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Index:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. a.djvu

Title United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, Part V. B. 2. a.
Author Pentagon-Department of Defense
Year 2011
Publisher U.S. Government
Location Washington, D.C.
Source djvu
Progress To be proofread
Transclusion Index not transcluded or unreviewed
Volumes
V.B.2

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS


The Truman Administration, 1945 – 1952


Contents and

Chronological List of Documents


1945 Page
⁠
1. Extract of minutes of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) held 13 April: Mr. Lovett states that "the lack of a policy [on Indochina] is a source of serious embarrassment to the military." The Committee agreed that the State Department should take up the question of clarification of policy on Indochina. Memorandum, R. E. Cox, SWNCC, to Mr. Bonbright - Minutes, 23 May (13 April) 1945 1
2. Secretary of State Stettinius informs Ambassador Caffery (France) on the status of U.S. assistance to French resistance groups in Indochina, Stettinius 1576 to Caffery (Paris), 19 April 1945 3
3. The U.S. rejects a French proposal to conclude an agreement with the French Provisional Government analogous to the Franco-Allied agreement of 25 August 1944. The U.S. refuses to consider diversion of resources to specific military operations in Indochina. Stettinius letter to French Ambassador Bonnet, 20 April 1945 5
4. The State Department undertakes an internal task to clarify U.S. policy toward Indochina following President Roosevelt's death, 12 April 1945, and the SWNCC meeting, 13 April 1945. A summary of how the State Department documented this task and the pertinent documents follow as 4.a. through 4.e. 9
a. Division of European Affairs (EUR) submits a proposed "Memorandum on Indochina Policy" to the Assistant Secretary for forwarding to the President. The memorandum recommends that the U.S. not oppose restoration of Indochina to France. H. Freeman Matthews, EUR, Memorandum, to Mr. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 April 1945 9
⁠b. Division of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) forwards comments and suggested changes to EUR version of the Memorandum on Indochina policy. FE recommends additions to the EUR proposals as well as not opposing restoration of Indochina to France, provided France gave adequate assurances on five major points chiefly concerning Indochinese independence. Memorandum by Mr. Stanton, FE, to Mr. Dunn, 21 April 1945 9
⁠c. Mr. Dunn feels that it is better to let the Indochina policy matter drift rather than base it on the FE version of the Memorandum. Dunn message to Mr. Grew, Under Secretary of State, 23 April 1945 18
⁠d. The final compromise Memorandum to the President includes extracts from both the FE and EUR versions, but does include mention that the U.S. would seek the French views on the five points raised by FE. Memorandum to the President, subject: American Policy with Respect to Indochina, undated, not sent 19
⁠e. The draft cable, which was approved by all Divisions concerned, requests French indication of intentions on five points: 22
(1) Indochinese self-government within a French Union.
(2) Economic and commercial non-discrimination.
(3) Haiphong as a free port.
(4) Recognition of an Indochina-Thai border.
(5) International security arrangements for Southeast Asia; Unnumbered cable, 9 May 1945.
⁠
5. Assistant Secretary of War proposes "so far as practicable" the U.S. should avoid "unnecessary or long term" commitments of assistance to French resistance forces in Indochina. Memorandum, R.E. Cox, SWNCC, to Mr. Bonbright, WE, 2 May 1945 26
6. French Foreign Minister is informed by Stettinius at San Francisco that "the record is entirely innocent…of this government questioning…French sovereignty over Indochina." Crew 1949 to Caffery, 9 May 1945 27
7. Matthews reports to President Truman of French desire to participate in Far East war and the JCS view that little military value would accrue from the French forces. Memorandum by Matthews for Truman, 16 May 1945 27
8. Grew reviews Hurley the present position of U.S. policy on "trusteeship structure" and the necessity of "voluntary" action by colonial powers and that the extent of French participation in the war in the Pacific was to be determined by Gen MacArthur. Grew 873 to Hurley (China) 7 June 1945 30
