretaries recommended strengthening this restriction by including in it the contingency of "augmented internal communist offensives." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Secretaries, October 18, 1950 (TS).
41.	Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Possible Future Action in Indochina, October 27, 1950 (TS).
42.	Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, December 21, 1950 (TS).
43.	Department of State Incoming Message from U.S. Minister Saigon 763, November 4, 1950 (TS).
44.	NSC Staff Study on Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, December 28, 1950 (TS).
45.	Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State to the National Security Council on the Implementation of NSC 64, March 15, 1951 (IS).
46.	OCMH TS-64-7-1, pp. 36, 47–48. All numbers are taken to be approximations.
47.	Irving Heymont, et.al., Cost Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operations, RAC-TP-232, June 1967, Vol 1, p. 10 (S).
48.	C.f., informal memorandum from Mr. Max Lehrer to General Bonesteel of April 21, 1954: "This [attached] report makes it clear that the U.S. MAAG has little information available on which it could operate. The written report actually understates the deficiencies in information. Our people find that the morale of the MAAG in Indochina is virtually non-existent and the MAAG is reduced to relative impotence."
49.	Department of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837, February 22, 1950 (S).
50.	NIE 63–54, Consequences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu, April 30, 1954 (S).
51.	Regarding the Letourneau-Allard plan, General Trapnell, Chief MAAG, reported, "while this plan is slow and expensive, the other course of action is to accept a stalemate which is also not only expensive, but in the long run, favors the Viet Minh and offers no solution." (Memorandum from General Trapnell, OSD files, March 31, 1953)
52.	Although General O'Daniel, in his report of July 15, 1953 (TS) waxed enthusiastic over the successor Navarre Plan, broadly and attractively described to him by General Navarre himself, it was clear to others that the plan was hollow. "There is no concrete evidence that the French Union forces will be able to take decisive action to win the war in the foreseeable future..." (Comments by Army Attache, Saigon, November 24, 1953 (S))
53.	Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954: "There are two basic military concepts for the defense of Southeast Asia: a. Static type defense (Korea type), b. An offensive to attack the source of communist military power being applied in Southeast Asia [i.e., China]." It is interesting that in this assessment the Chiefs selected b., although "The force requirements and logistic support...have not been fully developed." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event of Loss of Indochina to the Communists," May 21, 1954 (TS).
54.	C.f., the reports of General O'Daniel following his three missions to Indochina. Following the second mission, O'Daniel reported that "prospects for victory appear increasingly encouraging and I heartily recommend continuation and intensification of United States support." (Progress Report on Military Situation in Indochina as of November 19, 1953 (TS).) Following the third mission, which General Navarre tried unsuccessfully to prevent, O'Daniel was even more optimistic in his remarks, including those on Dien Bien Riu, given the circumstances. (Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina, February 5, 1954 (TS))
55.	Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens found it necessary to write, even following the U.S. experiences of the Korean war, "I am becoming increasingly concerned over the frequency of statements by individuals of influence within and without the government that United States air and sea forces alone could solve our problem in Indochina, and equally so over the very evident lack of appreciation of the logistics factors affecting operations in that area." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Indochina, May 19, 1954 (TS). See also Note 53.
56.	NSC 5405 file of OSD.