the infinite." That is to say the natural scientists are not aware of the fact that nature is a symbol, but they regard it as a thing-in-itself. The Philosopher alone understands (because he starts from within or from above) the symbolic significance. But then Schelling's philosophy likewise really amounts to nothing more than a system of analogies and allegories which are very arbitrarily applied. It is not without justification that the term "Philosophy of Nature" has acquired a suspicious sound in scientific ears.
Notwithstanding the fact that Schelling speaks of levels and transitions, he is nevertheless not an evolutionist in the modern significance of the term. He does not accept any real development in time, but regards nature as a magnificent system which reveals at once the profound antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity in the greatest variety of nuances and degrees, whilst none of these differences pertain to the absolute ground of his system. Time is nothing more than a finite form.— Schelling's ideas have nevertheless contributed much towards producing the conviction of the inner identity of the forces and forms of nature.
b. Schelling's philosophy, with various modifications which we cannot here discuss, bore the character of "Philosophy of Nature" throughout its first period (until 1803). But a problem now arises which all speculative philosophy must eventually take up: namely, if the Absolute is to be regarded as an absolute unity or indifference, how shall we explain the origin of differences, of levels or (as Schelling likewise remarks) of potencies? How can they have their ground in an absolute unity? He treats this problem in his essay on Philosophie und Religion (1804), which forms the transition from Schelling's
