Observations on Man (6th edition)/Part I/Chapter III/Section I
CHAP. III.
Section I edit
WORDS, AND THE IDEAS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM.
WORDS may be considered in four lights.
First, As impressions made upon the ear.
Secondly, As the actions of the organs of speech.
Thirdly, As impressions made upon the eye by characters.
Fourthly, As the actions of the hand in writing.
We learn the use of them in the order here set down. For children first get an imperfect knowledge of the meaning of the words of others; then learn to speak themselves; then to read; and, lastly, to write.
Now it is evident, that in the first of these ways many sensible impressions, and internal feelings, are associated with particular words and phrases, so as to give these the power of raising the corresponding ideas; and that the three following ways increase and improve this power, with some additions to and variations of the ideas. The second is the reverse of the first, and the fourth of the third. The first ascertains the ideas belonging to words and phrases in a gross manner, according to their usage in common life. The second fixes this, and makes it ready and accurate; having the same use here as the solution of the inverse problem has in other cases in respect of the direct one. The third has the same effect as the second; and also extends the ideas and significations of words and phrases, by new associations; and particularly by associations with other words, as in definitions, descriptions, &c. The advancement of the arts and sciences is chiefly carried on by the new significations given to words in this third way. The fourth by converting the reader into a writer, helps him to be expert in distinguishing, quick in recollecting, and faithful in retaining, these new significations of words, being the inverse of the third method, as just now remarked. The reader will easily see, that the action of the hand is not an essential in this fourth method. Composition by persons born blind has nearly the same effect. I mention it as being the common attendant upon composition, as having a considerable use deducible from association, and as making the analogy between the four methods more conspicuous and complete.
This may suffice, for the present, to prove the first part of the proposition; viz. that words and phrases must excite ideas in us by association. The second part, or that they excite ideas in us by no other means, may appear at the same time, as it may be found upon reflection and examination, that all the ideas which any word does excite are deducible from some of the four sources above-mentioned, most commonly from the first or third.
It may appear also from the instances of the words of unknown languages, terms of art not yet explained, barbarous words, &c. of which we either have no ideas, or only such as some fancied resemblance, or prior association, suggests.
It is highly worthy of remark here, that articulate sounds are by their variety, number, and ready use, particularly suited to signify and suggest, by association, both our simple ideas, and the complex ones formed from them, according to the twelfth proposition.
Cor. It follows from this proposition, that the arts of logic and rational grammar depend entirely on the doctrine of association. For logic, considered as the art of thinking or reasoning, treats only of such ideas as are annexed to words; and, as the art of discoursing, it teaches the proper use of words in a general way, as grammar does in a more minute and particular one.
This may be done by applying the doctrine of association, as laid down in the first chapter, to words, considered in the four lights mentioned under the last proposition.
First, then, The association of the names of visible objects, with the impressions which these objects make upon the eye, seems to take place more early than any other, and to be effected in the following manner: the name of the visible object, the nurse, for instance, is pronounced and repeated by the attendants to the child, more frequently when his eye is fixed upon the nurse, than when upon other objects, and much more so than when upon any particular one. The word nurse is also sounded in an emphatical manner, when the child’s eye is directed to the nurse with earnestness and desire. The association therefore of the sound nurse, with the picture of the nurse upon the retina, will be far stronger than that with any other visible impression, and thus overpower all the other accidental associations, which will also themselves contribute to the same end by opposing one another. And when the child has gained so much voluntary power over his motions, as to direct his head and eyes towards the nurse upon hearing her name, this process will go on with an accelerated velocity. And thus, at last, the word will excite the visible idea readily and certainly.
The same association of the picture of the nurse in the eye with the sound nurse, will, by degrees, overpower all the accidental associations of this picture with other words, and be so firmly cemented at last, that the picture will excite the audible idea of the word. But this is not to our present purpose. I mention it here as taking place at the same time with the foregoing process, and contributing to illustrate and confirm it. Both together afford a complete instance for the tenth and eleventh propositions, i.e. they shew, that when the impressions A and B are sufficiently associated, A impressed alone will excite b, B impressed alone will excite a.
Secondly, This association of words with visible appearances, being made under many particular circumstances, must affect the visible ideas with a like particularity. Thus the nurse’s dress, and the situation of the fire in the child’s nursery, make part of the child’s ideas of his nurse and fire. But then as the nurse often changes her dress, and the child often sees a fire in a different place, and surrounded by different visible objects, these opposite associations must be less strong than the part which is common to them all; and consequently we may suppose, that while his idea of that part which is common, and which we may call essential, continues the same, that of the particularities, circumstances, and adjuncts, varies. For he cannot have any idea, but with some particularities in the non-essentials.
Thirdly, When the visible objects impress other vivid sensations besides those of sight, such as grateful or ungrateful tastes, smells, warmth, or coldness, with sufficient frequency, it follows from the foregoing theory that these sensations must leave traces, or ideas, which will be associated with the names of the objects, so as to depend upon them. Thus an idea, or nascent perception, of the sweetness of the nurse’s milk will rise up in that part of the child’s brain which corresponds to the nerves of taste, upon his hearing her name. And hence the whole idea belonging to the word nurse now begins to be complex, as consisting of a visible idea, and an idea of taste. And these two ideas will be associated together, not only because the word raises them both, but also because the original sensations are. The strongest may therefore assist in raising the weakest. Now, in common cases, the visible idea is strongest, or occurs most readily at least; but, in the present instance, it seems to be otherwise. We might proceed in like manner to shew the generation of ideas more and more complex, and the various ways by which their parts are cemented together, and all made to depend on the respective names of the visible objects. But what has been said may suffice to shew what ideas the names of visible objects, proper and appellative, raise in us.
Fourthly, We must, however, observe, in respect of appellatives, that sometimes the idea is the common compound result of all the sensible impressions received from the several objects comprised under the general appellation; sometimes the particular idea of some one of these, in great measure at least, viz. when the impressions arising from some one are more novel, frequent, and vivid, than those from the rest.
Fifthly, The words denoting sensible qualities, whether substantive or adjective, such as whiteness, white, &c. get their ideas in a manner which will be easily understood from what has been already delivered. Thus the word white, being associated with the visible appearance of milk, linen, paper, gets a stable power of exciting the idea of what is common to all, and a variable one, in respect of the particularities, circumstances, and adjuncts. And so of other sensible qualities.
Sixthly, The names of visible actions, as walking, striking, &c. raise the proper visible ideas by a like process. Other ideas may likewise adhere in certain cases, as in those of tasting, feeling, speaking, &c. Sensible perceptions, in which no visible action is concerned, as hearing, may also leave ideas dependent on words. However, some visible ideas generally intermix themselves here. These actions and perceptions are generally denoted by verbs, though sometimes by substantives.
And we may now see in what manner ideas are associated with nouns, proper and appellative, substantive and adjective, and with verbs, supposing that they denote sensible things only. Pronouns and particles remain to be considered. Now, in order to know their ideas and uses, we must observe,
Seventhly, That as children may learn to read words not only in an elementary way, viz. by learning the letters and syllables of which they are composed, but also in a summary one, viz. by associating the sound of entire words, with their pictures, in the eye; and must, in some cases, be taught in the last way, i.e. wheresoever the sound of the word deviates from that of its elements; so both children and adults learn the ideas belonging to whole sentences many times in a summary way, and not by adding together the ideas of the several words in the sentence. And wherever words occur, which, separately taken, have no proper ideas, their use can be learnt in no other way but this. Now pronouns and particles, and many other words, are of this kind. They answer, in some measure, to x, y, and z, or the unknown quantities in algebra, being determinable and decypherable, as one may say, only by means of the known words with which they are joined.
Thus I walk is associated at different times with the same visible impression as nurse walks, brother walks, &c. and therefore can suggest nothing permanently for a long time but the action of walking. However the pronoun I, in this and innumerable other short sentences, being always associated with the person speaking, as thou is with the person spoken to, and he with the person spoken of, the frequent recurrency of this teaches the child the use of the pronouns, i.e. teaches him what difference he is to expect in his sensible impressions according as this or that pronoun is used; the infinite number of instances, as one may say, making up for the infinitely small quantity of information, which each, singly taken, conveys.
In like manner, different particles, i.e. adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions, being used in sentences, where the substantives, adjectives, and verbs, are the same, and the same particles, where these are different, in an endless recurrency, teach children the use of the particles in a gross general way. For it may be observed, that children are much at a loss for the true use of the pronouns and particles for some years, and that they often repeat the proper name of the person instead of the pronoun; which confirms the foregoing reasoning. Some of the inferior parts or particles of speech make scarce any alteration in the sense of the sentence, and therefore are called expletives. The several terminations of the Greek and Latin nouns and verbs are of the nature of pronouns and particles.
Eighthly, The attempts which children make to express their own wants, perceptions, pains, &c. in words, and the corrections and suggestions of the attendants, are of the greatest use in all the steps that we have hitherto considered, and especially in the last, regarding the pronouns and particles.
Ninthly, Learning to read helps children much in the same respects; especially as it teaches them to separate sentences into the several words which compound them; which those who cannot read are scarce able to do, even when arrived at adult age.
