Olmstead v. United States/Dissent Butler

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
Dissenting opinion by Pierce Butler
4416269Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) — Dissenting opinionPierce Butler

Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting.

I sincerely regret that I cannot support the opinion and judgments of the Court in these cases.

[p486] The order allowing the writs of certiorari operated to limit arguments of counsel to the constitutional question. I do not participate in the controversy that has arisen here as to whether the evidence was inadmissible because the mode of obtaining it was unethical and a misdemeanor under state law. I prefer to say nothing concerning those questions because they are not within the jurisdiction taken by the order.

The Court is required to construe the provision of the Fourth Amendment that declares: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Fifth Amendment prevents the use of evidence obtained through searches and seizures in violation of the rights of the accused protected by the Fourth Amendment.

The single question for consideration is this: May the Government, consistently with that clause, have its officers whenever they see fit, tap wires, listen to, take down and report, the private messages and conversations transmitted by telephones?

The United States maintains that "The 'wire tapping' operations of the federal prohibition agents were not a 'search and seizure' in violation of the security of the 'persons, houses, papers and effects' of the petitioners in the constitutional sense or within the intendment of the Fourth Amendment." The Court, adhering to and reiterating the principles laid down and applied in prior decisions* construing the search and seizure clause, in substance adopts the contention of the Government.

The question at issue depends upon a just appreciation of the facts.

[p487] Telephones are used generally for transmission of messages concerning official, social, business and personal affairs including communications that are private and privileged—those between physician and patient, lawyer and client, parent and child, husband and wife. The contracts between telephone companies and users contemplate the private use of the facilities employed in the service. The communications belong to the parties between whom they pass. During their transmission the exclusive use of the wire belongs to the persons served by it. Wire tapping involves interference with the wire while being used. Tapping the wires and listening in by the officers literally constituted a search for evidence. As the communications passed, they were heard and taken down.

In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, there was no "search or seizure" within the literal or ordinary meaning of the words, nor was Boyd—if these constitutional provisions were read strictly according to the letter—compelled in a "criminal case" to be a "witness" against himself. The statute, there held unconstitutional because repugnant to the search and seizure clause, merely authorized judgment for sums claimed by the Government on account of revenue if the defendant failed to produce his books, invoices and papers. The principle of that case has been followed, developed and applied in this and many other courts. And it is in harmony with the rule of liberal construction that always has been applied to provisions of the Constitution safeguarding personal rights (Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32), as well as to those granting governmental powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404, 406, 407, 421. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 153, 176. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52.

This Court has always construed the Constitution in the light of the principles upon which it was founded. [p488] The direct operation or literal meaning of the words used do not measure the purpose or scope of its provisions. Under the principles established and applied by this Court, the Fourth Amendment safeguards against all evils that are like and equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words. That construction is consonant with sound reason and in full accord with the course of decisions since McCulloch v. Maryland. That is the principle directly applied in the Boyd case.

When the facts in these cases are truly estimated, a fair application of that principle decides the constitutional question in favor of the petitioners. With great deference, I think they should be given a new trial.


Notes edit

*   Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313.


This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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