INDEX.
Aberdeen, Lord, and civil service reform, 285.
Accounts, British public, how audited, 144, how kept, 145; French public, how kept, 145; federal, how audited, 175-179; how kept formerly, 179.
Adams, John, on the constitutional balances, 12, 13: influence of, as President, 41; claim of originality for the Constitution, 55, 249.
Adams, Samuel, 209.
“Address” of early Presidents to Senate, 239.
Administration, talents for, not encouraged in U.S., 199, 200; questions of, now predominant, 203; divorced from legislation in U.S., 251-253; training necessary for, 255, 256; contrasted with legislation, 273, 274; not less important than legislation, 297; must be debated, 302; tendency towards widening sphere of national, 316, 317.
Alabama claims, in Senate, 51.
Alien and Sedition Laws, 21.
“American system” of protective tariffs, 167.
Appointing power of Speaker of House, 103; history of, of Speaker, 104; accustomed use of, for party ends, 108.
Appropriation, bills, “general,” 150; former methods of, 151; stinginess of Congress in, 152, 159; bills, reported at any time, 153; bills, specially debated, 78, 154, 155, 183, 184; bills, in the Senate, 155-158.
Appropriations, debate of, 78, 154, 155, 183, 184; “white-button mandarins” on Committee on, 111; Committee on, consider estimates, 149; “permanent,” 152, 153; Committees on, relations between, and financial officers of the govt., 160-164; reports of Committee on, preferred to reports of Committee of Ways and Means, 174, 183, 184.
Bagehot, Walter, on living reality and paper description of English Constitution, 10; description of Parliament by, applied to Congress, 44; on time required for opinions, 130; on public opinion, 187; on House of Lords, 220; on bicameral system, 221, 222; on technicalities of constitutional interpretation in U.S., 243; on questions asked in the Commons, 300; on influence of Geo. III. on Constitution of U.S., 309; on multiplicity of authorities in American Constitution, 309, 310.
Balance, between state and federal powers, See ‘Federal and State governments;’ between judiciary and other branches of federal govt., 34 et seq.; between state legislatures and the Senate, 40; of the people against their representatives, 40; of presidential electors against the people, 40; between Executive and Congress, 41; between Senate and House of Representatives, real, 228.
Balances of the Constitution, ideal, 52; present state of, 53; at variance with inevitable tendency to exalt representative body, 311.
Bank of the U.S., 22.
Bicameral system, utility of a, 219 et seq.
Bill of Rights, and the Constitution of the U.S., 7.
Bills, introduced on Mondays, 66; early course of, in House, 67; all committed, 67; doubt in committing some, 67, 68; fate of committed, 69; passed under suspension of Rules, 111, 112; of private members in House of Commons, 120, 121.
“Bland Silver Bill,” 185.
Bright, John, 198.
British govt. by party, 117 et seq.
Buckle, on use of legislation, 295.
Budget, controlled, not originated, by British House of Commons, 137; preparation and submission of, by English Chancellor of Exchequer, 140-142; both originated and controlled by Congress, 148, 191.
Cabinet, discords in first, 2; change in character of, 45 et seq.; real executive equality of, with President, 46, 257; diminishing power of, to control policy, 46, 47, 262, 269; parliamentary position of British, a single Standing Committee, 117; irresponsibility of, in U.S., in matters of finance, 164; an integral part of the Executive, 257; limits to independence of, 258; relations of, to President, 258, 259; ministerial, rather than political, officers in U.S., 261, 264 et seq., 291; duties of, supervised by Standing Committees, 262; in the leading-strings of Congress, 262, 266; fixed terms of, 261, 264 et seq.; represent whom? 265, 266; party relations of, 269; easily evade many questions and commands of Congress, 271, 272; indistinct responsibility of, 282; history of responsibility of British, 286 et seq.; status of, in American constitutional system, 291.
Canning, George, 209.
Caucus, failure of congressional nominating, 247; legislative, disciplines parties in Congress, 326, 327; invention of, by Democrats, 327, 328; privacy and irresponsibility of legislative, 328, 329; methods and constraints of legislative, 329, 330; necessity for legislative, 330.
