Discourse on the Method/Introduction by the Translator

by John Veitch

INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.

The Discourse on Method principally contains two things:—

1. An account of the Philosophical Method of its author.^[1]

2. A summary of the Chief Results of the Method.

To these I propose to advert in their order; but chiefly to the former, because, in the first place, a special reference to the Method itself is mainly relevant in an introduction to the Discourse on Method, and because, in the second place, a formal though general discussion of the results of the Cartesian Method must far exceed the limits of the present introduction. Certain of the prominent results of the Method will, however, fall to be noticed as illustrative of the characters of the Method itself: and certain of the more general relations of Descartes to succeeding philosophers will be indicated in conclusion.

 

OF THE METHOD OF DESCARTES.

The Method of Descartes has a preliminary, the character of which it is necessary precisely to ascertain.

The preliminary to the Method is Doubt. This leads us to inquire, in the first place, into the nature of the Cartesian Doubt.

I. Doubt in general, and the Cartesian doubt in particular, is equivalent simply to the absence of any decision, whether affirmative or negative, respecting the relation of the subject and predicate of a judgment. Doubt is thus the suspension of the act of the faculty of judgment, in so far as the determination of the joining or disjoining of the terms of a proposition is concerned. This suspension arises in the absence of grounds adequate to determine either certain affirmation or negation; and passes away whenever the mind is determined either to join or disjoin, to include or exclude, with certainty. Thus far of doubt in general, and of the Cartesian doubt in particular.^[2]

In it is necessary to state farther, that the Cartesian doubt embraced within its sphere all the judgments and beliefs that were due to education and authority. Of these Descartes made a surrender, under certain conditions and reservations to be found stated in the Method (Part III.): which, however, scarcely affect the generality and immediateness of the doubt.

But doubt, suspension of judgment, is with Descartes not an end in itself; it is not that for which, as with the Sceptic, the activity of the faculties of knowledge is put forth, and which is itself for no other end. On the contrary, doubt is with Descartes singly a means, and the end of the Cartesian doubt is the end of the Cartesian Method, viz., Certainty. In this respect is the Cartesian doubt distinguished from the sceptical, the end of which is not the certainty of affirmation and negation, but continual doubt, and thence permanent indifference and indisturbance.^[3]

The Cartesian doubt, therefore, in so far as preliminary to the Cartesian Method, is simply equivalent to a resolution to accept such truths as the philosopher might determine to fall within the sphere of Philosophy, on their own evidence, and on that alone.

Such is the nature and end of the Cartesian doubt. The manner in which Descartes avails himself of doubt to accomplish the end of his Method, will be noticed in detail when we come to show how he manifests the reality of knowledge.

From what has been said of the Cartesian doubt its legitimacy is manifest. Doubt of this nature, though perhaps not in an unlimited generality and immediacy, is even obligatory as a means to knowledge, if we would not take our opinions on trust.

But, in the second place, it may be proper at this stage to show what the Cartesian doubt, viewed in its general aspect, involves, in respect of the Principle of Truth and Certainty.

II. This is manifestly the denial of the jurisdiction of authority in the sphere of the true and the false. Descartes doubted, withheld his assent from the judgments bequeathed to him by education and authority, that he himself might determine which, and how many of these were true. By this act he implicitly asserted a right to decide upon the truth or falsity of what authority had laid down, and, therefore, the superiority to authority of another principle in the sphere of truth. This new principle was none other than Human Thought itself,—thought unfettered except by its own laws,—the intelligence acting within the limits prescribed to it by its own nature and constitution. But to proclaim free reflection as a principle superior to authority in the search after causes or reasons, was to proclaim the independence of philosophy,—to affirm that the deliverances of human thought were superior to the decrees of the Church. By his doubt, therefore, did Descartes challenge the propriety, and consummate the ruin of that philosophy known as Scholastic, whose foundations for the last two centuries had been gradually giving way, and chiefly under the influence of independent physical research. Under Scholasticism the human mind had other laws than its own,—thought was subordinated to authority, at first absolutely, then partially, and the whole activity of the mind was limited to the deduction of conclusions from principles which authority furnished. But in the new and pure philosophy of Descartes, the mind was set free to seek alike its principles and conclusions; authority was subordinated to thought. In this respect, what Bacon^[4] accomplished in Britain, Descartes accomplished on the Continent.

But, in the third place, it is not enough that the mind be disenthralled, and permitted to go in search of principles in independence of authority; care must be taken that liberty do not degenerate into license. After the Cartesian preliminary, it was possible that the mind might be carried away by the mere pleasure of activity; and, as the degree of activity is higher, and consequently the pleasure, in proportion to the absence of impediment or of rule, the danger of the mental activity setting at nought all limits, or of mind acting without rule, was great. Hence the need of a fixed or regular philosophical procedure as the only guarantee of reaching truth and certainty, hence, in a word, the need of a Method. This leads us to inquire more particularly into the nature of Method.

