Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations/Appendix 2

by D. P. Heatley

Layout 2

 

APPENDIX II

 

I

Effect of telegraphic communications upon the responsibility of diplomatic missions:

(1) Evidence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe:

'Has it been your experience with regard to the introduction of much more rapid locomotion, and the use of telegrams, that an increase, or a diminution, or that no difference has been made in the responsibility and the difficulties of the position of ambassador?—That, I conceive, is as the case may be.

'You are aware that arguments have been used of this kind that, with the present facilities of communication, the necessity for diplomatic servants of a high character is diminished; do you agree with that?—By no means; telegraphic communications, whatever may happen hereafter, have not yet operated to the exclusion of Despatches. They are subject, to all appearance, by their very nature, to the risk of conveying erroneous information, or premature instructions, equally involving much responsibility, and sometimes requiring the exercise of a superior judgment. They are, moreover, liable to frequent mistakes in the transmission. Time and practice will probably bring them to greater perfection. Meanwhile, the invention of the electric telegraph does not appear to have superseded the usefulness either of Despatches or of the Ministers who write them.

'I take it that in former times it was usual that the Despatch was written in such terms in the Foreign Office as left very little discretion to the ambassador in his mode of communication, for the very terms were used which he ought to use himself in communicating with foreign Governments, whereas if the instructions are received only by telegram, a great deal must be left to the discretion and the tact of the diplomatist?—No doubt.

'In that way would not telegrams rather require superior agents to interpret and deal with them than inferior ones?—When an instruction for immediate execution is transmitted to a distant representative abroad, it is more likely, I should think, to be couched in peremptory terms than when prepared in the form of a Despatch. A greater responsibility must, therefore, attach to any departure, however necessary, from the strict apparent intention, and an agent of inferior weight and position might well shrink from the personal hazard of incurring it.'—Report from the Select Committee on the Diplomatic Service, 1861, p. 168.

(2) Evidence of Sir A. Buchanan:

'Has the adoption of telegraphic communications much changed the nature of the relations between the Secretary of State and the foreign missions?—It reduces, to a great degree, the responsibility of the minister, for he can now ask for instructions instead of doing a thing upon his own responsibility; but at the same time it very often happens that he cannot get an answer in time, and that the instructions arrive after he has been obliged to act.

'Has the general effect of these telegraphic communications been to weaken the sense of responsibility on the part of the minister?—I do not think so.

'Do you think that the responsibility of these and other means of communication at all affects the question of the necessity of keeping up diplomatic establishments?—I think not; inasmuch as you will still require some organ on the spot to communicate verbally with the Foreign Minister.

'Do you think that, in some degree, it makes the presence of that organ, and the importance of that organ, less necessary?—I do not think so. One great use of a minister is to prevent the necessity of written communications, and to be able to communicate with foreign governments verbally.

········

'In the transaction of large and complicated affairs, is not the position of a minister made almost more difficult than it was before?—I think not; I think that upon the whole one gains a great deal by telegrams, though they sometimes cause embarrassment; telegraphic instructions are very concise, and it may be difficult to understand them exactly; on other occasions, a minister asks for instructions, and he is obliged to act before they arrive; but, upon the whole, I think telegrams are useful.'—Ibid., 129–30.

(3) Evidence of Lord John Russell (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs):

'With respect to the effect of telegraphs, do you consider that they have diminished the necessity for diplomatic agency?—No; of course, one has to think of these matters as there has been a great change; but they rather seem to me to increase the necessity for diplomatic agency. Formerly, a Minister, such a man as Mr. Canning, considered all the contingencies of a case, and all the arguments that might be used; and he wrote a long despatch, explaining clearly all those matters, which formed an instruction to the Minister, so that the Minister was obliged to go and speak to a foreign minister; he had his brief in his hand; but now he asks a question, or instructions, in a few words; he is obliged to supply, therefore, a great deal more than a Minister abroad formerly was obliged to supply.'—Ibid., 308.

 

2

The Publication of Dispatches: 'Secret Diplomacy':

(1) Evidence of Lord Wodehouse (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, formerly Minister, for two years, at St. Petersburg):

'I believe that in the papers which have been laid before the House, containing the opinions of different diplomatists abroad, there are one or two who refer to the publication of despatches in this country indiscriminately as rendering it difficult for them to obtain information for fear of the persons on the Continent communicating it becoming compromised; have you had any experience to that effect?—There is certainly some reluctance, on the part of foreign diplomatists, from their knowledge that what they communicate may be published in a Blue Book, but I do not see any mode of obviating this inconvenience. You must publish for the use of Parliament and of the country information on foreign affairs.'—Ibid., 86–7.

(2) Evidence of the Earl of Clarendon:

'A great deal has been said about what is called "public" diplomacy, in contradistinction to "secret" diplomacy; do you think it is possible that the transactions between the Government of this country and foreign Governments could be carried on by public despatches?—If by public despatches is meant only those despatches which are in their entirety laid before Parliament, I should say that it would be difficult to carry them on, because I think that there must always be a certain discretion left to the Secretary of State as to what should be laid before Parliament, but that is the only difficulty I see in it; I am perfectly certain there is always laid before Parliament a very fair anid complete view of the transactions between this country and any other to which those papers may relate. I know that foreign Governments rather complain of our Blue Books, and to a certain extent they may curtail some of the communications that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be extremely sorry to see our system of publication of diplomatic papers in any way curtailed, or different from what it is; of course, there must always be care taken not to compromise individuals for the information they have given, but I believe it is an immense advantage to this country that our despatches and diplomatic transactions should be known, because if they have the approbation of Parliament and of the country, the Government then has the whole weight of public opinion in its favour, and it is that which gives such strength to our policy and to our opinions in foreign countries.

'What I wish to ask you is, whether despatches could be ublished from day to day as negotiations are going on?—I think that that would be impossible; and in support of that opinion, I may state that at the first meeting of the Congress of Paris, the Plenipotentiaries were all asked not to make known, except to their respective Governments, that which passed there every day, because if it appeared in newspapers, or became published in any form, so many people would then take part in the negotiations that we should never come to an end; and that might be called secret diplomacy, because certainly the public were not admitted to the discussions of men who held a great variety of opinions, and had very different interests to conciliate; and I think that the admission of the public then would have prevented any final settlement. But there was nothing that passed at the Congress that was not recorded in protocols at the time, and subsequently laid before Parliament.