Centralization, present tendency towards, in federal govt. and Congress, 53, 315, 316; questions which seem to necessitate, 54.
Chairman of Standing Committees, govt. by, 102; elders of Congress, 102; relations of, to each other, 102, 103; limits to leadership of each of the, 205.
Civil Rights Act, 33, n.
Civil Service Reform, and usurpations of Senate, 49, 236 et seq.; hindered by institutional causes in U.S., 285, 290; history of, in Great Britain, 285 et seq.; history of, in U. S., 289, 290; conditions precedent to, 290.
Clôture in French Assembly, 126.
Cobden, Richard, 198.
Coinage Act of 1873, 185.
Commerce, federal power over, 30, 31; former control of appropriations for internal improvements by Committee on, 167.
Commission, legislative, proposed by J. S. Mill, 115, 129, 192; the most effective legislative, 192.
Committee, “Executive,” proposed for House of Representatives, 114.
Committees, select, 67.
Committees, Standing, government by, 56; chairmen of, leaders of House, 60; chairmen of, do not consult or coöperate, 61; for every topic of legislation, 61; served by rules of House, 66, 71; number and uses of, 67, 68; consider all bills, 67; overlapping jurisdiction of, 68; cannot reject bills, 69; neglect of, to report, 69, 70; entire direction of legislation by, 70, 78; hasty consideration of reports of, by House, 71; four specially licensed, 71, 72; average time given to each of the, to report, 72; call of, for reports, 72, 73; hastening of business by the, 74 et seq.; control of debate by, 75 et seq.; arguments before the, 81-85; division of power amongst the, 92; both parties represented on, 99; appointed in House by Speaker, 103; history of rules of appointment of, 104; aided by Speaker, 108; Roman magistrates and the, 109; “little legislatures” made up of all sorts of men, 113; contrasted with single Standing Committee of Parliament, 116, 117; of House of Commons, 122; which control national income, 136; which create demands upon the Treasury, 167, 168; on expenditures, 175-177; multiplication of, by Congress, 176, n.; approachability of the, by lobbyists, 189, 190; choice of, in the Senate, 212, n.; supervision of the departments by the, 231, 262, 271, 272; may command, but cannot superintend, 271; part of the mechanism of Congress, 281; offset by legislative caucus, 326.
Commons, House of, represented by Ministers of Crown, 59, 244; character of debate in the, 94, 95; Cabinet’s place and functions in the, 117 et seq.; private members’ bills in the, 120, 121; committees of, 122; functions and character of Speaker of, 122; the, in session, 123; compared with French Chamber, 123, 128, 129; controls, does not originate, financial measures, 137; opposition of, to civil service reform, 285, 289; cross-examination of Ministers in, 300.
Congress, the centre and source of power, 11; early awkwardness of, 21, 44; made dominant and irresistible by doctrine of “implied powers”, 23; check upon, by Judiciary, 35, 36; power of, over federal courts, 38; check upon, by President, 41; quick assumption of control by, 44, 45; enlarged powers of, created by efficiency of organization, 47; prominence of Senate in contests with executive, 47 et seq.; proper central object of constitutional study, 57; complex organization of, 58; without authoritative leaders, 59, 92, 205, 212, 315; embarrassments of new member in, 61 et seq.; work of, parceled out to Committees, 67; delays of each new, in getting to work, 72, 73; uninteresting character of debate in, 95, 96; means of financial control by, 147; supervision of expenditures by, 175, 179; difficulties of constituencies in controlling, 186-189; cause for distrust of, 186 et seq.; lobbying in, 189, 190; failure of presidential nominating caucus of, 247; does not breed administrators, 251, 252; and the Executive, party diversity between, 267; defective means of, for controlling executive action, 270 et seq., 302; and the Executive, absence of confidential co-operation between, 278; exactions of, upon the departments, 278, 279; diligence of, in legislation, 294, 297; necessity for discussion of administration by, 301 et seq.; informing function of, to be magnified, 303; grasps after new subjects of legislation, 304; freedom of action possible to, 304, 305; inferior to the Press as a critical authority, 306, 319; embarrassments of, in making its authority open and respectable, 312 et seq.; and Parliament succeeding Revolution settlement in Eng., 315; without adequate information, 315; tendency towards concentration of federal powers in hands of, 315, 316; irresponsibility of, 318; agreement and stability of majorities in, 324 et seq.; parties in, disciplined by caucus, 326, 327.