9. The U.S. military reply to the French offer of participation (by two French divisions) in the Pacific war outlines the provisions to acceptance in principle. Essentially, the U.S. desires complete command and control of the French trained, equipped and maintained divisions with movement from France based on the units having attained U.S. combat standards. Memorandum by U.S. Chief of Staff to Combined Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 16 July 1945 33
10. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff views that logistics considerations prevented French and Dutch participation in the Pacific war are presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration. Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 18 July 1945 36
11. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the French divisions be "employed in due course in French Indo-China." Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 18 July 1945 37
12. The U.S. Chief of Staff consider the British view and compromise earlier U.S. positions to allow for possible use of French divisions under British command in areas to "be determined later." Memorandum U.S. Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 19 July 1945 37
13. Report to the President and Prime Minis agreed summary of conclusions on the strategic concept and policies for prosecution of the war, reached by the Combined Chief of Staff at the terminal conference of the Potsdam meeting. Basically, the Chiefs' strategy focused on Japan with the U.S. controlling operations. The door was left open for French and Dutch participation based on "military considerations" and "shipping" requirements. JCS files, CCS 900/3, 24 July 1945 39
14. President Truman informs Hurley (China) that it was agreed at Potsdam to divide Indochina at latitude 16° north for operational purposes: the south going to Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and the north going to the China theater. Hurley is urged to get Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence. Truman telegram to Hurley from Berlin, 3 August 1945 44
15. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), reports on the French attitude toward the Indochina Provisional Government to the Secretary of State. A French committee was to negotiate with Annamite leaders on terms favorable to Indochina; the French were to act as advisors to the Indochina Provisional Government with the power to sign treaties for France. Annamite leaders, however, expressed the desire to have status as an American protectorate, excluding both French and Chinese occupation. Threats of violence over a French reoccupation were made. Memorandum by Donovan for Secretary of State, 22 August 1945 45
16. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, reasserts U.S. policy toward French control of Indochina to the Chargé in China (Robertson). The U.S. neither opposed nor assisted re-establishment of French control in Indochina, Robertson was told. The U.S. "willingness" to see French control is based on the future outcome of French claims of popular support. Acheson 1622 to Robertson, 5 October 1945 49
17. Caffery (Paris) informs Secretary of State of the Franco-British agreement on Indochina which recognizes the French Civil Administration as sole authority in Indochina south of the 16th parallel. Caffery 6006 to Secretary of State, 12 October 1945 49
18. Caffery reports that de Gaulle rejected announcing a far-reaching progressive policy designed to give Indochinese greater authority, representation, and responsibility in government under the pretext of the state of disorder which prevailed in Indochina. De Gaulle felt that "no such policy could be implemented pending restoration of French authority." Caffery 6857 to Secretary of State, 28 November 1945 50
⁠
1946
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19. Matthews requests direction from Acheson on transfer of Lend-Lease vehicles from the British to the French in Indochina. Acheson replies that President Truman thought the U.S. should agree to the transfer. Acheson-Matthews notes, 18 January 1946 52
20. Secretary of State Byrnes requests information on conditions in Indochina and especially on the status of French-Viet Minh negotiations. Byrnes 53 to Bangkok, 28 January 1946 53
21. Gen Gallagher, OSS, reveals that, in his view of Indochina, "one or two modern French divisions could defeat the Annamese" and that after de Gaulle's October pronouncement of colonial policy, the Annamese (Ho Chi Minh) refused to negotiate with the French and became hostile. "Ho himself will not deal with the French…and will be behind any continuing Annamese movement." The Viet Minh administration is young and inexperienced but "the demand for independence is widespread and even in the villages the peasants refer to the example of the Philippines…however, the Viet Minh should not be labeled full-fledged doctrinaire communist." Memorandum of Conversation by R.L. Sharp, SEA Affairs, 30 January 1946 53