III. On this point we have an explicit declaration by Descartes himself, which is at once brief and comprehensive. "By Method (he says) I understand rules certain and easy, such as to prevent any one, who shall have accurately observed them, from ever assuming what is false for what is true, and by which, with no effort of mind uselessly consumed, but always by degrees increasing science, a person will arrive at a true knowledge of all those things which he will be capable of knowing."—(Reg. ad direct. ingenii—Reg. iv.)

In accordance with this declaration, it is manifest that procedure by a Method is a fixed procedure, for it is a procedure according to rule. It is thus opposed to procedure by chance or at random.

Such procedure supposes, it is plain, the previous determination of some end which in thus proceeding we design, and exclusively design, to realize. Procedure by Method, as a procedure in accordance with certain rules, which we have laid down with a view to the realization of an end, is therefore a reflective procedure.

As a Method is thus a sum of precepts, the observance of which is calculated to enable us to realize a given end, it is plain that the kind and character of the precepts of which a method is the sum will be determined by the kind and character of its end: hence Methods will differ according to their ends. The character of philosophical Method will therefore be determined by the nature of the end of Philosophy.

Now, Philosophy or Science is possible, and is necessary, because of our possession of faculties of knowledge: hence the end of philosophy is the end of these faculties, that is, is Knowledge. Again, as we only really know when we know a thing as it is, that is, when our knowledge is true, the end of philosophy of science may be said to be Truth: hence philosophical or scientific Method will be a procedure so regulated as to enable the seeker to reach Truth.

It is thus that Descartes makes True Knowledge (vera cognitio), or Truth, the end of philosophical or scientific Method.

The mind, in proceeding by Method, while it manifests, likewise concentrates its activity. It seeks through the action of the faculties of knowledge specially directed, more perfect knowledge than is passively afforded in the spontaneous presentations of sense and self-consciousness. The activity of the faculties of knowledge is concentrated on objects, and is only manifested in accordance with certain rules. The cognitive power, by being thus limited to a determinate channel, is prevented from being wasted or thrown away in irregular exercise. The activity of the mind is subordinated to the realization of a given end; the mind itself has another rule than its own impetuosity. Descartes, therefore, to reach truth, and for the right conduct of the mind, that is, to prevent it from wasting its powers in capricious activity, instituted a Method.

Such is the end, and such the need of Method. It will be necessary, however, in the fourth place, to show more particularly the nature of the Method of Descartes; and, first, of the Method in its prior half.

IV. The end of philosophical procedure is, as we have seen, True Knowledge, or Truth.

Truth refers exclusively to judgments. A judgment is true when what we include within certain limits is really therein included, and when what we exclude is really therefrom excluded. The end of philosophical method in general is, therefore, the determination of real inclusions and exclusions.

We must distinguish, however, between Method that is instituted merely for the purposes of Science, and that instituted for the ends of Philosophy Proper.

The end of Scientific Method in general is, the determination of individual truths in this and that matter, the elaboration of these into classes, and the binding them up into system.

The end of the Method of Philosophy Proper, as this is laid down by Descartes, is twofold; for it is to find by reflection, the Ultimate Ground of the Truth of the judgments of Science; and likewise of our Assurance of the truth of these judgments.

Descartes thus seeks to establish and vindicate the reality of knowledge; and that by connecting, in the way of consequence, the whole series of subordinate truths, that is, the whole truths of Science with the ultimate truths, or truth, if such exist: and likewise by discovering the ground of our assurance of individual truths through the discovery of the ground of our certainty in the highest truth.

The determination of such truths or truth is, according to Descartes, to be reached by Analysis. The Philosophical Procedure of Descartes is thus, in the first instance, Analytic.

Analysis, in general, consists in the resolution of the complex into the simple and constituent.

The principal object of the Analysis of Descartes is to be found in our notions and judgments. The end of Descartes is to reach Principles or Reasons. In pursuance of this end, he proceeds always from the judgment of the truth of which he is uncertain, and seeks to find whether the other judgments, which the one in question involves, are true, and through these to determine the truth of the proposition from which he starts. Such is the nature of his general procedure.

The matter of our knowledge, viewed in the light of this Analysis, is not considered with reference to the purposes of classification ({{lang|la|non in quantum ad aliquod genus entis refertur), but with reference to its capability for consequence; to the relation of the determining and determined (in quantum unæ ex aliis cognosci possunt). The knowledge sought is thus, when reached, obtained through other knowledge, or by means of other truth.

The Analysis of Descartes thus manifestly supposes doubt as its essential preliminary; for, as the end of the Analysis is to manifest truth, it is plain, since we have recourse to it, that truth is concealed,—that we are in ignorance, need determining reasons; in a word, are in doubt. On the hypothesis that knowledge by Method is possible, it is plain that there must be some knowledge, or truth, which is superior to doubt, and capable of affording other knowledge, or truth whose certainty is dependent on the higher knowledge, that is, on principles.