Conkling, Roscoe, resignation of, from Senate, 237.
Constitution, The, its wayward fortunes, 1; difficulties attending adoption of, 2; outward conformity to principles of, in former times, 3; present attitude of criticism toward, 5; its change of substance and persistency of form, 7; growth of, 7; elementary structure of, 8; in operation and in the books, 9, 10; “literary theory” of, 12; “implied powers” of, 22 et seq.; centre of all early political contests, 196 et seq.; questions of interpretation of, not now urgent, 202; practically amended without being constitutionally amended, 242; modeled after the English Constitution, 307 et seq.; Bagehot on multiplicity of authorities in, 309, 310; forms of, hold Congress back from making its power convenient and honest, 312.
Consultation between President and Senate, not real, 232 et seq.; means of, between President and Senate, 234.
Contingent Fund of Treasury Dept., fraudulent use of, 178.
Convention, national nominating, real functions of a, 245 et seq.; minority representation in composition of a, 246; conditions surrounding choice of a candidate by a, 250, 251; does not pick from Congress, 251, 252.
Cooley, Judge, on balance between state and federal govts., 17, 18; on checks upon federal encroachment, 33, 34; on judicial control of the Executive, 35; on the originality of the Constitution, 55, 56; incompleteness of constitutional view of, 56, 57.
“Courtesy” of the Senate, 238.
Criticism, necessity for a new, of constitutional methods, 53 et seq.; former methods of constitutional, 57; Congress central object of constitutional, 57; of legislation by Senate, 219.
Cushman, Samuel, 89.
Dale, Mr., on indifference of public opinion in U.S., 331.
Debate, time for, and conditions of, in House, 75 et seq.; importance of, 78; on Ways and Means and Appropriations, 78; absence of instinct of, in House, 79; relegated to Standing Committees, 81, 82; in Standing Committees, 81; value of, in Committees, 82; kind of, necessary, 85; physical limitations of, in House, 86 et seq.; in early Houses, 89, 90; uninteresting and uninstructive character of, in Congress, 95, 96, 101, 134, 185, 298; parliamentary, centres about Ministry, 95; necessity for, under responsible Cabinet govt., 119; in French Assembly, 125 et seq.; of appropriation bills, 154, 155, 183, 184; of all financial questions by Congress, 183; in Senate, 211, 216 et seq.; in Congress, directed at random, 298; chief use of public, in representative bodies, 299 et seq.; of administration, cannot be too much of, in Congress, 304.
Deficiency Bills, 159.
Democracy, limited in U.S. by Senate, 226.
Departments, communications of, with Appropriation Committees concerning estimates, 160-164; present methods of book-keeping in the, 163; heads of, make interest with Appropriation Committees, 163; Senate’s share in control of the, 231; and Congress, defective means of coöperation between, 270, 271; demoralizing relations of, with Congress, 277, 278; exactions of Congress upon, 278, 279; objects of suspicion because of their privacy, 299, 300.
Eaton, D. B., on civil service reform in Great Britain, 285.
Education, federal aid to, 29.
Election, Senate shielded by the method of its, 224; of President, real method of, 243 et seq.; virtual, by nominating conventions, 245.
Electors, presidential, balanced against people, 40; agents of nominating conventions, 245, 250; history of action of, 246, 247, 250.
Ellsworth, Oliver, on veto power, 52.
Embargo, the, 21.
English Constitution, likeness between the, and that of U.S., 7, 307 et seq.; character of, when Constitution of U.S. was formed, 307, 308, 310, 311.
Estimates, in House of Commons, 137; preparation of the federal, 148, 149; federal, go to Committee on Appropriations, 149; communications and conferences between Appropriation Committees and the departments concerning, 160-164; thoroughness of later, 163.