22. Landon reports that d'Argenlieu-Ho Chi Minh negotiations have been proceeding and may be completed in two or three weeks, and that only temporary and local Franco-Chinese agreements have been realized. Landon (Saigon) O927 to Byrnes, 5 February 1946 58
23. Caffery informs Byrnes that present French government "will try to follow a conciliatory and moderate policy in Indochina and will be more progressive in its outlook than de Gaulle." Caffery 595 to Byrnes, 6 February 1946 59
24. Landon states that: "it seems certain that Annamese plan desperate resistance to French. Ho Chi Minh stated that he considering petitioning all United Nations to mediate Annamese independence and prevent extensive bloodshed." Landon (Hanoi) 2 to Byrnes, 16 February 1946 59
25. Landon refers to two letters to President Truman from Ho Chi Minh which request the USA as UN member to support Annamese independence according to the example of the Philippines. Landon summarizes the points in Ho Chi Minh's petition to the United Nations which includes a review of French conquests, Ho's governmental accomplishments, and requests for intervention by the Big Four. Landon (Hanoi) to Secretary of State, undated (received 27 February 1945) 61
26. The Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Wang, indicates that Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Indochina by 15 April and that he had urged a "bloodless" Franco-Viet Minh agreement with them. Wang suggests joint Chinese-American mediation of French-Indochinese problem and refers to the late President Roosevelt's interest in dependent peoples. Smyth (Chungking) 394 to Byrnes, 28 February 1946 62
27. Reed reports signing of the 6 March agreement whereby "Vietnam becomes a free state within the Indochina federation and will have own army, direct own internal affairs, and finance…Annamites are frankly pleased…French military occupation proceeding smoothly." Reed (Saigon) 20 to Secretary of State, 7 March 1946 63
28. Saigon informs State that Chinese are putting obstacles in the French path and Viet Minh incidents around Saigon are increasing. Reed 33 to State, 14 March 1946 63
29. Viet Minh extremists assassinate a member of the Cochin China Council, French seize Hanoi Treasury, and Tonkin incidents jeopardize peaceful outcome of events. Reed 70 to State, 1 April 1946 64
30. The U.S. informs France that the Combined Chiefs of Staff do not object to relief of Chinese troops by French forces in Indochina, and that on the repatriation of Japanese, the French military commander should coordinate with Gen MacArthur (since the Chinese and British were totally relieved of occupation and repatriation duties in Indochina). Byrnes' note to Bonnet, 12 April 1946 64
31. O'Sullivan (Hanoi) indicates that most important immediate question in the negotiations opening at Dalat appears to be status of Cochin China. O'Sullivan 2 to Byrnes, 18 April 1946 65
32. The U.S. indicates that Ho Chi Minh has requested U.S., U.K. and other recognitions as a free state within French Union. Byrnes to Consular Officers, 18 April 1946 66
33. Ho Chi Minh calls for Cochin-China to join Vietnam, French to cease entering Cochin-China, and for French to live up to agreements. French are pessimistic over Dalat conferences. "…over-all picture is not a happy one…" Reed 122 to Byrnes, 27 April 1946 66
34. U.S. reviews the situation at Dalat conference from the viewpoint of French and Vietnamese as pessimistic (in light of recent conflicts, outbreaks of fighting, and conflicting views on Cochin-China status) and feels that French will possibly attempt a coup when Chinese withdraw. Acheson to Consular Officers, 1 May 1946 67
35. Acheson reports that the French are confident of success in negotiations with Vietnam, but they feel the Vietnam delegation is controlled by better-organized communists, even though only half the delegation is communist. Acheson to Consular Officers, 13 May 19416 67
36. Ho Chi Mihh is reported as believing satisfactory agreement can be reached with the French. Acheson to Consular Officers, 14 May 1946 68
37. U.S. expresses concern over continued presence of Chinese troops in Tonkin and that everything possible should be done to speed evacuation. Acheson to Gen George C. Marshall (Nanking), 15 May 1946 68
