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Investigation into the Reedley Biolab/Chapter 2

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I. Apparent Pathogens and Other Dangerous Substances Discovered at the Reedley Biolab
Investigation into the Reedley Biolab (2023)
Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party
III. Public Health Risks, Safeguards, and the Federal Response
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​II. The Reedley Biolab, Jesse Zhu, and the People’s Republic of China

The Reedley Biolab operated under the direction and control of Jiabei “Jesse” Zhu, through the corporation Universal Meditech Incorporated (UMI).[1] UMI owned and operated the Reedley Biolab. Zhu is a PRC citizen[2] associated with PRC-government linked companies.[3] He is currently wanted in Canada for contempt of court, where he is the subject of a CAD $330 million judgment for stealing American intellectual property. Zhu appears to have fled the Canadian courts and entered the United States unlawfully given that he had an active arrest warrant in Canada, assuming the false identity of “David He.” Zhu then set up a new network of companies. Zhu appears to have accumulated thousands of vials labeled as dangerous pathogens, as well as expensive medical equipment. Based on the labeling found at the lab by local officials after the CDC’s inspection, the Reedley Biolab operators may have possessed the Ebola virus, one of the deadliest viruses known to humanity. He was able to acquire these apparent pathogens even though he was a wanted fugitive and operated an unlicensed and unregistered laboratory.

A. Jiabei “Jesse” Zhu Leads PRC Government-Controlled and Directed Companies in the PRC

While living in the PRC in the early 2000s, Zhu served as the Vice Chairman of a PRC state-controlled enterprise based in Xinxiang, Henan Pioneer Aide Biological Engineering Company Limited (“Pioneer Aide China”). PRC government entities exercised a controlling interest in Pioneer Aide China as ​beneficial owners and shareholders through a series of passthrough joint venture companies, including Henan Investment Group Company Limited, a company involved in military-civil fusion for the PRC.[4]

Zhu also served as Chairman of the Board and General Manager of Aide Modern Cattle Industry (China) Company Limited (“Aide Cattle China”), a company whose directors included an executive for a PRC defense firm and a company on the U.S. Entity List. Shareholders in Aide Cattle China include PRC state-controlled entities and individuals who have invested in other PRC state-controlled entities. Through Aide Cattle China, Zhu was the primary shareholder of 11 PRC cattle companies.[5]

After Zhu moved to Canada and created additional corporations there, his Canadian company, IND Modern Cattle Development Group Corporation (IND Group), became a minority shareholder in Pioneer Aide China.

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Figures 16-17–Corporate data of two of Zhu’s PRC companies involved in theft of American intellectual property. Derived from State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC), PRC Ministry of Commerce, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, exchange filings, and company announcements. This data was analyzed using proprietary third-party software.

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Figures 18-19–Analysis of PRC corporate data for Zhu’s Henan Pioneer Aide Biological Engineering Co. Ltd. showing PRC government ownership and funding.

Corporate data derived from State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC), PRC Ministry of Commerce, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, exchange filings, and company announcements. This data was analyzed using proprietary third-party software.

​B. Jesse Zhu Steals American Intellectual Property and Transfers It to the PRC, Leading to a $330 Million Judgment and Arrest Warrant

This connection to cattle was important because, at some point while Zhu managed these PRC businesses, he traveled to Canada and created dozens of companies in Canada, the PRC, and elsewhere. These companies engaged in massive theft of American cattle-related intellectual property, resulting in a CAD$330 million judgment against Zhu and his coconspirators. As Zhu stated in documents that the Select Committee obtained from the Reedley Biolab, “the Company is looking to seize the opportunity to develop the operational platform for the rapid growth in the Chinese dairy industry, fulfill[ing] [PRC] Premier [and CCP Politburo Member] Wen Jiabao’s wish to ‘provide every Chinese, especially children, sufficient milk every day.’” At that time, China faced a pressing milk crisis and the PRC’s government was pursuing “policies to develop the high-yielding dairy cattle market.”[6]

DRAFT Strategic Business Plan: January 2008

READER ADVISORY AND CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT

This Strategic Business Plan (hereinafter referred to as the “Plan”) contains proprietary information and is not to be copied, reproduced, used or divulged to any person in whole or in part without proper authorization, either verbal or in writing, from an Officer or Director of IND Lifetech Group Ltd. (“ILG” or the “Company”). This information is the property of IND Lifetech Group Ltd.

