Update Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee ISN: US9AF-001001DP (S)

Update Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee ISN: US9AF-001001DP (S)  (2005) 
by Jay W. Hood


S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20300830
APO AE 09360

30 August 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3 511N W 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee ISN: US9AF-001001DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1.    (FOUO)Personal Information:
  • JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hafizullah Shabaz Khaul
  • Aliases and Current/True Name: Hafizullah Shabaz Khal, Doctor Fazullah
  • Place of Birth: Paktia Province. Afghanistan (AF)
  • Date of Birth: 01 January 1946
  • Citizenship: Afghanistan (AF)
  • Internment Serial Number (lSN): US9AF-001001DP
2.    (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health, although he complains of acid reflux. No known allergies.
3.    (S/NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

(S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD).

a. (S/NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 20 Aug 04. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD).

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a senior level Anti-Coalition Militant (ACM) facilitator with significant ties to Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel. Detainee supplied logistical and operational support to hostile activities against US and Afghan personnel. Detainee abused appointed governmental positions by supporting ACM activities and conducting illegal operations for his own financial gain. Detainee used his position to release known terrorists from detention and aided extremists to escape US capture. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4.    (S/NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S/NF) Prior History: Detainee has 14 years of formal education: six years primary, six years secondary, and two years at Kabul, Afghanistan (AF) University where he received a degree in Pharmacy in 1969. Detainee moved to Kandahar where he worked at two separate hospitals until approximately mid-1978 when he quit his job during the Khalqi/Parchami war (Afghan civil war).

b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee and his family traveled to Miram Shah, Pakistan (PK) refugee camp in 1979 to escape the Soviet invasion. Detainee traveled back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan to work on a relative's farm during the spring and summer months. He claimed authorities imprisoned him for one year because he did not support the Taliban. Detainee denied Taliban or Al-Qaida connections, but does know and has identified Al-Qaida operatives.

c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: Detainee claimed he never received any type of military training, but did engage in military actions against Russian forces. Detainee served under the command of Diaz Ghul, a village-elected commander, and District Commander Momein. After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, detainee returned to his homeland and opened a pharmacy. In early March 2002, District Governor Taj Mohammed Wardak appointed detainee as the Zormat District Manager. Detainee lost his position once the new Afghan government was put in place under President Kharzai. In October 2002, the Governor of Paktia Province, AF, Rasmuhammad Dalily, appointed detainee Chief of Tribes with the primary mission of regaining the security of the region from rampant criminal activity.

d. (S) Capture Information: Detaineep roposed to Governor Dalily that all government employees be disarmed, including security personnel during off-duty hours. Detainee received reports accusing Head of Security, Abdullah Mujahed, of abusing his position and having access to weapons that were then used to steal from local merchants. Detainee informed the Governor of the accusations. On 26 March 2003, Abdullah Mujahed arrested detainee en route to see Governor Dalily. Detainee was arrested under suspicion of having Taliban and Al-Qaida connections. Abdullah Mujahed handed detainee over to US forces later that same day.

e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 9 May 2003

f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

  • Al-Qaida/Taliban/HiG members and activity in the Zormat area.
  • Ingress routes to Afghanistan.
5.    (S/NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessted detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S/NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