38. French propose federal organization for Vietnam (under High Commissioner who exercises French Union powers) with a legislative assembly of ten members each from Tonkin, Annam, Cochin-China, Laos, Cambodia and ten French members. Byrnes to Nanking, 20 May 1946 69
39. U.S. raises Consulate Saigon to Consulate General, effective 20 May 1946. Byrnes 2427 to Caffery, 20 May 1946 69
40. U.S. notes three important political parties in Vietnam: Viet Minh (whose most active members are former Indochinese Communist Party members), Dong Minh Hoi (DMH) and Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD), which seem to have support of the Chinese. Catholics appear to support no single party, but "as a group will not remain absent from politics." O'Sullivan 20 to Byrnes for General Marshall, 20 May 1946 69
41. Ho Chi Minh has constantly given impression that "he would pay great attention to any suggestions" made by the U.S. O'Sullivan (Hanoi) to Byrnes, 5 June 1946 71
42. U.S. Consul to Hanoi views Vietnam strength in Cochin-China as "diminishing," that Ho went to Paris for this reason, and at the same time, to seek support from French Left Wing. O'Sullivan to Byrnes, 5 June 1946 71
43. Caffery reports Franco-Viet conference at Fontainebleau is off to a bad start, as Vietnamese delegation protested assumption of the chairmanship by head of the French delegation, protested creation of Cochin-China as an independent state, and accused French of violating 6 March agreement. Ho Chi Minh held conversations with Algerians on similarity of their problems. Caffery 3323 to Byrnes, 7 July 1946 73
44. Vietnam breaks off negotiations at Fontainebleau on the grounds that France violated March 6 accord by convoking a new Dalat conference. Caffrey 3801 to Byrnes, 2 August 1946 74
45. U.S. views recent moves by the French as designed to regain a large measure of control over Indochina in "violation of the spirit of the 6 March convention" and that widespread hostilities may result from Vietnam resistance to these encroachments. Memorandum by Moffat (SEA) for Vincent (FEA), 9 August 1946 75
46. U.S. views results of Dalat conference as a reasonable basis for the future, but far short of larger degree of independence desired by Vietnam, and it is difficult "to foresee any great success…so long as Cochin-China stays apart from Vietnam…" Reed 342 to Byrnes, 17 August 1946 78
47. U.S. express concern over "French colonial tendency picture U.S. as aggressive and imperialistic" and indicates closeness of this unwitting French colonial view to Communist Party Line. Clayton (Acting SecState) 240 to Saigon, 4 September 1946 78
48. U.S. looks at intelligence reports linking USSR to Ho Chi Minh and requests information on relative strength outside contacts of Vietnam communists. Clayton 241 to Saigon. 9 September 1946 79
49. Caffery reports on visit of Ho Chi Minh just prior to signing, modus vivendi; Ho declares he is not a communist. Caffery 6131 to Byrnes. 11 September 1946 79
50. U.S. is informed by French of increased communist activities in French Indochina, chiefly Chinese Communist entrenchment in Saigon and Haiphong. Agencies outside of Indochina are supplying propaganda. Reed 374 to Byrnes, 17 September 1946 80
51. Caffery reports signing of modus vivendi and that Ho Chi Minh obtained satisfaction on many points, but French would have liked to include definition of Vietnam relations to Indochinese Federation and French Union. Caffery 4671 to Byrnes, 17 September 1946 80
52. Saigon views "amicable" meeting of Ho Chi Minh and High Commissioner in light of belief that "French Communists desire soft-pedal communist trends in Vietnam for political reasons" prior to elections. Reed 411 to Byrnes, 19 October 1946 82
53. Ho Chi Minh informs the U.S. that effectiveness of modus vivendi depends on France, fighting would not stop unless French applied the agreement, and that Cochin-China "must be united to Vietnam." O'Sullivan 96 to Byrnes, 25 October 1946 82
54. Contact between Vietnam and Chinese Communists is apparent, but the presence of Chicoms as advisors in the provinces is difficult to verify. Reports of Chinese in Haiphong are regarded with suspicion. O'Sullivan 101 to Byrnes, 1 November 1946 83
55. Caffery reports French concern over "positive proof" of direct contact between Moscow and Ho Chi Minh. Caffery 5857 to Byrnes, 29 November 1946 83
56. U.S. Consul views Ho Chi Minh's contacts with France as designed to facilitate application of Marxist principles when, and if, a Communist government is established in France. Further, French concern