Mr. Jiabei (Jesse) Zhu

Mr. Zhu graduated from Beijing Union Medical College with a master degree in cell biology. He was one of the original founders of International Newtech Development in 1991, and was primarily engaged in the product development for immunology and diagnostics. He spearheaded the establishment of IND Diagnostics and the Company in 1999. Mr. Zhu is the President and CEO of the Company.

Canadian food safety system and the various measures already in place. When the Company can once again import embryos in 2006, the Chinese government implemented policies to develop the high-yielding dairy cattle market. The Company is looking to seize the opportunity to develop the operational platform for the rapid growth in the Chinese dairy cattle industry, fulfilling Premier Wen Jiabo's wish to "...provide every Chinese, especially children, sufficient milk each day.”

Figure 20 - Extracts of a 2008 strategic business plan for IND Lifetech described Zhu as the President and CEO of the company and outlined IND Lifetech's mission in the context of Premier Wen Jiabao's vision. Source: Select Committee. ​Specifically, Zhu created IND Lifetech Group—an affiliate of IND Group—and entered into a business relationship with XY, Incorporated, a U.S. company that specialized in biological engineering techniques that allowed for a high rate of selection for female (and thus milk-producing) Holstein cattle.[7]

During the decade or so following his arrival in Canada, Zhu created dozens of corporations (including IND and Ai De / Aide) in China, Canada, the United States, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and Uruguay. Court records indicate that, while Zhu employed many PRC nationals in these companies and even had them named as shareholders, they “were only shareholders ‘on paper’ and that, ‘in reality,’ Zhu owned these companies.”[8] Additionally, “[a]lthough the various companies appear to have been set up for different purposes, they were, from Zhu’s point of view, interchangeable as his wishes dictated” as “they were all under the common control and direction of Zhu as he dictated for his own purposes.”[9]

Figure 21 - IND's corporate web, as outlined in corporate documents obtained by the Select Committee. It appears the web is not fully comprehensive of IND subisidiaries. Source: Select Committee.

Zhu used these corporations to steal valuable American intellectual property and unlawfully transfer it to the PRC. Zhu accomplished this in part by directing the wrongful transfer of confidential information and technology obtained from XY in Canada to IND’s PRC arms and affiliated PRC-based entities and individuals.[10] (IND’s presence in the PRC was significant—by October 2014, Zhu employed between 400-500 workers in the PRC at just one of IND’s location in ​Qingdao.[11]) Zhu estimated that this intellectual property would greatly benefit him and PRC state-affiliated entities indicating in a 2013 business plan that the combined market value of assets he brought to the PRC was “estimated at $1.37 billion.”[12]

In 2016, after years of litigation with XY over his IP theft, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, found Zhu guilty of “fraud on an ‘epic scale’ that ‘resulted in one of the largest awards in a Canadian court.’”[13] The court found that “Zhu, whose operations extend to China as well as Canada, plann[ed] to steal the technology to the point where XY’s market would collapse.”[14] The IP theft directly benefited PRC state-controlled enterprises like some of Zhu’s PRC-based companies, and it also benefited IND Group’s “two head offices in China, in Beijing and Qing[d]ao.”[15]

The court found that Zhu and his PRC co-conspirators made many disturbing statements as part of their plan. These include instances where Zhu, in response to a co-conspirator’s reference to “American imperialism,” replied that “the law is strong, but the outlaws are ten times stronger.”[16] In another instance, Zhu claimed that his fraudulent activity would help “defeat the American aggressor and wild ambitious wolf!”[17]

The Canadian court found Zhu and his co-conspirators guilty of civil IP theft, conspiracy, and other claims, issuing a $330 million judgment against them in June 2016. Zhu failed to appear before the court for sentencing, resulting in the judge issuing an arrest warrant for civil contempt of court, which carries a prison sentence of six months.[18] Zhu then fled Canada.

