CHAPTER XVI.
BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE'S SURRENDER—1865.
In the latter part of May, 1865, a steamer which had left New York two months before for San Francisco, by way of the Straits of Magellan, touched at Callao, Peru. Her passengers were anxious for news from home. Hurrying on shore, one of them found a man who had just arrived from New York by steamer from that port to Aspinwall, and the English mail steamer from Panama. "What has happened in the last sixty days, and how is the war getting on?" was the passenger's inquiry.
"Oh, nothing much," was the reply. "Richmond 's taken, Lee and Johnston's armies have surrendered, Lincoln has been assassinated, and Jeff. Davis is captured." It is not an overstatement to say that the listener was deprived of the power of speech for fully a minute, so great was his astonishment at this momentous intelligence.
The closing scenes of the rebellion were dramatically rapid in their movement, hardly less so than represented by the terse declaration quoted above. The battle that compelled the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond was fought on the first day of April, the evacuation took place on the 2d and 3d, Lee surrendered his army on the 9th, President Lincoln was assassinated on the 15th, Johnston's army surrendered on the 26th, General Dick Taylor's army surrendered May 4th, President Davis was captured on the 11th, on the 22d May a proclamation of President Johnson opened the Southern ports to commerce as of old, and on the 29th a proclamation of general amnesty was issued,—and all this within two short months.
The battle of Five Forks may be regarded as the decisive battle that ended the war, as its result compelled the retreat, and led to the capture of Lee and his gallant army, that had so long defended Virginia against the Northern forces. For four years Lee had prevented the capture of Richmond; for four years he had repeatedly driven back the Union army whenever it sought to advance, and on two occasions he had crossed the Potomac and endeavored to carry the war into the Northern States. Since his defeat at Gettysburg many a battle had been fought and many a noble life expended in the effort to capture or defend the capital of the Confederacy. But the end was approaching.
The Northern press and public clamored for the capture of Richmond, and down to near the close of the war that rebellious city was the goal which the commanders of the Army of the Potomac struggled to reach. Seven in all had made the attempt, McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and last of all Grant. After the fall of Vicksburg, he had been summoned to Washington, and placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, under fewer restrictions than had been given to the commanders who preceded him. All his predecessors had been overruled and hampered in their movements by orders from Washington; Grant declined the command unless he could have it without interference, and, doubtless with great reluctance, his demand was conceded by the Washington authorities.
Between Gettysburg and Five Forks great progress had been made towards the suppression of the rebellion. Savannah, Wilmington, and Charleston successively fell into Union hands, Mobile was securely blockaded, and the Confederates were without a port of consequence along their entire coast line of ocean and gulf. After the opening of the Mississippi by the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the army which had accomplished that great task was drawn to the eastward, and marched to the sea through Tennessee and Georgia, gaining victories at Chicamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and other points. Hood's Confederate army was practically annihilated by Thomas at Nashville, and the armies of Hardee, Bragg, and Beauregard had been gradually assembled under Joe Johnston, and formed a veteran force which was not to be lightly considered.
And now, early in 1865, while the Northern press and public clamored as loudly as ever for the capture of Richmond, that event was the very thing which General Grant did not desire. For the capture of Richmond meant the retirement of Lee's army to a junction with Johnston, and the combination of those armies under two such wily commanders would be a serious danger to the Union "Army of the Mississippi," which, having made its march to the sea, was now advancing northward, through the Carolinas, to attack Johnston. That it could defeat him single-handed there was no reasonable doubt, but with Lee's army added to Johnston's, there was great danger of a serious reverse to the Union arms. Consequently Grant's great desire was to keep Lee in Richmond until the Union army could be so disposed that escape would be impossible.
Since the early days of March, Lee had been planning to retire from Richmond and join his army with that of Johnston, and information of this design had been brought to General Grant. Lee and Johnston had made their preliminary arrangements, and the route by which the army would retreat was already laid out. The Richmond papers demanded that the city should be held at all hazards, and the Confederate government was unwilling that the fact that a retirement had been thought of should be known. The most emphatic denials were given to the rumor when it first went abroad, and to show the intention of holding on to the place new fortifications were constructed at several points. But Grant was not to be deceived, and he pushed his preparations for taking the Confederate army in a trap.
