ORDO II.
Decreased Volition.
GENUS II.
With decreased Actions of the Organs of Sense.
SPECIES.
1. Recollectionis jactura. Loss of recollection. This is the defect of memory in old people, who forget the actions of yesterday, being incapable of voluntary recollection, and yet remember those of their youth, which by frequent repetition are introduced by association or suggestion. This is properly the paralysis of the mind; the organs of sense do not obey the voluntary power; that is, our ideas cannot be recollected, or acted over again by the will.
After an apoplectic attack the patients, on beginning to recover, find themselves most at a loss in recollecting proper names of persons or places; as those words have not been so frequently associated with the ideas they stand for, as the common words of a language. Mr. ——, a man of strong mind, of a short necked family, many of whom had suffered by apoplexy, after an apoplectic fit on his recovering the use of speech, after repeated trials to remember the name of a person or place, applauded himself, when he succeeded, with such a childish smile on the partial return of his sagacity, as very much affected me.—Not long, alas! to return; for another attack in a few weeks destroyed the whole.
I saw a child after the small-pox, which was left in this situation; it was lively, active, and even vigorous; but shewed that kind of surprise, which novelty excites, at every object it viewed; and that as often as it viewed it. I never heard the termination of the case.
2. Stultitia voluntaria. Voluntary folly. The absence of voluntary power and consequent incapacity to compare the ideas of present and future good. Brute animals may be said to be in this situation, as they are in general excited into action only by their present painful or pleasurable sensations. Hence though they are liable to surprise, when their passing trains of ideas are dissevered by violent stimuli; yet are they not affected with wonder or astonishment at the novelty of objects; as they possess but in a very inferior degree, that voluntary power of comparing the present ideas with those previously acquired, which distinguishes mankind; and is termed analogical reasoning, when deliberatively exerted; and intuitive analogy, when used without our attention to it, and which always preserves our hourly trains of ideas consistent with truth and nature. See Sect. XVII. 3. 7.
3. Credulitas. Credulity. Life is short, opportunities of knowledge rare; our senses are fallacious, our reasonings uncertain, mankind therefore struggles with perpetual error from the cradle to the coffin. He is necessitated to correct experiment by analogy, and analogy by experiment; and not always to rest satisfied in the belief of facts even with this two-fold testimony, till future opportunities, or the observations of others, concur in their support.
Ignorance and credulity have ever been companions, and have misled and enslaved mankind; philosophy has in all ages endeavoured to oppose their progress, and to loosen the shackles they had imposed; philosophers have on this account been called unbelievers: unbelievers of what? of the fictions of fancy, of witchcraft, hobgobblins, apparitions, vampires, fairies; of the influence of stars on human actions, miracles wrought by the bones of saints, the flights of ominous birds, the predictions from the bowels of dying animals, expounders of dreams, fortune-tellers, conjurors, modern prophets, necromancy, cheiromancy, animal magnetism, with endless variety of folly? These they have disbelieved and despised, but have ever bowed their hoary heads to Truth and Nature.
Mankind may be divided in respect to the facility of their belief or conviction into two classes; those, who are ready to assent to single facts from the evidence of their senses, or from the serious assertions of others; and those, who require analogy to corroborate or authenticate them.
Our first knowledge is acquired by our senses; but these are liable to deceive us, and we learn to detect these deceptions by comparing the ideas presented to us by one sense with those presented by another. Thus when we first view a cylinder, it appears to the eye as a flat surface with different shades on it, till we correct this idea by the sense of touch, and find its surface to be circular; that is, having some parts gradually receding further from the eye than others. So when a child, or a cat, or a bird, first sees its own image in a looking-glass, it believes that another animal exists before it, and detects this fallacy by going behind the glass to examine, if another tangible animal really exists there.
Another exuberant source of error consists in the false notions, which we receive in our early years from the design or ignorance of our instructors, which affect all our future reasoning by their perpetual intrusions; as those habits of muscular actions of the face or limbs, which are called tricks, when contracted in infancy continue to the end of our lives.
A third great source of error is the vivacity of our ideas of imagination, which perpetually intrude themselves by various associations, and compose the farrago of our dreams; in which, by the suspension of volition, we are precluded from comparing the ideas of one sense with those of another, or the incongruity of their successions with the usual course of nature, and thus to detect their fallacy. Which we do in our waking hours by a perpetual voluntary exertion, a process of the mind above mentioned, which we have termed intuitive analogy. Sect. XVII. 3. 7.
This analogy presupposes an acquired knowledge of things, hence children and ignorant people are the most credulous, as not possessing much knowledge of the usual course of nature; and secondly, those are most credulous, whose faculty of comparing ideas, or the voluntary exertion of it, is slow or imperfect. Thus if the power of the magnetic needle of turning towards the north, or the shock given by touching both sides of an electrized coated jar, was related for the first time to a philosopher, and to an ignorant person; the former would be less ready to believe them, than the latter; as he would find nothing similar in nature to compare them to, he would again and again repeat the experiment, before he would give it his entire credence; till by these repetitions it would cease to be a single fact, and would therefore gain the evidence of analogy. But the latter, as having less knowledge of nature, and less facility of voluntary exertion, would more readily believe the assertions of others, or a single fact, as presented to his own observation. Of this kind are the bulk of mankind; they continue throughout their lives in a state of childhood, and have thus been the dupes of priests and politicians in all countries and in all ages of the world.
In regard to religious matters, there is an intellectual cowardice instilled into the minds of the people from their infancy; which prevents their inquiry: credulity is made an indispensable virtue; to inquire or exert their reason in religious matters is denounced as sinful; and in the catholic church is punished with more severe penances than moral crimes. But in respect to our belief of the supposed medical facts, which are published by variety of authors; many of whom are ignorant, and therefore credulous; the golden rule of David Hume may be applied with great advantage. "When two miraculous assertions oppose each other, believe the less miraculous." Thus if a person is said to have received the small-pox a second time, and to have gone through all the stages of it, one may thus reason: twenty thousand people have been exposed to the variolous contagion a second time without receiving the variolous fever, to every one who has been said to have thus received it; it appears therefore less miraculous, that the assertor of this supposed fact has been deceived, or wishes to deceive, than that it has so happened contrary to the long experienced order of nature.
M. M. The method of cure is to increase our knowledge of the laws of nature, and our habit of comparing whatever ideas are presented to us with those known laws, and thus to counteract the fallacies of our senses, to emancipate ourselves from the false impressions which we have imbibed in our infancy, and to set the faculty of reason above that of imagination.