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Figure 2 - Canadian media reported on Zhu's trial civil conviction. Source: Vancouver Sun.

C. Jesse Zhu Enters the United States and Assumes the Alias “David He”

At some point, Zhu appears to have entered the United States unlawfully, given that he was subject to a Canadian arrest warrant. While in the United States, he began to operate under the false identity of “David He.”[19]

The following evidence establishes that Zhu is using “David He” as an alias. First, federal law enforcement confirmed this information in their federal complaint.[20] Second, employees working in the Reedley Biolab told local officials that “David He” is in fact Jesse Zhu. Third, Select Committee investigators discovered numerous documents belonging to IND Group and Jesse Zhu in the Reedley Biolab. These include thousands of pages of (i) IND Group, AIDE, and other Zhu companies’ corporate documents; (ii) tax records for Zhu and these companies; and (iii) personal notes that appear to be addressed to Zhu. Fourth, Zhu’s prior official photograph from the early 2000s (though ~20 years younger), matches the facial characteristics of “David He.” Finally, financial documents found in the Reedley Biolab and other financial records show transfer of funds and shipments from Zhu’s IND Group to UMI and Prestige Biotech.

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Figure 23 - An FBI photograph of Jiabei Zhu (left), and texts between Code Enforcement Officer Harper and a former UMI employee (right) confirming the man they worked for is named “Jesse.” Source: City of Reedley.

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Figure 24 - A printout of a driver’s license and a copy of an Employment Authorization Card for David He. Source: City of Reedley.

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Figure 25 – Copy of Zhu’s prior CA driver’s license with contemporary photograph.

​D. Zhu Continues to Operate a Web of Interconnected PRC- and US- Based Companies Used in His Fraudulent Activities

In perpetrating IP theft in Canada, Zhu used a network of interconnected companies in the PRC, Canada, and elsewhere that were notionally distinct but, in practice, all subject to Zhu’s direction and control. The Supreme Court of British Columbia found in 2016 that:

Zhu uses his companies, and nominee shareholders and directors, with little or no regard for the notional separate personality of his companies. Rather, he creates corporations and appoints nominees to create the false appearance that a company is not owned or controlled by him, or otherwise to carry out his intentions which, in this case, were unlawful. This is also done to shield himself from liability for such unlawful actions.[21]

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Figure 26 - UMI corporate records showing a loan plan between UMI and IND Dairytech USA. The total amount loaned to UMI through the plan was $240,000. Source: Select Committee.

While operating in the United States, even the limited evidence available to the Select Committee demonstrates that Zhu continued to engage in a similar pattern of behavior with UMI and the other entities Zhu controlled. For example, documents found at the Reedley Biolab indicate that UMI borrowed $240,000 from two of Zhu’s previously established companies—IND Dairytech USA Inc. and International Newtech Development—in 17 installments between January 3, 2021 and September 24, 2022. IND and its various holdings, which were implicated by the Canadian court judgment, were supposed to be defunct in 2021. Even earlier in 2020, a deposit amounting to $125,000 was deposited in IND Dairytech USA Inc.’s bank account.

​Other documents reveal further ambiguous financial interactions between the IND and other companies from Zhu’s prior network and UMI. For example, UMI used a packaging company affiliated with and previously used by Aide Modern Cattle China to ship materials to California.[22] Moreover, additional documents show that Ai De Diagnostic Co., Ltd. wired $34,980 to UMI on June 26, 2017, for unknown reasons. The Supreme Court of British Columbia found International Newtech Development and Ai De Diagnostic Co, Ltd. to be “own[ed] and control[led]” by Zhu, and IND Dairytech USA Inc. also appears to be tied to Zhu.