'… I believe that there are, besides the ordinary despatches which pass between the Secretary of State and Ministers abroad, other despatches upon important subjects, marked "Secret and Confidential"?—Yes.

'And these are independent of that private correspondence to which you have referred?—Yes, entirely, and remain in the office.

'Is it your opinion that, in case of information being required by Parliament as to the policy which in any particular case is pursued by the Government, that the publication of the dispatches in the usual manner does give sufficiently satisfactory information to the public as to what is going on?—No doubt of it. I think from all I have known of Blue Books, with the publication of which I have been concerned, and others which I have read, that they give a complete and honest view of the transactions to which they refer.

'Are despatches marked "secret and confidential" generally not intended to be published?—No; not those that are received at the Foreign Office.

'Is not that security enough for a foreign Government, and a reason why they should not be unwilling to communicate information, when it is said that they are "secret and confidential"?—Yes, certainly it would be security enough: but then there are other matters sent home in despatches which are not marked "secret and confidential", which they nevertheless dislike the publication of.

'But the fact of "secret and confidential" being marked upon a despatch does not positively preclude the Government from giving it publicity?—Certainly not.'—Ibid., 110–11, 113.

(3) Evidence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe:

'With regard to communications between the Foreign Minister and the head of a mission, do you think that any advantage has resulted from the largely increased habit of writing private letters?—The practice of private correspondence, I think, is one upon which it would hardly answer any good purer to lay restriction. Upon the whole, I think that more advantage results from the use of private correspondence than the contrary; but the practice may be carried too far.

'In a certain degree, must not a very continual private correspondence detract something from the influence of the public documentary correspondence?—Not, if it be carried on in the right spirit. I conceive that the use of private correspondence is to afford a clearer view of the scope and intent of the official instruction, and to convey suggestions, or matters of information, without being committed to the formalities of the official correspondence, and to the publicity which frequently attends it; but anything which has the effect of contradicting in private what is made matter of instruction in the public correspondence, or anything that produces an action in public affairs, of which there is no trace in the public correspondence, is open to objection, as it is liable to abuse.

'Have you found yourself annoyed or restricted in your correspondence with the Secretary of State by the circumstance of most of the important despatches being from time to time laid before Parliament?—I do not remember at this moment to have experienced any annoyance from it myself; but there are, doubtless, occasions where the public interests might be compromised by indiscriminate publication. There have been cases where I cud have wished a Despatch to be published, and others where I should have deprecated its publication. It would be difficult to lay down any precise rule for such matters.

'Have you ever had cause to complain of communications, which you regarded as of a private nature, having been laid before Parliament?—No; I do not remember any instance respecting myself; but I must say that I hold it to be a most unfair thing, and one of which I should have thought m yself entitled to complain, if any letter of mine marked "private", and written in the usual form of private personal correspondence, had been laid before the public without my express consent. I have always understood that private letters of this kind are as correspondence between individuals, although relating to public subjects.

'When you have headed a Despatch "Private and Confidential", have you thereby intended that that Despatch should not go beyond the Secretary of State himself?—Letters marked "Private and Confidential", written in regular form on large paper, are usually considered as part of the public correspondence, subject, as to publicity, to the discretion of the Secretary of State.

'You draw, then, a clear distinction between Despatches you must consider of a reserved character, and the private correspondence between individuals?—Decidedly; it was to the latter class of private correspondence that my remarks were addressed; but I submit that the public in fairness has nothing to do with them. The Foreign Office might be moved by Parliament to put an end to such correspondence; but that is a different point; as long as there is no intervention of the kind, I consider the correspondence in question as being between two individuals, and, in honour, not to be communicated beyond the writer's intention.'—Ibid., 167–8.

(4) Evidence of Lord Cowley:

'You have held the post of Ambassador at Paris under several different English Ministers of different complexions, and you have carried on, I believe, a great deal of your business by private correspondence with all of them?—A great deal.

'Have you found any difficulties arise from a change of Ministry, in consequence of losing the thread of the private correspondence?—No, certainly not.

'Are you prepared to state that the mode of communication by private correspondence is not contrary to or inconsistent with the public despatches?—Certainly it is not, and it would be impossible to carry on the business between Paris and London without a great deal of private correspondence.

'I believe that it disappears from the office with the Minister?—Yes.

'But it is so managed, that what is important is embodied in a public dispatch.—Always.

'Therefore, the objection to what is called secret diplomacy you do not think holds good?—There is no secret diplomacy, properly so called.

'As to the publication of despatches, have you ever found yourself inconvenienced by the publication of your despatches?—No, I cannot say that | have.

'Do you think that it creates any difficulty as to obtaining information?—Yes; perhaps not so much in Paris, but in Germany, I think, that it must constantly interfere with our obtaining information, and with that confidence which a foreign minister would be ready to repose in an English diplomatist if he was certain that it would not be made use of publicly.

'Is there any difference made as to publishing your despatches if you state them to be confidential, or should you consider yourself ill-used if they were published in such a case?—No, everything in the form of a despatch I consider to be open to publication.'—Ibid., 232–3.

(5) Evidence of Lord John Russell (Foreign Office):

'Questions have been raised here with reference to the conduct of business by private correspondence; I presume you find that necessary as your predecessors did?—Yes, I do.

'Do you, however, agree with them in stating that there is no private correspondence carried on, of which there is not a sufficient record left in despatches in the office?—If a matter comes to be a subject of public argument, there is sure to be some record of it in the office; but, of course, there are things, I should say a number of things, upon which there is some hint or suggestion thrown out either abroad or here, and the suggéstion comes to nothing, and then it does not lead to public despatches.

'But if you apply the observation to what has been termed out of doors secret diplomacy, do you agree with your predecessors in denying that there is any such carried on?—There is none such carried on; anything that is agreed upon is a matter of public despatch.

'And so is put on record in the office?—Yes.'—Ibid., 307–8.

 

3

The Marquess Wellesley on the Spanish Supreme Central Junta, 1809:^[1]

'The constitution of the Supreme Spanish Junta is not founded on any well-understood system of union among the provinces, and still less on any just or wise distribution of the elements or powers of government; the confederacy of the provinces still exists; the executive power is weakened and dispersed in the hands of an Assembly too numerous for unity of council or promptitude of action, and too contracted for the purpose of representing the body of the Spanish Nation. The Supreme Central Junta is neither an adequate representative of the Crown, nor of the aristocracy, nor of the people; nor does it comprize any useful quality either of an executive council or of a deliberative assembly, while it combines many defects which tend to disturb both deliberation and action.