In accordance with the nature of his instru- ment, the whole Philosophy of Descartes is but an attempt to find the Principles or Principle which, as absolutely ultimate in the order of Analysis, and, therefore, absolutely primary in the order of the reverse process, that is, of Syn- thesis, affords the conditions and possibility of Philosophy, or of Methodical Knowledge. In other words, Descartes seeks that truth, which, itself contained in no higher, contains, or at least affords the condition of our reaching, all other truths.

Now the ultimate principles or principle must, as ultimate, be self-evidencing, that is, stand in need of no proof, or higher knowledge as its guarantee; and the degree of its evidence must be such as to determine in the knower absolute and indestructible assurance. The first truth must, therefore, be approached through the High- est Certainty.

Again, as the absolutely certain is wholly superior to doubt; as of such doubt in truth is impossible, Descartes makes Doubt the means of manifesting the Ultimate Truth, by constituting it the regulative principle of his Analysis.

Descartes thus not only commences with a general doubt. He likewise proceeds to truth through doubt; and that by proposing to determine the limits of doubt. He seeks to discover how far doubt is possible, of what it is impossible; that is, whether there be any knowledge of which we possess an absolute certainty.

Such is the Method of Descartes in its prior half. It will be necessary, however, now to develop its application, to show how Descartes essays to construct Philosophy, or the Science of Reasons.

Proceeding by Doubt, Descartes finds it possible to doubt of the truth of the presentations of Sense, and of the contents of Memory; and likewise even of the demonstrations of Mathematics. Such afford no absolute assurance.

But though it be possible to doubt whether anything exists as it is presented, or existed as represented in Memory, it is impossible to doubt of the existence of the presentations and representations themselves; and as these presentations and representations, in so far as we are conscious of them, are modes of our thought, it is impossible to doubt of the fact of Thought or Thinking.^[5]

But why is it impossible to doubt of the existence of thought? Because, replies Descartes, to doubt is to think. Hence in doubting itself we think; let us doubt as we will we never escape thinking.

But in affirming the fact of our thought, or thinking, and in being necessitated to affirm it, we affirm and are necessitated to affirm the fact of Self-Existence. This fact is, according to Descartes, above proof, as it is above doubt: our consciousness of it is the first or fundamental, as it is an absolute and indestructible, certainty. The place which this consciousness occupies in Cartesianism, as its cardinal point, demands for it special attention; while the diversity of opinions concerning the nature of the Cartesian expression in which the knowledge is embodied necessitates a special statement on the subject.

To simplify the question, we must consider that there are, as there can only be, two opinions regarding the nature of the famous Cartesian principle.

Descartes, in the expression "Cogito, Ergo Sum," must either be held to deduce the knowledge of self-existence from a higher (more general) knowledge, as, e.g., What thinks, is, phænomenon implies a substance, or simply to affirm the fact, that is, to announce it as a knowledge immediately evident. If the former alternative be true, it is manifest that this knowledge is no longer primary, is no longer fundamental, since there is a knowledge (viz., that from which it is inferred) which is relatively prior. If the latter be correct, this knowledge is a first principle; it is not inferred from any higher knowledge.

Now that this knowledge is mediate, or inferential, Descartes has repeatedly and explicitly denied.^[6] It is, therefore, according to Descartes, immediate and underived. But though incapable of proof, it is yet competent to show how the fact is arrived at, or supposed to be found, in the way of Reflective Analysis.

To place the whole matter in a clear light, we have, in the first place, to attend to the following points. It ought to be considered:—

1. That Existence is as nothing to us where it is not manifested in some determinate Manner. In thinking anywhat as existing, we must think it existing in this or that Mode or Manner: of Existence apart from the Mode in which it appears to us, we have no positive, or immediate knowledge.

2. Again, that, as in thinking a thing existing we must think it existing in this or that mode, so we cannot think of a determinate Mode of existence, without at the same time and in the same indivisible act of thought, thinking that Somewhat of which this Mode is a manifestation, exists. Wherefore:—

3. That Self, that "I" in existing for self, for me, exists only in this or that Mode: and likewise that in appearing to me in this or that Mode it to the extent of its appearance or manifestation exists, or is thought existent.

4. That Self as the Subject of, or Existence underlying certain acts or modifications which exist only in so far as we are conscious of them, is not known to us as existing unless through these; and likewise, that we cannot know, or be conscious of, any modification or act without knowing that Self to the extent to which we are conscious exists.

Now the First Principle of Descartes, as expressed in the famous Cogito, Ergo Sum, is merely a particular case, a concrete or determinate exemplification of these universal laws of thought. It is not an inference from these, but they are, so to speak, derived from it: for universal laws, though potentially prior, are actually posterior in the order of knowledge, to the particular cases in which they are discovered to us under a concrete form. Laws or principles that are necessary and of universal extent are, according to truth and the doctrine of Descartes, revealed to us in particular cases and in contingent matter, and are evolved out of these not certainly by elaboration, but by analysis, that is, they are found not made.