Thus we may see, how children and others are enabled to understand a continued discourse relating to sensible impressions only, and how the words in passing over the ear must raise up trains of visible and other ideas by the power of association. Our next inquiry must be concerning the words that denote either intellectual things, or collections of other words.
Tenthly, The words that relate to the several passions of love, hatred, hope, fear, anger, &c. being applied to the child at the times when he is under the influence of these passions, get the power of raising the miniatures or ideas of these passions, and also of the usual associated circumstances. The application of the same words to others helps also to annex the ideas of the associated circumstances to them, and even of the passions themselves, both from the infectiousness of our natures, and from the power of associated circumstances to raise the passions. However, it is to be noted, that the words denoting the passions do not, for the most part, raise up in us any degree of the passions themselves, but only the ideas of the associated circumstances. We are supposed to understand the continued discourses into which these words enter sufficiently, when we form true notions of the actions, particularly the visible ones attending them.
Eleventhly, The names of intellectual and moral qualities and operations, such as fancy, memory, wit, dulness, virtue, vice, conscience, approbation, disapprobation, &c. stand for a description of these qualities and operations; and therefore, if dwelt upon, excite such ideas as these descriptions in all their particular circumstances do. But the common sentences, which these words enter, pass over the mind too quick, for the most part, to allow of such a delay. They are acknowledged as familiar and true, and suggest certain associated visible ideas, and nascent internal feelings, taken from the descriptions of these names, or from the words, which are usually joined with them in discourses or writings.
Twelfthly, There are many terms of art in all the branches of learning, which are defined by other words, and which therefore are only compendious substitutes for them. The same holds in common life in numberless instances. Thus riches, honours, pleasures, are put for the several kinds of each. Such words sometimes suggest the words of their definitions, sometimes the ideas of these words, sometimes a particular species comprehended under the general term, &c. But, whatever they suggest, it may be easily seen, that they derive the power of doing this from association.
Thirteenthly, There are many words used in abstract sciences, which can scarce be defined or described by any other words; and yet, by their grammatical form, seem to be excluded from the class of particles. Such are identity, existence, &c. The use of these must therefore be learnt as that of the particles is. And indeed children learn their first imperfect notions of all the words considered in this and the three last paragraphs chiefly in this way; and come to precise and explicit ones only by means of books, as they advance to adult age, or by endeavouring to use them properly in their own deliberate compositions.
This is by no means a full or satisfactory account of the ideas which adhere to words by association. For the author perceives himself to be still a mere novice in these speculations; and it is difficult to explain words to the bottom by words; perhaps impossible. The reader will receive some addition of light and evidence in the course of this section; also in the next, in which I shall treat of propositions and assent. For our assent to propositions, and the influence which they have over our affections and actions, make part of the ideas that adhere to words by association; which part, however, could not properly be considered in this section.
Cor. I. It follows from this proposition, that words may be distinguished into the four classes mentioned under the twelfth proposition.
1. Such as have ideas only.
2. Such as have both ideas and definitions.
3. Such as have definitions only.
4. Such as have neither ideas nor definitions.
Under definition I here include description, or any other way of explaining a word by other words, excepting that by a mere synonymous term; and I exclude from the number of ideas the visible idea of the character of a word, and the audible one of its sound; it being evident, that every word heard may thus excite a visible idea, and every word seen an audible one. I exclude also all ideas that are either extremely faint, or extremely variable.
It is difficult to fix precise limits to these four classes, so as to determine accurately where each ends, and the next begins; and, if we consider these things in the most general way, there is perhaps no word which has not both an idea and a definition, i.e. which is not attended by some one or more internal feelings occasionally, and which may not be explained, in some imperfect manner at least, by other words. I will give some instances of words which have the fairest right to each class.
The names of simple sensible qualities are of the first class. Thus white, sweet, &c. excite ideas; but cannot be defined. It is to be observed here, that this class of words stands only for the stable part of the ideas respectively, not for the several variable particularities, circumstances, and adjuncts, which intermix themselves here.
The names of natural bodies, animal, vegetable, mineral, are of the second class; for they excite aggregates of sensible ideas, and at the same time may be defined (as appears from the writings of natural historians) by an enumeration of their properties and characteristics. Thus likewise geometrical figures have both ideas and definitions. The definitions in both cases are so contrived as to leave out all the variable particularities of the ideas, and to be also more full and precise, than the ideas generally are in the parts that are of the permanent nature.
Algebraic quantities, such as roots, powers, surds, &c. belong to the third class, and have definitions only. The same may be said of scientifical terms of art, and of most abstract general terms, moral, metaphysical, vulgar: however, mental emotions are apt to attend some of these even in passing slightly over the ear; and these emotions may be considered as ideas belonging to the terms respectively. Thus the very words, gratitude, mercy, cruelty, treachery, &c. separately taken, affect the mind; and yet, since all reasoning upon them is to be founded on their definitions, as will be seen hereafter, it seems best to refer them to this third class.
Lastly, the particles the, of, to, for, but, &c. have neither definitions nor ideas.
Cor. II. This matter may be illustrated by comparing language to geometry and algebra, the two general methods of expounding quantity, and investigating all its varieties from previous data.
Words of the first class answer to propositions purely geometrical, i.e. to such as are too simple to admit of algebra; of which kind we may reckon that concerning the equality of the angles at the basis of an Isosceles triangle.
Words of the second class answer to that part of geometry which may be demonstrated either synthetically or analytically; either so that the learner’s imagination shall go along with every step of the process painting out each line, angle, &c. according to the method of demonstration used by the ancient mathematicians; or so that he shall operate entirely by algebraic quantities and methods, and only represent the conclusion to his imagination, when he is arrived at it, by examining then what geometrical quantities the ultimately resulting algebraical ones denote. The first method is in both cases the most satisfactory and affecting, the last the most expeditious, and not less certain, where due care is taken. A blind mathematician must use words in the last of these methods, when he reasons upon colours.
Words of the third class answer to such problems concerning quadratures, and rectifications of curves, chances, equations of the higher orders, &c. as are too perplexed to be treated geometrically.
Lastly, words of the fourth class answer to the algebraic signs for addition, substraction, &c. to indexes, coefficients, &c. These are not algebraic quantities themselves; but they alter the import of the letters that are; just as particles vary the sense of the principal words of a sentence, and yet signify nothing of themselves.
Geometrical figures may be considered as representing all the modes of extension in the same manner as visible ideas do visible objects; and consequently the names of geometrical figures answer to the names of these ideas. Now, as all kinds of problems relating to quantity might be expounded by modes of extension, and solved thereby, were our faculties sufficiently exalted, so it appears possible to represent most kinds of ideas by visible ones, and to pursue them in this way through all their varieties and combinations. But as it seems best in the first case to confine geometry to problems, where extension, and motion, which implies extension, are concerned, using algebraic methods for investigating all other kinds of quantity, so it seems best also to use visible ideas only for visible objects and qualities, of which they are the natural representatives, and to denote all other qualities by words considered as arbitrary signs. And yet the representation of other quantities by geometrical ones, and of other ideas by visible ones, is apt to make a more vivid impression upon the fancy, and a more lasting one upon the memory. In similes, fables, parables, allegories, visible ideas are used for this reason to denote general and intellectual ones.
Since words may be compared to the letters used in algebra, language itself may be termed one species of algebra; and, conversely, algebra is nothing more than the language which is peculiarly fitted to explain quantity of all kinds. As the letters, which in algebra stand immediately for quantities, answer to the words which are immediate representatives of ideas, and the algebraic signs for addition, &c. to the particles, so the single letters, which are sometimes used by algebraists to denote sums or differences, powers or roots universal of other letters, for brevity and convenience, answer to such words as have long definitions, to terms of art, &c. which are introduced into the sciences for the sake of compendiousness. Now, if every thing relating to language had something analogous to it in algebra, one might hope to explain the difficulties and perplexities attending the theory of language by the corresponding particulars in algebra, where every thing is clear, and acknowledged by all that have made it their study. However, we have here no independent point whereon to stand, since, if a person be disposed to call the rules of algebra in question, we have no way of demonstrating them to him, but by using words, the things to be explained by algebra for that purpose. If we suppose indeed the sceptical person to allow only that simple language, which is necessary for demonstrating the rules of algebra, the thing would be done; and, as I observed just now, it seems impossible to become acquainted with this, and at the same time to disallow it.
Cor. III. It will easily appear, from the observations here made upon words, and the associations which adhere to them, that the languages of different ages and nations must bear a great general resemblance to each other, and yet have considerable particular differences; whence any one may be translated into any other, so as to convey the same ideas in general, and yet not with perfect precision and exactness. They must resemble one another, because the phænomena of nature, which they are all intended to express, and the uses and exigences of human life, to which they minister, have a general resemblance. But then, as the bodily make and genius of each people, the air, soil, and climate, commerce, arts, sciences, religion, &c. make considerable differences in different ages and nations, it is natural to expect, that the languages should have proportionable differences in respect of each other.