'Whether this Government, so ill-informed, be deficient in sincerity to the cause of Spain and of the Allies, is certainly questionable: whatever jealousy exists against the British Government or the Allies, is principally to be found in this body, its officers, or adherents; in the people no such unworthy sentiment can be traced. But, omitting all questions respecting the disposition of the Junta, it is evident that it does not possess any spirit of energy or activity, any degree of authority or strength; that it is unsupported by popular attachment or goodwill, while its strange and anomalous constitution unites the contradictory inconveniences of every known form of government, without possessing the advantage of any.

'It is not an instrument of sufficient power to accomplish the purposes for which it was formed; nor can it ever acquire sufficient force or influence to bring into action the resources of the country and the spirit of the people with that degree of vigour and alacrity which might give effect to foreign alliances, and might repel a powerful Invader.

'This is the true cause at least of the continuance of that state of weakness, confusion, and disorder, of which the British Army has recently experienced the consequences in the in administration of Spain, and especially of her military affairs,

'… The original powers delegated to the Junta have not been clearly defined, either with relation to time or authority.'—Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. George Canning: Seville, 15th September 1809.—Papers relating to Spain and Portugal, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 19th March 1810, p. 87.

Compare: … 'Spain, where the disposition to rely upon every thing rather than its own exertions is unfortunately so strongly marked in all the proceedings of the Supreme Junta.'

Canning to Wellesley: Foreign Office, 12th August 1809.—House of Commons Papers, 24th May 1810, p. 27.

See also Despatches and Correspondence of the Marquess of Wellesley during his Lordship’s Mission to Spain as Ambassador Extraordinary to the Supreme Junta in 1809, ed. by Martin (1838), pp. 119–35, and p. 192. The version of Wellesley’s dispatch in the House of Commons Papers is that which has been followed in the extract given above.

 

4

Mr. Gladstone on the Treaty-making Power: the Cession of Heligoland:

Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, July 24, 1890, following Sir J. Fergusson, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had moved the second reading of the Anglo-German Agreement Bill:

'… He [Sir J. Fergusson] said, towards the close of his speech, that the House was asked to accede to the cession of Heligoland. That is perfectly true in point of form. It might be said, if we looked at it from the outside only, that this is only an affair of parochial legislation, because the population of Heligoland, I think, is not equal to the average population of any of the 10,000 parishes of England. But, Sir, I wish to point out that, although the vote of the House is only to be taken upon the Agreement as to Heligoland in point of form, yet in point of substance the vote of the House is upon the entire Treaty. Now, upon that there can be no question whatever that the whole treaty-making power of the Crown is thrown into the hands of the House in respect not only to Heligoland, but to all the conditions relating to the South African portion of the Agreement, although upon the form of proceeding there is no indication whatever to that effect.

'… The question of the Treaty-making power is undoubtedly one of the most difficult questions of practical politics in the world. The proof of that is to be found in the history of the Constitution of the United States. The able and sagacious men who considered this question there, arrived at a solution of the difficulty by adopting a compromise. They gave the power of intervention to the Senate of the United States; they did not give it to the popularly elected body, and that body has nothing whatever to say to a Treaty concluded with a Foreign Power, and it has no power of interfering with the conditions of that Treaty either directly or indirectly by censuring or punishing those who have made it. No one doubts, Sir, that this power of Treaty-making lies in this country with the Crown, subject to certain exceptions, which, I believe, are perfectly well understood. Wherever money is involved, wherever a pecuniary burden on the State is involved in any shape, I say, it is perfectly well understood, and I believe it is as well known to Foreign Powers as to ourselves, that the Government is absolutely powerless without the consent of Parliament, and that that assent, if given, is an absolutely indispensable assent, upon which the Crown has no claim whatever, presumptive or otherwise. I believe it to be also a principle—and I speak subject to correction—that where personal rights and liberties are involved they cannot be, at any rate, directly affected by the prerogative of the Crown, but the assent of Parliament, the popularly elected body to a representative chamber, is necessary to constitute a valid treaty in regard to them. But, Sir, setting aside these cases which are well defined, both in principle and in practice, there remains a vast range over which this Treaty power extends. … There is one thing which I think is still higher than the dicta of legal authorities in this important question, and it is our long, uniform, and unbroken course of practice. It is one thing to stand upon the opinion of an ingenious or even a learned man; it is another thing to cite the authority of an entire State, signified in pratical conclusions, after debate and discussion in every possible form, all bearing in one direction and stamped with one and the same character. … Do not let it be supposed that I am in favour of action outside Parliament. … It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in scores of cases cession has taken place, and in all cases the practice has been uniform for the Ministers of the Crown to advise upon their responsibility, for the Crown to act, and for Parliament to accept the results. … If the House of Commons does not approve of a Treaty which has been entered into it can, of course, turn out the Government of the day. … The effect of the present system, therefore, be it theoretically good or theoretically bad, places in the House of Commons the supreme control over o Treaty-making power of the Crown. Is that to be the case after the Treaty-making power has come to be handled by this Bill? It seems to me almost a necessity that out of this proceeding some complications of weight and importance must grow, deeply affecting the relations of the Crown and Parliament and the administration of political power. Speaking roughly, as the matter now stands, we have, virtually, the whole control. The other branch of the Legislature—the House of Lords—cannot turn out a Government. We, if we have votes enough, can. But will that be so after this? No. That which we now have exclusively you invite us to halve with the other branch of the Legislature. Now, I have said I do not wish to make this a Party dispute, and, therefore, I do not want hon. Gentlemen opposite to listen to this, which I offer rather as consideration to Members on this side, who have a natural tendency to say, the more you take from the Crown and give to Parliament the better. That is a presumption in the Liberal mind; it may be sound, it may be right; I do not discuss it. But I must point out that what is now proposed is to take a power which we now possess, in a form theoretically irregular, but practically effective—to take this power out of our hands and divide it with another Assembly. … Such a change ought not to be made sub silentio. … I do not see any good cause for touching the Treaty-making power at the present moment.'—Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (1890), cccxlvii. 753, 761, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768.

 

5

Opinions of British Foreign Secretaries on publicity and responsibility in the conduct of foreign policy:

(1) Lord Palmerston, February 25, 1864:

'Her Majesty's Government are responsible to this House to give every information as to any communications which may take place with foreign Governments with regard to our foreign policy, but it is not our duty to state to this House what changes may have been made, or intended to be made, from time to time before or after a despatch may have been communicated to any of our Ministers abroad.'—Hansard, Third Series, clxxiii. 1103.

