Page:ACLU v. NSA Opinion (August 17, 2006), US District Court, East-Michigan.djvu/25

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prior judicial sanction, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stewart there wrote for the Court that searches conducted without prior approval by a judge or magistrate were per se unreasonable, under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 357.

Congress then, in 1968, enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (hereinafter "Title III")[1] governing all wire and electronic interceptions in the fight against certain listed major crimes. The Statute defined an "aggrieved person",[2] and gave such person standing to challenge any interception allegedly made without a judicial order supported by probable cause, after requiring notice to such person of any interception made.[3]

The statute also stated content requirements for warrants and applications under oath therefor made,[4] including time, name of the target, place to be searched and proposed duration of that search, and provided that upon showing of an emergency situation, a post-interception warrant could be obtained within forty-eight hours.[5]

In 1972 the court decided U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the Keith) case and held that, for lawful electronic surveillance even in domestic security matters, the Fourth Amendment requires a prior warrant.

In 1976 the Congressional "Church Committee"[6] disclosed that every President since 1946 [*26]

  1. Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.
  2. 18 U.S.C. 2510(11) ("aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.)
  3. 18 U.S.C. 2518
  4. 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)
  5. 18 U.S.C. 2518(7)
  6. The "Church Committee" was the United States Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.