Exchequer, Chancellor of, preparation and submission to Commons of budget by, 140-142; represented by House Committee of Ways and Means, 170; financial policy of, compared with policy of House Committee of Ways and Means, 171-175.
Executive, 242-293; relations of, with Senate, 230 et seq.; really chosen by representative, deliberative body, 244; and legislative service divorced in U.S., 251-253; the President not all of the, 257; elements constituting the, in U.S., 259; functions bestowed upon the Secretaries, 260; and Congress, party diversity between, 267; Roger Sherman upon real character of, 268; and Congress, defective means of coöperation between, 270 et seq.; responsibility of, and civil service reform, 285 et seq.; suspected because not clearly visible through Congress, 299, 300; embarrassed by half-informed criticism, 305.
Expenditure, questions of, disconnected from questions of supply, 174, 175: supervision of, by Congress, 175-179.
Federal govt., the, early weakness and timidity of, 18, 19; growth in self-confidence and power of, 19, 20; first questions that engaged the attention of, 20; brought to every man’s door, 25: supervision of elections by, 27; highest point of aggression of, 33; advantage of indirect taxation to, 133; necessity for two chambers in, 221, 222; possible paralysis of, in emergencies, 282; rapidly widening sphere of, 316, 317; weakness of our present, 318.
Federal and state govts., balance between, 13; object of balance between, 14; early conditions of balance between, 15; Hamilton on balance between, 16, 17; present inefficacy of balance between, 17; balance between, destroyed by doctrine of “implied powers,” 23; balance between, dependent on federal judiciary, 24; balance between, prejudiced by internal improvements, 28, and by federal power over commerce, 30, 31; balance between, last pictured in “reconstruction,” 32, 33.
Ferry, M. Jules, 248.
Fillmore, President, 259.
Finance, loose govt. practices concerning, 130, 131; comparatively unembarrassed character of American, 135; necessity for responsibility in direction of, 135; shifting character of federal, 135, 136; number of Committees controlling, in Congress, 136; administration of, in England, 137-146; administration of, in U.S., 146 et seq., 280; Senate Committee on, 169; confusion of public opinion in regard to action of Congress upon, 280.
Financial, officials, accessibility of English, in the Commons, 146, 147; officials, separation of, from Congress in the U.S., 147; officials, mere witnesses in U.S., 164; officials, irresponsibility of, for estimates in U.S., 164; system of U.S. contrasted with that of Eng., 180; system of U.S., incoherency of, 180, 181: policy of Congress, shifting character of, 181, 182; legislation, prominent place of, in congressional business, 183; questions, control of, by Committees in Senate, 212, n.; questions, confusion of public opinion regarding action of Congress upon, 280.
Fish, Secretary, and treaty with Denmark, 51.
Foreign relations, principal concern of federal govt. during first quarter century, 43; hand of Senate in, 49 et seq., 232 et seq.; no real consultation between President and Senate concerning, 232; Senate Committee on, 234.
French Assembly, organization of, 123; parties in, 124; proceedings of, 125 et seq.; compared with House of Representatives and House of Commons, 127-129.
Froude, J. A., on political orators, 215.
Gallatin, Albert, 181.
Gladstone, Wm. E., 59; on direct and indirect taxes, 134; 209, 322. Government, by chairmen of Standing Committees, 102; by Standing Committees, contrasted with govt. by responsible Ministry, 116 et seq.; conditions of perfect party, 267, 268; “by declamation,” 318.
Green, J. R., on Parliament and public opinion under Geo. III., 187, 188; on temper and embarrassments of the Parliament succeeding the Revolution Settlement in England, 313, 314.
Grévy, President, 248
Hall of House of Representatives, size of, 86 et seq.
Hamilton, Alex., on balance between state and national govts., 16, 17; influence of, upon early policy of govt., 21; advocacy of protective duties, 22; announces doctrine of “implied powers,” 22; 181, 259, 306, 307.
Hampden, John, 208.
Henry, Patrick, 209.
Hoar, G. F., Senator, on time for reporting given to Committees, 72; on suspension of the Rules in the House, 111, 112.
House of Commons, See ‘Commons, House of.’