With 10,000 cavalry Sheridan moved like a whirlwind through the Shenandoah Valley and made a wide sweep to the left of the Army of the Potomac, meeting little opposition, and demonstrating that all troops that could possibly be withdrawn from isolated points had been sent to Richmond. Wilson, with 13,000 men in his command, swept through Alabama and Georgia; and about the same time Stoneman advanced from Knoxville, Tennessee, with a strong column of cavalry, with which he devastated Western North Carolina. These various raids demonstrated that the Confederacy was but a shell whose kernel had been exhausted. All men capable of bearing arms had gone to the war, and there was no remaining material for the formation of new armies.
Though much larger on paper, Lee's army was not over 50,000 strong in effectives, while that of Johnston could not muster more than 30,000. Against Lee, Grant could bring a force of double the number, and while the former planned to escape and join Johnston, with whom he hoped to deliver a crushing blow to the Army of the Mississippi before Grant could overtake him, the latter was quietly studying to prevent the escape. Lee's plan was to retire by the Cox road, south of the Appomattox, and in order to cover his movement he made on the 25th of March an attack on Fort Steadman, on the Union right. Grant was in position in front of Petersburg, so that his army extended nearly to, but did not cover, the Cox road. Lee thought that the troops near the Cox road would be drawn away to support the attack on Fort Steadman. The attack was made by two divisions of Gordon's corps, and the fort was carried in fine style. But the attack was 
not supported, and the result was the Confederates were compelled to retire after heavy losses in killed and wounded, and nearly 2,000 prisoners.
The Union forces were not withdrawn from the Cox road as Lee had expected, and consequently he could not carry out his plan of escaping by that route. Realizing that Lee must have withdrawn men from other parts of his lines in order to attack Fort Steadman, Gen. Meade ordered an advance of the 6th and 2d corps, who were in position to the left of Fort Steadman. He found what he had expected, and the Union troops took possession of the Confederate picket line and permanently held it. Thus Lee's movement, which was intended to cut the Union army in two by the occupation of Fort Steadman and the works behind it, and thus afford him an opportunity to escape, was not only a failure, but resulted in his loss of important points.
This affair did not in the least interfere with Grant's plans, which were for a general movement on the 29th March. He proposed to swing a portion of his army around "by the left," and enable it to turn completely the Confederate right. By the success of this movement Lee would be effectually cut off from escape to the southward.
Three divisions of the Army of the James, which had long been lying in front of Richmond, were brought around to the left of the Union lines facing Petersburg. As soon as they were in position the 5th corps (Warren's) and the 2d corps (Humphreys') were ordered to the southwestward till they had crossed Hatcher's Run; then they faced northward and advanced till they could feel the Confederate right. On the extreme left was Sheridan with 10,000 cavalry, acting under orders direct from General Grant. Warren's corps had a slight encounter with the enemy, in which about 400 men were killed and wounded on the Union side; the Confederates lost about the same in casualties, with the addition of 100 prisoners.
During the night and all the next day (30th), rain fell heavily and the ground became unfit for the execution of movements of any consequence. Warren remained in the position he had taken on the 29th in front of the Confederate intrenchments; Humphreys and Sheridan moved up a little so as to bring them well towards the intrenchments, but did not endeavor to bring on a battle. Sheridan brought his cavalry in front of Five Forks, where he found the Confederates strongly posted, and after surveying the ground carefully he rode back to Dinwiddie Court-House where Grant was waiting to see him. Grant ordered Warren to support Sheridan, and placed him under the latter's command.
The ground was still so soaked on the next morning that Grant proposed to do nothing, but Lee was not so inclined. Leaving Longstreet with 8,000 men to hold the works in front of Richmond, he marched the rest of his infantry to the support of his right, which was so seriously threatened by Sheridan and the 5th and 2d corps. Sheridan had completely isolated the Confederate cavalry, which had been posted on Stony Creek, and it was compelled to make a long detour to enable it to join the rest of Lee's forces.