(2) The Earl of Clarendon, May 8, 1866:

'Of course, we have always been ready to answer any inquiry that might have been addressed to us. … There is now little of that secret diplomacy which in former days so much prevailed. There is on the part of every Government—such is the power of public opinion—so great an anxiety to appeal to it and obtain its support, that despatches of the most important character and entailing the gravest consequences are no sooner delivered than they are published; and the telegram secures that there shall bay no priority of information.'

(3) The Marquess of Salisbury, June 30, 1890, in reply to the Earl of Rosebery who had asked, whether it was true, as reported in a recent telegram, that the right of fortifying the island of Heligoland was to be subjected to restrictions:

'… I think the noble Earl is aware that it [the question] answers itself—of course, we have never suggested any limitation to the power of the German Government to fortify the island if they please. I quite recognise that the noble Earl and his friends owe acted with great consideration in reference to all these-affairs, and I am also willing to concede that full information is due to them; but I think it is a rule that has always been observed in the Foreign Office, and a very valuable tule, that discussions should not take place until negotiations of this kind are concluded, We thought it desirable to issue a Despatch for the purpose of stating what our general intentions were; because such matters as these become subjects of discussion and of public comment, and strange and distorted accounts of them are apt to get before the public eye. …

'The Earl of Rosebery: Would the able Marquess object to state what the means were which he took to ascertain the feelings of the population?

'The Marquess of Salisbury: Obviously they were means of a confidential character, and, therefore, it is not possible for me to discuss them.

'Earl Granville: Confidential with the population, does the noble Marquess mean?'—Ibid., cccxlvi. 305, 307.

'[Lord Salisbury, when in Opposition, spoke as follows in the House of Lords on May 12, 1885, with reference to Earl Granville's assertion of the great danger of public criticism of negotiations while they were still in progress between Russia and Britain with regard to Afghanistan: 'The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty of an Opposition not to canvass or condemn the conduct of the Government, if by so doing it should have the effect of discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to. The noble Earl must remember that if we are of opinion that the course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government has mismanaged, that faults are being committed and dangers are being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom we can appeal in order to correct the evil; our absolute Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the mischief which is going on. You have a form of Government which in many points is purely democratic, and you must take it with the incidents which naturally adhere to it, and one of these incidents is publicity of deliberation. The Cabinet is the authority which decides in the first instance, and it decides in secret, and it rightly maintains its secrecy to the utmost, but the authority to which you must appeal from the Cabinet is the people, and their deliberations are conducted in the open field. If they are to be rightly:informed, you must deal fully and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged communications between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argument because somebody else outside hears it and you may be adversely affected by it. You might as well say that you will allow a trial to go wrong, because counsel hesitated to tell the jury the whole truth as it appeared to him, lest some one outside should be offended or discouraged by the language used.']

(4) Mr. A. J. Balfour, speaking, March 19, 1918, on the motion ‘That, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs should be appointed, representative of all parties and groups in the House, in order that a regular channel of communication may be established between the Foreign Secretary and the House of Commons, which will afford him frequent opportunities of giving information on questions of Foreign policy and which, by allowing Members to acquaint themselves more fully with current international problems, will enable this House to exercise closer supervision over the general conduct of Foreign affairs.':

'He'—the speaker immediately preceding—'endeavoured to regard … the conduct of our foreign affairs as a practical question for practical men, to be dealt with, not according to abstract formulae, but according to the real necessities of the situation. … What is the business of the Foreign Office of this country and of every other country in its aspect of an international machine? It does not pursue strange and secret aims. I think the British world perfectly understands and would thoroughly describe the broad ends for which British diplomacy works. Questions are perpetually arising, sometimes large, sometimes small, ranging perhaps on the one side from some great boundary question between two great Empires to the gas lighting of Bangkok on the other. All these questions have to be dealt with by some Department. The objects which the Government have in view in dealing with them are quite simple, quite plain, and are known to all the world. What is not simple, what is not plain, what is not easy, is the actual day-to-day carrying out of the negotiations by which the end is to be attained. A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are great instruments for preventing, as far as can be prevented, and diminishing, even when you cannot prevent, friction between States which are, or which ought to be, friendly: How is the task of peace-maker—because that is largely the task which falls to diplomatists and to the Foreign Office, which controls diplomatists—to be pursued if you are to shout your grievances from the housetop whenever they occur? The only result is that you embitter public feeling, that the differences between the two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers of the two countries agitate themselves, that the Parliaments of the two countries have their passions set on fire, and great crises arise, which may end, have ended sometimes, in international catastrophes. … You have to consider, when you are perfecting your Parliamentary machinery, which, in the main, is your machinery of criticism, whether you are not weakening your machinery for action. This House is not an executive body, cannot be an executive body, and if it tried to be an executive body would do its work altogether abominably, The 670 Gentlemen could not do it, and no delegation to Commits Rooms of forty or fifty could do it, That is not the way the work of the world is done anywhere if it is done effectively. No house of business manages its affairs in that way; no Army and no Navy manages its affairs in that way. Those who aspire to that ideal of popular machinery and call it democratic confuse administration with criticism and legislation. Administration is one thing; criticism and legislation are another. You should have your control over those who manage your affairs, but it is not the kind of control which the hon. Member wishes to set up with his Committee of forty or fifty. It is quite a different control. You must know, broadly speaking, what the general lines of policy are, and I maintain that that is thoroughly known with regard to foreign affairs at this moment by every man in this House who takes the trouble to think. The general lines on which we are proceeding are thoroughly known. If the House, or any large body of the House thinks we are proceeding on wrong lines, turn us out—that is the proper remedy—but do not suppose that we can do the work better by having to explain it to a lot of people who are not responsible. That is not the way to get business properly done.^[2] … If you are going to ask Foreign Office officials, or officials of any Department, to expend some of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination, you will really be destroying the public service. There is nothing on which I feel more strongly than that. They are not accustomed to it, and they ought not to be accustomed to it. They are not trained for it, and they ought not to be trained for it. … I beg the House to remember that any system which keeps constantly before the eyes of the civil servants of this country the fear of examination, cross-examination, and re-examination by gentlemen who may be described as professional politicians, would be most disastrous in the public interest. Therefore … I read the Resolution with very little sympathy. I do not believe it is democratic. I do not believe it is practicable. I believe the evils against which it is directed are largely illusory evils. I do not hold the view that antique methods are pursued by diplomatists which no man of common sense adopts in the ordinary work of everyday life. On the contrary, the work of diplomacy is exactly the work which is done every day between two great firms, for instance, which have business relations, or between two great corporate entities which have interests diverging or interests in common. If you are a man of sense you do not create difficulties to begin with. You try to get over all these things without the embitterment which advertisement always brings with it. It is when you begin to press your case in public that antagonism arises. In private, in conversations which need not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, you can put your case as strongly as you like, and the gentleman with whom you are carrying on the discussion may put his case as strongly as he likes, and if good manners are observed and nothing but fair discussion takes place no soreness remains and no one is driven to ignore the strong points of his opponent's case. Directly a controversy becomes public all that fair give-and-take becomes either difficult or impossible, and if secret diplomacy meant anything so idiotic as an attempt to discuss in public matters in which sentiment, international pride, and international interests were profoundly concerned, I do not think that any sane assembly would ever really try to carry it out in the day-to-day national work which has to be got through. But if all you mean … is that it is wrong for the nations of the world to find themselves hampered in their mutual relations by treaties of which those countries know nothing, that, I think, is an evil. I do not say that there have not been secret treaties which were inevitable; but I do say that, if they are necessary, they are a necessary evil. Please remember that two nations make a treaty together for their mutual advantage. Both are desirous of passing it. One nation says, "It is against our interest that this treaty should be made public at present". The other says, "We do not like being committed to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make public at once". Which is going to prevail? Hon. Gentlemen talk as if it rested with the British Foreign Office to decide in every case whether a particular treaty shall be treated publicly or confidentially. It does not rest with any single Foreign Office, British or other. It is always an arrangement between two, possibly three or four, Foreign Offices. You cannot lay down, and I do not think you would be wise to lay down, an absolute rule that under no circumstances, and for no object, could you so far concede the point as to say that a treaty is to be made which is not to become public property. I am perfectly ready to admit that that is not a process which, to me, is a very agreeable one. To reduce secret treaties to the narrowest possible limits should, I think, be the object of every responsible statesman who has the control of foreign affairs. Beyond that I do not feel inclined to go. I do not see any signs of a grasp of the true realities of life in the Motion before us, I do not stand here to defend ancient forms and worn-out ceremonies. I stand here to defend the common-sense carrying out of great international objects, and those objects, so far as this country is concerned, are, first, to obtain peace, and then to maintain peace. I do not see that there can be, or ought to be, any collision between the Government and any section of this House upon the general aims of British policy; still less can I see anything in our system that can be described as antagonistic, inconsistent with or opposed to the true principles of democracy, interpreted in the light of the actual facts of national life as we see them artes us. I, therefore, shall resist the Motion.'—Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Tuesday, 19th March, 1918, Vol. 104, 865, 867–8, 872–6.