That the first principle of Descartes is of such a character and no other,—is indeed a particular exemplification of these universal principles,—and no inference, may be made manifest by briefly considering it. Thus, in the first place, when Descartes, in the expression Cogito, Ergo Sum, says, I think, or, I am thinking; he says likewise, I exist, or, I am existing. These affirmations are, in truth, identical. They are contemporaneous, and stand in no relation of subordination. I am thinking is precisely equivalent to I am existing, as it matters not whether we seem to proceed from thinking to existing, or from existing to thinking, for in the one knowledge is given the other: in knowing that I think, I know that I exist, and in knowing that I exist, I know that I think; that is, am conscious of some determinate act manifested by me. The expression, Cogito, Ergo Sum, is, therefore, not an enthymeme with the suppressed major (sumption), what thinks, is: but a simple affirmation of the identity in the sphere of self-consciousness of thought and being.

Nor, in the second place, is the existence of self as the subject of thought inferred from the higher knowledge, every Quality supposes a Substance, but affirmed: self and existence are not first sundered or found apart, and then conjoined through some third knowledge, which is higher, more general, and, therefore, inclusive, but immediately known and affirmed in conjunction, and by the same indivisible act (simplici mentis intuitu), in which we know and affirm the existence of thought. We do not even come to know that self, or a subject of thought exists, through thinking that thought is a quality, for this were virtually to have recourse to the general principle that quality supposes a substance; and besides, to have already determined that there is a subject of thought, it being impossible to know that a particular mode of consciousness is a quality, unless we already know that there is a subject of thought. By this process we could only reach the knowledge sought by first taking it for granted in order to prove or establish it. Thus far of what Descartes does not do. What he does is simply to affirm that in knowing the fact of thought, in thinking, or in being conscious in this or that mode, I know also the existence of a determinate something of which this thought is an act, and which it supposes: and this something is Self, or I To suppose that the thinking subject can only be known in as far as it is logically deduced from the higher principle of substance and phænomenon, is to betray an ignorance of the order in which we know, nay, of the condition under which we acquire this more general knowledge; for it is impossible to affirm by a reflective act that every phænomenon implies a substance, every act a subject, until we have first, and, without reflection, affirmed that this or that phænomenon has a substance, and then by reflection affirmed that this or that phænomenon must have a substance. Universal principles are at first given in particular forms—in this or that matter, and it is only by reflection that their necessity and universality become apparent.^[7]

These things manifest, it is plain, in the third place, that as of the fact of thinking we possess an absolute and indestructible assurance, so also do we possess a similar assurance of the fact of our existence. To think for self is to exist, and, as in thinking there is given a subject of thought, of the existence of self,—of this subject we have an absolute assurance. It is thus that Descartes holds it to be as impossible to doubt of self-existence as of the fact that we think; for, when I doubt whether I exist, I think, and thus even because I doubt of my existence, I, to the extent of this doubt, exist. Were I not existing when I supposed I was not, I should thus not exist by supposition, and yet exist because I supposed. The certainty of our existence is thus not dependent on the certainty of the existence of God, or on the certainty that God is no deceiver, for, even though deceived, though compelled to think and determine falsely, we think, are conscious; that is, exist. This certainty is the fundamental one; the basis and ground of all knowledge and science; the ultimate point on which Descartes, trusting to the potency of thought, seeks to raise the superstructure of science.

Thus far of the nature of the Cartesian Doubt, and its solution. But Descartes does not rest here. From finding somewhat that is above doubt, he proceeds to inquire into the grounds of its certainty, and therefore into the last ground of our assurance of the truth of all individual judgments. He thus seeks the Criterion of truth, or "that through which we may be assured that we possess truth," and through which, therefore, knowledge in its perfection, is possible, and is alone possible. The criterion of truth is to be regarded as the positive or final element in the Cartesian Method; for, besides now superseding doubt as the regulative principle of the Cartesian Analysis, it is likewise constituted the regulative principle of the Cartesian Synthesis.

There thus falls to be considered, in the fifth place, the Cartesian Criterion of truth.

V. According to Descartes, certainty, or assurance is not identical with the criterion of truth. The latter, or that through which we know that we possess truth, is the ground or source of certainty, or assurance: but as we must possess certainty before we can seek its ground or source, it is plain that, in the order of knowledge, assurance or the supposition that we possess truth is prior to our discovery of the ground of certainty, or the criterion of truth.

Hence it is that Descartes does not seek to discover, in the first instance, the criterion of truth, but only some judgment absolutely certain and indubitable: in other words, he allows the faculties of knowledge to spring into activity and form a product, that is, to affirm their own credibility, before he essays to determine that condition of cognitive activity, the consciousness of which is certainty. Descartes thus essays to determine not what must be the criterion of truth, but to discover what is, or by analysis to find that element in a knowledge, on the consciousness of which, all doubt disappears. This procedure is in perfect harmony with the nature and conditions of his instrument, Reflection, which does not create, but simply reveals or exposes to view what is already existent; and thus always supposes the previous existence of matter on which to act,—of some spontaneous mental activity.