House of Lords, Bagehot on the, 220.
House of Representatives, See ‘Representatives, House of.’
“Implied powers,” enunciated by Hamilton, 22; sustained national bank, 22; McCulloch v. Maryland, 23; a vigorous principle of constitutional growth, 23; effect of, upon status of States, 23, 24; practical issue of doctrine of, 25 et seq.
Internal Improvements, 28; moral effect of, upon state policy, 29; history of policy of, 165-167; sums appropriated for, 167; character of opposition to, 197.
James II., 213.
Johnson, President, contest of, with Senate, 49.
Judiciary, power of, to control Executive, 34, 35; power of, to control Congress, 35, 36; change of party color in, 37; power of Congress over, 38, 39.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 39.
Kentucky, protest of, against Alien and Sedition Laws, 21.
Leaders, absence of authoritative, in Congress, 58, 92, 205, 212, 315; lacking in parties of U. S., 187; raised up by the constitutional struggles before the war, 199 et seq.; slavery and anti-slavery, 201, 202; no offices for political, in U.S., 203; training necessary for, 255, 256; political, authority of, in England, 323.
Leadership, conditions of political, in U.S., 204 et seq.; 323; character of legislative, 206 et seq.; lack of, in Senate, 212, 213; the prize of, 214; lack of, in U.S. makes parties conglomerate, 324.
Legislation, character of, determined by privileges of Committees and necessity for haste, 74; compromise character of, in Congress, 101; conglomerate and heterogeneous, 113, 325; part of President in, by virtue of veto power, 260, 266; and administration contrasted, 273, 274; Buckle on present value of, 295; nature of present task of, 295, 296; generates legislation, 297; not more important than administration, 297; general function of, 301, 302; tendency toward widening sphere of, 316, 317.
“Log-rolling,” 169.
Lords, House of, Bagehot on, 220.
Lowell, J. R., on “government by declamation,” 318.
Macaulay, criticism of legislative leadership by, 207.
Machiavelli, on responsibility of ministers, 275.
Maclay, Wm., Sketches of First Senate by, quoted, 24, n.
McMaster, J. B., quoted, 19.
Magna Carta, and the Constitution of U.S., 7.
Member, the new, embarrassments of, in the House, 61 et seq.
Members, suppression of independence and ability amongst, in the House, by the Rules, 110.
Membership, of Senate, made up by promotions from House, 210; of Senate, biennially renewed in part, 228, 229.
Ministry, parliamentary debate centres around British, 95; disintegrate, in Congress, 102; parliamentary position of British, 95, 244; British, a single Standing Committee of Parliament, 117; necessity of public debate to British, 119; British, compared with French, 123, 124, 129; history of parliamentary responsibility of British, 286-288.
“Morning hours,” 73.
Nation, the, letter to, on federal financial system, quoted, 191; on status of Cabinet, quoted, 269.
National sovereignty, growth of sentiment of, 31, 32; sentiment of, makes advent and issue of the war inevitable, 32.
Newcastle, Duke of, 236.
Nominations, the Senate and, 235; popular interest attaching to action of Senate on, 236, 237; of Presidents by conventions, virtual character of, 245.
Northcote, Sir Stafford, 322
Orators, character of the ruling, of our race, 208 et seq.; natural leaders of a self-governing people, 209; Froude on political, 215; political, without authority or responsibility in U.S., 319 et seq.; political weight of, in England, 321-324.
Otis, James, 209.
Parties, vagueness of responsibility of, for legislation in U.S., 96-101; both, represented on Standing Committees, 99; in U.S., absence of responsible organization in, 187; in U.S., headless, conglomerate character of, 324; in Congress, discipline of, 326, 327; in Congress, kept together by caucus, 330.
Party, govt. by, practical necessity for, 97 et seq.; organization, outside Congress, 98; inside Congress, 99; choice of Speaker by, 107; govt. by, perfected in British system, 117 et seq.; diversity between Executive and Congress, 267; conditions of govt. by, 267, 268; relations of President and Cabinet, 269; insignificance of Cabinet, 270; leaders in England, weight and position of, 322.
