SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 22–174
GERALD E. GROFF, PETITIONER v. LOUIS DEJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2023]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins, concurring.
As both parties here agree, the phrase “more than a de minimis cost” from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 84 (1977), was loose language. An employer violates Title VII if it fails “to reasonably accommodate” an employee’s religious observance or practice, unless the employer demonstrates that accommodation would result in “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). The statutory standard is “undue hardship,” not trivial cost.
Hardison, however, cannot be reduced to its “de minimis” language. Instead, that case must be understood in light of its facts and the Court’s reasoning. The Hardison Court concluded that the plaintiff’s proposed accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business because the accommodation would have required the employer either to deprive other employees of their seniority rights under a collective-bargaining agreement, or to incur substantial additional costs in the form of lost efficiency or higher wages. 432 U. S., at 79–81, 83–84, and n. 14. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has interpreted Title VII’s undue-hardship standard in this way for seven consecutive Presidential administrations, from President Reagan to President Biden. See 29 CFR §1605.2(e) (2022) (citing Hardison, 432 U. S., at 80, 84).
Petitioner Gerald Groff asks this Court to overrule Hardison and to replace it with a “significant difficulty or expense” standard. Brief for Petitioner 17–38. The Court does not do so. That is a wise choice because stare decisis has “enhanced force” in statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). Congress is free to revise this Court’s statutory interpretations. The Court’s respect for Congress’s decision not to intervene promotes the separation of powers by requiring interested parties to resort to the legislative rather than the judicial process to achieve their policy goals. This justification for statutory stare decisis is especially strong here because “Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse [Hardison]—openings as frequent and clear as this Court ever sees.” Id., at 456–457.[1] Moreover, in the decades since Hardison was decided, Congress has revised Title VII multiple times in response to other decisions of this Court,[2] yet never in response to Hardison. See Kimble, 576 U. S., at 457.
Groff also asks the Court to decide that Title VII requires the United States Postal Service to show “undue hardship to [its] business,” not to Groff’s co-workers. Brief for Petitioner 42 (emphasis added); see 35 F. 4th 162, 176 (CA3 2022) (Hardiman, J., dissenting). The Court, however, recognizes that Title VII requires “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j) (emphasis added). Because the “conduct of [a] business” plainly includes the management and performance of the business’s employees, undue hardship on the conduct of a business may include undue hardship on the business’s employees. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U. S., at 79–81 (deprivation of employees’ bargained-for seniority rights constitutes undue hardship). There is no basis in the text of the statute, let alone in economics or common sense, to conclude otherwise. Indeed, for many businesses, labor is more important to the conduct of the business than any other factor.
To be sure, some effects on co-workers will not constitute “undue hardship” under Title VII. For example, animus toward a protected group is not a cognizable “hardship” under any antidiscrimination statute. Cf. ante, at 20. In addition, some hardships, such as the labor costs of coordinating voluntary shift swaps, are not “undue” because they are too insubstantial. See 29 CFR §§1605.2(d)(1)(i), (e)(1). Nevertheless, if there is an undue hardship on “the conduct of the employer’s business,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j), then such hardship is sufficient, even if it consists of hardship on employees. With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.
- ↑ See, e.g., H. R. 1440, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., §4(a)(4) (2021); H. R. 5331, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §4(a)(4) (2019); S. 3686, 112th Cong., 2d Sess., §4(a)(3) (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., §4(a)(3) (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(1)(B) (2008); H. R. 1431, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (2007); H. R. 1445, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (2005); S. 677, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (2005); S. 893, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(4) (2002); H. R. 4237, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(4) (2000); S. 1668, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (1999); H. R. 2948, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(3) (1997); H. R. 4117, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(3) (1996).
- ↑ See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 (overruling Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 5 (overruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U. S. 618 (2007)).