Unaware of Lee's intention to attack, Warren had sent skirmishers on his left to seize the White Oak road which was beyond the Confederate right, and ordered Ayres to send one brigade to support the movement. About half-past ten o'clock in the forenoon, Lee suddenly appeared on the flank and rear of Ayres' division, and struck so vigorously that the whole column was thrown back in confusion. The confusion was conveyed to Crawford's division, which also broke and retired in disorder, and for a little while it looked as though Lee was having decidedly the best of it.
Griffin's division stopped the Confederate advance, enabling Ayres and Crawford to rally behind it. This being done, Warren advanced, supported by Humphreys, and the Confederates were soon in retreat, having lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Confederates retired to their intrenchments, which they defended so desperately that several attempts failed to dislodge them. While this was going on, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddle C.-H. to Five Forks, which he carried while Lee's infantry was engaged with Warren.
But he was not allowed to stay there long, as Lee turned from the fight with Warren as soon as the attack had failed, and sent two divisions along the White Oak road to Five Forks, where they encountered Devin's division and Davies' brigade of cavalry, whom they drove out in disorder towards Dinwiddle C.-H. They followed in pursuit until they presented their flank and rear to Sheridan's main body, from which they had separated Devin. Sheridan charged with two brigades, and fighting continued till dark, after which the Confederates withdrew, Lee rightly concluding that his two divisions ran great risk of being taken in flank and rear by Warren, while engaging Sheridan.
There was some alarm at head-quarters when it was learned that the Confederates had driven Sheridan back from Five Forks to Dinwiddle C.-H., and had a good chance of routing him; Sheridan probably was not easy in his mind until he found about midnight that the enemy was retiring. Then he felt perfectly secure, and made his plans for advancing on the morrow.
Sheridan, supported by Ayres, moved at daybreak April 1st, and was joined about 7 a.m. by Warren, with his two other divisions. By 2 p.m. he had fought his way to Five Forks, and driven in the enemy with the aid of his cavalry alone, leaving Warren's corps in the rear waiting for orders. When the Confederates were fairly within their intrenchments at Five Forks, Sheridan ordered Merritt's cavalry division to turn their right, Sheridan pressing in front, and sending Warren's corps on his (Sheridan's) right, along the White Oak road, so as to come in on the enemy's flank. Then by a left-wheel movement Warren was to fall back upon that flank in full force, McKenzie, with the cavalry from the army of the James, covering Warren's right so that Lee could not draw reinforcements from Richmond.
Owing to the nature of the ground Warren could not move rapidly, thereby incurring the censure of Sheridan. It was 4 p.m. before the troops were in position for the charge, and when the order was given the movement was gallantly executed. Ayres' division was broken at one time by the severity of the enemy's fire, and there was great danger that it would be forced to fall back, but by a prompt order Sheridan sent Griffin's command to its relief, and the disorder was only momentary.
The turning movement was successful, the Confederates being taken in front and flank almost simultaneously. Their position was important, and they fought desperately, but superior numbers forced them back, as they were only two divisions, Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's. Ayres' division carried their flank intrenchments and captured about one thousand prisoners, while Griffin struck them in the rear and took as many more. Meantime Crawford pushed ahead to the Ford road, which ran northward from the Confederate centre, and cut off their retreat towards the rest of their army. Crawford captured four guns and several hundred prisoners, and at the same time the cavalry, pressing on the other flank of the Confederates, turned their left and put all that remained of the enemy to flight. The cavalry pursued until darkness made it impossible to follow farther. The Union loss in the day's fighting was about 1,000, while that of the Confederates amounted to 5,000 prisoners, not counting killed and wounded, which were estimated equal to those of the Union forces.
Sheridan sent Griffin to move eastward with two divisions of infantry to Gravelly Church, and open communication with the rest of the army. Another division went to support McKenzie's cavalry, which had advanced on the Ford road up to Hatcher's Run. At 10 p.m. a general cannonade was begun along the whole line by order of General Grant, and continued through the night.