Where languages have rules of etymology and syntax, that differ greatly, which is the case of the Hebrew compared with Greek or Latin, this will become a new source of difformity. For the rules of etymology and syntax determine the application and purport of words in many cases. Agreeably to which we see that children, while yet unacquainted with that propriety of words and phrases which custom establishes, often make new words and constructions, which, though improper according to common usage, are yet very analogous to the tenor of the language in which they speak.
The modern languages of this western part of the world answer better to the Latin, than according to their original Gothic plans, on this account; inasmuch as not only great numbers of words are adopted by all of them from the Latin, but also because the reading Latin authors, and learning the Latin grammar, have disposed learned men and writers to mould their own languages in some measure after the Latin. And, conversely, each nation moulds the Latin after the idiom of its own language, the effect being reciprocal in all such cases.
In learning a new language, the words of it are at first substitutes for those of our native language; i.e. they are associated, by means of these, with the proper objects and ideas. When this association is sufficiently strong, the middle bond is dropped, and the words of the new language become substitutes for, and suggest directly and immediately, objects and ideas; also clusters of other words in the same language.
In learning a new language, it is much easier to translate from it into the native one, than back again; just as young children are much better able to understand the expressions of others, than to express their own conceptions. And the reason is the same in both cases. Young children learn at first to go from the words of others; and those who learn a new language, from the words of that language, to the things signified. And the reverse of this, viz. to go from the things signified to the words, must be difficult for a time, from what is delivered concerning successive associations under the tenth and eleventh propositions. It is to be added here, that the nature and connexions of the things signified often determine the import of sentences, though their grammatical analysis is not understood; and that we suppose the person who attempts to translate from a new language is sufficiently expert in the inverse problem of passing from the things signified to the corresponding words of his own language. The power of association is every where conspicuous in these remarks.
Cor. IV. It follows also from the reasoning of this proposition, that persons who speak the same language cannot always mean the same things by the same words; but must mistake each other’s meaning. This confusion and uncertainty arises from the different associations transferred upon the same words by the difference in the accidents and events of our lives. It is, however, much more common in discourses concerning abstract matters, where the terms stand for collections of other terms, sometimes at the pleasure of the speaker or writer, than in the common and necessary affairs of life. For here frequent use, and the constancy of the phænomena of nature, intended to be expressed by words, have rendered their sense determinate and certain. However, it seems possible, and even not very difficult, for two truly candid and intelligent persons to understand each other upon any subject.
That we may enter more particularly into the causes of this confusion, and consequently be the better enabled to prevent it, let us consider words according to the four classes above-mentioned.
Now mistakes will happen in the words of the first class, viz. such as have ideas only, where the persons have associated these words with different impressions. And the method to rectify any mistake of this kind is for each person to shew with what actual impressions he has associated the word in question. But mistakes here are not common.
In words of the second class, viz. such as have both ideas and definitions, it often happens, that one person’s knowledge is much more full than another’s, and, consequently, his idea and definition much more extensive. This must cause a misapprehension on one side, which yet may easily be rectified by recurring to the definition. It happens also sometimes in words of this class, that a man’s ideas, i.e. the miniatures excited in his nervous system by the word, are not always suitable to his definition, i.e. are not the same with those which the words of the definition would excite. If then this person should pretend, or even design, to reason from his definition, and yet reason from his idea, a misapprehension will arise in the hearer, who supposes him to reason from his definition merely.
In words of the third class, which have definitions only, and no immediate ideas, mistakes generally arise through want of fixed definitions mutually acknowledged, and kept to. However, as imperfect fluctuating ideas, that have little relation to the definitions, are often apt to adhere to the words of this class, mistakes must arise from this cause also.
As to the words of the fourth class, or those which have neither ideas nor definitions, it is easy to ascertain their use by inserting them in sentences, whose import is known and acknowledged; this being the method in which children learn to decypher them: so that mistakes could not arise in the words of this class, did we use moderate care and candour. And, indeed, since children learn the uses of words most evidently without having any data, any fixed point at all, it is to be hoped, that philosophers, and candid persons, may learn at last to understand one another with facility and certainty; and get to the very bottom of the connexion between words and ideas.
It seems practicable to make a dictionary of any language, in which the words of that language shall all be explained with precision by words of the same language, to persons who have no more than a gross knowledge of that language. Now this also shews, that, with care and candour, we might come to understand one another perfectly. Thus sensible qualities might be fixed by the bodies, in which they are most eminent and distinct; the names of a sufficient number of these bodies being very well known. After this, these very bodies, and all others, might be defined by their sensible properties; and these two processes would help each other indefinitely, actions might be described from animals already defined, also from the modes of extension, abstract terms defined, and the peculiar use of particles ascertained. And such a dictionary would, in some measure, be a real as well as a nominal one, and extend to things themselves. The writer of every new and difficult work may execute that part of such a dictionary which belongs to his subject; at least in the instances where he apprehends the reader is likely to want it.
Cor. V. When words have acquired any considerable power of exciting pleasant or painful vibrations in the nervous system, by being often associated with such things as do this, they may transfer a part of these pleasures and pains upon indifferent things, by being at other times often associated with such. This is one of the principal sources of the several factitious pleasures and pains of human life. Thus, to give an instance from childhood, the words sweet, good, pretty, fine, &c., on the one hand, and the words bad, ugly, frightful, &c., on the other, being applied by the nurse and attendants in the young child’s hearing almost promiscuously, and without those restrictions that are observed in correct speaking, the one to all the pleasures, the other to all the pains of the several senses, must by association raise up general pleasant and painful vibrations, in which no one part can be distinguished above the rest; and when applied by farther associations to objects of a neutral kind, they must transfer a general pleasure or pain upon them.
All the words associated with pleasures must also affect each other by this promiscuous application. And the same holds in respect of the words associated with pains. However, since both the original and the transferred pleasures and pains heaped upon different words are different, and in some cases widely so, every remarkable word will have a peculiar internal feeling, or sentiment, belonging to it; and there will be the same relations of affinity, disparity, and opposition, between these internal sentiments, i.e. ideas, belonging to words, as between the several genera and species of natural bodies, between tastes, smells, colours, &c. Many of these ideas, though affording considerable pleasure at first, must sink into the limits of indifference; and some of those which afforded pain at first, into the limits of pleasure. What is here said of words, belongs to clusters of them, as well as to separate words. And the ideas of all may still retain their peculiarities, by which they are distinguished from each other, after they have fallen below the limits of pleasure into indifference, just as obscure colours, or faint tastes, do.
It is observable, that the mere transit of words expressing strong ideas over the ears of children affects them; and the same thing is true of adults, in a less degree. However, the last have learnt from experience and habit to regard them chiefly, as they afford a rational expectation of pleasure and pain. This cannot be discussed fully, till we come to consider the nature of assent; but it may give some light and evidence to the reasoning of this corollary, just to have mentioned the manner, in which we are at first affected by words.
Cor. VI. Since words thus collect ideas from various quarters, unite them together, and transfer them both upon other words, and upon foreign objects, it is evident, that the use of words adds much to the number and complexness of our ideas, and is the principal means by which we make intellectual and moral improvements. This is verified abundantly by the observations that are made upon persons born deaf, and continuing so. It is probable, however, that these persons make use of some symbols to assist the memory, and fix the fancy: and they must have a great variety of pleasures and pains transferred upon visible objects from their associations with one another, and with sensible pleasures of all the kinds; but they are very deficient in this, upon the whole, through the want of the associations of visible objects, and states of mind, &c., with words. Learning to read must add greatly to their mental improvement; yet still their intellectual capacities cannot but remain very narrow.
Persons blind from birth must proceed in a manner different from that described in this proposition, in the first ideas which they affix to words. As the visible ones are wanting, the others, particularly the tangible and audible ones, must compose the aggregates which are annexed to words. However, as they are capable of learning and retaining as great a variety of words as others, or perhaps a greater, cæteris paribus, and can associate with them pleasures and pains from the four remaining senses, also use them as algebraists do the letters that represent quantities, they fall little or nothing short of others in intellectual accomplishments, and may arrive even at a greater degree of spirituality and abstraction in their complex ideas.
Cor. VII. It follows from this proposition, that, when children or others first learn to read, the view of the words excites ideas only by the mediation of their sounds, with which alone their ideas have hitherto been associated. And thus it is that children and illiterate persons understand what they read best by reading aloud. By degrees, the intermediate link being left out, the written or printed characters suggest the ideas directly and instantaneously; so that learned men understand more readily by passing over the words with the eye only, since this method, by being more expeditious, brings the ideas closer together. However, all men, both learned and unlearned, are peculiarly affected by words pronounced in a manner suitable to their sense and design; which is still an associated influence.
Cor. VIII. As persons, before they learn to read, must have very imperfect notions of the distinction of words, and can only understand language in a gross general way, taking whole clusters of words for one undivided sound, so much less can they be supposed to have any conceptions concerning the nature or use of letters. Now all mankind must have been in this state before the invention of letters. Nay, they must have been farther removed from all conceptions of letters, than the most unlearned persons amongst us, since these have at least heard of letters, and know that words may be written and read by means of them. And this makes it difficult to trace out by what steps alphabetical writing was invented; or is even some presumption that it is not a human invention. To which is to be added, that the analyzing complex articulate sounds into their simple component parts appears to be a problem of too difficult and perplexed a nature for the rude early ages, occupied in getting necessaries, and defending themselves from external injuries, and not aware of the great use of it, even though they had known the solution to be possible and practicable. However, I shall mention some presumptions of a contrary nature under the next proposition.