of Ho's communist contacts at this time is peculiar when they are forcing collaboration or preparing a puppet government; this a possible diversion from French policy in Indochina. O'Sullivan 131 to Byrnes, 3 December 1946

84
57. Acheson instruct Moffat on Ho Chi Minh communist record and offers guidelines of U.S. policy in discussion with Ho. Essentially, the U.S. is concerned over Tonkin events, the American people have welcomed Indochinese attainments but violence imperils this sympathy, and U.S. is informing France similarly. The U.S. is not making formal intervention at this time. Acheson 305 to Saigon, 5 December 1946 85
58. U.S. feels France would engage in full scale military operations only if forced, since they realize it is no longer possible to maintain a closed door. However, Cochin-China political question must be settled French cannot resolve it without fight. The Cochin-Chinese prefer Tonkin to France. Reed 472 to Byrnes, 6 December 1946 87
59. Secretary Byrnes reviews basic French-Vietnamese difficulties for Missions at London, Moscow, and Nanking. Essentially, the difficulties revolve around deep nationalist sentiment and opposition to the French, guided by a few communist trained leaders in the government with apparent contacts with Moscow and Yenan. However, "French influence is important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence, but to protect Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism." Three basic troubles are mutual distrust, French irresolution of the term "free state," and Vietnamese intransigence. Byrnes message to certain Missions 17 December 1946 88
60. Byrnes reviews recent French political crisis and influence of Indochina policy as an important factor. Outbreak of hostilities in Hanoi seen as serious and not likely to be resolved by Moutet and d'Argenlieu. Byrnes message to Moscow, Nanking and Saigon, 20 December 1946 90
61. Vincent informs Acheson that with inadequate forces and divided public opinion, the French have tried to accomplish in Indochina what a strong, united Britain found unwise to attempt in Burma. In short, "guerrilla warfare may continue indefinitely." The

