Mr. Justice CAMPBELL dissenting.
The defendant, in the year 1828, entered upon the land conveyed to him by Nehemiah Wyman, and retained it until 1844. He then sold it as his own property, and appropriated the price to his own use. During this whole period, there was no act on the part of Wyman from which the relation of a mortgagor or debtor can be inferred, and no account was rendered by the defendant, nor was any act performed by him inconsistent with his deed.
The evidence relied on to engraft a trust on this deed consists of conversations reported by Nehemiah Wyman, the debtor, and his brother William, as contemporaneous with the deed, and other conversations reported by William Wyman as occurring in 1844 and 1851; and also the statements of the answer.
No intercourse between Nehemiah Wyman and the defendant took place between 1828 and 1851, directly or mediately, relative to this subject.
The witness, Nehemiah Wyman, is not, in my opinion, a competent witness. This suit is brought by his son upon an assignment made after the controversy had commenced, and with the acknowledged purpose of using his father as a witness.
It was found that sufficient evidence did not exist to support the claim, and machinery was resorted to, calculated to introduce the evils of champerty and maintenance.
The witness sold his claim, with a concession to the assignee to employ him as a witness to establish it.
Such a practice holds out to parties a strong temptation to commit perjury. (Bell v. Smith, 5 B. and C., 188, J. Bayley's Opinion; Maury v. Mason, 8 Part., 212; Clifton v. Sharpe, 15 Ala. R., 618; 1 Penn. R., 214; 12 Pet., 140.)
The testimony of Edward Wyman is open to much observation; and I feel entirely indisposed to rest a decree upon his evidence. Nor do I see intrinsic difficulties in the inconsistencies of the answer. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that nothing has been done between these parties for above twenty-three years inconsistent with the relations of vendor and vendee, or consistent with the relations of a creditor and debtor, except the detention of the evidence of the original debt by the defendant, and the most important part of that evidence was cancelled in 1830 by him.
I dissent from the opinion of the court in reference to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States in Massachusetts. It is admitted that, in the courts of Massachusetts, this trust could not be incorporated into the deed. The statute of frauds prevents it. (Walker v. Locke, 5 Cush., 90.)
This statute constitutes a rule of property for the State. In the present case, the subject of the suit is a contract made in Massachusetts, by citizens of that State, and affecting the title to real property there. In my opinion, the statute law of Massachusetts furnishes a rule of decision to the courts of the United States.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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