6

The Treatment of International Questions by Parliaments in France, Germany, and the United States of America:

I. France:

'According to the French constitution, the President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties with foreign Powers. These treaties are then to be communicated to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies as soon as is compatible with due regard to the interests and security of the State. Treaties of peace and commerce, and those which affect the finances of the State, the status of persons and the rights of property of French citizens abroad, are only binding after they have been approved by a vote in the two Houses. No cession, exchange, or acquisition of territory may take place without a law be passed to authorise it.

'It may here be remarked that the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th July, 1878, was ratified by the President of the Republic, and promulgated without the approval of Parliament being asked, presumably because it was not considered as falling within any of the above-mentioned categories of treaties.

'The Chamber of Deputies appoints sixteen grand committees at the beginning of each fresh Legislature, to examine and report on questions concerning the various departments of the State with which the House is called upon to deal. One of these committees is "La Commission des Affaires extérieures et coloniales". It is elected for the whole legislative period (four years), and composed of forty-four members, designated by the various political groups in proportion to their numerical strength. This choice has to be confirmed by the Chamber at a public sitting. The committee does not examine the Budget for Foreign Affairs, as the yearly credits for that department are discussed by the General Budget Committee ("Commission du Budget"). The Foreign Affairs Committee reports to the Chamber on all questions relating to foreign policy which are submitted to it. It may summon before it any persons whose evidence may be of a nature to guide it in its deliberations, but when these persons hold an official post, the Minister concerned must first give his consent, with or without the condition that professional secrecy is to be observed. A Minister himself may be requested to appear and give explanations to the committee on points of policy. Although, in theory, a Minister is not obliged to appear before the committee, a refusal to do so would not be in harmony with French parliamentary traditions. All papers which the committee desires to consult are communicated to it through its chairman by the competent Minister. Should the latter consider that reasons of State forbid him to communicate any document thus asked for, the Minister informs the chairman of the committee, which usually acquiesces in the Minister's view. If the committee persists in its demand, the matter is brought before the Chamber. Should the latter support the committee, such action is likely to bring about a Ministerial crisis.

'In certain cases, the Committee for Foreign Affairs may be invested by the Chamber with the powers of a special commission of enquiry. These powers include the right of hearing sworn witnesses and of pursuing investigations in any part of France or abroad.

'There is no permanently constituted Committee for Foreign Affairs in the Senate. Bills submitted to this Assembly concerning foreign affairs are referred to a special committee. In some cases, especially when the matter is pressing, they are merely referred to the Senate Finance Committee. The same rules respecting the summoning of witnesses, official or non-official, as obtain in the case of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber apply in the committees of the Senate.

'The General Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, which is the most important of all parliamentary committees, is also composed of forty-four members nominated by the House in the same manner as the Committee for Foreign Affairs, but, unlike the latter, is elected for one year only. It appoints a reporter^[3] for each of the departmental budgets, who, for the purposes of his report, has necessarily to be in close touch with the Minister and departments concerned, from whom the greater part of the information contained in the report has to be derived.

'The report on foreign affairs of the Budget Committee is a valuable annual record of French policy. It is published generally towards the end of each year.

'Interpellations respecting foreign policy by individual deputies on their own initiative, or in the character of spokesmen of their political group, are frequent in the French Parliament. In many cases, the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepts an immediate decision; in others, he requests the permission of the House to postpone it to some later and unspecified date, or to join it on to other questions of which notice has been given so as to form a general debate on foreign policy.'—Treatment of International Questions by Parliaments in European Countries, the United States, and Japan. Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. § (1912), [Cd. 6102], pp. 7–8.