This brings us to the Cartesian Criterion of truth itself. This is, in general, the clearness and distinctness of the thought: by this, that a thing is clearly and distinctly thought, do we know that the thing is as we think it. Descartes, it ought, however, to be mentioned, connects his criterion of truth with the perfection of Deity.^[8]

There is a single principle upon which the criterion as well as the other elements of the Cartesian Method depend,—a principle through which the whole Method is led up to unity. In accordance with this view, the criterion falls to be considered in subordination to this grand principle, and illustrative of it.

The principle of which the whole Cartesian Method, from its fundamental to its most remote character, is but a manifestation and development in a variety of forms, is, that with a view to truth and certainty, to the realization of the end of Philosophy, there must be accorded to the thinker the perfect, that is, the free and full, action of the faculties of knowledge.^[9] The high generality of this principle secures to the Cartesian Method, in each and all of its precepts, perfect unity But this requires illustration, and, in its development, will be found the proof of the principle.

With a view to the illustration of the statement we must refer, in the first instance, to what has been said concerning the nature of Method in general. Method in science seeks a more perfect, because more determinate, knowledge than is passively afforded in the spontaneous and disorderly presentations of sense and self-consciousness. The mind, in proceeding methodically, asserts the superiority of its activity to its passivity, in that what is presented is, by an act of will, arrested for examination by the faculties of knowledge. Philosophical Method in general is thus, as has been said, the manifestation of the cognitive activity in accordance with certain rules. This activity is the condition of philosophical or scientific knowledge.

But if activity of mind be the condition of philosophical knowledge, it is manifest that the most perfect activity will best secure this knowledge, that is, the end of Method. Or since man is capable of knowledge, only in so far as he possesses certain faculties of knowledge; and as man only actually knows, in so far as he exerts these faculties, it is manifest that man will better or more perfectly know, in proportion to the absence of hinderances to the manifestation of the acts of his faculties; and that the most perfect knowledge will be realized through the least impeded action of the powers of knowledge.

The perfect exercise of our faculties of knowledge is only secured by the observance of certain conditions which may appear in the form of precepts.

The Cartesian Method is but a sum of precepts which teach how to secure the highest or most perfect, that is, at once the free and full action of the faculties of knowledge. The end of each of the Cartesian precepts is the free, or the full, action of these faculties.

Descartes teaches how to reach this end in the following injunctions:—

1. In his counselling a preliminary Doubt; for by this the mind throws off the influence of authority which leads us to think a thing in accordance with what others have thought, and thus to judge of a thing not from an actual inspection of it, but from the view of it taken by others. Authority thus interposes a barrier between thought and its matter. The power of thought, indeed, in being completely subject to authority, is altogether repressed in its action: the mind is wholly passive. It was thus that Descartes, to secure the free outgoing of the faculties of knowledge in the search after truth, counselled a general doubt.

2. Descartes seeks to allow to the faculties of knowledge perfect action in his precept to shun Precipitancy (R. I.): for this tendency coming into exercise while we are conducting a process of thought, stays the process prematurely, and thus determines judgments not in accordance with the matter of our thought.

3. The same is true of his precept to include in our judgments such matter alone as is clearly and distinctly presented (R. I.): and his doctrine of error points also to the necessity of the perfect action of our faculties of knowledge; for error, according to Descartes, arises when we include in our judgments objects obscurely and indistinctly thought.

It ought to be observed that the terms clearness and distinctness, as used by Descartes, do not relate, except in the most general manner, to the qualities of Notions Proper, that is, to the products of the Faculty of Comparison. They refer to the character of the matter of any of the cognitive faculties, though the object known be considered only in itself, that is, simply as possessing certain qualities, and without relation to other objects, with which it may possess qualities in common. Thus viewed, these terms and their opposites, the obscure and indistinct, express merely a higher and lower degree of consciousness, or cognitive activity, in some degree or other of which objects are only known.

That such is the meaning of Descartes may be easily evinced.

For, (1,) he considers the clear and distinct as equivalent to the real in thought, and their opposites as participating of negation and arising from our imperfection.^[10]

According to this doctrine, the clear and distinct must be held as equivalent to a certain degree of consciousness, and the obscure and indistinct as equivalent to the absence of this degree: For, first, thought is only real or actual when it exists in a determinate degree. And hence, secondly, as the obscure is a negation, it must be a negation, as the opposite of the clear, of the real in thought, and, therefore, of a determinate degree of consciousness. The obscure and indistinct thus arise in the absence or negation of adequate cognitive action.