Since characters made by the hand are capable of the greatest varieties, they might be fitted by proper associations to suggest objects and ideas immediately, in the same manner as articulate sounds do. And there are some instances of it in common use, which may serve to verify this, and to lead us into the nature of characters standing immediately for objects and ideas. Thus the numeral figures, and the letters in algebra, represent objects, ideas, words, and clusters of words, directly and immediately; the pronunciation of them being of no use, or necessity, in the operations to be performed by them. Thus also musical characters represent sounds and combinations of sounds, without the intervention of words, and are a much more compendious and ready representation than any words can be.
Characters seem to have an advantage over articulate sounds in the representation of visible objects, inasmuch as they might, by their resemblance, even though only a gross one, become rather natural, than mere arbitrary representatives.
They had also an advantage as representatives in general, before the invention of alphabetical writing, since persons could by this means convey their thoughts to each other at a distance.
If we suppose characters to be improved to all that variety and multiplicity which is necessary for representing objects, ideas, and clusters of characters, in the same manner as words represent objects, ideas, and clusters of words, still they might be resolved into simple component parts, and rendered pronunciable by affixing some simple or short sound to each of these simple component parts; just as articulate sounds are painted by being first resolved into their simple component parts, and then having each of these represented by a simple mark or character.
If we suppose the most common visible objects to be denoted both by short articulate sounds, and by short characters bearing some real, or fancied, imperfect resemblance to them, it is evident, that the sound and mark, by being both associated with the visible object, would also be associated with one another; and consequently that the sound would be the name of the mark, and the mark the picture of the sound. And this last circumstance seems to lead to the denoting all sounds by marks, and therefore perhaps to alphabetical writing.
At the same time it must be observed, that the marks would bear different relations of similarity and dissimilarity to one another from those which the corresponding sounds did.
This would happen, according to whatever law the marks were made, but especially if they were resemblances of visible objects. And this, as it seems, would occasion some difficulty and perplexity in representing sounds by marks, or marks by sounds.
A figure is a word, which, first representing the object or idea A, is afterwards made to represent B, on account of the relation which these bear to each other.
The principal relation, which gives rise to figures, is that of likeness; and this may be either a likeness in shape, and visible appearance, or one in application, use, &c. Now it is very evident from the nature of association, that objects which are like to a given one in visible appearance, will draw to themselves the word by which this is expressed. And indeed this is the foundation upon which appellatives are made to stand for so great a number of particulars. Let the word man be applied to the particular persons A, B, C, &c. till it be sufficiently associated with them, and it will follow, that the appearance of the new particular person D will suggest the word, and be denoted by it. But here there is no figure, because the word man is associated with different particular persons from the first, and that equally or nearly so.
In like manner, the corresponding parts of different animals, i.e. the eyes, mouth, breast, belly, legs, lungs, heart, &c. have the same names applied in a literal sense, partly from the likeness of shape, partly from that of use and application. And it is evident, that if we suppose a people so rude in language and knowledge, as to have names only for the parts of the human body, and not to have attended to the parts of the brute creatures, association would lead them to apply the same names to the parts of the brute creatures, as soon as they became acquainted with them. Now here this application would at first have the nature of a figure; but when by degrees any of these words, the eye for instance, became equally applied from the first to the eyes of men and brutes, it would cease to be a figure, and become an appellative name, as just now remarked.
But when the original application of the word is obvious, and remains distinct from the secondary one, as when we say the mouth or ear of a vessel, or the foot of a chair or table, the expression is figurative.
Hence it is plain, that the various resemblances which nature and art afford are the principal sources of figures. However, many figures are also derived from other relations, such as those of cause, effect, opposition, derivation, generality, particularity; and language itself, by its resemblances, oppositions, &c. becomes a new source of figures, distinct from the relations of things.
Most metaphors, i.e. figures taken from likeness, imply a likeness in more particulars than one, else they would not be sufficiently definite, nor affect the imagination in a due manner. If the likeness extend to many particulars, the figure becomes implicitly a simile, fable, parable, or allegory.
Many or most common figures pass so far into literal expressions by use, i.e. association, that we do not attend at all to their figurative nature. And thus by degrees figurative senses become a foundation for successive figures, in the same manner as originally literal senses.
It is evident, that if a language be narrow, and much confined to sensible things, it will have great occasion of figures: these will naturally occur in the common intercourses of life, and will in their turn, as they become literal expressions in the secondary senses, much augment and improve the language, and assist the invention. All this is manifest from the growth of modern languages, in those parts where they were heretofore particularly defective.
We come now to the consideration of analogy. Now things are said to be analogous to one another, in the strict mathematical sense of the word analogy, when the corresponding parts are all in the same ratio to each other. Thus if the several parts of the body in different persons be supposed exactly proportional to the whole bodies, they might be said to be analogous in the original mathematical sense of that word. But as this restrained sense is not applicable to things, as they really exist, another of a more enlarged and practical nature has been adopted, which may be thus defined. Analogy is that resemblance, and in some cases sameness, of the parts, properties, functions, uses, &c. any or all, of A to B, whereby our knowledge, concerning A, and the language expressing this knowledge, may be applied in the whole, or in part, to B, without any sensible, or, at least, any important practical error. Now analogies, in this sense of the word, some more exact and extensive, some less so, present themselves to us every where in natural and artificial things; and thus whole groups of figurative phrases, which seem at first only to answer the purposes of convenience in affording names for new objects, and of pleasing the fancy in the way to be hereafter mentioned, pass into analogical reasoning, and become a guide in the search after truth, and an evidence for it in some degree. I will here set down some instances of analogies of various degrees and kinds.
The bodies of men, women, and children, are highly analogous to each other. This holds equally in respect of every other species of animals; also of the several corresponding parts of animals of the same species, as their flesh, blood, bones, fat, &c. and their properties. Here the words applied to the several analogous things are used in a sense equally literal in respect of all. And the analogy is in most cases so close, as rather to be esteemed a coincidence, or sameness.
In comparing animals of different kinds the analogy grows perpetually less and less, as we take in a greater compass; and consequently our language more and more harsh, when considered as literal, whilst yet it cannot well be figurative in some things, and literal in others; so that new words are generally assigned to those parts which do not sufficiently resemble the corresponding ones. Thus the fore-legs of men and fowls, as we might call them in a harsh, literal, or a highly figurative way, are termed hands and wings respectively. However, in some cases, the same word is used, and considered as a figure; as when the cries of birds and beasts are termed their language. We may also observe, that every part in every animal may, from its resemblance in shape and use to the corresponding parts in several other animals, have a just right to a name, which shall be common to it and them.
What has been said of animals of the same and different kinds holds equally in respect of vegetables. Those of the same kind have the same names applied to the corresponding parts in a literal sense. Those of different kinds have many names common to all used in a literal sense, some new ones peculiar to certain kinds, and some that may be considered as so harsh in a literal sense, that we may rather call them figurative terms.
The same may be said of the mineral kingdom, considered also according to its genera and species.
Animals are also analogous to vegetables in many things, and vegetables to minerals: so that there seems to be a perpetual thread of analogy continued from the most perfect animal to the most imperfect mineral, even till we come to elementary bodies themselves.
Suppose the several particulars of the three kingdoms to be represented by the letters of an alphabet sufficiently large for that purpose. Then we are to conceive, that any two contiguous species, as A and B, M and N, are more analogous than A and C, M and O, which have one between them. However, since A and B, M and N, are not perfectly analogous, this deficiency may be supplied in some things from C and O, in others from D and P, &c. so that M can have no part, property, &c. but what shall have something quite analogous to it in some species, near or remote, above it or below it, and even in several species. And in cases where the parts, properties, &c. are not rigorously exact in resemblance, there is, however, an imperfect one, which justifies the application of the same word to both: if it approach to perfection, the word may be said to be used in a literal sense; if it be very imperfect, in a figurative one. Thus when the names of parts, properties, &c. are taken from the animal kingdom, and applied to the vegetable, or vice versâ, they are more frequently considered as figurative, than when transferred from one part of the animal kingdom to another.
In like manner, there seems to be a gradation of analogies respecting the earth, moon, planets, comets, sun, and fixed stars, compared with one another. Or if we descend to the several parts of individuals, animals, vegetables, or minerals, the several organs of sensation are evidently analogous to each other; also the glands, the muscles, the parts of generation, in the different sexes of the same kind, &c. &c. without limits. For the more any one looks into the external natural world, the more analogies, general or particular, perfect or imperfect, will he find every where.
Numbers, geometrical figures, and algebraic quantities, are also mutually analogous without limits. And here there is the exactest uniformity, joined with an endless variety, so that it is always certain and evident how far the analogy holds, and where it becomes a disparity or opposition on one hand, or a coincidence on the other. There is no room for figures here; but the terms must be disparate, opposite, or the same, in a strictly literal sense respectively.
The several words of each particular language, the languages themselves, the idioms, figures, &c. abound also with numerous analogies of various kinds and degrees.