  • (S/NF) Detainee provided logistical support to operations directly targeted against US interests. Detainee facilitated the movement of Al-Qaida personnel to escape Coalition capture. Detainee is assessed as a leader of ACM activities, having established relationships with senior Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel in the Paktia Province. Detainee abused the rights and privileges of his appointed official offices under the Karzai government.
  • (S/NF) Detainee provided operational and logistical support to Al-Qaida operations.
  • (S/NF) In early 2002, Al-Qaida operatives in Paktia Province each gave detainee a payment of $3,000 to secured etainee's support for Al-Qaida operations. Additionally, detainee facilitated the departure of Al-Qaida family members fleeing to Iran for safe haven.
  • (S/NF) In February 2002, detainee probably aided a large group of Al-Qaida personnel located in Hadron Canyon, Paktia Province. A group comprised of Uzbek, Chinese, and Chechen members was holed up for two weeks while attempting escape to the Rabat Region. (Analyst Note: The Rabat region probably refers to the triborder zone between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.)
  • (S/NF) While serving as Assistant Governor of Zormat, detainee along with Zormat Police Commander Abdul Matin, released three suspected Al-Qaida members without due investigation. Detainee expressed dissatisfaction with checkpoint personnel for capturing them in the first place by cutting off their subsistence pay.
  • (S/NF) Detainee's telephone number was associated with Peshawar Taliban cell leader Maulawi Toha. Other numbers on the list included numerous other Taliban and Al-Qaida operatives throughout Afghanistan.
  • (S/NF) Zormat district ACM personnel consider themselves Al-Qaida vice Taliban; therefore, all Zormat ACM indoctrination training is based on Al-Qaida philosophy.
  • (S/NF) Detainee established ACM relationship with regional warlord Saifullah Rahman Mansour, a former Taliban Commander. Mansour is recognized as the senior Al-Qaida leader in the Paktia Province.
  • (S/NF) Detainee led a 12-man guerrilla force designed to attack US interests in the Paktia Province. The small tactical force was part of larger 80-man contingent made up of former Taliban and Al-Qaida members. Mansour organized and financed the group. (Analyst Note: Mansour is the former Taliban 8tn Division Commander. He is a known ACM leader listed on CENTCOM's Tier III personalities and is wanted by Afghan and Coalition Forces.)
  • (S/NF) Detainee's brother, Rahmat, is identified as a senior lieutenant for Mansour. Rahmat owns a large car dealership that acts as a logistic warehouse for weapons, including AK-47s, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).
  • (S/NF) Detainee was identified as leader of an ACM unit comprised of former Taliban and Al-Qaida personnel.
  • (S/NF) Shardar Khan, US9AF-000914DP (ISN 914), stated he was with a unit operating in Zormat from July until November 2002. ISN 914 stated that he served under Samoud Khan, who worked for a Dr. Hafizullah, detainee. (Analyst Note: Samoud Khan is probably Samoot Khan, US9AF-0001850DP (ISN 1850), a known regional warlord with significant ties to Al-Qaida and Taliban throughout the Gardez and Paktia provinces. Khan is known to have direct ties with Saifullah Mansour.)
  • (S/NF) ISN 914 identified detainee as commander of the "Taker" and "Ansoff' units. The Taker unit was located near Mousawal, Zormat and trained on the Kalashnikov in infantry tactics. The Taker unit also had several RPGs. ISN 914 did not elaborate on the Ansoff unit.
  • (S/NF) Habib Rahman, US9AF-00907DP (ISN 907), identified detainee as Dr. Hafizullah, unit leader who worked with Samoud Khan.
  • (S/NF) Assad Ullah, US9AF-00912 (ISN 912), captured at Samoud Khan's Charwakala camp, identified detainee as the County Chief of Zormat. ISN 912 stated that Dr. Hafizullah and Samoud Khan met every Friday at detainee's house.
  • (S/NF) Other GTMO detainees identified detainee's photo numerous times as Dr. Hafizullah (Commander of Samoud). Detainee threatened other detainees not to identify him by issuing threats of retribution.
  • (S/NF) Detainee abused appointed positions through comrption and facilitating activities against new Afghan government interests.
  • (S/NF) Paktia Governor Wardak fired detainee and Abdul Matin, US9AG-01002DP( ISN 1002), assessed to be the Deputy Chief of Taliban intelligence, after personally investigating allegations of corruption. Wardak confirmed that detainee's house and belongings exceeded his means and ascertained that he obtained these by improperly seizing money and goods from travelers.
  • (S/NF) Detainee met with known Al-Qaida Zormat regional cell leader Amir Mohammad Ahmadi to plan an operation to assassinate detainee's replacement Jambaz Sidiqi. Detainee provided money and weapons to those who agreed to participate in the assassination operation.
  • (S/NF) ISN 914 stated that detainee worked for the current government and provided Samoot Khan protection.
  • (S/NF) Detainee, while serving as Assistant Governor of Paktia Province, organized a sting operation against travelers through his province. Detainee ordered checkpoint personnel to confiscate money and goods from travelers on detainee's and Paktia Province's Police Commander's behalf.

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW-MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has recently been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff.


6.    (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

  • (S/NF) Detainee is assessed to have knowledge of operational and logistical specifics pertaining to Paktia Province ACM activities. Detainee had access to senior Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel and their operations by holding several senior governmental positions. Detainee resided in this region most of his life, yet he submits he has no knowledge of anti-coalition operations. Detainee has contradicted himself throughout his detention and was identified as being deceptive during polygraph examinations.
  • (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
  • Anti-Coalition Movement
    • Samood Khan, ISN 1850
      • Ties to the Taliban
      • Role as an Anti-Coalition leader
      • Associated attacks against Doalitfion forces
      • Anti-Coalition activities in the Paktia Province, AF
    • Saifullah Rahman Mansour
      • Ties to the Taliban and Al=Qaeda
      • Role as an Anti-Coalition leader
      • Associated attacks against Coalitfion forces
      • Associated attacks in the Paktia Province, AF
    • Attacks in the Zormat Region of the Paktia Province, AF
    • Al-Qaida support to the Anti-Coalition Movement
    • Taliban support
    • 80 man unit planning attacks against US and Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) positions and personnel in the Paktia Province, A.F.
  • Corruption in the Zormat District Government
  • Al-Qaida movement through the Zormat district of the Paktia Province
7.    (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

Jay W. Hood Major GeneralU. SA Commanding

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 2O3OO83O