lousness of his objections. So much for Mr Cairns' assertion that my proof is invalid: now for his averment, that the Deity reached by its means is "inadequate."
Suppose that you were listening to a preacher discoursing on the omniscience of the Supreme Being—would you regard his arguments or assertions as tantamount to a denial of the Supreme Being's omnipotence. You certainly would not. Yet this is the way in which Mr Cairns misrepresents my position. I contend for the existence of the Deity, on the ground that an omniscient Being is a necessity of our thinking. This line of argument fell particularly within the scope of my work. Whereupon, says Mr Cairns, your argument disproves His omnipotence: and a Deity short of omnipotent is "inadequate." How so—I very humbly ask—how by all that is wonderful, should my argument have any such effect? By what tortuous process of ingenuity can the argument proving the Divine omniscience, be held equivalent to an argument disproving the Divine omnipotence? So far from being equivalent to this, the latter conclusion follows as a necessary corollary from the former. It is impossible for a Being to be omniscient, without being also omnipotent and the first great cause. No one infinite attribute is compatible with any finite attributes. That is certain. But my system is not a treatise on natural theology; it is only an introduction to it; and, hence, I did not profess to discuss fully the power and attributes of God. The detailed consideration of these would, I think, be out of place in a work on metaphysics—this supplies the ground-work—the superstructure is left to theology. Mr Cairns' allegations that my assertion of Divine omniscience is a denial of Divine omnipotence, and that my assertion of Divine intelligence is a denial of Divine causation—are altogether unaccountable; and show to what strange expedients people may be driven by the spirit of partizanship, particularly when they are assured that they have a pliant and imperfectly informed audience to deal with.
Finally, it is utterly untrue that my system denies "any other process of proof or basis of belief in regard to the Divine existence." There is not one word in my work—which, by any refine-