(2,) We have an explicit declaration of the nature of the clear and the distinct by Descartes, in which these terms are made to refer exclusively to the degree of cognitive activity. "Claram voco illam, (he says,) quæ menti attendenti præsens et aperta est; sicut ea clarè a nobis videri dicimus, quæ oculo intuenti præsentia, satis fortiter et apertè illum movent. Distinctam autem illam, quæ, cùm clara sit, ab omnibus aliis ita sejuncta est et præcisa, ut nihil planè aliud, quàm quod clarum est, in se contineat."—Prin. Phil. P. P. § 45; see also § 46. From this statement it is plain that the clear is that which stimulates to free and full cognitive activity.

The resolution of Descartes, therefore, to accept nothing but what was clearly and distinctly presented, was taken with a view to secure the most perfect activity of the faculties of knowledge.

4. The same is true of the precept (which is in subordination to the preceding), to sunder complex objects, and consider their qualities separately (Rs. II., III.) This precept is necessary only because the activity of our faculties of knowledge is limited; because our power is not infinite. It is owing to our limitation that objects whose qualities are numerous cannot be at once compassed in their totality, without being vaguely and indistinctly apprehended. The extension of our activity is in an inverse ratio to its intension. Hence if we would secure adequate and complete cognitive activity, we must seek the qualities of objects in succession, i.e., we must decompose or analyse, and embrace at a time only so much as can be compassed with facility.

5. The same end is sought in his precept to make complete enumerations and general reviews (R. IV.) to prevent the omission or overlooking of any element in the matter of our knowledge. This precept, when observed, will of course secure the full action of the faculties of knowledge; for when any element in a particular matter or object of thought is overlooked, this object is not fully but partially thought as, on the contrary, an object is fully thought when thought without omission of any of its constituents.^[11]

Thus far of the Cartesian Method in its prior half, and in its application. But in order accurately to fix the character of the Method of Descartes, we must take into account its latter or final part.

VI. As in the prior half of his Method Descartes seeks principles, and makes the discovery of such the terminating point of his Analysis; so in the latter half he proceeds from principles, making the most remote conclusions from these the terminating point of his Synthesis.

The regulative principle of the Cartesian procedure in the establishment of the reasons of individual phænomena is the relation of truths as Reasons and Consequents. From what is given intuitively, he essays to reach by demonstration the extreme limits of Philosophy, that is, to construct a system of reasons. It is thus that, though Descartes recommended and practised a return to observation and experiment in the interest of Philosophy, his mode of reaching the highest principles of Science is far from being identical with the Baconian. This and the Cartesian are, in truth, at opposite poles. With Bacon, the highest principles of Science are merely the most extensive generalizations, and form the terminating point of his investigation. With Descartes, on the contrary, the highest laws are ungeneralized, are in themselves, and independently of any elaboration, principles of universal extent, and form the starting-point of demonstration. With the former, these laws are the products of the Elaborative Faculty, and are reached by leading this, that, and the other fact, to unity; evolving thus out of the particular and the contingent the universal. With the latter, these laws are not products at all, for they are not formed, but given in consciousness, and discovered by Analysis. They are thus intuitive and immediate, and by intuition and demonstration does Descartes essay to construct Philosophy.^[12]

To the high generality of the principles of the Cartesian Synthesis, taken in conjunction with his non-discrimination of the twofold import of his criterion of truth, are, perhaps, to be attributed the most daring of the philosopher's errors.—Descartes has not analysed his criterion of truth into its ultimate elements, nor can he be said accurately to have determined its sphere. He has not distinguished, though including both under clear knowledge, that knowledge given in the agreement of one thought with another, and that afforded in the harmony of a thought with its object. This is manifest from his adherence to the Ontological Demonstration of the existence of the Absolute. This demonstration founds on the concept or notion of God, which includes necessary existence; and from the notion alone, as possessed of this character, determines that God or the Absolute is really existent. It thus assumes that the thinking of a thing in harmony with the laws of thought is a sufficient guarantee of the real existence of the thing, in other words, of the matter of the thought. In the present instance, the demonstration proceeds on the principle of identity; for merely because God is thought under the notion necessary existence, in other words, because it is clearly thought that the notion is equal to its character or itself, it is concluded that Deity is really existent. Such procedure in identifying what is possible in thought with what is actual in existence is of course wholly illegitimate.^[13]

With reference to the Cartesian Synthesis, it is at the same time deserving of notice, that however inapplicable such procedure, when allowed to predominate, may be in the real sciences, it is yet of strict and legitimate application in the formal, to the full extent of its employment by Descartes. Thus Logic is, in its last details, but the evolution of what is given in a fixed number of ungeneralized universal laws; and, as a formal science, is wholly superior to generalization.

Thus far of the Cartesian Method, and of such of the results of the Method as serve to illustrate its nature and application.

In order, however, adequately to determine the place of Descartes in the History of Speculation, we must know not only his Method, but the results of his Method, that is, his Philosophy. As a statement and criticism of the philosophical system of Descartes is for the present impossible, it may be proper, in room of this, to give, in conclusion, a faint outline of the course and character of the philosophical activity which Cartesianism has elicited.^[14]

To the philosophy of Descartes are due the cardinal doctrines in the systems of Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.