At daybreak on the 2d April there was a general assault along the Confederate line by the 2d, 6th, 9th, 24th, and 25th corps. The fire of the enemy was destructive and retarded the advance at several points, but could not stop it. The 6th corps carried the works in its front, and one division (Seymour's), broke through to the South-Side railway and began to tear it up. The 24th corps was also successful, and so were the 2d and 9th. The 9th had probably the hardest fighting of the day, in which it captured Fort Mahone, on the Jerusalem plank road; the enemy tried to retake it, and was nearly successful, when the 6th corps came to the aid of the 9th, and the dearly obtained position was saved. A Confederate brigade (Harris'), which defended one of the forts, was 250 strong at the beginning of the battle, and lost 220 men before it was over.
Along nearly the whole line the outer defences were entirely in the hands of the assailants, and though Lee still held the city of Petersburg he saw that his position was no longer tenable. Accordingly, at 10.30 a.m. he telegraphed as follows to President Davis:
My lines are broken in three places. Richmond must be evacuated this evening.
Mr. Davis was in church when this dispatch was handed to him. He rose and walked out quietly, and the service went on as though nothing had happened. But there was a deathly silence over the whole congregation, and every one felt that something awful was about to happen. After the services were over the news spread rapidly, and before noon everybody who cared to know was aware that Richmond was about to be occupied by the enemy.
There was great excitement in the city all through the afternoon, many persons desiring to go with the Confederate government and follow its fortunes. Wagons and carriages rose to an enormous price, as much as $100 in gold or Union currency being offered for a conveyance for a single day. The streets were filled with a mass of fugitives carrying trunks, boxes, and all sorts of receptacles. As a precautionary measure the City Council ordered the destruction of all intoxicating liquors in Richmond, and hundreds of barrels were rolled out and their contents poured into the gutters. General Ewing ordered the burning of the four principal tobacco warehouses in spite of the protests of the Mayor and Council, who feared that the whole business part of the city would be destroyed. As was expected, the fire caused great destruction, and the first work of the Union troops that entered Richmond was to extinguish the flames. The Confederate gun-boats were blown up and burned, and all the steamers at the dock were burned with the exception of a single flag-of-truce boat.
The government wagons removed as much as possible from the commissary depot, and then the place was thrown open to the public to help themselves. Bacon, flour, etc., by the ton were thus distributed to many who had long stood in sore need of it. As usually happens in such cases, the strong overpowered the weak, and it is said that several persons were trampled to death in the rush that followed the opening of the doors.
During the night of the 2d the evacuation went on, and about 3 a.m. a negro came from Richmond into the Union lines and announced that the Confederates had gone. General Weitzel rode in about 6 a.m. Threading his way carefully over the ground, which was thickly planted with torpedoes, and accompanied by his staff, he reached the centre of the city in advance of his troops, and hoisted the American flag over the capitol. The Confederate works were found to be of great strength, and those who saw them did not wonder that the Union army had so long been kept at bay, when they remembered that the defences were manned by Lee's tried and trusty veterans.
The evacuation of Petersburg was simultaneous with that of Richmond, and was conducted so quietly that the Union pickets, only a few yards away, were unaware of it until daylight showed that the Confederates had gone. The Confederates had a start of several miles, marching out along the Danville Railway, and the direct road to Lynchburg, by which Lee still hoped to effect a junction with Johnston, and again take the offensive either against Grant or the Army of the Mississippi. Unfortunately for him, he was compelled to take the north side of the Appomattox, as the forces of Grant were mainly on the south side of that river, and completely barred his retreat in that direction.
With his army reduced to less than 35,000 men, Lee pushed as rapidly as possible to Amelia C.-H., where he had ordered supplies sent from Danville. By a mistake in the execution of the order, the train laden with these supplies had been sent to Richmond, and consequently the weary and famished soldiers were compelled to forage on the already exhausted country and find what food they could. Here he rested on the 4th and 5th April and then prepared to advance, still hoping to reach Lynchburg before the enemy could interfere with him. But his plans were rudely frustrated.