II. Germany:

'Parliamentary participation or intervention, actual or possible, in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the German Empire, could be fully defined only by an exhaustive examination of the theory and working of the Federal and State machineries. The considerations most necessary to bear in mind are:

'1. The powers expressly reserved by the constitution of the German Empire to the Emperor, as laid down in article 11 of the constitution, which runs as follows:

'"The Presidency of the Federation is vested in the King of Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor. The Emperor has to represent the Empire internationally; to declare war and to conclude peace in the name of the Empire; to enter into alliances and other treaties with foreign Powers; to accredit and receive Ambassadors.

'"The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Federation has taken place.

'"Tn so far as treaties with foreign States have reference to affairs which, according to article 4, belong to the domain of Imperial legislation, the consent of the Federal Council is requisite for their conclusion, and the sanction of the Reichstag for their coming into force."'

(Article 4 gives a list of the affairs which are subject to the superintendence and legislation of the Empire.)

'2. The relations between the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellor, who is solely responsible for the Government departments, including the Foreign Office, and is not responsible to the Reichstag; and

'3. The limitation of the effective powers of the Reichstag to a share in legislation.

'In practice the Reichstag deals with foreign affairs (a) in connection with the Imperial Budget, which, including as it does the estimates for the office of the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office, is embodied in an annual Bill, which requires the consent of the Reichstag before it can be passed into law, and (b) by occasional debates on interpellations, or (c) more rarely, on motions.

'(a) The Budget Bill, like other Bills, is read three times. The first reading stage consists of a general discussion, which falls naturally into discussions on foreign and home affairs respectively. The second reading stage consists of, first, detailed debate in committee (see special remarks appended _on the Budget Committee), and, secondly, the debate on the report to the whole House. Both in committee and on report the estimates for the separate departments are taken in succession, In committee there is usually a considerable debate on the Foreign Office estimates, and confidential communications are made by the Imperial Chancellor, or more usually the Foreign Secretary, and if necessary by Foreign Office officials, On report also there is often a fairly long debate on the Foreign Office estimates, in which the Imperial Chancellor generally takes part. Foreign questions appear to be seldom raised on the third reading of the estimates.

'(b) The only way in which questions can be addressed in the Reichstag to the Imperial Chancellor—for since the subordinate Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, appear solely as the Chancellor's representatives, questions cannot be addressed to them, though they are often deputed to answer them—is by the tabling of an interpellation, signed by not less than thirty deputies. On the day when the interellation is placed on the order paper the president asks the mperial Chancellor "whether and when" he will answer the interpellation. If the Chancellor consents to answer, the interpellator delivers a speech, the Chancellor or his representative replies, and a debate may follow if it is desired by not less than fifty members. Motions on the subject of the interpellation are not permissible.

'(c) Motions of any kind can be tabled if signed by not less than fifteen deputies, and if they are not withdrawn after debate, votes are taken upon them. The presentation of critical motions is, however, almost invariably checked by the knowledge that the Imperial Chancellor or his "representatives" will neither take part in nor even attend the debate, and by the fact that a motion which is carried remains an academic expression of opinion. The small number of interpellations, and motions on foreign questions during the last session^[4] of the Reichstag shows to what extent that body makes use of its powers apart from the annual discussion on the estimates.

'As will appear from what has been said, deputies have no power to put questions except by means of the procedure for interpellations which has been described.

'It has been observed that the effective powers of the Reichstag are limited to a share in legislation. The necessity therefore for the Government to consult the Reichstag arises in international questions only when legislation is necessary (see last paragraph of article 11 of the constitution, quoted above). A case has recently arisen of an important treaty which was found not to involve legislation, and therefore not to require the Reichstag's consent. The "Bundesgebiet", or federal territory, is defined by article 1 of the constitution, which gives a list of all the Federal States, and "alterations of the constitution can be effected only by legislation. They are considered as rejected if they have 14 votes in the Federal Council against them” (article 78 of the constitution). The colonies do not form part of the "Bundesgebiet". The Franco-German Treaty, ceding and acquiring territory in the Cameroons and Congo, did not therefore require to be accepted by the Reichstag, and was in fact merely communicated: to the House. In view of the dissatisfaction caused by the discovery of this fact, the Reichstag on the 5th December, with the assent of the Government, read three times and passed a law which causes the following paragraph to be inserted in the Colonial Law of the 25th July, 1900 ("Schutzgebietsgesetz"):

'"An Imperial law is required for the acquisition and cession of a protectorate, or part of such. This provision does not apply to the question of the adjustment of frontiers."

'It remains to consider the practical or possible influence of the State Diets upon foreign affairs, Although the separate States retain Ministers for Foreign Affairs (usually the Ministers-President), and the right to separate representation abroad—Bavaria, for instance, has Ministers at Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Paris, and Rome (Vatican and Quirinal), and Saxony at Vienna—foreign relations are now conducted almost entirely (a) in Germany, by the Imperial Foreign Office in Berlin, which was raised to federal status out of the Prussian Foreign Office in 1867, and (b) abroad, by the Ambassadors and Ministers appointed by the Emperor (see article 11), Attempts are sometimes made to raise in the State Diets—especially at Dresden, Munich, and Stuttgart—questions of State policy in the Empire's foreign relations. Such questions can be referred to in general debates, or interpellations may be introduced. The question usually asked is what influence the Government of the State in question has exercised in Berlin, and especially whether there has been a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council. This committee is essentially different from the seven permanent committees of the Federal Council.

'By article 8 of the constitution: "The Federal Council forms permanent committees from its own members:

1. For the land-army and fortresses;
2. For naval affairs;
3. For customs and taxes;
4. For commerce and intercourse;
5. For railways, posts, and telegraphs;
6. For affairs of justice;
7. For finances.

'"In each of these committees, besides the presidency, at least four of the Federal States will be represented, and in the committees each State has only one vote. In the committee for the land-army and fortresses Bavaria has a permanent seat; the other members thereof, as well as the members for the naval committee, are nominated by the Emperor; the members of the other committees are elected by the Federal Council. The composition of these committees is to be renewed for every session of the Federal Council or every year, as the case may be, when the outgoing members may be re-elected.

'"Besides these, a committee for foreign affairs will be formed in the Federal Council, comprised of the representatives of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, and of two other representatives of other Federal States, who will be yearly elected by the Federal Council, in which committee Bavaria will occupy the chair.

'"The necessary officials will be placed at the disposal of these committees."