1. From the Cartesian dogma, that God has accorded to created Substance no principle of subsistence, and that the existence of each substance, from moment to moment, is due to the renewal in each moment of the creative act of Deity,^[15] the further doctrine, that God likewise determines the phænomena, or actual state of each substance, is but slightly removed: and this latter doctrine is precisely that of Occasional Causes, or the doctrine which makes Deity the sole and immediate cause of each change that takes place in the creature; and this is the fundamental dogma in the Philosophy of Malebranche.

2. Again, the doctrine that Deity is the sole and immediate cause of every change in the universe, taken in conjunction with the identification by Descartes, whether merely seeming or real, of substance with its fundamental attribute,^[16] and thereby, the virtual negation of substance, leads obviously to the doctrine that there is, in truth, but a single substance and a single cause, of which all things are but the passing modes and changing effects. This dogma is the fundamental position of Pantheism; and thus it is that the philosophy of Descartes had the effect of paving the way for Spinozism.

3. The philosophies of Malebranche and Spinoza gave rise, in the way of corrective, to that of Leibnitz, who, by identifying Substance and Force, sought to give a principle of subsistence to created substances; and thus to vindicate to the finite a real as opposed to a phænomenal existence.

But Cartesianism stands related to subsequent thinking, not only by the development of its positive doctrines, but likewise by the continuance in the current of subsequent speculation of its exclusive tendency.

4. The tendency in the main of Cartesianism is to Rationalism and Idealism, and by this character it has, in a very marked manner, influenced and determined the current of subsequent speculation.

By Rationalism in Philosophy is to be understood the taking into account those elements or conditions of knowledge which, in the act of knowledge, are the contribution of the thinking subject itself. Every Philosophy is to the extent of its recognition of such elements Rationalist. The term is, however, more generally employed to denote, in addition to the simple recognition of such elements, the attribution to them of an undue importance or rank, so as to exclude a due regard to, or even the recognition of such elements as, in the act of knowledge, arise from the object. In this latter and abusive sense the term is applicable to Cartesianism; for the tendency, as a whole and in general, of the Philosophy of Descartes, is to elevate the purely subjective elements of knowledge above the objective,—the native above the adventitious. In this respect the Philosophy of Descartes and that of Locke are at opposite poles. Locke's extreme, indeed, was principally determined by the opposite extreme of Descartes.

Idealism, when taken in its narrower sense, and not as equivalent to Rationalism, is merely a special form of the latter; for it denotes the doctrine according to which matter is merely an educt from mind. Rationalism, in this special manifestation, is involved in Cartesianism; for it follows, from the denial of the contemporaneousness of the knowledge of mind and matter, and the ascription of priority to the knowledge of mind: and such ascription of priority is made by Descartes to the virtual exclusion of the possibility of the knowledge of matter. The process by which Descartes essays to demonstrate the existence of matter is, of course, paralogous. All modern Idealism has its source in Descartes.

The Rationalist and Ideal tendency of Cartesianism is manifested in higher development in Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, the Leibnitzian Wolf; and, indeed, in the general tenor of the Philosophy that prevailed in the Schools of Europe until the complete ascendancy of Empiricism, through the Essay of Locke, on the death of Wolf in 1754. From this period Cartesianism, as a system or body of philosophical doctrines, gave place to the Sensuous Philosophy of Locke, which, in its turn, was the prevalent philosophy until exhausted in Hume. Since then Lockianism has been on the wane; and in room of the Sensuous Philosophy, the ruling is again the Rationalist, which, with all the elaborations of more modern thinkers, is, in substance, Cartesian.

