The sixth and last result given out as the crowning horror of the new philosophy is this:—
"VI. That, by an invalid demonstration, it reaches an inadequate Deity, and, by denying any other process of proof, or basis of belief, divorces Metaphysics and Natural Theology."
We must turn to the body of Mr Cairns' pamphlet, to discover and examine the evidence by which this result is endeavoured to be borne out.
First, To show the invalidity of my argument for a Deity, Mr Cairns asks (I should first mention that my argument proceeds on the proof given in Prop. III. Ontology, that nonsense and contradiction do not fill the universe)—he asks, "By what necessity may not sheer nonsense and contradiction fill the universe, since, according to Professor Ferrier, they may fill so much of it—the lower animals, according to him, being, probably, mere incarnate absurdities, gazing on unredeemed contradiction?" He here asks, "By what necessity may not sheer nonsense fill the universe?" I answer, by the necessity of thinking—that is the necessity by which nonsense cannot fill the universe. Sheer nonsense and absurdity cannot be either known or conceived, by any intelligence, to fill the universe, and therefore they do not fill it. I am as much entitled to argue from knowledge to existence as any other philosopher is. Besides, have I not assumed Real existence; and is not real existence different from the nonsensical and contradictory. As for my assertion about the lower animals, I do not dogmatise on that point. I merely maintain that they are what I have described, if they are totally destitute of intelligence. I do not affirm that they are so; but if they are, as Plato hints, mere wooden horses, with senses stuck into them—in that case I maintain, not that they are nonsense to us, but that they, and all around them, are nonsense to themselves.
Mr Cairns proceeds, in his attempt, to show the invalidity of my theistic argument. He says, "Why, since finite intelligence begins in time to redeem the universe from contradiction, may