Power, diffusion of, in Congress, 92, 206; irresponsible, 92, 93, 314; and accountability, 283, 284.
Presidency, tendency to raise governors of States to the, 253.
President, the, and Supreme Court, relations between, 35; independence and influence of, 41; declining prestige of office of, 43; belittled by growth of congressional power, 43; and Cabinet, division of labor between, 45, 46; veto power of, 52, 260; and Senate, no real consultation between, 232 et seq.; irresponsible dictation of Senate to, 238, 239; functional contrast of, with English Prime Minister, 249; conditions surrounding choice of a, by convention, 250, 251; character of usual functions of, 254; not all of the Executive, 257; relations of, to Cabinet, 258, 259; De Tocqueville on position of, 266, n.; party relations of, 269; party insignificance of, 270; and Congress, defective means of coöperation between, 270, 271.
Presidents, character and influence of the early, 41; decline of character of, along with crystallization of electoral system, 42; real method of electing, 243 et seq.
Press, the, political influence of, in U.S., 305, 306, 319-321; in England, subordinate to political leaders, 321.
Prime Minister, method of selecting a, in England and France, 248; and President, contrast between, 249; questions asked the, in House of Commons, 300.
“Private bill day,” 73.
Public life, conditions of, in U.S., 195 et seq.; in England, 214; attractivehess of leadership in, 214.
Public opinion, not instructed by congressional debate, 101; difficulties of, in understanding and controlling Congress, 186-189: not led in U. S., 187; distrust of Congress by, 188; confusion of, with regard to congressional policy, 280; instruction of, important duty of representative assembly, 297 et seq.; information of, by inquisitive public body, 300, 301; leaders of English, 322; paralysis of, in U.S., 331.
Reform Bill of 1832 in England, 220.
Reichstag, consent of, necessary to policy in Germany, 59.
Reports, of Standing Committees, time given to, 72; backed by neither party, 96; thoroughly considered in early Congresses, 106; of Committee on Appropriations, privileges of, 153, 154; of Conference Committees, extraordinary privilege of, 158; annual, of Treasury, referred to Committee of Ways and Means, 170, 171; of Committee on Appropriations preferred to reports of Committee of Ways and Means, 174.
Representative assemblies, duties and means of, in instructing public opinion, 298 et seq.; supremacy of, in every system of self-government, 311.
Representative government, government by advocacy, 208.
Representatives, House of, 58-192; position of Speaker in, 59, 103-108; led by chairmen of Standing Committees, 60; multiplicity of leaders in, 61; rules of, restrain individual activity, 63; introduction of bills in, 64; bills in, introduced on Mondays, 66; early course of bills in, 67, 68; daily course of business in, 73; press of time in business of, 74, 90; conditions of debate in, 75 et seq.; absence of instinct of debate in, 79; best discussion impossible in, 86; hall of, 86, 87; debate in, in former times, 89; compared with Roman assembly, 109; concentration of federal power in, 110; suspension of rules of, to pass bills, 111, 112; compared with British Commons, 116 et seq.; with English and French chambers, 129; disintegrate character of, 210; “latent unity” of, with Senate, 224.
Responsibility, of administrators, to representative chamber for inefficiency, 274, 276, 277; of ministers, Machiavelli on, 275; scattering of, by federal constitutional system, 281: with power, 283, 284; of Executive, and civil service reform, 285 et seq.; history of ministerial, in England, 286 et seq.
Resumption Act of 1875, 185.
Revenue, controlled by House Committee of Ways and Means and Senate Committee on Finance, 169; policy of Committee of Ways and Means and of English Chancellor of Exchequer, 171-175; subordinate to Supply in Congress, 174, 175.
Revolution, English, of 1688, character of Parliament succeeding the, 313.
Rivers and Harbors, Committee on, 165; prerogatives of Committee on, 167; Committee on, and “log-rolling,” 168.
Rockingham, Lord, 287.
Roman assembly and House of Representatives, 109.
Rosebery, Lord, on the Senate, 228.