1. Descartes was born at La Haye, in Touraine, in the year 1596, and died at Stockholm in 1650. Of the particulars of his life it is unnecessary to say anything, as a knowledge of them is easily accessible. The Discourse on Method contains, moreover, an account of the rise and progress of his speculations; and it is in his character of thinker and philosophical reformer that we have now to deal with him.
   The principal works of Descartes are—
   1. The four Treatises originally published in a single volume with the following title, {{lang|fr|Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa Raison, et chercher la Vérité dans les Sciences. Plus, la Dioptrique, les Météores, et la Géométrie, qui sont des Essais de cette Méthode]]. Leyden, 1637.
   The Method, Dioptrics, and Meteorics, were translated into Latin by Courcelles, and published at Amsterdam in 1644. There is also by Descartes a fragmentary treatise, the subject of which is kindred to that of the Method. It is entitled, Regulæ ad Directionem Ingenii; and to it is annexed another entitled, Inquisitio Veritatis per Lumen Naturale. These were published posthumously.
   2. Meditationes de primâ Philosophiâ, ubi de Dei existentiâ, et animæ immortalitate. Paris, 1641.
   3. Principia Philosophiæ. Amsterdam, 1644.
   4. Traité des Passions de l'Ame. Amsterdam, 1649.
2. As in certain passages of the Discourse on Method the precise nature of the Cartesian doubt does not appear, it may be proper to quote the following explicit declaration by Descartes himself, in reply to Gassendi:—"In order to rid one's self of all sorts of prejudices, it is necessary only to resolve to affirm or deny nothing of all that we had formerly affirmed or denied, until this has been examined anew, although we are not on this account prevented from retaining in the memory the whole of the notions themselves." Lettre de M. Descartes à M. Clerselier, &c. See Simon's Ed., p. 367. Compare Remarks on Seventh Objections, E.
   In doubting, therefore, Descartes suspended his judgment, that is, he asserted neither that the subject lay within nor without the sphere of the predicate; and as in this respect the act had no determinate product, Descartes was not as yet a Dogmatist. Again, as the doubter resolved to doubt, he affirmed the propriety of the doubt, and its necessity as a means to his end; to the extent of this affirmation, Descartes is a Dogmatist.
3. See the Method, Part III., p. 71; also Part IV.; and the 1st Meditation, passim; compare Hypotyposes of S. Empiricus, Book I., chap. iv.
4. The Philosophical Reformation accomplished by Descartes was effected in absolute independence of Bacon. Descartes was no doubt acquainted with the works of Bacon in the year 1633 (Ep. Pars. ii. Ep. lxvii.), and even perhaps so early as 1626. These admissions do not, however, affect his absolute originality, for we know from his own statement that he had commenced in 1619 to seek truth in independence of authority, and according to the principles of the Method which even then he had thought out for himself. But Descartes, in truth, in what he essayed and accomplished, and in the means he adopted, has but little in common with Bacon.
5. To show in what extension the term Thought (cogitatio, pensée) is used by Descartes, the following passages may be adduced: "In the term thought I comprehend all that is in us of which we are immediately conscious. Thus all the operations of the will, of the intellect, of the imagination and senses, are thoughts."—Resp. ad Sec. Object. p. 85. (Ed. 1663.) Again, in reply to the question, What is a thing which thinks? he says, "It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives,] affirms, desires, wills, refuses, that imagines also and perceives."—Med. II. p. 11.
6. See M. Cousin, Sur le vrai sens du Cogito, Ergo Sum, in the Fragments Philosophiques. But see especially Descartes' Responsio ad Secundas Objectiones, p. 74 of the ed. 1663. See likewise Spinoza's Prin. Phil. Cartes, vol. i. pars I. p. 4. (Ed. 1802.)
7. Compare Descartes' Resp. ad Sec. Obj., p. 74, (ed. 1663,) and M. Cousin, Lect. 14th on the True. (Brussels ed.)
8. See the Discourse on Method, pp. 80, 81, 82.
9. With respect to the principle of which the Cartesian Method is here shown to be a development, the author of these introductory pages is desirous of stating that its full importance and extent have been mainly suggested by the speculations of Sir W. Hamilton on the nature of Error.
10. Discourse on Method, pp. 80, 81; see also Med. IV. passim.
11. The reader may compare with this view of the Cartesian Method what Bacon says of the importance of the removal of obstacles from the exercise of the faculties. See Nov. Org. Bk. I. § 130.
12. See the Method, P. VI.
13. The demonstration to which reference is here made is given at length in Med. V. See also Resp. ad Sec. Obj., towards the end. Descartes explicitly makes it a corollary from his criterion of truth. It ought to be observed, that Descartes gives three demonstrations of the existence of God: none of which, however, he has fully elaborated in the Method. The first in order of these, as given in the Method, founds upon the existence of the notion of the Perfect in relation to that of the Imperfect. A limited being, according to Descartes, cannot be the cause either formal or eminent of the existence of this notion. Its only adequate cause is an Absolute Being: hence, as the notion exists, the cause, i.e., God, must also exist.
    The notions of the Infinite and Finite necessarily arise in the limited being; but it is not on its necessity, but on the representative perfection of the notion of the Infinite that Descartes founds his demonstration. With regard to the character of this notion as positive or negative, he is, however, vacillating.
    Through this demonstration Descartes arrives for the first time at the knowledge of somewhat different from the thinking subject. The Cartesian Non-Ego is thus not matter, but God.
    In the second proof, Descartes founds on the fact of our existence and its limitation; and infers that there is a sustainer or ground of dependence, by whose act we at first commenced to exist, and by whose power, manifested in acts repeated from moment to moment, we continue to exist.
    The third proof is the Ontological. This is referred to in the text. See Method, p. 79. On the Arguments of Descartes for the Existence of Deity, consult Cousin's Lectures on Kant. Lec. VI., Log. Transcendentale.
14. For the results of the Method of Descartes, the Meditations especially should be consulted—a work which M. Cousin pronounces "one of the most beautiful and solid monuments of philosophical genius." [A translation of the Meditations, and part of the Principles of Philosophy, uniform with the Method, is now published.]
15. See especially Med. III. p. 23. (Ed. 1663.)
16. See especially Prin. Phil. p. p. § 63.