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Figure 28 - UMI bank records obtained by the Select Committee. A Cathay Bank account wired $90,000 to UMI in a one month period. Source: Select Committee.

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Figure 27 - UMI bank records obtained by the Select Committee. AI DE Diagnostic sent UMI tens of thousands of dollars. Source: Select Committee.

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Figure 28 - A counter deposit check for IND Dairytech USA found amongst UMI financial paperwork. $125,000 from an unknown source was deposited over the counter. Source: Select Committee.

As “David He,” Zhu claimed that he was merely the “special representative” for UMI and Prestige Biotech. Employees have stated, however, that Zhu is the “main man” and “owner” who actually controls the UMI/Prestige Biotech operations at the Reedley Biolab. In addition, he is the only person local officials have engaged with who appears to have actual decision-making power at the organizations.

Figure 29 - In FDA registration records, Ai De Diagnostic is listed as having the same registration address as a former UMI address in Fresno. Ai De Diagnostic’s contact address places it in the Qingdao High-Tech Industrial Park. Source: FDA website.

This is consistent with Zhu’s former practice. The Supreme Court of British Columbia described Zhu as the “directing mind” of a large corporate network engaged in fraud. It appears that Zhu continues to operate as the “directing mind” of the UMI corporate network. Zhu, as “He,” continued to use the same corporations in China and hire many of the same individuals to run his PRC operations. For instance, Universal Meditech Inc (UMI) / Prestige Biotech Inc. executives Yao Xiuqin and Wang Zhaoyan share the names with the heads of Ai De Biopharmaceutical in Qingdao, China: 姚秀芹 (Yao Xiuqin) and 王朝艳 (Wang Zhaoyan). He also continued to tie his PRC companies (such as Ai De Diagnostic) in with UMI and Prestige, such as using UMI as Ai De’s U.S. Agent. According to import records and documents recovered at the Reedley Biolab, Ai De Biopharmaceutical (which shares the same address as Ai De Diagnostic) in Qingdao has made many shipments of medical supplies to ​UMI and Prestige. Zhu’s PRC companies are located in the Qingdao High-Tech Industrial Park.[23] The Qingdao High-Tech Industrial Park is a specialized area that the CCP established and oversees for the development of biomedical science and technology.[24] Currently, the Qingdao High-Tech Industrial Park is overseen by an individual who is also the Deputy Secretary of the CCP Chengyang District Committee, and who joined the CCP in 1992.

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Figure 30 - PRC website showing PRC control of Qingdao High-tech Industrial Zone.

E. Zhu’s Fraudulent Activities in the United States

After arriving in the United States, Zhu hired Accountant 1 (an individual known to the Select Committee) to help Zhu—a wanted international fugitive—set up several companies in the United States.[25] Accountant 1 also helped with ​bookkeeping for those companies. Accountant 1—not Zhu himself—has incorporated and performed work for organizations whose leadership is linked to CCP leadership and to the United Front Work Department.[26] These include organizations that advocate for CCP control over Taiwan and the “repatriation” of overseas PRC citizens, set up “little red classrooms” in Nevada’s public schools that promote CCP ideology, and promote the CCP’s narrative about the COVID pandemic. One such organization, which advocates for CCP control over Taiwan, is directly tied to the radicalization of David Chou, a PRC national and a Nevada resident who went on an armed shooting spree at a Taiwanese church in 2022.[27]

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Figure 31 - UMI internal receipt showing a $625 payment to Accountant 1 for setting up a "Nevada holding company." Source: Select Committee.

The companies that Accountant 1 set up for Zhu engaged in fraud and operated the unlicensed and illegal Reedley Biolab. As described above, this involved obtaining and storing vast quantities of apparent pathogens, biological, and chemical materials, and preserving them at great expense. It is unclear when Zhu began obtaining these apparent pathogens and other materials—handwritten labels appear to indicate that he obtained some as early as 2009. If that is correct, Zhu appears to have transported them across the northern border when he entered the United States unlawfully due to the active arrest warrant in Canada, a pathogen importation violation.