Analogies are likewise introduced into artificial things, houses, gardens, furniture, dress, arts, &c.
The body politic, the body natural, the world natural, the universe;—The human mind, the minds of brutes on one hand, and of superior beings on the other, and even the Infinite Mind himself;—the appellations of father, governor, judge, king, architect, &c. referred to God;—the ages of man, the ages of the world, the seasons of the year, the times of the day;—the offices, professions, and trades, of different persons, statesmen, generals, divines, lawyers, physicians, merchants;—the terms night, sleep, death, chaos, darkness, &c. also light, life, happiness, &c. compared with each other respectively; life and death, as applied in different senses to animals, vegetables, liquors, &c.—earthquakes, storms, battles, tumults, fermentations of liquors, law-suits, games, &c. families, bodies politic lesser and greater, their laws, natural religion, revealed religion, &c. &c. afford endless instances of analogies natural and artificial. For the mind being once initiated into the method of discovering analogies, and expressing them, does by association persevere in this method, and even force things into its system by concealing disparities, magnifying resemblances, and accommodating language thereto. It is easy to see, that in the instances last alleged, the terms used are for the most part literal only in one sense, and figurative in all their other applications. They are literal in the sense which was their primary one, and figurative in many or most of the rest. Similes, fables, parables, allegories, &c. are all instances of natural analogies improved and set off by art. And they have this in common to them all, that the properties, beauties, perfections, desires, or defects and aversions, which adhere by association to the simile, parable, or emblem of any kind, are insensibly, as it were, transferred upon the thing represented. Hence the passions are moved to good or to evil. Speculation is turned into practice, and either some important truth felt and realized, or some error and vice gilded over and recommended.
Here there is a great difficulty through the want of sufficient data. I will assume a few of those that appear to me most probable, and just shew the method of applying the doctrine of association to them; leaving it to learned men, as they become possessed of more and more certain data, to make farther advances.
I suppose then, that Adam had some language, with some instinctive knowledge concerning the use of it, as well as concerning divine and natural things, imparted to him by God at his creation. It seems indeed, that God made use of the visible appearances or actions, or perhaps of the several cries of the brute creatures, as the means whereby he taught Adam their names. But whether this was so, also whether, if it was, any analogous method was taken in respect of the names of other objects, or of ideas, and internal feelings, is an inquiry, in which nothing that yet appears can afford satisfaction.
I suppose, also, that the language which Adam and Eve were possessed of in paradise, was very narrow, and confined in great measure to visible things; God himself condescending to appear in a visible, perhaps in a human shape, to them, in his revelations of himself. It might also be monosyllabic in great measure. They who suppose Adam to be capable of deep speculations, and to have exceeded all his posterity in the subtilty and extent of his intellectual faculties, and consequently in the number and variety of his words, and the ideas belonging to them, have no foundation for this opinion in scripture; nor do they seem to consider, that innocence, and pure unmixed happiness, may exist without any great degrees of knowledge; or that to set a value upon knowledge considered in itself, and exclusively of its tendency to carry us to God, is a most pernicious error, derived originally from Adam’s having eaten of the tree of knowledge.
After the fall, we may suppose, that Adam and Eve extended their language to new objects and ideas, and especially to those which were attended with pain; and this they might do sometimes by inventing new words, sometimes by giving new senses to old ones. However, their language would still continue narrow, because they had only one another to converse with, and could not extend their knowledge to any great variety of things; also because their foundation was narrow. For the growth and variations of a language somewhat resemble the increase of money at interest upon interest.
If to these reasons we add the long lives of the antediluvian patriarchs, the want of arts and sciences in the antediluvian world, and the want of leisure through the great labour and fatigue necessary to provide food, clothing, &c. we shall have reason to conjecture, that the whole antediluvian world would speak the same language with Adam, and that without any great additions or alterations. After a hundred or two hundred years, association would fix the language of each person, so that he could not well make many alterations; but he must speak the language of his forefathers till that time, because those to the sixth or seventh generation above him were still living; and consequently he would continue to speak the same language, i.e. the Adamic, with few variations, to the last. The narrowness of the languages of barbarous nations may add some light and evidence here.
If we suppose some kind of picture-writing to have been imparted to Adam by God, or to have been invented by him, or by any of his posterity, this might receive more alterations and improvements than language, from the successive generations of the antediluvians. For the variety of figures in visible objects would suggest a sufficient variety in their characters; the hand could easily execute this; and their permanency would both give the antediluvians distinct ideas of all the original characters, and all their variations, and also fix them in their memory. We may suppose therefore, that though their words and marks would be so associated together (agreeably to what was before observed), as that the word would be the name of the corresponding mark, and the mark the picture of the word in many cases, yet their marks would in some instances extend farther than their words; and consequently, that on this account, as well as because the marks would be similar and different, where the words were not, there would be no alphabetical writing in the antediluvian world.
They might, however, hand down a history of the creation, fall, and principal events, in this picture-writing, attended with a traditional explanation, which might remain uncorrupted and invariable till the deluge. And indeed, if we suppose picture-writing to be of divine original, it will be most probable, that they received a divine direction to do this, and that they would not apply their picture-writing to any other purpose for some time: just as the Israelites afterwards seem to have employed alphabetical writing chiefly for recording the divine dispensations and interpositions.
After the flood, the great change made in the face of things, and in natural bodies, with the appearance perhaps of some entirely new ones, would make some parts of the antediluvian language superfluous, at the same time that it would be greatly defective upon the whole. Hence we may suppose, that the antediluvian language must receive much greater alterations and additions just after the flood, than at any time before. But Noah and his wife, having their words and ideas more firmly associated together than Shem, Ham, and Japheth, and their wives, on account of their superior age, would be far less able to make the requisite changes in their language. Something like this must also take place in respect of their picture-writing, if we suppose there was any such thing in the antediluvian world.
Let us suppose this, and also with Mr. Whiston and Mr. Shuckford, that Noah, his wife, and their postdiluvian posterity, settled early in China, so as to be cut off from Shem, Ham, and Japheth, and their posterity. Here then we may suppose farther, that they would alter and improve their picture-writing, or character, so as to suit it to the new face of things in the postdiluvian world, and to make it grow with the growth of knowledge, more than they would their language, from the greater facility of doing this: for I presume, that the antediluvian language contained but few of the articulate sounds which are now known, and that they could not invent more. Thus their character and language would both of them be the immediate representatives of objects and ideas; only the use and application of the character would be much more extensive than that of the language. After some time, some centuries, or even chiliades, suppose, both the character and language would begin to be fixed, to have fewer new marks and words added, and fewer alterations made in the old ones in any given interval of time. The words would also be so firmly associated with the corresponding marks, as to be the names of them, i.e. to represent them, as well as the objects or ideas to which they were originally affixed. But then there would be many marks, to which there would be no such names, taken from the names of objects and ideas, on account of the poverty of the language here supposed. They would, however, endeavour to give them some names; and hence a diversity would arise in their language. We may conceive also, that as they separated farther from one another, in multiplying, particular clans would deviate even in the pronunciation of the monosyllabic words of the original language, as in the several dialects of other languages; and consequently deviate still more in the compound names of the marks: but the marks being permanent things, capable of being handed down accurately to the successive generations, and of being conveyed to distant countries, would continue intelligible to all. And thus we may conceive, that the postdiluvian posterity of Noah might all write the same characters, and yet speak different languages; also that their character would be very extensive, and always the immediate representative of objects and ideas, whereas their language would be narrow, and in some cases the immediate representative of the character, and only denote objects and ideas by means of this. And this I take to be the case with the people of China, and the neighbouring countries of Japan, Tonquin, Siam, &c. But I only presume to offer conjectures, not having any knowledge of the character or languages of these countries.
Since the Chinese marks are very numerous, and their simple words very few, whereas our words are very numerous, and our simple marks, or the letters of our alphabet, very few; also since our words are the sole immediate representatives of objects and ideas, our written and printed marks being merely artificial pictures of words; one might suspect, that the Chinese words are, in correspondence to this, merely an artificial enunciation of their character. But I think this not so probable, as the mixed supposition mentioned in the last paragraph. For it cannot be supposed, that any nation should be so far destitute of language, as not to have words for common objects, and internal feelings; or having these, that they should lay them entirely aside, and adopt the artificial names of the marks representing those objects and ideas in their steads. But they might easily adopt names, simple or compound, at first ascribed artificially to marks, whose objects and ideas had before this adoption no names.
That in affixing names artificially to marks, a great diversity might arise, appears from the great diversity of alphabetical characters expressing the same words. Thus the Hebrew, Samaritan, and Syriac languages, agree nearly in sound and sense, but differ entirely in characters. Thus also, amongst modern languages, several are written in different characters, as English in the common round-hand, in various law-hands, and various short-hands.