French should be informed of U.S. concern, especially since the conflict may come before the UN or other powers may intervene. Memorandum by Vincent for Acheson, 23 December 1946

91
62. U.S. advances reasons why the Vietnamese attacked the French on 19 December: (a) orders from Moscow to upset Southeast Asia, or to increase Communist Party strength in France as a result of a quick settlement if the CP should take power from Blum; and (b) hope for similar Javanese-Dutch settlement resulting from fighting while negotiating. O'Sullivan 194 to Byrnes, 23 December 1946 92
63. U.S. impresses concern over Tonkin events on the French, but expresses no offer to mediate. U.S. is concerned that the UN might become involved. Byrnes 6586 to Caffery, 24 December 1946 93
64. U.S. takes the position to oppose Chinese proposals for intervention in Indochina. Acheson 8317 to Gallman (UK), 27 December 1946 95
65. Reed, in discussing with whom Moutet can deal, offers creation of new government under Bao Dai and/or Tam. Reed 4599 to Byrnes, 30 December 1946 95
66. The U.S. approves the Consul in Hanoi to act on humanitarian grounds to save lives, but cautions not to become involved in any situation which could be interpreted as mediating basic political issues without express authorization.
Byrnes 25 to O'Sullivan, 31 December 1946		 96
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1947
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67. U.S. reasserts the non-involvement policy of approving sales of military arms and armaments to France except in cases which relate Indochina hostilities. Byrnes 75 to Paris, 8 January 1947 97
68. U.S. expresses support and full recognition of France's position; however, U.S. cannot overlook dangerous outmoded colonial French methods. On the other hand, the U.S. does not desire the France be replaced by Kremlin communism as evidenced by Ho Chi Minh connections. The U.S. does not favor UN intervention, but "frankly we have no solution of the

problem to suggest." George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 431 to Paris, 3 February 1947

98
69. The U.S. is concerned that the Western democratic system is on the defensive in emerging nations and Southern Asia is in a critical phase. The key to the U.S. position is an awareness that in respect to the position of Western democratic powers in Southern Asia, the United States is in the boat as the French, British and the Dutch. "We cannot conceive setbacks to the long range interests of France which would not also be setbacks of our own." The U.S. is ready to he helpful in any way, however, non-intervention is still the U.S. policy. Marshall 1737 to Paris, 13 May 1947 100
70. The State Department is concerned that a rumored, dry season French offensive would have repercussions in a Congress which will be called on for extensive financial aid to Western Europe in light of France's economic, financial, and food position. Marshall 3433 to Paris, 11 September 1947 103
71. M. Bollaert, French High Commissioner in Indochina, delivers publicly the most important declaration of French policy since before hostilities broke out. The French ask for a Vietnamese "representative government" to accept French terms, and exclude dealing with Ho Chi Minh except as a last resort, and then only for his surrender. The U.S. sees this policy resulting from a strengthened France (and a proportional unwillingness to make concessions) as a "retreat" from the March 6 accords. O'Sullivan letter to Marsha, 12 September 1947 104
72. The French deny any planned dry season military offensive. Caffery 3715, 12 September 1947 111
73. France considers Bollaert's policy speech as a step forward on two points: formal abandonment of Indochina federation idea, and acceptance of the principle of union of the three KYs without a referenda. Caffery 3753 to Marshall, 14 September 1947 112
74. The Chinese view French policy as making the position of U.S. and China difficult and do not see a successful government without participation of Ho Chi Minh. The "Chinese people" would not regarded a Bao Dai monarchy favorably. Though his

