Chap. IV.
1. Distinction of Land and Sea not without a Providence. 2. As also the Consistence of the Sea-Water that it can bear Ships. 3. The great convenience and pleasure of Navigation. 4. The admirable train of fit Provisions in Nature for the gratifying the Wit of man in so concerning a Curiosity.
1. Having thus passed over the Hills, and through the Woods & hollow Entrails of the Earth, let us now view the wide Sea also, and see whether that do not inform us that there is a God; that is, whether things be not there in such fort as a rational Principle would either order or approve, whenas yet notwithstanding they might have been otherwise. And now we are come to view those Campos natantes, as Lucretius calls them, that vast Champain of Water, the Ocean; I demand first, Whether it might not have been wider then it is, even so large as to over-spred the face of the whole Earth, and so to have taken away the habitation of Men and Beasts. For the wet particles might have easily ever mingled with the dry, and so all had either been Sea or Quag-mire.
2. And then again, though this distinction of Land and Sea be made, Whether this watry Element might not have fallen out to be of so thin a consistency as that it would not bear Shipping; for it is so far from impossibility, as there be de facto in Nature such waters, as the River Silas, for example, in India. And the waters of Borysthenes are so thin and light, that they are said to swim upon the top of the Stream of the River Hypanis. And we know there is some kind of wood so heavy that it will sink in any ordinary kind of water.
I appeal therefore to any mans reason, whether it be not better that there should be a distinction of Land and Sea, then that all should be mire or water; and whether it be not better that the Timber-trees afford wood so light that it swim on the water, or the water be so heavy that it will bear up the wood, then the contrary. That therefore which might have been otherwise, and yet is settled according to our own hearts wish, who are knowing and rational Creatures, ought to be deemed by us as established by Counsel and Reason.
3. And the closer we look into the business, we shall discern more evident foot-steps of Providence in it: For the two main properties of Man being Contemplation, and Sociableness or love of Converse, there could nothing so highly gratifie his nature as power of Navigation, whereby he riding on the back of the waves of the Sea, views the wonders of the Deep, and by reason of the glibness of that Element, is able in a competent time to prove the truth of those sagacious suggestions of his own Mind; that is, whether the Earth be every way round, and whether there be any Antipodes, and the like; and by cutting the Æquinoctial line, decides that controversie of the habitableness of the Torrid Zone, or rather wipes out that blot that lay upon Divine Providence, as if so great a share of the world had been lost by reason of unfitness for Habitation.
Besides, the falling upon strange Coasts, and discovering men of so great a diversity of manners from our selves, cannot but be a thing of infinite pleasure and advantage, to the enlargement of our thoughts from what we observe in their Conversation, Parts and Policy. Adde unto this the sundry Rarities of Nature, and Commodities proper to several Countreys, which they that stay at home enjoy by the Travels of those that goe abroad, and they that travel grow rich for their adventure.
4. Now therefore Navigation being of so great consequence to the delight and convenience of humane life, and there being both wit and courage in man to attempt the Seas, were he but fitted with right Materials and other advantages requisite: when we see there is so pat a provision made for him to this purpose in large Timber, for the building of his Ship; in a thick Sea-water, sufficient to bear the Ship's burthen; in the Magnet or Load-stone, for his Compass; in the steady and parallel direction of the Axis of the Earth, for his Cynosura, and then observing his natural wit and courage to make use of them, and how that ingenite desire of knowledge and converse, and of the improving of his own parts and happiness, stir him up to so notable a design; we cannot but conclude from such a train of Causes so fitly and congruously complying together. That it was really the counsel of an Universal and Eternal Mind, that hath the overseeing and guidance of the whole frame of Nature, that laid together these Causes so carefully and wisely; that is, we cannot but conclude That there is a God.
And if we have got so fast foot-hold already in this Truth by the consideration of such Phænomena in the world that seem more rude and general, what will the contemplation of the more particular and more polished pieces of Nature afford in Vegetables, Animals, and the Body of Man?