Let us now return to Shem, Ham, and Japheth, and their posterity. They must be supposed to proceed in the same manner, in general, as Noah and his immediate posterity, till the confusion of tongues at Babel; excepting that Shem, Ham, and Japheth, with their wives, would be more apt to alter their character and language, and suit them to their present exigences, than Noah and his wife, on account of their being all young persons; also that, being all as it were equal to each other, they might each of them be the authors of certain diversities in the common character and language, and establish them in their respective posterities. However, if Noah be supposed to have continued with them till the division of the earth by God’s command, and then only to have departed from his postdiluvian posterity for China, the country assigned to him, whilst Shem, Ham, and Japheth, with their posterity, began to build the tower of Babel in opposition to God’s command, then Noah, and all his sons, &c. must be supposed to have suited their character and language to the new world in nearly the same manner.
The confusion of tongues at Babel appears to me to be miraculous for the following reasons.
First, This appears to be the most natural interpretation of the text.
Secondly, Thus the confusion of tongues will correspond to the gift of language imparted to Adam at his creation, which must be supposed; also to the gift of tongues at Pentecost.
Thirdly, Learned men seem to have shewn, that the diversity of ancient languages does by no means favour the supposition of a natural derivation of them all from one original form.
Fourthly, The original plan of the Greek and Latin tongues (which I consider as sister languages derived from the same mother or original plan), appears to have been very uniform, yet with a considerable variety. Now I think this uniformity and variety could scarce be invented and established by rude multitudes, almost entirely occupied in providing necessaries for themselves, and much less as alphabetical writing seems to be of a later date than the diversity of languages. And in fact we do not find, that barbarous nations do by length of time improve their languages so as in any measure to approach to the perfection of the Greek or Latin, or of their common mother. It adds strength to this argument, that the original plan of the Greek and Latin, i.e. the rules of etymology and syntax, as grammarians call them, is entirely different from that of the Hebrew and Arabic (whose original plans agree), though the first colonies, which came by sea into Greece and Italy, came from Palestine and Egypt, i.e. from the neighbourhood of countries where Hebrew and Arabic were spoken.
Fifthly, The natural deviation of languages, since history has been clear and certain, does by no means correspond to a supposed natural derivation of all languages from one mother-tongue, especially in so short a time as the interval between the flood and the rise of many different ancient languages. Let the reader here only reflect upon the great difference of the Biblical Hebrew from the ancientest Greek extant, and the small difference of this from modern Greek, or of the Biblical Hebrew from the Rabbinical.
If now the confusion of tongues was miraculous, we may conjecture, from the agreements and disagreements of mother-languages from each other, that it was of the following kind.
First, That the original monosyllabic words of the antediluvian language were incorporated into each new language.
Secondly, That as these words included only few of the articulate sounds of which the human voice is capable, the several families were put upon making new articulations, some having one set, some another, imparted to them.
Thirdly, That each family had a new stock of words given them, consisting partly of old, partly of new articulations; and that this new stock far exceeded the old one in number and variety.
Fourthly, That a new and different etymology and syntax were also communicated to each family.
Fifthly, That there were as many new languages given as there are heads of families mentioned Gen. x.; the confusion of tongues, by which the division of the earth was effected, not happening till Joktan’s sons were old enough to be heads of families, though it had been determined and declared by God before. Those families, however, which were derived from the same stock, or had contiguous countries assigned to them, might be inspired with languages that had a proportionable affinity.
Whatever may become of these particular conjectures, I think it highly probable, that the new languages far exceeded the old common one in the number and variety of words; and that the confusion of tongues was by this means a beneficial gift and blessing to mankind, as all God’s other chastisements used to be.
We may also see reasons to make us judge, that a diversity of languages is suited to the other circumstances of mankind. For this must prevent the infection of vice from spreading with such rapidity, as it would otherwise have done, had mankind lived together in one large body, and had a free communication with each other by means of the same language.
Diversity of languages does also both help the invention, and correct false judgments. For we think in words, as appears by the foregoing theory, and invent chiefly by means of their analogies; at the same time that a servile adherence to those of any one language, or the putting words for things, would lead us into many errors. Now diversity of languages does both enlarge the field of invention, and by opposing analogy to analogy preserve us from the prejudices derived from mere verbal agreements. Let me add here, that the abstract terms of logicians, metaphysicians, and schoolmen, which may be considered as a distinct language, have spiritualized men’s understandings, and taught them to use words in reasoning, as algebraists do symbols.
Different languages do likewise improve one another, and help one another to grow in some proportion to the advancement in the knowledge of things.
Let us now examine the probable consequences of supposing different languages, and such as were far more copious than the old one, to be given at once miraculously.
First then, The character, which suited the old language very imperfectly, would be still less suited to the new one.
Secondly, The new language might be more copious, and better adjusted to express objects and ideas, than the character. And this I think can scarce be doubted, if we suppose the new languages given miraculously.
Thirdly, The agreement between many of the marks of the character, and the words of the old language, may be supposed likely to put some persons upon denoting the words of the new language by marks. But whether this would necessarily lead to alphabetical writing, is very doubtful. I think not. The first attempts at least would not be alphabetical writing.
Fourthly, Persons of different families, who could not understand one another’s language, might yet correspond by the character. However, one may guess from the circumstances of things in ancient times, that this would seldom take place in fact.
Fifthly, This and the convenience of corresponding with persons of the same family at a distance, also the desire of preserving memorials of remarkable events and transactions, might make them continue the use of the character, and improve it, considered as a method of conveying ideas, distinct from that of language. And the character thus separated from the language might give rise to hieroglyphical writing in all its varieties.
Sixthly, The patriarchs after the flood in the line of Shem might convey in succession the history of the creation, fall, deluge, calling of Abraham, &c. either in the original picture-writing improved, or in the mixed character, which, according to the third of these consequences, denoted in some imperfect gross way the words of the new language. And some of the difficulties of the book of Genesis may be owing to its consisting of patriarchal records of one of these kinds, translated by Moses into the Hebrew of his own times, and then written alphabetically.
I do not think it necessary to have recourse to any such hypothesis as this, in order to vindicate the truth and authority of the book of Genesis. The length of life, even after the flood, to the time of Moses, appears sufficient for the preservation of such important traditional histories uncorrupted in the religious line of Shem, by natural means. Or God might interpose miraculously, as in so many other instances in patriarchal times.
If it be objected, that we have not the least intimation of writing of any kind in Genesis, I answer, that this is a difficulty. However, one cannot draw any certain conclusions from an omission. The original of writing is not likely to be one of the first things which would be committed to writing. And if it was used only for the conveyance of important facts to the succeeding generations, we have no reason to expect the incidental mention of it. It was probably so tedious and difficult a thing to express themselves accurately in it, and verbal messages and contracts so easy and natural in those simple ages, when the veracity of the messenger or contractor was not suspected, as that writing was never used after the confusion of tongues, when language became copious, unless in affairs of great consequence.
Picture-writing is alluded to in the second commandment, and must have been in use for some time before, since a system of idolatry had been founded upon it. And this may incline one to think, that it had been chiefly employed in sacred affairs, and therefore perhaps communicated originally to Adam by God. However, if we suppose, that it did not take place till after the flood, this will not totally vitiate the foregoing conjectures. The main purport of them may stand with due alterations and allowances. But it would be tedious to state all the varieties in things of so uncertain a nature.
I come now to the art of alphabetical writing. This I conjecture to have been communicated miraculously by God to Moses at Sinai, for the following reasons, which, however, I do not judge to be decisive ones.
First, then, God is said to have written with his own finger upon the tables of stone. And I think it would be harsh to suppose this done in conformity to, and, as one may say, imitation of, any mere imperfect human invention.
Secondly, The Israelites are the only people in the whole world that have preserved any regular account of their own original. This is easily accounted for upon supposition, that alphabetical writing was first given to them in perfection; and afterwards, suppose in the time of Eli, borrowed by other nations, and accommodated in an imperfect manner to their languages. But if we suppose any other nation, the Egyptians or Arabians for instance, to have invented writing before the time of Moses, it will be somewhat difficult to assign a reason why other persons should not have borrowed this invention as well as Moses, and, like him, have given some account of their own nation, and their ancestors; and more difficult to assign a reason why the people, who invented alphabetical writing, should not do this.
As to the Egyptians in particular, their continuing to use hieroglyphical writing, and excelling in it, shews, that they could not have invented alphabetical; for this, if we suppose it invented so early as before the time of Moses, would have abolished that, just as the use of the ten cyphers has all the other imperfect methods of notation of numbers. Nor does it seem very likely, that hieroglyphical writing should lead to alphabetical, but rather from it, since hieroglyphical characters are the immediate representatives of objects and ideas, and the mediate representatives not of letters, or simple articulate sounds, but of words, and even of clusters of words. It seems probable also, that the Egyptians would even be backward in receiving alphabetical writing from the Israelites at the time that the Philistines or Phœnicians did; as being then greatly advanced in the use of their own hieroglyphical writing, and prejudiced in its favour. And thus we may solve that very difficult question, why the Egyptians, who seem to have erected a kingdom early (however, I judge Nimrod’s to have been the first by the manner in which Moses has mentioned it), and to have brought it to considerable perfection before Joseph’s time, and to very great perfection afterwards, chiefly by his means, should yet have left no history of their affairs, nor even of the great empire under Sesac or Sesostris, and his successors. For they had no public calamities sufficient in any measure to destroy all their records, till the time of Cambyses; and the desolation under him being less in degree, shorter in duration, in a kingdom of greater extent, and two generations later in time than that of the Jewish state under Nebuchadnezzar, which yet did not destroy the Jewish records, could not have totally destroyed the Egyptian records, had they been more early, and superior to the Jews, in the use of alphabetical writing. Even the Greeks, who had no alphabetical writing till six hundred years after the time of Moses, have given a better account of their affairs, than the Egyptians. It ought, however, to be remarked in this place, that if we suppose the Jewish history to have been recorded by the divine appointment and direction, which is highly probable, this will lessen the force of the present argument, but not quite destroy it.