By following directly after Lee and engaging him in battle, Grant would still leave the Confederate general an open way to Lynchburg in case of defeat. His object was not to defeat, but to capture Lee with his whole army, and with this object in view he sent Sheridan with the cavalry and the 5th corps to move as rapidly as possible by roads considerably south of the one through Amelia C.-H., and thus get in front of Lee and intersect his movements. Sheridan executed the order with the dash for which he was famous; he struck the line of the Richmond and Danville Railway at Jetersville, where he planted himself, prepared to resist the whole of Lee's forces until Grant and Meade could come up and deliver a crushing blow in the rear. Late in the afternoon of the 5th, Meade arrived with the 2d and 6th corps, while Lee was still at Amelia C.-H., which he left on the night of the 5th.
Lee marched around the position of Meade and Sheridan at Jetersville, aiming for Farmville, where he hoped to recross the Appomattox and escape. But General Davies, with his cavalry brigade, had advanced to the road and struck Lee's train in advance of his infantry, destroying 180 wagons and capturing 5 guns and many prisoners. Two other cavalry brigades came to the relief of Davies, who was hard pressed by the enemy. They fell back to Jetersville, whence they continued the pursuit the next day (6th), striking the enemy's line at Sailor's Creek, where a brilliant engagement was fought; 400 wagons were destroyed, and 16 guns and a considerable number of prisoners were taken. The Confederate line was pierced; General Ewell's division, 6,000 strong, being cut off from the rest and compelled to surrender, though it fought as long as there was any chance of escape.
On the evening of the 6th, Lee crossed the Appomattox at Farmville, his rear being so closely pressed that he was unable to destroy the bridge of the wagon road, though he succeeded in burning the railway bridge. The rear-guard retired just as General Barlow's division arrived, and so rapid was the retreat that the Confederates abandoned 18 guns and many wagons. The pursuit was kept up through the 7th and 8th with no engagement of consequence. The 2d and 6th corps under Meade followed directly in the trail of Lee and his fugitive companions, while Sheridan's cavalry pushed on to head off Lee, followed by Ord's and Griffin's infantry divisions, who could not, of course, keep pace with the horses. As it was now impossible for Lee to make for Danville, Sheridan took a position to head him off from Lynchburg, which was now his only place of refuge. Sheridan learned that four trains laden with supplies for Lee's starving soldiers had been sent from Lynchburg and were at Prospect Station, five miles from Appomattox C.-H. Making a forced march of twenty-eight miles, he captured these trains, and then sent Custer's division forward, which soon found itself in front of Lee's advance.
Custer fought until darkness put an end to the combat, driving the advance back on the main body of the army, and capturing 25 guns, a hospital train, and a large number of wagons, and making many prisoners. Sheridan brought up the rest of the cavalry, and planted it right in front of Lee's army, and sent couriers to Grant, Griffin, and Ord, saying that the capture of Lee's whole army was now certain. Griffin and Ord with their corps and one division of the 25th corps made a forced march during the night and reached Appomattox at daylight on the 9th.
And now came one of the most dramatic incidents of the war—an incident which dwarfs to littleness the most magnificent spectacle ever presented on the theatrical stage.
On the morning of that memorable 9th of April, Lee's army of ragged, starving, wearied soldiers, was drawn up in battle array in front of Sheridan's cavalry. Their ranks had been terribly reduced by the events of the past ten days, and out of the 50,000 that held the trenches of Petersburg and Richmond on the 28th March, little more than 10,000 remained actually effective for battle. But 
campaign map—battle of five forks.
though few in number, worn, weary, and suffering from the pangs of hunger, they were ready to meet their adversaries and prepared without flinching to charge upon Sheridan's troopers. It was the last charge of the Army of Northern Virginia.
By Sheridan's order the cavalry in line of battle dismounted and gave way gradually, though all the while showing a steady front, in order to give time for the wearied infantry of Ord's and Griffin's corps to take up their position. When this had been accomplished the cavalry remounted and moved rapidly to the right, so as to come in upon the Confederate left for a flanking charge. As the cavalry thus drew away from its former position, the Confederate commander saw to his astonishment the long and solid lines of the Union infantry, lines of blue tipped with the steel of flashing bayonets, and stippled at intervals with the muzzles of cannon, with the artillery-men in their places ready for their death-dealing work.