'As the foreign affairs committee of the Federal Council exists solely for the purpose of receiving information about foreign affairs, which is usually conveyed by the Imperial Chancellor himself, and of providing means for an exchange of views, Prussia, in whom the actual conduct of foreign affairs is vested, is not a member of the committee. The proceedings are confidential, and State Ministers, when questioned in their respective Diets, usually say nothing more than that the information conveyed to the committee has been satisfactory, and that unanimity has prevailed. In reality, the committee has met on very few occasions since the foundation of the Empire, but since the domestic crisis of November 1908 it has become the practice for Bavaria to call meetings in connection with any foreign question of great magnitude and lasting public interest, From 1871 to 1908 only two meetings of the committee appear to have been held. Since 1908 there have been several meeings, including one before the meeting of the Reichstag in October of the present year.

'The Budget Committee of the Reichstag

'Besides the estimates, questions of great public interest, especially in connection with foreign affairs, are occasionally referred to the Budget Committee.

'It consists of twenty-eight members, appointed by the leaders of the various parties in the Reichstag, who alone have power to add to or make any alteration in the committee.

'A reporter ("Referent") and assistant-reporter are appointed, who can work separately or together as they like, and who report verbally to the whole committee.

'There are no regular sub-committees, These are occasionally appointed by the committee, and consist of from three to seven members.

'Neither the sub-committees nor the Budget Committee itself have the right to send for persons, papers, or records, but they can, and often do, ask the president of the Reichstag to do so.

'After the Budget Committee has received and considered the reports of the various reporters, a general reporter is appointed who reports verbally to the Reichstag.

'The distribution of the questions to be reported on is made by the heads of the committee after agreement with the members.

'Ministers can always make statements in the committee.

'The proceedings are secret, but reports of the sittings are issued.'—Ibid., pp. 8–11.

III. United States of America:

Mr. James Bryce, in transmitting, on January 31, 1912, a memorandum prepared by the councillor of the British embassy at Washington, wrote:

'Upon the general subject it is sufficient to say that when the United States constitution was formed, the question arose as to the authorities of the Government in which the control of foreign affairs should be vested. To have given it to the executive alone, following the precedent of England,^[5] seemed open to objection as entrusting to him a range of discretionary power which might easily have been abused, On the other hand, to confide it to any council would have made negotiations much more difficult, and probably have impeded prompt action in cases where promptitude was needed, ‘The result was the plan of entrusting the initiative to the executive and the power of sanction to the Senate, which was intended, being a small body at the time the constitution was made, to be, although elective, something resembling the older forms of the English Privy Council. It was thought that a comparatively large body like the House of Representatives was not well fitted to join in the exercise of such functions.

'The capital difference between the United States system and our own lies in the fact that here the President holds office for a fixed period by direct commission from the people, irrespective of the Legislature, while in Great Britain the Ministry is dependent on the confidence and support of the House of Commons. Had the people of the United States left the control of foreign affairs and the treaty-making power entirely in the hands of the executive, they would have given to it a power greater, because unchecked by the Legislature, than a Cabinet enjoys in England. Ifa President had resolved to follow a course deemed dangerous by the Legislature, there would have been no means of stopping him in that course until the end of his term, except, indeed, by the extreme method of impeachment—a tedious method and one hard to apply in practice, It was therefore deemed necessary to associate the Senate with the President in this important function. In Great Britain the practice has been to allow the Cabinet to use the ancient powers of the Crown with comparatively little interference by Parliament, because the House of Commons has, by its practice of interrogating Ministers, the means of knowing what course in foreign affairs they are following, and, if it disapproves that course, of indicating its disapproval. Each country can therefore advance solid reasons on behalf of its own system.'—Ibid., p. 26; and see, further, pp. 26–33.

[In the discussions that led to the framing of the Constitution, it was proposed by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay that the Executive should be appointed 'during good behaviour, or in other words for life', Other members of the Convention proposed that the appointment be for seven years. The proposal that it be for four years was carried. 'The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive', says Mr. Justice Story, following Hamilton in The Federalist,^[6] 'are unity, duration, an adequate provision for its support, and competent powers. The ingredients which constitute safety in a republican form of government are a due dependence on the people, and a due responsibility to the people.'^[7] 'A government ill executed, whatever may be its theory, must, in practice, be a bad government.'^[8] 'Whether the period of four years will answer the purpose for which the Executive department is established, so as to give it at once energy and safety, and to preserve a due balance in the administration of the Government, is a problem which can be solved only by experience. That it will contribute far more than a shorter period towards these objects, and thus have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the Government, may be safely affirmed.'^[9]

The study of this subject may with advantage be pursued in The Federalist, especially in five letters—lxii–lxvi—chiefly by Hamilton on the Senate, and in letters lxix–lvxv on the Executive, by Hamilton; in Tocqueville's La Démocratie en Amérique, and in Bryce's American Commonwealth. 'To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume', wrote Hamilton. 'It forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations and all the advantages connected with national character.'^[10] 'As for myself', said De Tocqueville, 'I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction, that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles. Experience, instruction, and habit may almost always succeed in creating a species of practical discretion in democracies, and that science of the daily occurrences of life which is called good sense. Good sense may suffice to direct the ordinary course of society; and amongst a people whose education has been provided for, the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal affairs of the country may more than compensate for the evils inherent in a democratic government. But such is not always the case in the mutual relations of foreign nations, Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient. Democracy is favourable to the increase of the internal resources of a State; it tends to diffuse a moderate independence; it promotes the growth of public spirit, and fortifies the respect which is entertained for law in all classes of society: and these are advantages which only exercise an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience.'^[11] 'In all free countries', writes Lord (then Mr.) Bryce, 'it is most difficult to define the respective spheres of the legislature and executive in foreign affairs, for while publicity and parliamentary control are needed to protect the people, promptitude and secrecy are the conditions of diplomatic success. Practically, however, and for the purposes of ordinary business, the President is independent of the House, while the Senate, though it can prevent his settling anything, cannot keep him from unsettling everything. He, or rather his Secretary of State, for the President has rarely leisure to give close or continuous attention to foreign policy, retains an unfettered initiative, by means of which he may embroil the country abroad or excite passion at home.'^[12]