Thirdly, The late reception of writing amongst the Greeks, is both an argument, that it did not exist in any other neighbouring nation before the time of Moses, and also is consistent with its being miraculously communicated to him, to be made use of for sacred purposes, and for the preservation of the history of the world, and true religion, amongst God’s peculiar people the Israelites. I here suppose, that the art of writing was not known to the Greeks, till the time of Cadmus; and that he came into Greece, agreeable to Sir Isaac Newton’s opinion, about the middle of David’s reign. And indeed, unless the principal points of his chronology be admitted, it does not appear to me, that any rationale can be given of ancient times, the inventions that rose up in them, the establishment and duration of kingdoms, their mutual intercourses, &c.
For, first, If alphabetical writing was known upon the continent of Asia and Africa six hundred years before Cadmus, how could it be kept from the Greeks till his arrival amongst them, and then accommodated to the Greek tongue only very imperfectly? For the Greeks received but sixteen letters from him. The Greek tongue came itself perhaps from Egypt, in some measure; and they who brought the language two generations before Cadmus, would have brought an exact method of writing it alphabetically, had they been possessed of any such. For it is not probable, that Inachus, and the colonies of Egyptians that came with him, and after him, should change their language entirely for that of the poor wandering Cimmerians, whom they found in Greece, since we see in fact, that the colonies of Europeans do sometimes teach the barbarous natives, where they go, an European language; but never change it for theirs.
Secondly, If alphabetical writing was given to Moses miraculously, it is easy to be conceived, that it should not arrive at Greece sooner than the time of Cadmus. For the Jews were a separate people, their priests kept the writings of Moses in the ark, i.e. the only alphabetical writings in the world; and must be some time before they could be ready and expert either in reading or writing; in their attempts to copy, it is probable they would make some mistakes so as to fall short of the purity and perfection of the art, as communicated by God; the neighbouring nations feared and hated the Israelites, their religion, and their God; they had probably a picture-writing, or perhaps some imperfect method of denoting words, agreeably to what has been remarked above, which answered all purposes that seemed necessary to them; and thus the art of alphabetical writing might not transpire to any of the neighbouring nations till the time of Eli, when the ark, with the writings of Moses in it, was taken by the Philistines. For since the writings of Moses were not in the ark, when it was put in the temple by Solomon, it may be, that the Philistines kept them, and learnt from them the art of writing alphabetically, being now sufficiently prepared for it by such notions concerning it, as had transpired to them previously in their former intercourses with the Israelites. And thus the Phœnicians, or Philistines, will have appeared the inventors of letters to the Greeks; and Cadmus may well be supposed to have been able to accommodate the Phœnician method of writing, in an imperfect manner, to the Greek language, about two generations after the taking of the ark. Thus also, when Samuel put the writings of Moses together, as they had been copied by the priests, or others, in the order in which they now stand in the Pentateuch, there would be some deviations from the original method of writing communicated to Moses by God; and these, with such as happened in after-times, particularly upon the return from the Babylonish captivity (when it is supposed by some, that even the original letters were changed), may have made the ancient method of writing the Hebrew, as the Jews practise it in their bibles for the synagogues without points, so imperfect as not to appear to be of divine original. For the same reasons, the corruptions of the Hebrew language, or the language given to Heber or Peleg, at the confusion of tongues, before Moses’s time, may incline us to think the Hebrew of the Pentateuch not sufficiently regular for a divine communication. Much is also to be ascribed to our own ignorance in both these cases. However, there is a wonderful simplicity and uniformity still left, both in the Biblical Hebrew, and in the manner of writing it without points; so great, as to appear to me superior to the invention of rude ancient times.
Fourthly, The order of the Greek and Latin alphabets, by being taken from that of the Hebrew, as we have it in the alphabetical Psalms, bears testimony to the great antiquity of the Hebrew alphabet. It is to be observed here, that both the Greek and Latin alphabets coincide with the Hebrew alphabet, as much as with each other, or more; and that there is no other ancient alphabet remaining to be a competitor to the Hebrew.
Fifthly, The resolution of the complex articulate sounds of ancient languages into simple elements or letters, and then recomposing these complex sounds in writing them down alphabetically, seems to me, as observed above, too difficult a problem for ancient times; especially as they neither could see the use of it, nor conceive the practicability. It would have appeared to them a task of an infinite extent; they would never conceive, that so small a number of elements would be sufficient, even supposing they could first hit upon the design. It confirms this, that no barbarous nation has ever invented alphabetical writing for themselves. They continue ignorant of it till taught. However, let it be observed, on the other hand, that as the ancient languages were simple and narrow, the difficulty of analysing their complex sounds would be the less upon that account.
Sixthly, Since the method of making and erecting the tabernacle was communicated by God to Moses, Bezaleel, and Aholiab, in a supernatural manner, we may more easily suppose the art of writing alphabetically to be a divine gift. But then it is some objection to this, that Moses has not mentioned it as a divine gift, at least not expressly.
Seventhly, The time of Moses appears to be a suitable one for such a gift, as human life was then, perhaps, just brought down to the present degree of shortness. Till Moses’s time, the length of life had preserved the sacred traditions uncorrupted, either with or without the helps above-mentioned, at least in the line of Abraham; but then tradition began to be mixed with fables, and to lead to idolatry.
Eighthly, Alphabetical writing, by being introduced among the Israelites in the wilderness, would abolish hieroglyphical, and consequently cut off one source of idolatry. It would likewise make them superior to the Egyptians, their enemies, in the art of writing; who, perhaps, prided themselves much upon account of their perfection in hieroglyphical writing, as they might also in their river, the wisdom of their policy, the comparative greatness of their kingdom, their magical arts, religious ceremonies, &c. For this would tend to the glory of the God of the Israelites, and the establishment of the true religion amongst them.
It may be objected here, that alphabetical writing was in use before the giving of the law at Sinai, since Moses was directed before this to write an account of the battle with Amalek in a book; also to write the names of the children of Israel upon the high-priest’s breast-plate, like the engravings of a signet. I answer, that both these may refer to a picture-writing, or to some improvement of it, whereby entire words were denoted, without being resolved into their simple sounds. The first might also be a prophetic intimation to Moses, however not understood by him when it was given, that he should be soon enabled to write in a much more complete manner than he, or his enemies the Egyptians, could at present.
The Edomites seem also to have had some kind of writing early, from the account which we have of their dukes in Genesis. But this might be only picture or verbal writing, explained to Samuel by some Edomite, at the time when he put together the writings of Moses: or they might learn writing from the Israelites, sooner than any other nation, as being nearly related in blood, and contiguous to them in situation.
The simplicity and uniformity of the Arabic tongue would also incline one to think, that the inhabitants of Arabia had alphabetical writing early, this having a great tendency to preserve a fixed standard in a language. But the Ishmaelites, or Midianites, who were nearly related to the Israelites, or the Kenites, who lived amongst them, might learn it from them, perhaps even during their abode in the wilderness. We may observe also, that the Arabic tongue was not only fixed, but perhaps rendered more regular, soon after the time of Mahomet, by means of the Alcoran, and of the grammars that were made for this language some time afterwards; and that before Mahomet’s time, the Arabians had little communication with their neighbours, and therefore would preserve their language more pure and simple.
The changes which have happened to languages, and to the methods of writing them, since the invention of letters, and which are treated of with great copiousness in the writings of grammarians and critics, afford innumerable attestations to the doctrine of association, and may, conversely, be much illustrated by it. But the full detail of this must be left to those who are well skilled in the several ancient and modern languages.
If we suppose mankind possessed of such a language, as that they could at pleasure denote all their conceptions adequately, i.e. without any deficiency, superfluity, or equivocation; if, moreover, this language depended upon a few principles assumed, not arbitrarily, but because they were the shortest and best possible, and grew on from the same principles indefinitely, so as to correspond to every advancement in the knowledge of things, this language might be termed a philosophical one, and would as much exceed any of the present languages, as a paradisiacal state does the mixture of happiness and misery, which has been our portion ever since the fall. And it is no improbable supposition, that the language given by God to Adam and Eve, before the fall, was of this kind; and though it might be narrow, answered all their exigencies perfectly well.
Now there are several methods, in which it does not seem impossible for mankind in future ages to accomplish so great a design.