The hopelessness of the charge was apparent to every Confederate officer who saw that mass of infantry waiting for the assault. The advance was stopped and in a few minutes a white flag was displayed in front of General Custer, who was leading Sheridan's cavalry column, and preparing for a charge upon the Confederate left. With the white flag came the information that the Confederates were ready to surrender. General Sheridan immediately rode over towards the Confederate lines, where he was met by General Gordon, who asked that hostilities be suspended. He added that Generals Grant and Lee were already negotiating for a capitulation, and said he had no doubt that the terms would be speedily arranged.
The capitulation had been discussed among the Confederate officers on the night of the 6th around a camp-fire. General Lee was not present, but the opinion of his officers was conveyed to him by General Pendleton. The decision was unanimous that a surrender was inevitable, as the army had been terribly reduced in numbers, and the men who remained were so weakened by famine that large numbers of them had thrown away their guns, being too feeble to carry them. Even if they could escape from their pursuers they could only do so by abandoning all their artillery and heavy munitions and they had already lost a large part of their wagon train.
On the 7th General Grant took the initiative and thus saved General Lee the mortification of proposing a surrender. He wrote a letter couched in the following language:
General:—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so; and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.
Gen. R. E. Lee.
General Lee received the letter late in the afternoon, and replied briefly, asking the terms of surrender, though not admitting the hopelessness of the further struggle. Grant replied on the 8th to the effect that the only terms he could accept were unconditional surrender, the men and officers surrendered being disqualified from taking up arms until properly exchanged. Lee responded on the same evening, saying he did not think the emergency had arisen for the surrender of the army, that he did not intend to propose it, but only wished to know the terms that would be demanded. He declined meeting General Grant for the purpose of negotiating a surrender, but expressed a wish to meet him with a view to the restoration of peace.
On the morning of the 9th General Grant wrote again to General Lee to the effect that he had no authority to treat for peace and the proposed meeting could therefore do no good. He added that the terms on which peace could be obtained were well understood, that the South must lay down its arms, and by so doing would save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.
Immediately after the stoppage of the last charge of the Army of Northern Virginia in the manner previously described, General Grant rode to Sheridan's head-quarters, and while on his way there received a note from General Lee, asking for an interview with reference to the surrender of the army. Hostilities had been suspended, and the interview of the two commanders took place in half an hour after the receipt of the note. It was held at the house of Mr. W. McLean, near the court-house of Appomattox, and was over in a short time, as the business was easily arranged. Officers and men were paroled not to take up arms again until properly exchanged, all public property, arms, and artillery to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed to receive them. The officers were allowed to retain their side arms, horses, and personal baggage, and though not mentioned in the official documents, General Grant afterwards permitted the cavalry soldiers to retain their horses, remarking as a reason for his leniency, that they would "be useful in putting in a crop." Twenty-seven thousand men were said to have been included in Lee's capitulation but not more than 10,000 were actually in line of battle with their arms on the morning of the 9th April.
The victory of Five Forks was the prelude to the surrender at Appomattox, and that surrender was practically the end of the war. One after another the remaining armies of the Confederates submitted to the fortune of war and laid down their arms, and in every instance the terms accorded were almost identical with those arranged between Grant and Lee. No great battle was fought after Lee's surrender, and of the few collisions that occurred before the wings of peace were outstretched over the whole country, there were none of consequence. The last battle of the war was fought in Texas, May 13th, resulting in a loss of about thirty killed and wounded on the Union side, some forty or fifty taken prisoners, and four or five wounded on the Confederate side.
The number of men paroled in the Confederate armies, at the close of the war, was 174,223, and at the same time 98,802 Confederate prisoners of war were held in Northern prisons or depots. The aggregate Union force on the muster rolls of the Union armies on March 1, 1865, was 965,591, and on the first of May the number exceeded 1,000,000. On that date all enlistments were suspended, and shortly afterwards the work of disbanding the army began. By the end of November more than 800,000 men had been mustered out of the service and returned to the occupations of civil life. The sudden termination of the war was unexpected by the great mass of the public on both sides, though to the thoughtful leaders, who knew the conditions against which they were contending, the result was apparent months and months before.