Zhu rented out large warehouses, purchased and maintained at least 1,000 transgenic mice, bought expensive medical-grade and other freezers and refrigerators, and rewired electrical circuits to draw in enough power to keep these freezers at a sufficiently low temperature.

​The Select Committee’s investigation did not produce a complete record of Zhu’s activities in the U.S., but it revealed that Zhu had previously operated a similar unlicensed facility in the city of Fresno, California. At the Fresno location, it appears that Zhu and his associates had rewired the electrical system in a way that may have caused the fire that forced Zhu to flee. When that location was no longer available, Zhu proceeded to find a second potential laboratory and again go through the elaborate process of retrofitting it for his illicit operation. It appears that Zhu has had to move medical equipment, transgenic mice, and apparent pathogens several times over the years, incurring significant costs in the process.

The Select Committee has obtained evidence indicating that Zhu and his associates at the Reedley Biolab were purchasing counterfeit test kits from the PRC and re-selling them in the United States as “Made in the USA.” The Reedley Biolab contained dozens of large boxes full of PRC-made medical device test kits, shipping manifests for these items from the PRC, and bills indicating the acquisition of these test kits from PRC companies (in some cases, companies affiliated with Zhu). These kits were allegedly used to test for COVID-19, pregnancy, ovulation, and certain narcotics. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that UMI’s test kits “may not be ‘safe and effective,’” and issued a recall.[28] This evidence matches allegations made in lawsuits against Zhu’s companies for this fraudulent practice.[29]

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Figure 32 - One of the pregnancy tests offered by UMI. The cassette in the bottom left corner, above the "Made in USA" stamp, is identical to cassettes UMI imported from the PRC. Source: City of Reedley.

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Figure 33 - A UMI invoice for a U.S.-based customer purchasing from Ai De Diangostic in the PRC. The invoice, which notes a shipment from the PRC of 100,000 tests, includes a picture of the test cassette. The cassette is identical to the one shown in Figure 26. Source: Select Committee.

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Figure 34 – a China Chamber of International Commerce Certificate for Exportation of medical devices.

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Figure 35 - Additional UMI testing products, primarily pregnancy tests. The box second from the right includes a picture of the same PRC-origin cassette as Figures 26 and 27. Source: City of Reedley.

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Figures 36-38 - Of the equipment in the Reedley Biolab, most was for packaging products. Pictured above, left and going clockwise: a PRC-origin automatic packing machine, a PRC-origin automatic separating and cutting machine, and an automatic folding machine. Source: City of Reedley.

F. Zhu’s Lab Appears to Have Contained Biological Pathogens, Medical Equipment, and Transgenic Mice That Had No Clear Purpose in His Fraudulent Sale of Fake Test Kits.

The Select Committee did not find evidence that the Reedley Biolab was engaged in active diagnostic test kit manufacturing—instead, the available evidence indicated that Zhu and his associates were simply purchasing counterfeit tests, falsely relabeling them as American-made, and selling them to American consumers.

​There is also no evidence that the Reedley Biolab was selling test kits for any pathogen except for COVID-19. The Select Committee reviewed documents found at the Reedley Biolab (such as UMI printed sales brochures), fake test kits found on site, FDA recall notices, and archived web data. These materials showed that, aside from COVID-19 test strips, UMI was not selling any diagnostic test strips relating to any pathogens while it operated in Reedley.[30]

Moreover, there is little to no market for test kits that would test the majority of the pathogens that the Reedley Biolab appeared to contain, let alone test kits created in an unlicensed laboratory. The Select Committee did find evidence that at least one pathogen may have been tested on the mice at the Biolab, but the purpose and scope of such testing is unclear.