personality and ability are impressive, Ho Chi Minh is regarded as a communist, and his regime on China's south border does not appear of critical importance. Stuart (Nanking) 2096 to Marshall, 18 October 1947

114
⁠
1948
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75. India hesitates to submit Indochina question to the UN because France could veto and the GOI is not convinced that Vietnam [Ho Chi Minh[ exercises de facto authority or represents majority viewpoint in Indochina. Marshall telegram to Consular Officers, 29 January 1948 116
76. A Ho Chi Minh lieutenant is reported going to India with a petition for UN intervention. Marshall 21 to Saigon, 3 February 1948 117
77. Hanoi Consul summarizes recent events centering on Bao Dai singing Bai d'Along conference accords, Bao Dai withdraws commitment and will stay in France until called for as "emperor." Rendall (Hanoi) 31 to Marshall, 19 February 1948 118
78. French Government authorizes Bollaert to approve formation of a provisional Vietnamese government headed by General Xuan. Caffery 2567 to Marshall, 12 May 1948 120
79. Xuan government arouses very little enthusiasm. Bao Dai is waiting for favorable signs to return. Stuart 971 to Marshall, 29 May 1948 121
80. French indicate dubious chances of success for Xuan Government. Caffery 3063 to Marshall, 9 June 1948 123
81. Chinese desire U.S. views on Ho Chi Minh's communist connections as an indicator of U.S. attitudes and ultimate policy vis-a-vis the Viet Minh. Stuart (Nanking) 1116 to Marshall, 22 June 1948 125
82. U.S. position on Ho Chi Minh is that he is a communist with a well-known record in the Comintern, but no evidence of a direct link to Moscow. Marshall 974 to Nanking, 2 July 1948 127
83. U.S. believes that given present world political and economic conditions, French cannot possible amass sufficient strength for a military solution to Indochina. Marshall 2466 to Paris, 3 July 1948 130
84. Caffery suggests that U.S. inform the French that they are faced with alternatives of approving Viet independence, union of three KYS or losing Indochina. Caffery 3621 to Marshall, 9 July 1948 134
85. U.S. approves Caffery's suggested action (tel 3621) and would publicly approve of French actions on Cochin-China status as a forward looking step toward settlement in Indochina, Marshall 2637 to Paris, 14 July 1948 135
86. U.S. feels that France is evading the issue of altering the French Colony status of Cochin-China which, in effect, nullifies the Baie d'Along agreement. Marshall 2891 to Paris, 29 July 1948 136
87. The French Assembly must face the issue of changing Cochin-China status and approve Baie d'Along agreements, if the little progress in Indochina is not to be nullified, is the view of the French Ministry of Overseas Territories. Caffery 4034 to Marshall, 5 August 1948 137
88. U.S. seeks to determine, in the absence of firm commitments, how France can dispel Vietnamese distrust of French, split off adherents of Ho, or reduce hostilities. Marshall 136 to Saigon, 27 August 1948 138
89. U.S. believes "nothing should he left undone which will strength truly nationalist groups" in the steadily deteriorating Indochina situation. Marshall 3368 to Saigon, 30 August 1948 140
90. The U.S. publicly recognizes major strategem of communists in Southeast Asia is to champion the cause of local nationalism. Lovett 149 to Saigon, 22 September 1948 141
91. U.S. policy statement on Indochina cites four long-term objectives in Indochina: (1) eliminate communist influence, (2) foster association of the people with Western powers, particularly France, (3) raise the standard of living, and (4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration. The immediate objectives is to satisfactorily resolve the French-Vietnamese impasse. Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina, 27 September 1948 143
92. The U.S. view is that for Moscow "prospects are excellent that Ho Chi Minh will eventually force the withdrawal of the French and set up the first 'New Democratic Republic' in Southeast Asia." Abbot (Saigon) despatch No. 195 to SecState, 5 November 1948 150
⁠
1949
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93. The U.S., in assessing Bao Dai, cannot "irretrievably commit U.S. to support of native government which…might become virtually puppet govt…" Lovett (Acting SecState) 145 to Paris, January 1949 152
94. The U.S. cautiously avoids any premature endorsement of Bao Dai in order to retain freedom of action in face of French pessimism. Acheson (SecState) 70 to Saigon, 2 May 1949 153
95. Abbot, Saigon Consul, reviews the entire Indochina situation (for the New Delhi Foreign Service Conference, February 1949) for the State Department. "The alternatives to the Bao Dai solution are either continued costly colonial warfare of French withdrawal leaving a communist-controlled government in a strategic area of Southeast Asia." Abbott despatch 93 to SecState 5 May 1949 154
96. The U.S. desires the success of Bao Dai experiment and will extend recognition, as there appears no other alternative to the established communist pattern in Vietnam and possible communist success in China. Acheson 77 to Saigon, 10 May 1949 190
97. U.S. fears France is offering "too little too late" and the U.S. should avoid a "conspicuous position" of any kind. Acheson 83 to Saigon, 20 May 1949 193
98. The U.S. feels that the question of Ho Chi Minh's nationalism versus communism is "irrelevant." "All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists." Acheson 14 Hanoi, 20 May 1949 196
99. The U.S. submits comments on the 8 March Franco-Bao Dai agreement to France. Essentially, the U.S., while hoping the 8 March agreements would succeed, is pessimistic that the requisite concessions will be made by France. Butterworth, FEA, letter 289 to Bruce (Paris), 6 June 1949 200
100. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requests the National Security Council to study the Asian situation to re-examine current policy. "The advance of communism in large areas of the world and particularly the successes of communism in China seriously affect the future security of the United States." Johnson Memo to NSC, 10 June 1949 217
101. The U.S. regards establishment of Bao Dai as only the "first step" in the evolution of the Vietnam problem and that France will have to concede more to accommodate nationalists. Webb (Acting) 145 to Rangoon, 20 June 1949 219
102. The Singapore Conference recommends that the U.S. join the UK in support of Bao Dai, that the French clarify Vietnam's legal status, that de facto recognition be granted on 1 January 1950, and hopes that the U.S. would fulfill its UN duties in event of an attack on Indochina. Bliss (London) A2063 to SecState, 9 November 1949 223
103. The National Security Council submits a report, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," which, from a military view, indicates the "current basic concept of strategic offense in the 'West' and a strategic defense in the 'East.' The importance of Southeast Asia is principally as an exporter of strategic materials -- tin, fibers, and rubber." NSC 48/1, 23 December 1949 225
104. The President approves the conclusions of NSC 48/1 as amended. The basic objectives cited are -- development of stable nations and sufficient military power to prevent communist expansion in Asia, reduction of USSR influence in Asia, and prevention of power relationships which could threaten the U.S. Specifically, in Indochina, the U.S. will use its influence to resolve the colonialist-nationalist. conflict. NSC 48/2, 30 December 1949 265
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1950
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105. The JCS reviews the current Mutual Defense Assistance Program and certain objectives evolve as the basis for future military assistance programs. A specific long range objective is "development of sufficient military power in selected nations of the Far East" to prevent encroachment by communism. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 26 January 1950 273
106. The State Department recommends and President Truman approves recognition of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Memorandum for the President, 2 February 1950 276
107. The U.S. forwards the letters of recognition to the Associated States and requests a reply to the suggestion on exchange of diplomatic representatives. Acheson 59 to Saigon, 4 February 1950 278
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