Mr. Balfour, in the discussion already referred to^[13] in the House of Commons, on March 19, 1918, alludes to both the French Parliamentary Committee and the American Foreign Relations Committee. The French Committee 'does not really make French diplomacy more democratic or less concerned in the interchange of ideas through the ordinary diplomatic channels than British diplomacy. … What I have heard about the working of the French Committee does not make me specially desirous of seeing it introduced into this country.'^[14] 'The American Foreign Relations Committee stands on a wholly different basis, for this reason among others, that the American Minister responsible for foreign affairs is not, and cannot be, a member either of the House of Representatives or of the Senate. His only connection with the Legislature of his country is through the Committee. If that is the system on which your Constitution is to work, there may be a great deal to be said for it; indeed, a Committee seems to me to be very nearly a necessity. If you are going to exclude your Ministers from this House, very likely you would find it desirable to have a Committee to act as intermediary between them and the House. But that is a change which none of us are going to live to see, and which certainly does not seem to me to be in the democratic direction. What this House desires is to be in contact with the Ministers who control its affairs and to turn them out if it does not like them. That is not the American system. The American system is that Ministers of the day depend upon the President of the day, that the President of the day is elected by direct popular election, and that during his term of office he is, in that sense, quite independent of the approval or disapproval of Congress.'^[15]

We have not travelled far beyond the wise words of the author-statesman, Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist^[16] against the participation of the House of Representatives in the treaty-making power. 'The fluctuating and, taking its future increase into account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy,^[17] and despatch are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous, The very complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection.'^[18]]

 

7

The Dominions and the Control of Foreign Policy before the Paris War Conference.

(1) The following Resolution was adopted by the Imperial War Conference on April 16, 1917:

'The Imperial War Conference are of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and too intricate a subject to be dealt with during the War, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

'They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government, and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognise the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.'^[19]

(2) ‘'For some time it had become increasingly apparent that some method had to be found of informing the Overseas Governments of the political and military situation and of enabling nations which were making such sacrifices for the common cause to take their part in the counsels of the Empire. Accordingly, at the beginning of 1917, the Prime Ministers of the Overseas Dominions were invited to attend a series of special meetings at the War Cabinet in order to discuss the problems of the war and the possible conditions of peace. India, for the first time, was also asked to send representatives to take part in this Council of the Empire. The sessions of the Cabinet, thus enlarged, came to be known as the Imperial War Cabinet. The necessities of the war have thus brought into being a body representative of all parts of the Empire, able to deliberate and to come to decisions on questions affecting the day-to-day conduct of the war as well as on the larger issues of Imperial policy without impairing the autonomy of the units of which the Empire is composed. … So successful was this experiment in the opinion of its members that it was decided unanimously that there ought to be an annual meeting of the Imperial Cabinet and that the Prime Ministers of the Empire or their specially delegated representatives, together with the Ministers in charge of the great Imperial Offices should be ex officio members.'^[20]

'In June 1917 the War Cabinet invited General Smuts who had attended the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet as the Representative of the Government of the Union of South Africa, to attend the meetings of the War Cabinet during his stay in the British Isles.'^[21]

'The outstanding event of the year in the sphere of Imperial affairs has been the inauguration of the Imperial War Cabinet.'^[22]

The advance made during 1918 is shown by the following announcement which was issued on August 18, 1918:

'During the past two and a half months the Imperial War Cabinet has been in continuous session. Every aspect of policy affecting the conduct of the war and the question of peace has been examined by the Prime Ministers of the Empire and other members representative of all its parts.

'These meetings have proved of such value that the Imperial War Cabinet have thought it essential that certain modifications should be made in the existing channels of communication, so as to make consultation between the various Governments of the Empire in regard to Imperial policy as continuous and intimate as possible.

'It has, therefore, been decided that for the future the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, as members of the Imperial War Cabinet, should have the right to communicate on matters of Cabinet importance direct with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom whenever they see fit to do so.

'It has also been decided that each Dominion shall have the right to nominate a visiting or a resident Minister in London to be a member of the Imperial War Cabinet at meetings other than those attended by the Prime Ministers. These meetings will be held at regular intervals. Arrangements will also be made for the representation of India at these meetings.'^[23]

1. See above, p. 52, foot-note.
2. Mr, Balfour gave evidence on these lines before the Select Committee on House of Commons Procedure, 1914: e.g. '1707. On the whole, you would be inclined to think foreign affairs is a question which should not be aired too frequently in the House of Commons?—That is my opinion. I think neither Indian affairs nor foreign affairs are very fitting subjects for constant discussion and debate. Indiscreet speeches, the value of which we can perfectly weigh within the House, get reported and circulated abroad, or in India, or even at home in the provinces, and very often make bad blood quite unnecessarily, and raise difficulties which might easily have been avoided.

   '1708. Then, you do not think the uninformed condition of the House of Commons on foreign affairs matters?—I am not disposed to agree that the position of the House of Commons is uninformed. It does not know, and it cannot know, and, if I may say so, it ought not to know exactly what passed between the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador of this or that Great Power in such a conversation on such and such a day. Such conversation must be confidential if you are to work the European system at all, and I do not think that it would be any gain to the peace of the world or our own national interests, if 670 prying eyes were perpetually directed towards these current details of international obligations.'

3. For this, and for a comparison of the French system with the British, see Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms (1901), pp. 108–10.
4. This Report was transmitted from Berlin by Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office in December 1911.
5. This is not wholly true of England, since even in the eighteenth century the executive, in so far as Ministers and a Cabinet stood for the executive, was to a considerable extent dependent upon the Houses of Parliament for its own life and for security of policy.
6. No. lxx.
7. Commentaries on the Constitution (1833), § 1418.
8. Ibid., § 1417.
9. Ibid., § 1439. See also § 1515.
10. The Federalist, No. lxii.
11. La Démocratie en Amérique, ch. xiv. (translation by Henry Reeves).
12. The American Commonwealth, part i, ch. vi.
13. Above, pp. 265 sqq.
14. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 104, 869.
15. Ibid.
16. No. lxxv. See the Preface to this work.
17. Italicized in the original.
18. Cf. No. lxiv. (by Jay).
19. Imperial War Conference, 1917. Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Conference [Cd. 8566], p. 61.
20. The War Cabinet. Report for the Year 1917 [Cd. 9005], pp. vi–vii.
21. Ibid., p. 1.
22. Ibid., p. 5; and see pp. 6–10.
23. For the general question of the position held in the past by the self-governing colonies—now styled 'Dominions'—in relation to the conduct of foreign policy, see Keith, Responsible Government in the British Dominions, iii, pp. 1101–57 and 1455–6, and The Oxford Survey of the British Empire (6 vols., 1914), i: General Survey, especially pp. 32, 54, 59, 84, 89, 114, 117.