While Zhu’s fraudulent activity itself required little overhead, maintaining large numbers of apparent pathogen samples, medical equipment, potentially hazardous chemicals, and transgenic mice was expensive. More importantly, they posed significant health risks both for individuals who worked in the facilities and to the broader community.

The apparent presence of Ebola samples at the Reedley Biolab is the clearest example of the lack of apparent legitimate (or even profit-motivated criminal) motive in the operation of the illegal facility. The need for Ebola tests is minimal and the potential market is extremely small. Experimenting with Ebola (even for benign purposes) is very dangerous—case fatality rates for Ebola have ranged between 25-90% in past outbreaks.[31] Handling Ebola requires a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facility, “the highest level of biological safety.”[32] Only a few laboratories in the world have the equipment, licenses, and safety protocols required.[33] The Reedley Biolab clearly does not. It is unclear how any non-BSL-4 facility, let alone the Reedley Biolab, would potentially be able to acquire this deadly pathogen in the first place.

​G. Zhu Receives Large Unexplained Payments from the PRC

The Select Committee investigation uncovered documents and other records showing that, while Zhu was selling fraudulent kits and engaging in unknown pathogen-related activity, he was also receiving unexplained payments via wire transfer from PRC banks.[34] In a few years, these payments totaled over $1.3 million. This number may significantly underestimate the total amount he received via suspicious payments, because the Select Committee only has access to partial data and records. These payments do not accord with Zhu’s fraudulent activity, as he should have been paying money to PRC firms for the test kits and receiving payments from American individuals or companies who purchased the counterfeit test kits. These payments may be indicative of money laundering. These payments deserve continued scrutiny.

H. FDA Agents Arrest Zhu in Connection with Federal Charges Relating to Fraud and False Statements

On October 19, 2023, federal agents arrested Zhu on a criminal complaint for manufacturing and distributing misbranded medical devices in violation of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and for making false statements to the FDA.[35] In addition to confirming his identity, the criminal complaint discussed Zhu’s ties to the Reedley Biolab site and the business therein.[36] It also described Zhu’s multi-year fraudulent activities and false statements he made to federal agents in order to conceal his identity.