Rules of House, restrict individual activity of members of House, 63; support privileges of Standing Committees, 66, 71, 74; complexity of, 73, 74; principle of, 74; readopted biennially, 104; repress independence and ability, 110; oligarchy of Committee on, 111; suspension of, to pass bills, 111, 112.
Senate, the, 193-241; overt character of contests of, with President, 48; efforts of, to control nominations, 49; usurpations of, and civil service reform, 49; semi-executive powers of, in regard to foreign policy, 49 et seq.; and treaty with Denmark, 50; and Alabama claims, 51; thoroughness of discussion in, 94; amendment of appropriation bills by, 155, 156; usual estimates of, 193, 194; character and composition of, 194, 195; conditions of public life, shaping character of, 195 et seq.; a select House of Representatives, 210; contrasts of, with the House, 211; organized like the House, 212; choice of Committees in, 212; absence of leadership in, 213 et seq.; character of debate in, 216 et seq.;equality of, with House of Representatives, 223; and House of Representatives, “latent unity” between, 224; not a class chamber, 225; limits democracy in Constitution, 226; dignity and remove from popular heat of, 227; a real check upon the House, 228; liability of, to biennial change in membership, 228, 229; “slow and steady” forms of, 230; share of, in control of executive departments, 231; and President, no real consultation between, 232 et seq.; and President, means of consultation between, 234; and nominations, 235 et seq.; “courtesy” of, 238; irresponsible dictation of; to President, 238.
Sherman, Roger, 268.
Silver Bill, the Bland, 185.
Smith, Robt., Secretary of Treasury, 162.
Smythe, nominated Minister to St. Petersburg by Pres. Grant, 235.
Speaker, of House of Representatives, appoints leaders of House, 60; prerogatives of, 103-108; appoints Standing Committees, 103; history of appointing power of, 104; power of appointing of, renewed with Rules, 105; chosen by party vote, 107; personal character of, 107; use of power by, in constituting and aiding Committees, 108; concentration of power in hands of, 110, 111; of House of Commons, functions and character of, 122.
“Star Route” trials, 178, n.
State and federal governments, balance between, See ‘Federal and state governments.’
States, the, disadvantages of direct taxation to, 133.
Sumner, Chas., Chairman Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 235.
Sumner, Prof. W. G., on task of legislator, 296.
Sunderland, Earl of, 314.
Supervision of elections by federal govt., 27.
Supply, Committee of, in House of Commons, 137-139; vital character of votes of, in House of Commons, 139; Committee of, in House of Representatives, 154; questions of, take precedence of questions of revenue in Congress, 174.
Swiss Constitution and bicameral system, 221.
Tariff of 1833, character of contest over, 198.
Taxation, sensitiveness of people concerning, 131; direct and indirect, 132, 133; Mr. Gladstone on direct and indirect, 134; direct, by States, indirect, by federal govt., 133.
Tocqueville, De, on position of President, 266, n.
Treasury, accessibility of heads of British, in the Commons, 146, 147; “Letter” from Secretary of, 149; annual reports of, referred to Committee of Ways and Means, 170; character of annual reports of, 170, 171; Secretary of, duties of, 263; non-political character of functions of Secretary of, 264.
Turgot, M., on bicameral system of U.S., 220.
Van Buren, Martin, 259.
Victorian Parliament, two chambers of, 223.
Virginia, protest of, against Alien and Sedition Laws, 21.
War, change wrought by the civil, in constitutional methods and in constitutional criticism, 5 et seq.; the civil, a struggle between nationality and principles of disintegration, 32; opened a new period of public life in U.S., 195.
Washington, antagonisms in first Cabinet of, 2; influence of the Executive under, 41, 246, 252, 259.
Ways and Means, debate of, 78; “Brahmins” of Committee of, 111; chairmen of, federal Chancellors of Exchequer, 134; preference of Committee of, for indirect taxation, 134; Committee of, in House of Commons, 139-144; weight of votes of Committee of, in Commons, 142; House Committee of, formerly controlled appropriations, 161; character of Committee of, 170; policy of Committee of, compared with policy of English Chancellor of Exchequer, 171-175; reports of, deferred to reports of Committee on Appropriations, 174, 183, 184.