Thus, first, They may examine all the possible simple articulations of which their organs are capable, with all the combinations, or complex articulate sounds, that result from them, and the relations which these bear one to another, and assign to each respectively such simple and complex ideas, and such variations of the last, as a deep insight into the nature of things, objects, ideas, the powers of the human mind, &c. shall demand by a natural claim, so as to make every expression the shortest and best possible. And though this, in our present state of ignorance, cannot but seem an impracticable project, yet the same ignorance should teach us, that we can form no notions at all of the great increase of knowlege, which may come in future ages, and which seems promised to come in the latter happy times predicted by the prophecies. However, the great, and to former times inconceivable, advancement of knowledge, which has been made in the two last centuries, may help a little to qualify our prejudices.
Secondly, If all the simple articulate sounds, with all the radical words, which are found in the present languages, were appropriated to objects and ideas agreeably to the present senses of words, and their fitness to represent objects and ideas, so as to make all consistent with itself; if, farther, the best rules of etymology and syntax were selected from the present languages, and applied to the radical words here spoken of, so as to render them capable of expressing all the variations in objects and ideas, as far as possible, i.e. so as to grow proportionably to the growth of knowledge, this might also be termed a philosophical language; and, though more imperfect and narrow than the last, yet seems more possible to be brought to execution and practice.
Thirdly, If such simple articulations as are now wanting in the Hebrew alphabet were added to it, and its radical words, composed of all the combinations of twos and threes completed, proper simple senses being assigned to them, from other languages suppose, and particularly from the Arabic, Chaldee, Syriac, and Samaritan, as in Castellus’s lexicon, and other books of a like kind; if, farther, such new rules of etymology and syntax were added to those which take place at present in the Biblical Hebrew, as this increase of the radicals, and application of the language to the whole aggregate of objects and ideas requires; we should have a much more simple, precise, and extensive language, than any now in being. It would also be easy to be understood by the Jews in all quarters of the world. For most of them have some knowledge of the Biblical Hebrew, and many understand the Rabbinical, which seems to be formed upon a plan not very unlike that here proposed, though without any express design; and to which, therefore, a due regard ought to be had by any one, who should attempt to execute this plan. Many eastern nations, and the Mahometans every where, would also be expert in learning this language, from the relation and resemblance which it would bear to languages already known by them; and it would be easier to be learnt by perfect novices than any other, on account of its greater simplicity and regularity. A dictionary might be made for it in itself; the Biblical Hebrew, where its sense is determinate and known, being the basis, or thing given.
In the mean time, where the writer endeavours to express himself with plainness, sincerity, and precision, being first duly qualified by the knowledge of his subject, and the reader pays a due regard to him, as his teacher, for the then present time, by using sufficient industry and candour, the ill effects of the confusion of tongues become evanescent in respect of them. But it would be happy to take away all occasion of mistake from the bulk of mankind, and to give them an opportunity of learning important truths with more ease and certainty, and in a shorter time, than they can at present.
It may not be amiss to add here, that Mr. Byrom’s method of short-hand affords an accurate and elegant instance of the possibility of proceeding in such matters upon simple and philosophical principles; his short-hand being a real and adequate representation of the sounds of the English tongue, as far as is necessary for determining the sense, and that in the shortest manner possible. If we were possessed of a philosophical language, it ought to be denoted by this character, mutatis mutandis.
This has been done, in great measure, already, in the corollaries to the twelfth proposition. I will here insert some observations of a like kind, which would have interrupted the reader too much in that place, but may properly follow the account of language given in this section.
Let a, b, c, d, &c. the several letters of an alphabet, supposed to be sufficiently extensive for the purpose, represent respectively the several simple sensible pleasures and pains, to which a child becomes subject upon its first entrance into the world. Then will the various combinations of these letters represent the various combinations of pleasures and pains, formed by the events and incidents of human life; and, if we suppose them to be also the words of a language, this language will be an emblem or adumbration of our passage through the present life; the several particulars in this being represented by analogous ones in that.
Thus the reiterated impressions of the simple sensible pleasures and pains made upon the child, so as to leave their miniatures, or ideas, are denoted by his learning the alphabet; and his various associations of these ideas, and of the pleasures and pains themselves, by his putting letters and syllables together, in order to make words: and when association has so far cemented the component parts of any aggregate of ideas, pleasures and pains, together, as that they appear one indivisible idea, pleasure or pain, the child must be supposed by an analogous association to have learnt to read without spelling.
As the child’s words become more and more polysyllabic by composition and decomposition, till at length whole clusters run together into phrases and sentences, all whose parts occur at once, as it were, to the memory, so his pleasures and pains become more and more complex by the combining of combinations; and in many cases numerous combinations concur to form one apparently simple pleasure.
The several relations of words, as derived from the same root, as having the same prepositions and terminations, &c. represent corresponding relations in the compound ideas, pleasures, and pains.
When the complex pleasures and pains, formed from miniatures of the sensible ones, become the means of gaining other and greater pleasures, viz. by fading from frequent repetition, and so becoming mere ideas, or by any other method, we must suppose, that our present knowledge in language is used as a means of attaining farther knowledge in it.
As the sight and sound of words, impressed upon us on common occasions, do not at all suggest the original of these words from simple letters, this being a light in which grammarians and linguists alone consider words; so the complex pleasures and pains may pass over men’s minds, and be felt daily, and yet not be considered by them as mere combinations, unless they be peculiarly attentive and inquisitive in this respect.
This comparison may serve as a method of assisting the reader’s conceptions, in respect of the manner in which combinations of miniatures are formed. It is also a considerable evidence in favour of the general doctrine of association, since language is not only a type of these associated combinations, but one part of the thing typified. Was human life perfect, our happiness in it would be properly represented by that accurate knowledge of things, which a truly philosophical language would give us. And if we suppose a number of persons thus making a progress in pure unmixed happiness, and capable both of expressing their own feelings, and of understanding those of others, by means of a perfect and adequate language, they might be like new senses and powers of perception to each other, and both give to and receive from each other happiness indefinitely. But as human life is, in fact, a mixture of happiness and misery, so all our languages must, from the difference of our associations, convey falsehood as well as truth, as above noted. And yet, since our imperfect languages improve, purify, and correct themselves perpetually by themselves, and by other means, so that we may hope at last to obtain a language, which shall be an adequate representation of ideas and a pure channel of conveyance for truth alone, analogy seems to suggest, that the mixture of pleasures and pains, which we now experience, will gradually tend to a collection of pure pleasures only, and that association may be the means of effecting this, as remarked in the ninth corollary of the fourteenth proposition.
Scholium.
Musical sounds afford, like articulate ones, various instances of the power of association. It ought to be remarked here also, that the concords formed from the twelve semi-tones in the octave, are more in number than the discords; and that the harshness of these last passes by degrees into the limits of pleasure, partly from frequent repetition, partly from their associations with concords.
The doctrine of association may likewise be illustrated by that of colours. Thus, let the seven primary colours, with their shades, represent the original sensible pleasures; then will the various associated pleasures of human life, supposing that we enjoyed a state of unmixed happiness, be represented by the compound vivid colours, which natural bodies, of regular makes, and strong powers of reflection, exhibit to the eye. White, which is compounded of all the colours reflected copiously, and which yet, as far as the eye can discern, bears no resemblance to any of them, would represent a state of great mental happiness, ultimately deduced from all the sensible pleasures, and in which, notwithstanding, the person himself distinguishes no traces of any of these. And, agreeably to this, light, brightness, and whiteness, are often put for perfection, purity, and happiness, as obscurity, blackness, and darkness, are for imperfection and misery. Besides white, there are other compound colours, which bear little or no resemblance to any of the primary ones, as well as many in which some primary colour is evidently predominant. These represent the several kinds and degrees of inferior compound pleasures, some of which are, according to common estimation, quite foreign to the senses, whilst others are manifestly tinged with pleasant sensations, and their miniatures.
If the moderate agitations which light causes in bodies, when it is by them reflected back upon, or transmitted to, other bodies, be supposed to correspond to pleasant vibrations in the nervous system, and the greater agitations, which it excites in those that absorb it, to the violent vibrations in which pain consists; then the colours of natural bodies, some of which incline to light, and some to darkness, and that with all the possible varieties and mixtures of the primary colours, may be considered as the language by which they express that mixture of pleasures and pains in human life, to which their agitations are supposed to correspond. And here again we may observe, that though there are some natural bodies, which absorb and stifle within themselves almost all the light which they receive, and which accordingly are dark, black, and unpleasant to the beholders, yet the greatest part of natural bodies either reflect lively colours, or reflect some, and transmit others, or transmit all the colours freely. And this type is also, in part, the thing typified, inasmuch as agreeable and disagreeable colours make part of the original pleasures and pains of human life.
Compound tastes may likewise illustrate association, as above noted under the 12th proposition: for where the number of ingredients is very great, as in Venice treacle, no one can be tasted distinctly; whence the compound appears to bear no relation to its component parts. It is to be observed farther, that ingredients which are separately disagreeable, often enter compounds, whose tastes are highly agreeable. Now in these cases either the opposite tastes must coalesce into one, which pleases from the prepollence of agreeable tastes upon the whole, as soon as the association is cemented sufficiently, or else the disagreeable tastes must, by frequent repetition, fall within the limits of pleasure at last; which seems rather to be the truth.
The similarity of the three instances of this scholium arises from the analogy of our senses to each other, and to our frame in general; which is the sum total of all our senses. And, conversely, they confirm this analogy.