  1. ↑ Zhu employed many passthrough and shell companies as part of his ventures. This behavior continued in his management of the Reedley Biolab, where he created other corporations such as Prestige Biotech to obfuscate the true actors involved. For ease of reference, this report will hereafter refer to UMI and all its affiliated and associated entities as “UMI.”
  2. ↑ United States v. Jia Bei Zhu, No. 1:23-MJ-00123-SKO, (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2023) (Criminal Complaint) (“Customs and Border Patrol records show that [Zhu] is a citizen of China”).
  3. ↑ See Figures 17-20, infra.
  4. ↑ See Figures 16-17, infra.
  5. ↑ Zhu also used complex corporate forms, such as using Cayman Island holding companies like IND Lifetech Group Limited that he wholly controlled, to create other various PRC companies. See Figures 16-19.
  6. ↑ See generally Tania Branigan, China executes two for tainted milk scandal (Nov. 24, 2009, 11:36 AM).
  7. ↑ XY, LLC v. Canadian Topsires Selection Inc., 2016 BCSC 1095 (“Zhu was the 100% owner of IND”).
  8. ↑ Id.
  9. ↑ Id.
  10. ↑ Id. at 216.
  11. ↑ Id. Zhu operated additional companies, who are also codefendants in the Canadian court case, in Qingdao as well, including Ai De Qingdao, which is linked to the PRC affiliate of Universal Meditech Incorporated, the corporation involved in the Reedley lab. See id.; infra at pg. 32.
  12. ↑ XY, LLC v. Canadian Topsires Selection Inc., 2016 BCSC 1095.
  13. ↑ Keith Fraser, B.C.-Based Businessman Employees Ordered to Pay $330m in Damages, Vancouver Sun, (Jun. 12, 2016).
  14. ↑ Id.
  15. ↑ XY, LLC v. Canadian Topsires Selection Inc., 2016 BCSC 1095.
  16. ↑ Id.
  17. ↑ Id. These statements are from 2011 and 2010, respectively.
  18. ↑ Keith Fraser, Canadian businessman facing jail over fraud has appealed stayed following no-show, Vancouver Sun (Jul. 14, 2016).
  19. ↑ Zhu also managed to acquire false identification documents as “He.”
  20. ↑ Press Release, Department of Justice, Arrest Made in Central California Biolab Investigation (Oct. 19, 2023); United States v. Jia Bei Zhu, No. 1:23-MJ-00123-SKO, (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2023) (Criminal Complaint).
  21. ↑ XY, LLC v. Canadian Topsires Selection Inc., 2016 BCSC 1095. (“[I]t is manifestly clear that Zhu uses his companies, and nominee shareholders and directors, with little or no regard for the notional separate personality of his companies. Rather, he creates corporations and appoints nominees to create the false appearance that a company is not owned or controlled by him, or otherwise to carry out his intentions which, in this case, were unlawful. This is also done to shield himself from liability for such unlawful actions.”).
  22. ↑ See generally Figures 16-19.
  23. ↑ See generally, Ai De Diagnostic website.
  24. ↑ High-tech Industrial Development Zone, CCP Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China.
  25. ↑ See generally Alex Joske, The Party Speaks for You, American Strategic Policy Institute (Jun. 9, 2020). The UFWD is a CCP Central Committee department with over 40,000 employees that coordinates and carries out hybrid government and private sector activities to benefit the CCP.
  26. ↑ Sources include publicly available documents, media reporting, and information related to business filings. Sources on file with Select Committee.
  27. ↑ Information was derived using a blend of specialized resources and analytical methods, complemented by data extracted from publicly available sources, following established reporting guidelines.
  28. ↑ FDA warns against pregnancy tests from illegal bio lab, The Business Journal (Aug. 14, 2023, 2:05 PM).
  29. ↑ See, e.g., Sensiva Health vs. Universal Meditech, No. 21-598, 2022 WL 17576345 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2022) (Judgment).
  30. ↑ As noted above, the other alleged test kits were focused on pregnancy, ovulation, and certain narcotics tests. The Select Committee did uncover earlier brochures and archived web data from early 2010s listing three other pathogens: Malaria, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C. This was before the establishment of the warehouse in Reedley. While these pathogen diagnostic test kits were listed on the brochure and online, it is unclear whether Zhu’s companies actually developed these kits or instead sold counterfeit test kits, in conformance with their recent medical device kit activities. None of the evidence accounts for the majority of labeled pathogens found in the biolab.
  31. ↑ Ebola Disease CDC (Mar. 23, 2023). Ebola “is a rare and often deadly” disease that results in hemorrhagic fevers, with a case fatality rate ranging from 25% to 90% in past outbreaks. Symptoms appear within 2-21 days of infection and are often severe. While Ebola’s rapid onset and high lethality make it unlikely to spread into a pandemic, it can cause many localized deaths. See also Ebola Disease, WHO.
  32. ↑ Training: Recognizing the Biosafety Levels, CDC.
  33. ↑ Infographic: Biosafety, CDC (Aug. 30, 2021, 9:40 AM).
  34. ↑ See, e.g., analysis in II.D., supra. The Select Committee's investigative authorities are limited with respect to the potential investigatory steps related to financial records.
  35. ↑ The Select Committee notes that the Criminal Complaint charged Zhu with “manufacturing and distributing misbranded medical devices” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and (c). Charging instruments are charged in the conjunctive (“and”) but proven in the disjunctive (“or”). See Justice Manual, 227. Conjunctive and Disjunctive Elements. In addition, the Select Committee is unaware of whether Zhu had the devices manufactured abroad or elsewhere.
  36. ↑ Press Release, Department of Justice, Arrest Made in Central California Biolab Investigation, (Oct. 19, 2023); United States v. Jia Bei Zhu, No. 1:23-MJ-00123-SKO, (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2023) (Criminal Complaint).
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